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THE 

NTCOMACHEAN ethics 

OF 

ARISTOTLE. 



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BAXTER, PRINTER, OXFORD. 



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THE 



NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 



OF 



ARISTOTLE, 



WITH ENGLISH NOTES. 



BY 

JOHN S. BREWER, M.A. 

queen's college, oxford. 



Non nisi ex Aristotele ipso discas demum Arhtotelem intelligere. 

Buhlk. 



OXFORD, 

HENRY SLATTER, HIGH STREET ; 

WHITTAKER AND CO., LONGMAN AND CO., S1MPKIN AND MARSHALL, LONDON; 
T. STEVENSON, CAMBRIDGE; W. JACKSON, NEW YORK. 

MDCCCXXXVI. 



& Z7 . 




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J 



PREFACE. 



In preparing this edition of Aristotle's Nico- 
machean Ethics for the press, I have followed 
the text of Bekker's smaller edition, published 
in the year 1831, from which I have seldom 
ventured to deviate except upon the authority 
of the MSS. or ancient commentators ; and 
on such occasions I have always retained the 
rejected reading in the notes. In dividing 
the books into chapters and subdividing the 
chapters into paragraphs, as their previous di- 
vision rested not on the sanction of antiquity, 
I have allowed myself unreserved liberty, in- 
corporating two or more chapters into one, or 
breaking up one chapter into several, where 
by so doing the unity of the subject was better 
preserved, or the argument rendered more in- 
telligible. But in order to obviate any incon- 
venience consequent upon such alterations, I 
have retained in the inner margin the number- 
ing of the chapters as they are marked in 
Bekker's edition. 

The advantage to be derived from thus 
dividing the chapters into paragraphs, and 
distinguishing each paragraph with a capital 
letter, upon the introduction of a new argu- 



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vi PREFACE. 

ment, is too obvious to require specific men- 
tion ; especially as this edition is intended 
merely for the use of those who are com* 
mencing the study of Aristotle. But as the 
interpretation of a passage sometimes depends 
on such a division, it becomes necessary to 
advertise the reader, that in this respect, I 
have been guided by a merely arbitrary rule; 
and by what appeared to be the sense of the 
author. 

It now only remains for me to state the 
authorities which I have principally followed 
in compiling the notes and illustrations to the 
text. However imperfectly the design has been 
realized, my chief object has been to illustrate 
Aristotle by himself; a mode of interpretation 
more necessary for the Ethics than for many 
of his other writings, inasmuch as the diffusive 
yet inaccurate Scholia of Eustratius, or the 
more meagre labors of Michaelis Ephesius or 
Aspasius, furnish but a poor substitute for the 
learned commentaries of an Alexander, a Sim- 
plicius, or a Johannes Philoponus. 

The earliest commentaries upon the Ethics 
appeared in the shape of a Paraphrase ; and to 
some attempt of this kind in all probability we 
owe the Magna Moralia and the Eudemean 
Ethics*. Of these, the most valuable is that 

* This accounts for the reason why such copious extracts 
and even entire books of the Ethics occur verbally in these 

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PREFACE. vii 

which is generally attributed to Andronicus 
Rhodius, which was first published by Daniel 
Hemsius at Leyden in 1607, reprinted at Cam- 
bridge in 1679, and finally at Oxford in 1809. 

Next to these are the Greek Scholia pub- 
lished by Aldus at Venice in 1536, folio*, of 
which a Latin version by Gio. Bern. FeK- 
ciano c was printed at Paris in 1543, folio, 

treatises. For where the subject was not very intricate, or 
very difficult, such extracts would coincide with the design 
of the author. These works, however, have often been 
attributed to Aristotle ; but a strong internal evidence may 
be urged against this supposition ; not so much from the 
style, as on account of their remarkable discrepancy from 
the Nicomachean Ethics, and his other writings. 

* Of this collection, the commentaries on the first, second, 
third, and fourth books are attributed to Eustratius, Bishop 
of Nice ; on the fifth to Michaelis Ephesius, the sixth to 
Eustratius, the seventh and eighth to Aspasius, the ninth 
and tenth to Eustratius. But it is not probable that 
Eustratius is the author of the commentary on the tenth 
book, because the author of that book calls Heracleitus 
of Ephesus his fellow-citizen, and because, from the com- 
mentary on the third chapter of the first book, it is clear 
that Eustratius was a warm supporter of Plato against 
the objections of Aristotle ; while on the other hand, from 
the commentary upon the second and third chapters of 
the tenth book, we should infer quite the contrary. This 
collection I have generally quoted by the term " Scholia." 

' * For the use of this book I am indebted to the kindness 
•of my friend, the present Librarian of New College. The 
publisher of Felician pretends, that another MS. of the 
Greek original was collated for this book ; but in all the 
difficult and corrupt passages I have observed, that the 
Translator does not give a faithful version as on other 
occasions, but merely a paraphrase. 



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vin PREFACE. 

and dedicated to Cardinal Alexander Far- 
nese. 

The merit of the writers in this collection is 
very unequal ; for while the commentaries of 
Alexander of Aphrodisium, Simplicius, and 
others, upon the physical and metaphysical 
writings of Aristotle, have preserved to us not 
only some valuable notices of the , state and 
history of philosophy, but also several frag- 
ments of the lost writings of Aristotle, they 
exhibit a much deeper acquaintance with the 
Peripatetic system than either Eustratius or 
Aspasius, who possess none of the other ad- 
vantages. Besides, the Platonic partialities of 
Eustratius, his evident anxiety to vindicate his 
master, and to reconcile at any rate his tenets 
with those of Aristotle, render him an un- 
safe guide wherever his prejudices are brought 
into action. And this liability is more frequent 
than at first sight would appear when it is con- 
sidered, that indirect references to Plato occur 
throughout this treatise; that in most instances 
no specific mention is made of Plato's name, 
nor the particular passages or treatises verbally 
or definitely quoted, against which the whole 
force of an objection is directed. To this may 
be added, that several of the most important 
writings of Plato have been lost, and that con- 
sequently, did we but possess them all, in- 
stances would be found of this commentatpr's 
misrepresentations more numerous than can 



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PREFACE. ix 

easily now be determined. These difficulties, 
in conjunction with the practice of Aristotle, 
who seldom quotes his authorities, or the 
names of the writers whom he is refuting, 
frequently occasion great obscurity, and must 
furnish my apology if I have often brought 
forward in the notes parallel passages from 
Plato and other writers which appear to bear 
but little on the text. 

Of the almost innumerable Latin Com- 
mentators, the most valuable are Albertus 
Magnus 1 * and Thomas Aquinas*. But their 
labors are far more adapted to those who are 
already conversant with the philosophy of 
Aristotle, than to those who are only com- 
mencing the study. 

From the date of these Schoolmen till the 
commencement of the fifteenth century, no- 
thing was done towards explaining the text of 
the Ethics or the moral philosophy of Aristotle. 
Men were content to follow the steps of the 
scholastic commentators, rather than to consult 
the original; to comment and compose anno- 
tations on the commentaries already existing 



d See Alberti Magni Ethica, vol. iv. of his Works, pub- 
lished at Lyons (Lugduni), 1651. 

e I do not mean his professed commentary upon the 
Ethics, which is little else than a paraphrase, but his 
Summa Totius Theologiae ; particularly the second and third 
parts, known by the names of Secunda Summa and Tertia 
Summa. 



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x . PREFACE. 

without attempting to seek for fresh inform- 
ation from authentic and original sources. 

But the revival of learning under .the au- 
spices of Pope Nicholas V, breathed fresh vigor 
and animation into the lifeless and attenuated 
form of Greek literature, and especially of 
Greek philosophy. By the indefatigable re- 
search of this most illustrious Pontiff, Greek 
books and manuscripts were procured from aU 
parts of the globe; and the most celebrated 
scholars of every nation were invited to his 
court to transcribe and translate them. Pog- 
gio, George of Trebizond, Leonardo Bruni of 
Arezzo, Giannozzo Manetti, Fr. Filelfo, Laur* 
Valla, Theod. Gaza, and Guarini, formed part 
of this illustrious circle, who were encouraged 
by his bounty, and preferred to places of honor 
and emolument. By their exertions, a flood of 
light burst forth upon the astonished world, 
and penetrated through the dusky regions of 
monastic seclusion. Where the Master of the 
Sentences, Aquinas and Scotus, had ruled with 
an undisputed and undivided sway, a new race 
of literary champions were springing up, pre- 
pared to dispute their claims, and to question 
the supremacy even of Aristotle and of Plato. 

Men of the greatest literary eminence were 
now earnestly engaged in the no very philo- 
sophical contest of placing the one or the other 
of these philosophers on the highest pinnacle 
of literary renown, to the utter degradation of 



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PREFACE. xi 

hig rival. The world rung with the disputes 
of the Aristotelian and the Platonist ; nor can 
the days of romance produce an instance where 
greater zeal and devotion were displayed by 
rival knights and squires in the service of 
some earthly goddess of their idolatry, than 
was shown by the rival champions of Aristotle 
and Plato in vindicating the peerless superiority 
of their respective masters f . 

This dispute, however, although perhaps 
trivial in itself, was great and beneficial in its 
consequences. These literary skirmishes taught 
men to feel their own powers, opened their eyes 
to a more perfect appreciation of the ancient 
philosophy ; and they who had been engaged 



f This controversy commenced in an amusing way, 
originating with Gemistius Plethon, who had inspired 
Cosmo d| Medici with a predilection for Platonism. 
This brisk; and staunch old scholar had been sent to the 
Council of Ferrara to take part in the conferences between 
the two Churches; upon which occasion he combated so 
warmly fo? his own, that, contrary to the example of several 
of his compatriots, he refused to make a single confession. 
He wrote a treatise in Greek upon the difference between 
the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, in which he turned 
into ridicule the opinions of those who thought the two 
philosophers could be reconciled, and treated with much 
contempt both Aristotle and his followers. Upon this the 
Aristotelians took fire, and entered the lists against him ; 
but Plethon died before he could reply. Two of the most 
earnest and eminent who engaged in this quarrel were 
Cardinal Bessarion and George of Trebisond. See Ginguene, 
Hist. Litt. d'ltalie, iii. p. 357. 



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xii PREFACE. 

in contending for others, had now learned to 
venture for themselves. The names of some 
who were most eagerly engaged in these dis- 
putes, are still illustrious in the annals of 
literature, and Europe still venerates the me- 
mory of Bessarione, Don. Acciajuoli, Argiro- 
pulo,Erm. Barbaro, Marsiglio Ficino, Giov.Pico 
dalla Mirandola, Cristoforo Landino, Poliziano, 
Alexander and his son Franc. Piccolomini, Laur. 
Donati, Franc. Patrizi, Charpentier, and Bembo. 

But it would be superfluous to enter here 
into a detail of the merits of this controversy, 
to show what advantages it produced towards 
the illustration of Aristotle generally, or of the 
Ethics in particular; nor shall I weary the 
reader's patience by enumerating the host of 
modern commentators, who have devoted their 
time to the illustration of this treatise, parti- 
cularly after the labors of Buhle, Zell, and 
Hoffman. I shall therefore only mention those 
which after some examination appear to me to 
be the most deserving of notice. 

1. The earliest of these is Jo. Argiropulo 
with his disciple Acciajuoli, to whose deserts 
the celebrated Victor has paid a merited eulo- 
gium*. Argiropulo was a native of Byzantium, 
and upon the capture of that city by the Turks 
retired to Florence, where he was liberally re- 
ceived by Cosimo di Medici. In this splendid 

9 See p. 357, note to this Edition. 

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PREFACE. xiii 

retreat he became tutor to Peter the son, and 
Lorenzo the grandson, of Cosmo ; and num- 
bered among other pupils the celebrated Angelo 
Poliziano. To avoid the plague which devas- 
tated Tuscany during the latter part of his life, 
he retired to Rome, where he died in 1480. 
His Latin version of the Ethics was first pub- 
lished in 1488, and republished several times 
within that century. In 1535 it was reprinted 
at Venice, with the commentary of his pupil 
Acciajuoli h , and again at Paris more accurately 
in 1555. 

2. The next and most important is the com- 
mentary of Victorius (Pietro Vettori), born of 
noble parents at Florence, July 11, 1499. The 
attentions of this eminent scholar were not con- 
fined merely to literary exertions ; he took an 
active part in the political divisions which agi- 
tated his country. Upon the tragical death of 
Alexander of Medici, he intended to settle at 
Rome, but was diverted from his purpose by 
the Grand Duke Cosmo di Medici, who ap- 
preciated his talents, and recalled him the fol- 
lowing year (1538) to Florence. Here he was 
appointed Professor of the Greek and Latin 
tongues ; and having filled the chair with much 
reputation and ability, was elected by acclama- 

h This commentary is attributed by Buhle to Argiropulo 
incorrectly. See the dedication prefixed to the Paris Edi- 
tion of this version and commentary, and Acciajuoli's own 
dedication to Cosmo di Medici. 



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xiv PREFACE. 

tion President of the Florentine Academy in 
1542. He died at an advanced age at Florence, 
loaded with civil and literary honours, Decem- 
ber 18, 1585, a year after the publication of 
his Commentary upon the Ethics l . 

3. Johannes Magirus, Doctor of Medicine, 
and Professor of Natural Philosophy in the 
Academy of Marpurg ; author of an ingenious 
commentary upon the Ethics, which he was 
prevented from completing by a premature 
death. His work was published at Frankfort 
in 1601, 12mo k . 

4. Hubert Van GifFen, (Giphanius), a cele- 
brated jurist, born in 1534 at Burn, a little 
village in the ancient duchy of Gueldres. After 
commencing his studies at Louvain, he re- 
moved to Paris, and finally to Orleans in 1566, 
where he received a Doctor's degree the sub- 
sequent year. Having travelled over Italy, he 
at length fixed himself at Strasbourg, where he 
taught philosophy and civil law. In conse- 
quence of his reputation he was appointed Pro- 
fessor of Civil Law at Ingolstadt ; but attract- 
ing the notice of Rodolph the Second, was 



1 Petri Victorii Commentarii in X libros Aristotelis de 
Moribus ad Nicomachum. Positis ante singulas declara- 
tions Graecis verbis auctoris : iisdemque ad verbum Latine 
expressis. Florentiae ex officina Junctarutn 1584. fol. On 
the reverse is a portrait of him in his 81st (86th ?) year. 

k Dr. Joannis Magiri Philosophise professoris in Academia 
Marpurgensi inclyti, Corona virtutum Moralium, &c. 



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PREFACE. xv 

by that Emperor invited to Prague, where he 
died 26th July, 1604. His commentary upon 
the Ethics was not printed till after his death 
in 1608. 

Of all the critics now mentioned, Acciajuoli 
is most valuable for his acuteness, and the 
knowledge he displays of the other writings of 
Aristotle. Magirus furnishes a clear and easy 
interpretation and paraphrase of the argument, 
aiming at little else than rendering the terse 
and sometimes involved reasoning of Aristotle 
familiar and intelligible to the beginner. The 
commentary of Vettori is more distinguished 
for its critical scholarship, and its illustrations 
produced principally from the Latin classics; 
but in explaining the philosophy of Aristotle, 
or the systems of others which he is employed 
in supporting or refuting, this commentator is 
inferior to any of the others. The most valu- 
able is the commentary of Giphanius, who, to 
an intimate knowledge of the writings of Aris- 
totle and great natural acuteness, united the 
study of the other Greek philosophers. In the 
labors of this excellent scholar the reader will 
frequently find that satisfaction which else- 
where will be sought in vain. Of the notes of 
Zell (1820) and Michelet (1833) it is needless to 
speak ; with the former I am no otherwise ac- 
quainted than through the extracts of Dr. Card- 
well, whose selections from the ancient com- 
mentators are extremely useful, and had they 

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xvi PREFACE. 

been given in English would have rendered 
needless an edition like the present. The notes 
of Michelet in the earlier part of his book 
generally display considerable ingenuity, but 
his patience and industry seem to have failed 
towards the latter part, where his labors 
become jejune and unimportant. 

But though the attention of scholars in our 
own country, and more particularly abroad, is 
now being attracted to Aristotle, and the use 
and advantage of improved editions of his 
works, little has been done of late years for 
the elucidation of his philosophy, more par- 
ticularly the Ethics. That field is still open 
to one who, to a sound judgment, accurate 
scholarship, and a familiar acquaintance with 
the other writings, more particularly the logic, 
of Aristotle, shall unite a calm and chastised 
love of philosophical investigations. But if he 
come to such a task with a mind already pre* 
possessed with other systems, with a desire 
to torture the philosophy of antiquity to the 
measure of his own conceptions, he must, as 
others have done, experience only a miserable 
failure. 

For this edition I have only to observe, that 
these notes were compiled without any inten- 
tion of publication : and had I not since the 
time in which they were originally written been 
engaged in occupations of an entirely different 
and opposite nature, I should gladly have re- 
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PREFACE. xvii 

modelled the whole. But my only object was 
to present Aristotle's Ethics in a form less 
repulsive to beginners ; to no higher merits 
does this book pretend ; and if it should not 
entirely fail of this end, I shall fully have at- 
tained the object of my wishes. Should I not 
succeed even thus far, but be found to have 
mistaken the meaning of my author in more 
instances than I myself suspect, or than a dif- 
ference of opinion may plead my excuse, I 
must defend myself in the words of a pas- 
sage, which will ever be applicable to those 
who are engaged in enquiries after moral as 
well as physical truth, and which furnishes the 
best encouragement for the feeble and diffident, 
the best reproof for the able and overconfident 
enquirer, -q 7T€/h rfjs akr/Oeias Oecopia rjj p&v 
y(akeirri, rg 8e paSia. atjpuuov 8e to fju/jre ajjla>$ 
fitjSeva Swaardou rv\eiv avrrjs, firjre irauras a7ro- 
ruyxai/c^y, dAA* Ikolotov Xeyetu rt 7re/>l ttjs (f)vcr€co? y 
teal naff Iva fiev firjSh rj fwcpov iirifiaXXtiv avrrj 9 
€K wdpT&v 8e <rvvaBpoi£opueiwv yiveaOai n fieyeOo?. 
— ov fioi/op 8e \apip %X €lv 81kouov tovtoi? &p ai/ 
to KOLVCxyvrjaat rals 86£ou$, aAAa kou rots en eiruiro- 
Xouorepov aTrotyivaiiivois, kou yap kou ovtoi ovpfiak- 
Xoptou rt. Arist. Metaphys. ii. 1. 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 



Since our knowledge of the moral nature of man, as well 
as of the nature of every other class of beings, must depend 
upon our previous knowledge of the end of his existence ; for * 
those actions and habits only which have reference to this end 
can be considered as his proper characteristics, and the perfec- 
tion of his being must be considered as the perfect adaptation 
of his faculties for energizing upon those objects for which he 
was produced; therefore before we can proceed to the consi- 
deration of the nature and perfection and consequently the 
Happiness of man, we must first learn what is the object of 
his being. And first, whether he have any such particular 
object. 

If he has such a particular object, it must be marked by 
these properties; that every other end must be subordinate 
to it; that whatever be its nature, whether some result in- 
dependent and beyond the mere action that produced it, or 
whether it be an action itself, it must be the chief end of all, 
including within it all other ends, and consequently superior 
to them in value and completeness. 

But such an end as this is the end of the Political Science, 
for to that end all the ends of all other energies and sciences 
are subordinate ; we know therefore thus much touching the 
nature of the end we are investigating, that it is identical 
with the end of the Political Science; that is to say, e$ £rjv 
and €$ vg&rrsiv, for such is the end of the Political Science. 

But the advantages to be derived to our subsequent in- 
quiries from the result at which we have now arrived, are more 
apparent than real. For in their notions and interpretation 
of this perfection or happiness (fv $jv) all men are at variance, 

c2 



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XX 



GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 



and every one forms his conceptions of it according to his 
own particular fancies. Thus one person calls it Pleasure, 
another Honor, another Wealth, another Virtue, and Plato 
an * Ideal Good. But the perfection of man, as man, cannot 
consist in Pleasure, in its vulgar sense, for this is common 
to brutes. Nor in Honor, as neither in Wealth, for these 
are not final; we seek Wealth with a view to some other 
good, and Honor with a view to be thought virtuous, so that 1 
Virtue would possess a better claim. But neither is Virtue 
Happiness, for this perfection is an energy («J $jv), Virtue 
a habit ; Misery may coexist with Virtue, but not with Hap- 
piness. Neither is it the Ideal Good, because such a notion 
is contrary to the general practice and sense of mankind; 
and such a good is rather the unreal creation of a philo- 
sopher's brain; and to say the least, has no practical influence' 
with mankind. All these notions respecting this Chief Good 
of man are therefore deficient in some essentials, nor can all 
be at once correct ; both because Nature has produced men 
for one object, and therefore their Perfection or Happiness 
must be uniform; and secondly, because Truth is never at 
variance with itself, nor changes its colours according to the 
passions and prejudices and habits of men. 

Our investigation then has not advanced beyond the first 
steps of our inquiry. 

What then is this «5, or e8 $jy, which men interpret so 
variously ? That it is both final or perfect we infer from our 
introductory remarks; from which it would also seem to follow, 
that it is a complete and independent Good, not requiring 
other subordinates to increase its essence or improve it 

But to resume. If, as we have already stated, an instru- 
ment or agent can only then be said to 'be perfect when it* 
is so adapted as perfectly to perform the end and object of 



■ I use this term technically, not ac- Greek reader will at once understand the 
cording to its usual acceptation. The meaning. 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xxi 

its being, to discover the perfection (to §5) of any thing, we 
must first look to the object of its being (to* fgyov) : in other 
words, its characteristic. For as Nature nftver produces (as 
man often does) one thing for two uses, it must necessarily 
follow, that its characteristic, or, to speak logically, its dif- 
ferentia? must have reference to its Zfyoy; consequently, if we 
can discover the differentia of man we shall be able to discover 
his Igyov, consequently his t3 $v. That differentia then is 
reason, or, more correctly, the exercise of reason, or $jy xarot 
Apyov, consequently the perfection of man must be, the living 
perfectly (eJ or xar agervjv) according to reason; and the 
highest perfection of man, when he lives according to reason 
in the highest perfection, (xar otqvrip aghrr^v) : the Happiness 
of man, therefore, will be a life, or evegyn* ^u%ifc, for the terms 
are synonimous, perfectly according to reason; or higyei* ipvgifc 
xar ogrngy a§/<rnjv, adding to our definition what common 
sense teaches us, that such a life must be exercised for a 
length of time ; so that the complete definition of Happiness 
will be evegytiot tJ«J%iJ£ *«t ocperrjv ag/onjv by fiiop reXf/cp. 

If then this definition be correct, as it seems to be in 
theory, it must also be correct in practice, and in some degree 
meet the general apprehensions of mankind. Let it then be 
examined in conjunction with those theories of Happiness 
which we have already discussed and rejected, and see how 
it agrees with what is true in them, and avoids what is false and 
reprehensible. 

With their notions then who consider Happiness to be the 
highest of all goods, this definition isibund to agree ; for the 
goods of the soul are die highest of all, and such are the 
energies of the soul (ivigyeiou 4"%>i0* Likewise by defining 
it to consist in energy, we agree with those who consider it to 
be eutyri* and ev*fa£ia. 

Nay, even all the qualities which mankind attach to Hap- 
piness may be found in this definition. For if we look to 
Socrates and others who consider virtue to be synonimous 



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xxii GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

with Happiness; our definition, by describing it as an energy 
according to Virtue, will meet with their view, for the energies 
according to Virtue are Virtue. And further, an energy ac-^ 
cording to Virtue avoids the objection, which may be urged 
against their tenets, that Virtue may be inactive, whereas 
they only that run receive the crown, they only are happy who 
energize. 

Or whether, on the other hand, with Aristippus and his 
followers, we consider Happiness to consist in Pleasure, we 
shall find that Pleasure is essentially included in our definition 
of Happiness. For they only can be called virtuous actions 
and energies which spring from perfect habits, and the exer- 
cise of such habits is necessarily attended with Pleasure, 
Pleasure being the criterion of the perfection of the habit* 
Whereas Pleasure, according to the notion of the generality 
of mankind, is ever varying and fluctuating, like a wave of 
the troubled sea, tossed hither and thither according to the 
caprices of mankind. In short, our definition includes all 
that is desirable in life ; for since the good man is the only 
unerring standard, and judges that the virtuous energies are 
the most beautiful, most eligible, most perfect, most pleasant 
of all actions, the virtuous energies do possess all these 
qualities, so consequently must the Happiness which is ac- 
cording to those energies. 

Yet may it not be questioned whether our definition is 
in all parts complete? For not to say that we can hardly 
suppose a person to be happy who is sunk in the very depths 
of poverty, whose children are vicious, or his own life bur- 
thened with personal disease and deformity, can virtuous 
energies be exercised without external means, and must we 
not therefore add to our definition, that the happy man must 
be competently furnished with external goods? The affirma- 
tive of this question certainly coincides with the opinions 
of a great number, who consider good fortune and prosperity 
as essential to Happiness. 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xiiH 

To this we reply, that such a question necessarily involves 
another; what is the cause of Happiness? If man, (for we 
omit the consideration of divine agency, as not within the 
scope of this treatise, as well as from other considerations,) 
the former question receives an immediate answer: and that 
man is the cause of his own happiness appears from what has 
been said already, that Happiness is the end of the Political 
Science, and it would be absurd to suppose that we should be 
directed to its acquisition, (as we are by the Political Science), 
if the attainment of it were not in our own power. But if 
Fortune be the cause of Happiness, then certainly Good For- 
tune most bear a much more important part in pur definition 
than it at present possesses* But is it not inconsistent with 
the whole course of nature, and contrary to analogy, to attri- 
bute the noblest good to an uncertain and ignoble cause? 

Nevertheless, as the opinion that external prosperity is 
essential to Happiness, is supported not only by the consent 
of the many, but seems also countenanced by the adage of 
Solon ; it will be right to consider what was Solon's opinion, 
and thus more explicitly to determine the question. 

According to Solon then, no one can be called happy as 
long as he lives. By which assertion Solon did not mean 
to say that he might be called happy when he was dead, but 
that during the whole of his life he was so completely within 
the power of Fortune, that she could at any lime render him 
miserable; from whose thraldom Death only could release 
him* But granting this position to be true, we are reduced 
to this alternative; either that no one can be happy at any 
time, (which is contrary to the general feeling of mankind), 
or that we are not to call a man happy when he really is so 
(during life) for fear of some eventual unhappiness, which is 
absurd. Neither, if Solon objected to calling a man happy 
while he was alive from fear of such an event, but allowed him 
to have been happy when dead as being then beyond the power 
of fortune, has he entirely avoided the difficulty as he imagined. 



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aiv GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

For death does not appear entirely to remove man from 
the effects of good or ill fortune. At all events, we often 
call a dead man happy or miserable in reference to the 
fate and conduct of his descendants, which seems to imply 
that they, are affected by what happens upon this earth b . 

But indeed 1Mb whole view of the Happiness of man seems 
to be erroneous; for the good and evil of life (to §1 $ xaxcb$) 
does not consist in good or evil fortune ; although Happiness 
cannot exist without a degree of good fortune, if Happiness 
consist in virtuous energies, and energies cannot be exercised 
without external means. And this very consideration that 
Happiness is a virtuous energy, removes it at once from the 
objections which militate against a theory which would make 
it depend upon the caprice of fortune. For nothing is more 
stable, more uniform, than the virtuous energies, none are so 
much in the power of man, or so independent of the fickleness 
of fortune. And unless ill fortune befal the happy man (such 
as we have described him) to so great an extent as to pre- 
vent his energizing, ill fortune can scarcely deprive the vir- 
tuous, that is, the happy man of his Happiness. And this will 
be more certain and evident should it hereafter appear, that 
Happiness is of that chief and highest class of goods which do 
not, like the moral energies, depend upon external means. 

Having thus confirmed his definition, and refuted the ob- 
jections which might be brought against it, Aristotle now 
proceeds in his analysis. For to define Happiness to be an 
energy of the soul according to Virtue, or in perfection (x*r 
agrrrjv), and yet not to explain the terms, virtue and perfec- 
tion, must leave the whole indistinct; at the least, useless 
for practical purposes. 

If man therefore be a compound animal, the perfection of 
man will be the perfection of all the parts which compose 
him ; and so also if the soul of man be compounded, whether 

* Compare Cicero De Senect. c. 23. 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xxv 

in reality (as some have supposed) or merely in formality (h 
Xoytp), the virtue of the soul*, in other words, the virtue of man, 
will be twofold. In its most extensive division, we may sepa- 
rate the soul into rational and irrational; and consequently 
its virtues into two, rational and 1 irrational. The reality of 
this definition seems apparent from this consideration ; for (to 
omit a subdivision of the irrational, the merely vegetative) we 
certainly imply a division of this kind, when we praise the 
temperate man ; as though he possessed a twofold virtue, one 
of reason to direct him aright, the other of an irrational 
part which obeys the dictates of that reason. Virtue then 
is divisible, according to this difference, into Rational and 
Irrational ; in other words, into Intellectual and Moral. 

Moral or Ethical Virtue (^foxij ogtrij), as the name indicates, 
is derived from habit ( Jfej) ; hence it would seem, that Moral 
Virtue is not the gift of nature. 1st, Because natural gifts 
can not, as are all the Moral Virtues, be altered by habit. 
2dly, Of those gifts which we have by nature* we have the 
faculties first, and then exercise them ; but in the Moral Vir- 
tues, on the contrary, the faculties are acquired by previous 
exercise, ddly, The conduct of legislators points us to the same 
conclusion ; for they would never institute rules and laws for 
the acquirement of those excellencies which nature only can 
bestow. 4thly, Moral Virtue is both produced and destroyed 
by the same efficient cause, viz. actions, which is never the 
case in nature ; the same efficient cause in nature never being 
productive as well as destructive of the same effects. These 
observations bring us to the following results, that Moral 
Virtue is not the gift of Nature, but of ourselves ; that it is 
generated, increased, and destroyed by action ; good actions 
being productive of good habits, evil actions of the contrary. 

We have then discovered thus much of the nature of Moral 

c We have no adequate term to express fore I employ the word soul in this ex- 
the Greek word ^*tf»» life and soul tensive sense, 
being equally implied in it And there- 



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xxvi GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

Virtue, that it is a good habit produced by a repetition of 
good actions. But yet, as far as regards practice, we have still 
to learn what are good actions. 

Leaving then, for the 'present, the consideration that all 
such actions must be done according to reason, it may serve for 
a general observation, that good actions are destroyed by ex- 
cess and defect For instance, too mueh exercise as well as too 
little, is prejudicial to health, whereas moderate exercise pro- 
motes and preserves it. The same remark applies to the habits 
of temperance, courage, and the like ; men becoming tempe- 
rate by the performance of actions avoiding either extremes, and 
virtuous generally by the performance of such actions. But not 
only, as we have already observed, are the Virtues produced 
by good or moderate actions (ev peo-tfrip-i), and destroyed by 
the excessive and defective, but upon those actions by which 
a habit has been produced, on the same will it reoperate, the 
actions and habits reciprocally acting upon each other, the 
actions producing the habit, the habit assisting in the pro- 
duction of the actions. Thus by a continual abstinence from 
unlawful and immoderate Pleasures, men acquire a habit of 
temperance, and that habit, when acquired, gives a greater 
facility to the practice of that abstinence. This furnishes a 
solution to the question, how are we to know when we have 
acquired the habit, and what is the criterion of its perfection? 
That criterion is to be found in the pleasure or pain result- 
ing from the performance of the actions ; for he to whom the 
performance of a moral action causes pleasure, has acquired 
the perfect habit, as he who feels pain is without it. Thus 
Moral Virtue, then, is chiefly occupied with Pleasure and 
Pain ; Moral Virtue being a proper disposition in reference 
to Pleasure and Pain ; all our actions being guided by them, 
all our motives derived from them. Thus far then we have 
learnt what is the origin of Moral Virtue, and what are the 
causes of its destruction, its objectr-matter, and the effect 
which it produces upon actions. We may then proceed at once 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xxth 

to its definition ; but before doing this, it may be as well to 
meet an objection, which might be brought against some pre- 
vious observations. 

It has been stated, that Virtue is the result of a repetition 
of good actions; consequently, virtuous actions, or actions 
resulting from Virtue (xar *$trr}v) 9 cannot be performed at 
once; in other words, men by doing virtuous actions become 
virtuous, gain a habit of virtue, and then only when the habit 
is gained, perform the virtuous actions, properly so called. Of 
what character then are those actions to be considered which 
are done previous to the acquirement of the habits? are they 
not virtuous ? A temperate act done previous to the acquire- 
ment of temperance, and with a view to acquire it, is it not an 
act of temperance ? And a bold action, before the habit of 
bravery, a brave action ? Is it not so in the case of another 
class of habits, the arts? Do not they have all their perfec- 
tion in themselves ? Thus he who can perform on an instru- 
ment is a musician, and he who makes a watch is a watch- 
maker, whether he has acquired the habit or not 

To this we reply, that this objection is not valid; for even 
in reference to the Arts, he who performs the act of an artist is 
not at once an artist; something more is required. And even 
granting it to be true, the cases are not parallel ; for in the 
Arts we look to little eke than the excellence of the produc- 
tion ; in the Virtues, not to the action but the disposition of 
the agent. In the case of the Arts, we require knowledge as 
the chief; in the Virtues, knowledge has but little weight 
towards constituting the character of a virtuous act. 

We proceed then to the definition of Virtue. And first to 
discover its genus. 

Since in the moral part of the soul the Affections (tol h rjj 
i^9tjj ytvtfjuvu) are only three; passions, faculties, and habits; 
Moral Virtue must be one of these. By passions, I mean 
those affections of the mind which are attended by pleasure 
<or pain ; by faculties (&vwep«$), the capacities of being affected 



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xxvni GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

by the passions; by habits, certain dispositions according to 
which we are rightly or wrongly disposed in reference to die 
passions. Now Virtue is neither a passion nor a faculty, since 
we are not praised or blamed with reference to the mere 
possession either of the passions, or of the capacities of being 
influenced by them, but in being influenced by them in an 
improper degree; in other words in being wrongly disposed 
in respect to them ; consequently Virtue and Vice are habits. 
But since Virtue is ever productive of good actions, making 
not only its possessor good, but his actions, (as the virtue 
of the eye makes the eye perfect and its act perfect,) Virtue 
must be a habit of this nature, he who possesses it must 
be a good man, and his actions will be good likewise. The 
good man therefore and his actions will be our rule for the 
discovery of Virtue, as we have frequently observed. What 
then are his actions? such as we have already stated, as avoid 
excess, defect, and are in a mean, (ev jfcwo-njT*). 

But the mean is of two kinds, either absolute, (in which case 
it is equally distant from the extremes, as in surfaces and 
solids, and never varies,) or relative, in respect to us, in which 
instance it is continually fluctuating. To this mean, Moral 
Virtue always directs its aim, the absolute mean being seldom 
the mean to us. Virtue then is, e£i$ n-goafgerix^, h p,«r<mjr* 
o3<ra rrj wgo$ %&£?, wgicrpivYi Xiyop xo) 00$ ay 6 <ppdvi[ju>$ ogkreiw — 
a mean in its essence and definition, an extreme in its quality 
and excellence. Not that all actions admit of a mean, some 
always being extremes, and consequently always culpable, 
otherwise there would be a mean of excess and a defect of 
excess, which is absurd. But Virtue being a relative mean, 
as we have stated, it will frequently happen that it is further 
removed from one extreme than the other, and this for two 
reasons ; either from the nature of the things themselves, or 
from our being more inclined to one extreme than the other. 
Thus illiberality is further removed from the mean than pro- 
digality from the nature of the habits themselves ; but in the 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION; xxix 

case of the man who is inclined to prodigality, prodigality is 
farther removed from the mean than illiberaHty; and, conse- 
quently it is his duty, if he be desirous to arrive at the mean, 
to go to the opposite extreme, that the influence of his favorite 
habit may cause him to recoil, as it were, upon the mean* 
To give more exact rules at present for the attainment of this 
purpose, is difficult; much must be left to circumstances; 
but as a general rule we ought to avoid excess and defect, and 
follow the example of the good man. 

But since praise or blame, and consequently Virtue and 
Vice, are attributed only to voluntary acts, and one species 
of the voluntary enters into the definition of Virtue, it will 
be requisite to consider the nature of the voluntary and in- 
voluntary. Involuntary acts then appear to be such as are 
done from compulsion or ignorance. The compulsory is that 
whose principle is external, the agent or patient contributing 
nothing to the action (oS if agxy i£a6w toukJti) o5<r* h jj (trfib 
avfifiaXXerou 6 rg&rrw $ 6 Tccury&v). There are however an- 
other class of actions, in which, although the principle is 
external, yet the agent or patient do contribute to the act ; 
as the throwing one's goods overboard in a storm. These 
actions can be considered neither as voluntary, sipce abso- 
lutely every one would avoid them; nor yet involuntary, as they 
want part of the character which constitutes an involuntary 
act. They may, therefore, be considered as of a mixed 
nature. Their attributes also, as their nature, are mixed and 
variable ; sometimes being praised or blamed like the volun- 
tary, at other times pardoned or pitied like the involuntary 
acts. But their character as moral acts must depend much 
upon the actions themselves, and the consequences they 
involve ; being praised or blamed, pardoned or pitied, accord- 
ingly as they involve great honor or great disgrace, or not 
involving either great honor or great disgrace, are done under 
the influence of overwhelming pain. 
» Of the involuntary from ignorance, a distinction must be 



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m GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

made ; for actions done from ignorance are not always invo- 
luntary; some being even voluntary, (as when men are 
themselves the authors of their own ignorance); some, 
though not voluntary, yet at the same time not being in- 
voluntary ; as when after an act has been done from igno- 
rance, no pain and no repentance, but rather pleasure, is felt 
for the evil which has been done ; and lastly (which alone 
can be properly considered the involuntary acts of ignorance), 
when men are not themselves the cause of their own igno- 
rance, and feel sorrow when subsequently conscious of the 
wrong which they have done. Involuntariness of this kind 
can only take place when men are ignorant of some particu- 
lars connected with the fact, for ignorance of the principle can 
only arise from wilful blindness brought on by a continued 
repetition of evil acts. Voluntary acts, therefore, are those 
whose principle is internal, the agent knowing the parti* 
culars of the act (to kxofotov M%uw iv elvou qv q *&& & <*&r<i 
ej&OTi t£l vmS ixaffTO. tv o1$ r) wjoftf ). 

Having thus then determined the essentials of voluntary 
and involuntary acts, we are naturally led to the consider- 
ation of choice (*pd«/f«r»$), for all irpoaifBo-q is voluntary, 
although not all acts that are voluntary are done from deli- 
berate choice. Things done on the sudden are often volun- 
tary, but manifestly not the result of deliberate choice. 
Further, children and brute animals act voluntarily, but not 
from deliberate choice. Nor is vgoedgeins the same as desire 
or anger, for both are common to brutes with man, whereas 
*Kyu*Lqvji$ is not; both are also opposed to wgoaignn$. Neither 
is it will (fiov\r}<n$), although having a great resemblance to 
it. For will is often of the impossible, *gow$e<ns is not. 
\yilj is often of things over which we have no control, not 
so TTgoatgwis. Will is rather of the end, vpoalgecis of means 
to the end. Nor yet is Trfoalfang the same as opinion. For 
opinion is equally of things impossible and eternal, as of 
things i# our own power. Opinion is distinguisjied by truth 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xxxi 

and falsehood, *§oai$8<ri$ by its virtuousness and viciousness, 
Neither is it the same with any particular opinion. For our 
characters are determined by our deliberate choice of good 
or evil, not by the opinion we form concerning them. 
Opinion is inert, vqo*lgwrt$ is an active principle. FLpoalptrtc 
is praised for being of what it ought, rather than for any 
correctness in itself; opinion for being true. And not 
unfrequently they who form the best opinions are the least 
likely to form and act upon a good flrgaa^m; 4 . 

But although *§oal$8<rtf is none of these, yet, from what 
has been already stated, and from its name, it should seem 
that it is attended with reason and deliberation, being a choice 
titer deliberation formed between two alternatives ; (oXX* igi yt 
to wgofiefkvtevidvov ; ij y&g vgoaiparis (jurci hiyw xo) havolaf . 
vwooiytalmv 9 eoixe xeu roSvofia *$ 8* tjo hi few elgtrov). Before 
then we can satisfactorily determine its definition, we must 
first examine into the nature of Deliberation. And this may 
be more easily discovered by first determining what is its 
object-matter* 

No one then deliberates concerning those things whose 
existence depends upon nature, necessity, or chance. Nor 
even upon those things of which man himself is the cause, 
but over which he has no control. But we deliberate each 
of us only concerning those things which are in our own 
power ; more especially, of those things whose results are 
uncertain and contingent ; and in all cases where there is 
greater room for doubt. Thus we deliberate more concern- 
ing the inexact than the exact arts and sciences. Conse- 
quently, we deliberate upon meaos, not ends; for fixing 
upon some end, we then proceed to deliberation, and seek 
for means to the accomplishment of the end in view. Deli- 
beration, therefore, is a kind of search (itfnpri?) but not idea* 
tical with it, for search ranges over a much wider object* 

4 Compare Sutler's Anal. 1. &. 



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xxxii GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

matter, as mathematical and physical troths. BrfAiwif and 
Tgooigfo-jf then appear almost to be the same, yet there is 
this difference between them; pookawt is previous in point 
of time to jrgoa/gfo-if, for when fiovXturig is completed, then 
TfoedfM'tg begins. As in states, /SooXfwrif is the deliberative, so 
Tgoa/gto-jf is the executive faculty, acting according to and 
after the dictates of fkuXmmg. Gathering up then the 
threads of our previous conclusions, it would seem that wqociI- 
fttris is povXevTwr) Sgegig rm tf* fyJv. Having thus determined 
the nature of those faculties which are employed upon the 
means, we proceed to some observations upon that which is 
employed upon ends (BouAjjct^). 

According to the opinion of some philosophers, fiovkyns is 
only of the good ; according to the opinion of others, of the 
apparent good. Both of these opinions have their difficul- 
ties. For if /SouAapn; be only of the good, bad men cannot 
exercise /SopAqcj? ; or, if so, then the object of their will 
(/3ovAj)<ri;) is not always an object of will (for then it must be 
a real good), whereas it is generally an evil. If, on the 
contrary, /SooXijcr^ be only of the apparent good, then it will 
follow, that nature has implanted a faculty within us without 
any specific object-matter upon which it is to be exercised. 
Perhaps then the difficulty might be solved by the following 
consideration ; that, absolutely speaking, the real good only 
can be the object of /SouXjjct^, but in the case of the indi- 
vidual, the apparent good. To the good man, therefore, 
(since to him the real is always the apparent good), the real 
good will always be the object of /SovAqcns ; and that only is 
in truth an object of |SowAij<ri$, which is an object of /SouAqcn? 
to him, he only being capable of forming a correct judg- 
ment in morals, and being an unerring standard by whom 
we are to form our judgments. 

If then the end be the object of the will, and the mean 
the object of ngo*l§e<n$ and deliberation, actions which have 
regard to them must be voluntary; and consequently Virtue 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xxxiH 

and Vice (being formed by such actions) must be voluntary 
likewise. For if we have the power of doing an act (and that 
act constitutes Virtue), we must also have the power of ab- 
staining from doing it (which constitutes Vice), and vice 
versa ; so that if Virtue (as some are willing to concede) be 
voluntary, Vice must be voluntary likewise. That Vice is as 
equally voluntary as Virtue, seems apparent from the fol- 
lowing considerations. 1st. If man, and man only, be the 
principle of his own actions, Ins actions must be voluntary. 
2dly. The fact of reward being attached to good and 
punishment to bad actions, proves them to be voluntary ; 
for we never exhort men to or dissuade them from actions, 
which are not in their own power. 3dly. In the case of 
ignorance which is self-caused, men are punished; and so 
also in cases where, from their own carelessness or neglect, 
they acquire bad habits ; nor is it allowed to be a sufficient 
exculpation, or shelter from punishment, to say that they 
did pot know that their ignorance would be productive of 
such ill effects, since such ignorance is a proof of Vice. 
4thly. Where a man has acquired a confirmed evil habit 
which he cannot change, and acts in obedience to that habit, 
without being able to withstand its influence, he is con- 
sidered a voluntary agent, since he was a voluntary agent 
through every step that led to this evil habit. And his own 
wishing to' change it after it has been formed, can no more 
constitute him an involuntary agent, than it can prove that 
man to fee who having thrown a stone voluntarily, repents 
after it is out of his hand. 5thly. This is also confirmed by 
the distinction we observe in reference to bodily deformities, 
blaming and punishing them only in such instances where 
they are self-inflicted. 

But it may be urged, that each one aims at the good 
which his QavreurU presents to him, and is not master of 
his phantasy (pavra<r/a), and consequently is not a volun* 
tary agent. 

d 



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toiv GENERAL INTRODUCTION, 

To this we reply ; 1st, That if every man's QoarrwrU i» 
regulated by his moral habits, (and that it is so, has been 
already shown), if men are masters of their moral habits,, 
they are also masters of their <p*vrourl*. 2dly, If it be not 
. so, and if no one has the power of fixing upon the end, but 
as nature presents it to him so must he view and take it,, 
and do every thing in reference to it, if it be the case with 
the bad man it is also the case with the good man ; and if 
one be not voluntary, then neither is the other ; or if the 
latter (as is conceded) be voluntary, so also is the former*. 
So that whether a man can influence his apprehension of 
the end or whether he cannot, he is still a voluntary agent, 
Therefore even if we grant this latter alternative to b* 
true, if the good man is a voluntary agent from putting. in 
practice the means to an end (the apprehension of which 
end he cannot alter), so also is the bad man in the same way 
a voluntary agent. Nevertheless, actions are more within 
our own control than are our habits; for the one are 
entirely in our power, and each part of them perceptible^ 
But of habits only the commencement, and each progressive 
step is hidden from us and imperceptible. 

(Having thus far analyzed his definition of Virtue, Aris- 
totle now applies it to particular instances, devoting an 
entire book to Justice, when he comes to treat of that virtue, 
as being more important than the rest, and a Sgi$ h fur+- 
tyn in a different way from the other habits. We forbear 
to follow him into this detail, as not only unnecessary but 
also prejudicial to the general outline of the treatise.) 

Although then we have proceeded thus far in our expla- 
nation of the definition of Virtue and the questions con- 
nected with it, yet a very important and vital part of it still 
remains for discussion. 

It has been stated that Virtue is a habit in a mean deter- 
mined by reason (eg* & /wawnp-i fyvftini loyto), and not *only 
determined by reason, but determined in such a way as he 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

who possessed Q^vyns would determine it («fc Jh 6 fffapH 
opfoetef). We hove therefore to examine what is *6yo$, and 
if there be several kinds of it, what is that xSyot which . 
directs us to this true mean ; secondly, what is Qfinp'S* and 
further to determine the true nature of xgoalpr^, which was 
left undecided in the third Book. Last of all to examine 
the intellectual virtues, according to the division at the con- 
clusion of the first Book. 

We have already seen that there are two divisions of the 
soul, the one without the other possessing reason (hiy** 
«%ov): the nature of this latter then we now proceed to in- 
vestigate, in order to acquaint ourselves with the nature of 
that reason (ktyog) of which we are in search. 

If, then, all matter upon which the soul can operate be two- 
fold, it would seem from analogy that the nature of the soul 
is twofold, to correspond to that matter. That one part of 
the soul does not energize upon both matters, but each 
upon its own peculiar matter, is also probable. Thus if all 
matter be necessary and contingent, it is reasonable to 
expect that there should be two parts of the soul, each 
respectively operating upon its peculiar matter. The one 
upon contingent matter, which we may term the deliberative 
(deliberation being only employed, as we have already shown, 
upon contingent matter), the other upon necessary matter, 
which may be termed the scientific. 

Our object then is to discover what are the virtues of 
each part. But the i5, or virtue and excellence of every 
thing, is to be found in reference to its fgyw (as we have 
already seen); if therefore we can discover the Sgy*v of each 
part of the soul, we shall discover the virtues of each part. 

All the igya of the soul of man (as distinguished from 
brutes) must be moral action and truth ; and the principles 
of all operations are, cu<rdrpig, vw$ 9 and S% s£i$ ; or putting 
aside uirthpis (as being no cause of moral action), vo0$, and 
o£t£f£. Since then all deliberation is for action, the delibe- 

d2 

• 



xxxvi GENERAL INTRODUCTION, 

rati ve part of the soul must have Tgofij for its Sgyov. But 
all good moral action flows from a correct xpoaifto-ig, and alT 
vgoatg&ts is, as we have already seen, ogcfc directed by vov& 
directed of course in such a way that vws shall discover and 
dictate the truth, and Sjgefif be obedient to its dictates. 
Truth in practice, then, or practical truth (j? oAqteia xga*» 
tixij), is the Spyov of this part of the soul ; and its virtues- 
will be those habits which give it an aptitude for the dis- 
covery of such truth. But since science has reference 
merely to abstract truth, abstract truth will be the Igyov of 
the scientific part of the soul. And its virtues will be those 
habits which direct it aright in the search of that truth. 

Since then the iqya of the soul are, of the Deliberative 
practical truth, of the Scientific abstract truth, the habits 
which direct each part in the truth will be five, rixyn* nri- 

1. Of these habits, that which is employed in discovering- 
truth in necessary matter by means of demonstration is 
science (nrioTtyti)); or ?£i$ rt$ fura, kfyov oAqAou? aroS«xnx^ y 
x. t. X. For of whatever things we possess science, we are 
convinced that those things cannot be otherwise ; that is,, 
they are necessary ; and likewise that they are demon* 
strative, that demonstration proceeding from certain prin- 
ciples already laid down and determined. 

2. Of those habits, that which is employed upon produc- 
tion, (for tins may be considered as a division of contin- 
gent matter), that is, producing according to certain true 
principles (s£*f r*$ fisrei klyw akffioug xonp-ixq), is art. For. 
art is not only employed in production (wegl ywanv), but 
in theorizing also respecting production, and therefore re- 
quires true reason equally as science. 

3. Of these habits, that which is upon the other division: 
of contingent matter, viz. moral action, in directing us. 

* In what way this division is discovered,. see the Introduction to Book VI. p. 2\%s 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xxxvii 

aright in them by right reason (e£i; ti; fierci Xoyou Jtkrflovg 
Teg) rot Mpanrwa ayaSsi rgcLXTixtj) is <p$fai<rt$. That Qqinpig is 
such a habit as here described, is plain from considering 
who they are whom we call fg6nfiot 9 and for what reason we 
*pply this term to them ; who are they whom we conceive 
to be good reasoners and counsellors, with reference to 
*ome good end of which there is neither art nor science ; 
consequently tyovrpis must be a distinct habit from either art 
or science. And this is also that habit, of which we have 
already spoken in our definition of virtue as directing us to 
the true mean in morals (^^<r/x«ij Xoy» nod d$ fa 6 fgo'wpo? 
igio-gjgiv); and hence, because temperance preserves this 
right conception, we give it the name <r»$goavni — &$ ratywr* 
tjjv tyo'vi}<riv, — temperance preserving QySvrpts in its integrity, 
and enabling it to judge aright, our intellectual being in- 
fluenced by our moral habits as to moral actions, and he 
only being competent to exercise $$6)Hpi$ in perfection who 
possesses the moral habits in perfection. <f>gov»j<n£ conse- 
quently cannot exist without Moral Virtue, as we shall 
presently see at greater length. 

4. It has already been stated that Science must proceed 
from certain given principles, without a right and true con- 
ception of which there can be no science ; consequently there 
must be some habit which has these for its peculiar pro- 
vince (?£*£ rig fjurcL Xiyov khrfiovg xsgl ran «g%cov), and such is 
*fi$ ; for no other habit which is employed in the contem- 
plation of truth can have this peculiar province. Not *wi- 
<nSjfuj, for the reasons stated ; not <ro$ia 9 for a-oflet is of de- 
monstration as well as the principles of demonstration ; not 
Qgovrp^ or Tepcwj, because they are confined to contingent 
?natter. 

5. A fifth habit remains for investigation ; a habit em* 
ployed in discovering the truth not only of first principles, 
but deductions and demonstrations from first principles 
ipy fMVOV toL Ix tcov olq%wv tiSeyoj aXXx xou *eg\ rag o^yoig akfjr 



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xxxviii GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

Mat), and this is cofl*; which is farther apparent from 
considering what persons we call o-opo/, whom we conceive 
to be not partially wise and partially ignorant, but wise 
universally and entirely, cro$ol ik»s. This term originally was 
applied to those who were most perfect and accurate in their 
respective arts, and it would therefore appear that <ro$l* was 
the most perfect and complete of all the sciences; more excel- 
lent even than ?go'yij<rf£, since its object-matter is more excel- 
lent; the object-matter of the first being in a continual 
state of change and fluctuation, that of the latter eternal 
and immutable. The former being attributed, in some 
degree, even to brutes, the other possessed only by men of 
the highest intellectual attainments. From these remarks 
it is evident, that <ro<pU is a habit essentially distinct from 
IgoVqo-if, and from every kind of fgfai<n$ 9 if there be more 
than one according to the general opinion of mankind. 
And this would be more evident by instituting a parallel 
between them at greater length : for pjAnjcis is employed 
not only upon universals but also upon particulars ; nay, to 
such a degree, that it would seem that particulars were the 
more important of its object-matter, and that he who pos- 
sessed merely a fginja-^ of particulars (if such a thing were 
possible) would have a better claim to the title of 4>$&iftQs 
than he who merely possessed a p gowjo-i $ of universals ; as he 
who is a mere empiric and can heal in particular instances 
without a knowledge of the general principle, has a 
better claim to be considered $g4wjxo; in this particular sub- 
ject, than. he who is acquainted with the general principle 
which he cannot apply ; particularly since <pp6vr)<n$ is essen- 
tially practical. Not but that to possess $qiyipi$ in perfection 
both are necessary, a <p§iwi<n$ of the universal, and a fgovrp-'S 
of the particular ; but the knowledge of the particular is 
only to be gained by experience ; and thus it is that young 
men may possess science, but never can possess ^powjo-if, and 
for the same reason we are bound to pay particular respect 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION, 



xxxix 



to aged and experienced men, since they only can possess 
this kind of knowledge in perfection. 

From these remarks it will be seen in what way vofta 
differs from f g 0*1*1$ ; from the same it may be inferred in 
what respect it differs from nfy. For vov; is of extremes 
both speculative and practical of which there is no de- 
monstration ; the first principles both in morals and 
science. 
. Having then shown in what way w/3wA/*, <r6mns 9 and yv»fw> 
are connected with QfHnpts, Aristotle proceeds to show the 
utility of Qginpis and <ro<pla, and what place they occupy in 
the Happiness of man. For it might be objected, that troflet 
having nothing to do with moral action, must be entirely 
useless as far as our happiness is concerned ; and that even 
^§ovr)<n£, although it is practical, might easily be dispensed 
with. To the good man it is certainly of no use ; for he 
will do good and just, and such like actions, from the very 
feet of his being a good man ; and mere knowledge, or 
pgovqo-i; , will not make him at all more practical (irgaxri- 
xcorogo;), especially since the virtues are habits; so that to 
the good man the possession of <p$tvr\<ng will be of no use* 
Neither will it be of use to men who are not good, but are 
desirous of becoming such ; for why should they not be able 
to follow the directions of others who have already arrived 
at that desired point, without possessing <f>g<foj<n$, just as to a 
sick man it is not necessary to learn the art of physic to be 
healed; it is enough for him to follow the directions of his 
physician ? 

. To this we reply, 1st, That if it be granted that they are 
virtues (as we have seen), each of each part of the soul 
respectively, they are eligible for their own sakes, even were 
they no otherwise productive of beneficial consequences, as 
the objector states. 

2dly, They are useful, useful as constitutive parts, and not . 
as the conditions and causes of Happiness. Happiness is 



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xl GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

an energy according to Virtue, and they are parts of Virtue, 
and consequently of Happiness. 

8dly, Happiness is an energy according to Virtue, but it is 
impossible to energize according to Virtue without fgwyr^. 
For to every virtuous action a good end, as well as good 
means, are required. Now, though Moral Virtue fixes upon 
the good end, pgAnja-is is requisite to direct us to the true 
means to that end. With reference then to the objection that 
we are not at all more practical of what is good and just by 
means of pglnp-i;, let us examine the subject more deeply. 

To perform a just or a virtuous act it is not sufficient (as 
the objector has supposed) to follow certain orders and direc- 
tions, but they mtist be performed from a certain disposition 
in the agent himself, from a correct principle (jrgoaffso-i;) and 
right motives. Virtue then makes the xgoa/gwi* correct, but> 
whatever is done with a view to this principle must be directed 
by some other faculty. That faculty, then, which fixes upon, 
the competent means to any end, is fojyorw, a faculty given us 
by nature ; but if it be improved by experience, and be di~. 
rected to a virtuous end, if, in other words, it be attended 
with Moral Virtue, it becomes pgrfnpri?, consequently he who 
is fgivifios must at the same time be virtuous. 
, The virtuous man must also be pgow/Ao;. For the same 
relation which 8«vrfnj$ (a natural faculty) has to $$ov)j<n$, Na- 
tural Virtue has to Moral Virtue. For as Seiwnj* regards not 
the end, so that it but fix on sufficient means for the attain- 
ment of its object, so Natural Virtue, if it has determined the 
right end, cares not for the means which it uses for its object. 
But since to constitute a perfectly virtuous action, good means 
as well as good ends are requisite, and that faculty which fixes 
upon good means, the end being good, is, as we have shown, 
QpSvypts, Moral Virtue is not without ffrfvipri?, nor <p^wj<r^ 
without Moral Virtue. Consequently $%&Ytp*$ is indispensably 
requisite for the very existence of Moral Virtue and the happi- 
ness of man, and not (as the objector supposes) an otiose 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xli 

faculty removed from all moral action. Indeed, from the 
great necessity of fyifw*s to Moral Virtue, Socrates went so 
far as to suppose that Virtue itself was pgrfvqo-i;, incorrectly; for 
though Virtue cannot exist without it, Virtue is rather, as we 
have seen, a habit according to right reason, which right 
reason is fgot»j<rij. Now therefore we may substitute the more 
definite terms for the more general in our definition of Virtue. 
Instead of describing Virtue as g£i; x. t. X. aogio-fjJnri kfyw, we 
shall say agio-juivq tyoviprei, as we have now discovered what 
that kiyog is which directs us to the true mean, and which was 
the inquiry proposed at the commencement of this book. 

(Having proceeded thus far in the examination of his defini- 
tion, having discussed both the Moral and now the Intel- 
lectual. Virtues, Aristotle proceeds to investigate the nature of 
certain habits and their kindred dispositions, such as Temper- 
ance and Intemperance, and the like. Hie reasons for which 
arrangement have been already stated in the Introduction of 
the Seventh Book, where a brief analysis is given of their 
contents, to which the reader is referred ; that Book, with the 
Eighth and Ninth, entering too much into detail to be included 
in a general introduction to the Ethics.) 

We proceed then to a question which has been already 
briefly handled; whieh both from its own intrinsic importance, 
and the mistakes which have arisen concerning it, demands 
the utmost attention. It was stated that they who possessed 
the Happiness we described in our first Book, would neces- 
sarily possess the greatest pleasure, the energies according 
to Virtue, involving in themselves the greatest of all pleasures '• 
In order to show this more clearly, as well as for the reasons 
just stated, it is necessary to examine the nature of Pleasure, 
and first the theories which have been promulged concerning 
it. All these may very well be classed under two heads ; the 
system of Eudoxus, and its opposite, the system of Plato. The 

f See p. 30. 



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xlii GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

first considering Pleasure to be the greatest of all goods, the 
other to be no good at all. Probably in this as in many 
other instances, the truth will be found to lay between the 
two. 

1. Eudoxus supposed Pleasure to be the greatest good, 
because all things aimed at it; for that which is a good 
to ally and at which all things aim, must be the Good. To 
this reasoning Plato objected, by saying, that it did not neces- 
sarily follow that that was a good at which all things aimed. 
For the greater part of mankind are guided by their inptional 
appetites, and can therefore afford no criterion to the philo- 
sopher. To this objection of Plato, Aristotle replies : if only 
they who are swayed by irrational appetites sought after 
Pleasure, there might be some plausibility in this reasoning, 
but such is not the fact; for the rational and philosophical 
m well as the irrational and uneducated seek after Pleasure. 
And even granting that none but the irrational did seek for 
it, yet as they are guided in this impulse by a natural instinct, 
that very feet shows that Pleasure is a good. The assertion 
that the common consent of mankind can prove nothing, is 
too absurd to need refutation. They who would annihilate 
such a testimony, what better can they substitute in its room ? 

2. Eudoxus asserted, that that which is opposite to the 
greatest evil is the greatest good; that Pain is the greatest 
evil, (being universally avoided,) and consequently Pleasure is 
the greatest good. To this argument Plato objected, that 
Pleasure is not opposed to Pain in the manner here stated; 
that there are two kinds of opposition, the one of evil to evil, 
as extremes to extremes, the other of evil to good, as ex- 
tremes to the mean; that Pleasure was not opposed to Pain in 
the latter, but in the former way, as an extreme to an ex- 
treme, and that consequently as Pain was an evil, Pleasure 
was an evil. 

Aristotle meets this objection by saying, that if both were 
extremes, both must be the objects of aversion (peuxri), all 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xffii 

extremes being of that character; but such is not the case in 
this instance ; for though Pain may be, Pleasure is not, an 
object of avoidance, and consequently not opposed to Pain as 
one extreme to another. 

3. In support of his doctrine Eudoxus further alleged, 
that Pleasure is eligible entirely for its own sake, which is the 
characteristic of the greatest good : no one ever thinking of 
asking another for what object, or with what view, he feels 
pleasure ; which consequently is a proof that Pleasure is most 
final, most perfect, (tiXmototo*). , 

. 4. Last of all he asserted, that the good could only b* 
increased by itself; but all good is the more eligible with the 
addition of Pleasure, therefore Pleasure is the good*. Upon 
this Aristotle remarks, that the conclusion which Eudoxus 
wishes to infer, does not follow foam these premises; any one 
good added to .any other makes the whole more eligible it is 
true, not because the essence of the one is necessarily in* 
creased, but because two goods are better than one ; and so 
Pleasure added to every other good makes the whole more 
eligible, but does not necessarily increase the essence of the 
good to which it is added. By a similar objection Plato over- 
turned thi$' conclusion of Eudoxus : for if, said Plato, the addi- 
tion of one good to another makes that good more eligible, and 
the compound is more eligible than either of the single goods, 
Pleasure singly cannot be the chief good, since it becomes 
more eligible in conjunction with another good, whatever that 
good may be. So that a' compound good is the chief good, 
according to this argument, whereas the chief good is single, 
and can never be made more eligible by the addition of any 
other good. 

, Having thus stated the arguments of Eudoxus, in support of 
Pleasure being the chief good, Aristotle passes on to -examine 
the reasons of Plato against Pleasure being a good at all. 

s See this explained at greater length in the note, p. 400. 



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xfiv GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

1. All goods, they say, are qualities, but Pleasure is not a 
quality, and therefore not a good. Aristotle denies the major; 
the virtuous energies, he says, are not qualities, and yet they 
are in the class of goods*. 

2. All good is definite, but Pleasure is indefinite (because 
it admits of more and less), therefore Pleasure is not a good. 
Aristotle replies, by denying the minor and its proof, and by 
a distinction. The term Pleasure, he says, is ambiguous, and 
may mean, either the act of being pleased, or Pleasure in the 
abstract. If then, from seeing men more or less pleased, 
Plato infers that Pleasure itself admits of more or less, and is 
consequently indefinite, he might object in the same way to 
Virtue being a good, because some men are more or less 
virtuous, and then by the same argument Virtue must be 
indefinite. Thereupon must follow one or other of these 
alternatives; either that the abstract does not necessarily 
admit of more and less because the concrete does, and then 
the minor is false ; or that whatever admits of more or less is 
not necessarily indefinite, and then the major is false. 

But, secondly, if they mean Pleasure in the abstract (ei reus 
jjSova*;), it is not true universally that Pleasure admits of more 
and less. And if some pleasures do, yet, as health, they may 
be perfectly definite although admitting of degrees. 

3. Plato said, All good is perfect, but Pleasure is not 
perfect (because it is a motion and a generation), therefore it 
is not a good. 

Aristotle replies by denying the minor: and first as to the 
first member of it, that Pleasure is a motion. All motions, he 
says, must be attended with quickness or slowness, either 
absolute or relative, but neither of these are compatible with 
Pleasure itself. It is true a man may pass from a state of 
Pain or neutrality to Pleasure (rptvpou) quicker or slower, but 



8 1 am not certain that this argument is intended against the Platonists ; I should 
rather think not. 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xlv 

▼hen in the state of pleasure ($8f?fej,) the terms quickness or 
slowness or any mood of progression cannot be applied to him* 
So a man may pass from motion to rest, or from rest to 
motion, quickly or slowly, but when in a state of rest the 
terms quickly or slowly are wholly inapplicable to that state* 

Secondly, as to Pleasure being a generation. Every thing 
generated is produced from some fixed and adequate gene* 
rating cause; men gather not grapes off thorns, nor figs off 
thistles; and further, from what any thing is generated, into 
that it is resolved. But can it ever be shown that Pleasure 
is resolved into any thing similar to that from which it was 
generated? It is impossible; and these notions, he subjoins, 
have originated from a very incomplete and partial view of 
the subject, from considering merely bodily pleasures ; and it 
was conceived, that because there is in them an apparent 
process or generation from a state of want to a state of 
fulness, that Pleasure must be a kind of change or progression 
from one state to another state. But in the purer and more 
perfect kind of pleasures, nothing of this kind takes places 
for as they arise from no previous deficiency, so neither da 
they have or end in any repletion. 

To those who bring forward vicious pleasures as an argu- 
ment against Pleasure generally, it is sufficient to state, that 
there are various kinds of pleasure, differing as the sources 
from which they are derived * y differing also in respect to dif- 
ferent persons. And so, on the other side, against those who 
would assert that Pleasure is the Chief Good, it might be said 
that then a life of pleasure would be of itself the most eligible ; 
yet no one would wish to pass through a mere life of pleasure, 
such as the life of a child, with the intellect and the amuse- 
ments of a child, though he should never feel any pain. 
Consequently Pleasure alone is not the Chief Good, nor 
singly most eligible. But some pleasures are eligible and' 
some are not, as they differ in species, or in the sources 
whence they are derived. 



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xlvi GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

Having thus examined those theories of Pleasure which 
were most popular in his own time, Aristotle now proceeds to 
his own definition of it 

Pleasure, he says, is not a xfapn;, for time and place consti- 
tute specific differences in motions, but not in pleasures. 
Further, Motion is divisible, and the parts of it differ essen- 
tially from the whole, and from each other; and Motion 
requires time and rdtfration for ks perfection ; but Pleasure 
does not Pleasure is perfect without time, as actual sight, a 
point, or a unit Pleasure, then, resembles actual -sensation. 
But since 'Pleasure attends every act of sensation, the most 
perfect Pleasure' will attend the most perfect act of sensation: 
That then will be the best act or energy, when the sense or 
faculty is disposed in the most perfect manner to its most 
perfect object of sensation; so that the most perfect energy 
will be the most pleasant, and the most pleasant the most 
perfect; so that Pleasure, in a sense, perfects the energy. 
But Pleasure perfects the energy in a different way, either 
from the habit 6r the object-matter; as a superadded end, 
following upon the exercise of the energy, by a simultaneous 
consequence. But if Pleasure follows upon the exercise of 
the energies, it may be asked, why do not men constantly 
energize, since they would, by so doing, constantly experience 
pleasure ? To this it is sufficient to reply, that human nature 
is not adapted for such energies, the faculty becomes weary, 
and no longer perfectly adapted for energizing upon its proper 
dbjectp-matter, the energies accordingly become imperfect, 
and consequently not attended with pleasure. From what 
has been previously stated, that Pleasure perfects the ener- 
gies, it will appear that Pleasure is the perfection of life, since 
life is an energy. 

But since Pleasure perfects the energies, and things differ- 
ing in species are perfected by things differing in species, if 
the energies differ in species, Pleasure must differ in species. 
2dly, Since certain pleasures are proper to certain energies, 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xlvii 

and the properties of things essentially different are themselves 
essentially different, Pleasures are essentially different 3dly, 
Since the pleasure resulting from one energy frequently destroys 
the pleasure resulting from another energy and that other 
energy itself, consequently Pleasures must be specifically dif- 
ferent, since they produce the very opposite effects. 4thly, Since 
the pleasures differ according to the energies, and the energies 
differ in virtuousness and viciousness, pleasures must differ in 
the same way. And like the energies also they must differ 
in degrees of virtuousness and viciousness* And further they 
must differ relatively; the pleasure of each man, or of each 
animal, being that of his peculiar tgyoy, or rather energy* 
Consequently, the peculiar pleasure of man, as man, must be 
that of his igyov. But is it so in reality? Would it not then 
follow that all men's pleasures should be alike ? But such is. 
not the fact Are we then to reject this conclusion ? Cer- 
tainly not For if we apply it to the case of the good man,, 
we shah 1 find that his pleasure is the pleasure which result* 
from the proper energies of man, the energies of a life ac- 
cording to Virtue. He, as we have already said, is to be our 
criterion for judging of the truth ; nor are we to forego it, if 
we find mankind, who are debased or diseased, pursuing those 
pleasures which are not the real pleasures of man. 

From what has been stated, it is apparent that a life accord- 
ing to Virtue, such as we have described in our first book, is- 
not only the Happiness of man, but necessarily the greatest 
pleasure, nay rather the pleasure of man, as man. Recapi- 
tulating then the whole subject, this will be more apparent* 
and will more clearly show the connection and mutual cohe- 
rency of the several parts of the argument 

We have stated that Happiness is not a habit, for then it 
would be compatible with a life of inaction and misery. It is 
therefore rather an energy ; but since the energies are eligible 
either as means to an end, or for their own sakes, it is evident 
that Happiness must be of this latter class of energies. But 



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xlviii GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

of this class not only are the virtuous energies, but likewise 
those of mere amusement. It might therefore be thought 
that Happiness was a kind of amusement ; not only because 
those energies are self-eligible, but because it is found that 
those whom the generality of the world call happy, and whom 
the sophists have brought men to think so, spend their lives 
in these kind of energies, and promote those to honor who 
can invent and discover new ways of amusement We are 
hot however to infer from the conduct of the fortunate and 
powerful the true nature of Happiness, since they afford us 
no criterion to those energies of Virtue and Intellect from 
which good energies, and consequently Happiness, is derived. 
For, as we have frequently stated, the only guide in these 
things is the good man. Happiness does not therefore consist 
in amusement ; first, because amusement is not final, for we 
seek amusement in order to exercise higher and more serious 
energies, and not the reverse ; and further, if a life of happi- 
ness were a life of amusement, it would be compatible with 
a life of a slave, or of a child ; that is, with the state of those 
who have not the free use of their energies, who as far as they 
are slaves or children, have no independent, and consequently 
no energies of their own. Happiness then is an energy 
according to Virtue, that is, according to the best Virtue; 
in other words, Happiness is the most perfect energy. But 
the most perfect energy is, as we have stated, that of the most 
perfect faculty b . If then that faculty be votfc, which seems 
to be the noblest and most royal of all, whether from 
being in itself divine, or divine in comparison with our other 
faculties, its perfect energy will be perfect Happiness. That 
energy then, as we have seen, is Qeoogla. That this inference 
is correct will appear from another view of the subject ; for if 
the energies of this faculty possess to a greater degree than any 
other energy the qualities which reason tells us ought to be 

b See page xlvi. See also Tntrod. to Book VI. 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xlix 

found in Happiness, Happiness and this energy (Happiness 
being an energy) must be identical. And such it is. For it 
is the noblest of all our energies, being that of the noblest 
faculty on the noblest object-matter. It is the mod; con- 
tinuous, man having power to continue his theoretical energies 
longer than he can act or produce. It is the most pleasant, 
for all exercise of the intellect is pleasant, and, as we have 
already seen, its energies are more pure and perfect than any 
other class of energies; but the energy of vrif or taeafla is the 
most perfect of all the intellectual energies, inasmuch as 
actual knowledge surpasses an advance to knowledge. This 
energy is also the most independent, the moral energies being 
dependent upon external goods, and upon the existence of 
other* for their instruments and object-matter ; whereas the 
energies of the mind require neither. It is likewise most final, 
having its end entirely in itself, and not seeking any result 
extraneous to itsel£ Last of all, if Happiness consist in a 
life of ease and freedom from trouble and disturbance, 
sadh are this class of energies and this only. If there- 
fore this energy possesses all the qualities which we attribute 
to Happiness, it must be Happiness. But a life with such 
qualities would be too high for man, as man ; such only in 
its perfection is the life of a god; and only as far as man 
lives according to the divinity within him, will such a life be 
within his reach. If then, in comparison with the rest of man, 
m$ k divine, the energies or life according to vow* will be 
divine in comparison with human life. This then is the 
faculty which man is bound to cultivate and obey, winch is to 
exalt him above himself; these are the energies peculiarly 
his own, and consequently must possess those pleasures which 
are the Boost exquisite, and properly the pleasures of man; 
sinoe, as we have already stated, the greatest pleasures for 
each are those to be derived from his own peculiar energies. 

Nevertheless as man is a compound being, he will still 
require the energies of his properly human nature to complete 



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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

his Happiness. These, indeed, will be his Happiness, but in 
a secondary sense; since they possess in a degree very inferior 
to the intellectual energies the requisites for Happiness ; and 
as being the energies of the inferior part are necessarily of 
themselves inferior. And further they are less independent, 
requiring external means ; and the nobler and more excellent 
they are, the greater means will they require. For although, 
for the mere habit and existence of the principle, external 
means would not necessarily be required, yet for the exertion 
of that habit, in other words, for its energies, they are needful 
Which is not the case with the intellectual habits and energies. 
Perfect Happiness then is a theoretical energy; and this in- 
ference is confirmed by considering in what the Happiness 
of the happiest beings consists, namely the Gods. These we 
can suppose to exercise no other than the intellectual ener- 
gies : for they cannot exercise the moral, the very existence 
of such energies presupposing a state of vice and imper- 
fection. If, therefore, the Gods are happy (as we suppose 
them to be), they must energize, and if so, their energies 
must be those of tewqiou Consequently the greatest Happiness 
consists in decoplot. 

But although it has been stated that external means and 
external prosperity are requisite for man, for he is not 
sufficient of himself to employ merely his intellectual energies 
to the neglect and exclusion of all others, but those of his 
inferior nature must also be regarded, in order to die perfect 
exercise of the others, it does not follow that he must neces- 
sarily possess great means, and great good fortune. For suffi- 
ciency consists not in excess, neither are great means requisite 
for perfect moral actions; it is possible to be just and generous 
without possessing seas and mountains, and still more to exer- 
cise our other moral habits. And this is a sufficient explanation 
of the assertion of Solon, which has been already examined in 
the first Book. But he who exercises the theoretical energies, 
he who cultivates in the highest degree his intellectual 



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GENERAL INTRODUCTION. li 

faculties, as he is the most perfect of men, so is he (in 
all probability) the most favoured and beloved by the Gods, 
as most resembling themselves. Him, it is probable, they 
regard with peculiar, interest and benevolence, watching over 
his welfare as a friend. Such a one then truly possesses the 
most exquisite Happiness; the most perfect of men, the 
most dear to the, Gods, regarding and regarded by them 
with somewhat of those feelings which arise from a common 
and kindred nature. But such blessings belong only to 
the wise. 



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INTRODUCTION TO BOOK I. 



Human happiness being the object of all our investi- 
gation, Aristotle in this treatise proposes to teach men 
the means by which they may as far as possible arrive 
at it. For since, according to the opinions of the Peri- 
patetics, the soul of man is but a tabula rasa, (aJcnrtg h 
ygotpfjutrelcp co jxijflsv wrig^ei ivreXs^ela. yeygocppivov. De Anim. 
iii. 4. see also De Mem. I.) not possessing innate per- 
fection as Plato thought, but only the powers and capa- 
cities of attaining it, Aristotle conceived that it was highly 
useful and necessary that we should have some know- 
ledge of the ultimate end to which we are to direct all 
our actions, as archers, by first seeing the mark at which 
they have to shoot, are more likely to hit it. We ought, 
therefore, to know what is Happiness. 

But before this can be done, we must first inquire, 
whether there is such a thing as Happiness, or the chief 
Good ? and, if so, whether it be attainable by man ? 

Having first shewn, then, that there is such a thing 
as a chief or ultimate Good, Aristotle next proceeds to 
define it ; first, examining into the accuracy of such no- 
tions concerning it as were afloat in his time. And 
having arrived at his definition synthetically, he proposes 
to analyse and examine its component parts, which oc- 
cupies the other nine books. 

This book, then, divides itself into the following parts. 
In the 1 st Chap, he proves that there is such an ultimate 
Good, and also what it is. In the 2d and 3d Chap, he 
explains its name, and the various opinions of mankind 
and philosophers concerning it. In the 4th and 5th he 
propounds his definition of it. In the 6th he examines 



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2 INTRODUCTION. 

the correctness of his definition, by comparing it with 
the approved opinions of others. In the 7th, the efficient 
cause of it. This leads him to consider, in the 8th, how 
far Solon's opinion of that cause was correct; and to 
examine in the remainder of the book other circum- 
stances and questions connected with his definition. 



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ARISTOTELIS 
ETHICA NICOMACHEA. 

LIB. I. 

CHAP. I. 

That there is a chief and ultimate Good — and that it is the end of 
the Political Science. 

FIA2A rexinj /cat iraucra fieffoSos, ofMolco? dcHowtodis- 
irpa^is re kou irpoaipecriS) ayaOov twos €(f>UaOcu finality of 



In this chapter Aristotle ex- 
amines the question, Whether there is 
such a thing as Happiness, or an ulti- 
mate Good ; and if so, whether it is 
attainable by man? He proves that 
there is, by the following syllogism. 

If the chief Good is most final, 
(rtXuormr§9 ) then it is the end of the 
Political Science. It is r$Xuirmr$t 9 
and therefore it is the end of the Poli- 
tical Science. The major is proved 
from J. 1 and 3 j the minor from $. 1. 

By the term V0)*rtxk we are to 
understand that Science which em- 
braces all others whatsoever which 
have any reference to man, or in any 
degree contribute to his happiness. 
As Aristotle himself says, iaSfut 31 
»*) rag IfTtfutrmrag rZt ivtajiutt wr« 
rmurttt »8,*t m. r. X. p. 6 

Il£«rr«* pit 0vt fast fo7 %n ***nt 
i*t*rnfttis mm) %u**p%mt \*ri rt rix«r, 
ma) vdur aymiit •uttftUi ym^ §vr 



W$*T+pn rirt ivtmpug !»•«•» mmmw i*r$. 
ii tut ***** rSf inapt** kymilt ri 
rtXt, tnX»t in mm) rng fiikrirrmg 0iX- 
rt*r»t At tin mkkk pit nyt wXnrwh 
faXrttm ivmfuf **rt ri rtX#f mwrnt 
«f tin kymiir ut\( kymtw kfm, it 
Istxit, rifiut Xtmritt. Mag. Moral, p. 3. 
See the Pol. iii. 7. 

1. wm*m *i%ni m. r. X.J The ar- 
rangement of these words, if we may 
credit the Greek Scholiast, is not acci- 
dental. Ti^Mi is placed before pfAfc 
and «"{«&* before wf#«/{i#vf , according 
to the custom of Aristotle, imitating 
nature, progressing from the more im- 
perfect genera {it yttbm) to the more 
perfect ; rigm being less perfect than 
fAi^tf, r£«$if than «r{««/{iri*. f. 2. b. 
But Acciajolus thinks that Aristotle 
here progresses from the better to the 
less known, according to his usual 
custom. 

— (&**•{] pilots X \*m Xlit Jf# 



B2 



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4 ARISTOTELIS 

8ok€i* Sib KaXco? dme$r}vavTO rayaBov, 08 iravr 
€(f)L€rou. Sui(popa Se ns <f>alv€Tcu t&v tcXwv' ra 
fiev yap elatv evepyeuu, ra St Trap auras tpya 
rim. a>v S elcrl reXrj nva irapa tos 7rpa£eis 9 kv 
tovtols fieXrico 7r€(j>vK€ rS>v ivtpytmv ra epya.5 
7roXX(Si/ St irpa^ttov ovcrtov kou Tt\va>v kcu tin- 
arrjfJL&v iroXXa yiuercu kcu to, TtXq' larpiKrjs p,tv 
yap vyUia, vavmjyucT}? St irXolov, OTpaTrjyucrjs St 
utterly oltcovofJUKT]? St ttXovtos. oaai # tial tG>v 



m-unrtnh furk \iyv. Eustratius f. 2. b. 
See an admirable Dissertation on this 
subject in the Preface to the Ency- 
clopaedia Metropol. by Coleridge. 

It is to be observed, that Aristotle 
has brought forward these four, rix*n, 
/iU§i§t, *&fyt, *-p*lii&H, to prove his 
conclusion. Because there are two 
principles of all human operations and 
actions; intellect (n5f), and appetite 
(Sfifyf). Intellect is divided into two, 
speculative {Intrnfurm^) and active 
(m-(*xrixn) ; so also appetite is divided 
into two, deliberative (rgMUf irutri) and 
executive. Under active intellect is 
placed *$£»*, and all the mixed or 
active sciences : under speculative in- 
tellect, all the pure sciences. Under 
the deliberative or elective appetite is 
included *p*ip*it : under the execu- 
tive appetite, action («*g«$# , in its ex- 
tensive signification) . A cciaj . 

1. xakSt &vi$riratT6 r&yath] 
Wcutii rout ri &y*fit vm'ay^d'^ayras , 
on m*Xms **i$n*mrra to kya6h tttett 
0V *&tr* itpnreu- *Wi£ l£ Xxttymynt 
TtVOf fl"g£ri£«F Tti* iiTty^affif *t*TV~ 

*afunt. »rt 0% #¥# fyt (definition), 
ri ttftifiirop ifTtf &XX* v*»yt*<pn (de- 
scription), JJ»X#f I* t*v XtKpfiirai i* m 
vrrlfut. r»v ya^ ntinu \<pir«v ^rxtra 
ret IftifAtia ffrrif*. ?ri xet) ig Xxutov 



mint*. Schol. 

— T*yMf] This word is used in- 
discriminately to signify either the real 
or apparent Good; and frequently 
rkymin appears to have been used by 
the philosophers of the time to signify 
Good simply, as well as the chief Good, 
The sense, however, will amount, in s 
this place, to the same. For if we 
here interpret it by the chief Good, 
then we must understand the argument 
thus ; art and every thing else aims at 
some Good, and through that, as a 
mean, at the chief Good, (xmi && 
pb**v \»Uf»v rgif to xwtot &ruri.) Eu- 
strath.f.2. 

2. fmtnreu] Qmnrm means certain 
knowledge, 3«g« uncertain knowledge. 
Plato arranges the different states in 
this order, science, opinion, ignorance; 
<pantrat applies to the first, ftgc to the 
second, which is continually wavering 
between the other two. See Repub. 
p. 478. 

3. fyy* nr d] Some results, re- 
maining after the energies have ceased 
or been withdrawn. Thus walking, if 
it be for walking sake, has no end 
beyond the energy: if it be for health's 
sake, health is the %&•* remaining after 
the energy has ceased. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 1. 5 

rotovrtop vtto fiiav riva Svpa/iip, Kadanep vtto ttjp 

iwiTlK7)P 7) \aXlPOTTOUKr) KOU OCTCtl dXXoU TG>P 17171"*- 

k<op bpydvcov eialv' avrrf 8e kcu ircura TroXefUKTj 
7rpa£i9 wro rr)p crrpaTTjyucTjv' top avrop Srj rpoirov 

baXXcu v(j) kripa? ip dirdvais h\ ra t&p apxire- 
ktoplk&p t4Xt) ttuvtcov £otip aipeTtorepa t5>v im 
aura' tovtcdp yap \dpip KaKtiva Skok€tou. fiia- 
(f)€pet & ovfep ray tpepyeias auras eipai ra tIXtj 
t<dv 7rpd{J€(ov r) irapa TavTas aXXo rt> Kaddirep 

I0€7r! tg>p XexOeur&v eirt,OTr)pj£>p. El 8r) ri reXoy The chief 

4CTTL TCDV TTpOKTCDP O 01 OVTO pOvXo/JL€oa, TOAAa final. 

Se Sea rovrOy teal firj irdvra hi trtpov alpovfieOa 
(jrpoeta't yap oura> y els airetpov, cocrr elvai k€pt)p 
kol puaraiav ttjp opefyp), SrjXop a? tovt olp etrj 



1. fuat — %vta/ui\ Avtafitt Tt rht 
<rix*W ittoftaet 2j«s *i ItuXat' n ya£ vXn 
2vta(tts> its It <ry iutaptt 4u*£»uftitti . if 
« xtXSs xa) h wiif JY tit xa) •/ Tt%fcu 
2tneiftUi, its tto*t%iftttai xa) ri trap.- 
<pori£i%ut ?%our*i irtp rt atrvrttfyt xa) 
xarogfafit' a<rX&s 2i SXnt \iyoft.it riit 
vmi toTs yitofiituf xottnr irjji Ti rfc» 
*£osixri (peculiar) U&ry. Schol. f. 
.3. b. etafi^u W irtfrApn o*maftws, 
en h ftit ytSetf \*r)t i£ atayxaivt *•£«- 
raettn rh* tvrraftt %%»vfa xa) xaf 
■auri xa) y avro xa) v^Lrmt xa) 
ifiievt xa) auriut reu rvfxvt^afftartt, 
*j ix fvfivtgafftaTvt SL Ix Twovrm 
4Vti.y%<rai i its f*fl \tl'%x%*4xi T9vt aXXt 
xa) &XXc *upT%qx9fiM reltt TgMiyovpi 
its WfTtyMftxeis ivificu, &XX* at) t« 
awri. h Ti \x tS» its WirrroXu xa) 
fih at) ifatpt fii^tot aircfiatnt vns atri- 
Qam*t txtvra, aXX* Irrtt %rt xa) 
t<rig«v, Jwapis Xtyapit* ha ri Xva.fi,' 
$ort£i%ttt. its ya£ iv) tut Xvarrivi h 
iixT4xh aurZt ZXn Iwafus Xiytrea, ita 



to \xari£$t ata pips ivtarh tttat 22- 
%trfat f •Zrtt xa) al rtavrm rZt vt%tSt 
0*vt6ifiut Xiytrat, irt^iix i% atayxtis 
avfiaift tartfot ftiptt l%$wtt, mXX* 
tent »v xa) t} trtpt. rtavrat 2i tint 
Krt haXtxnxti xa) n fnrt^ixn if* 
IxaTt^d rt y*£ xa) ZftQu iftzupvri 
ra riis atrt<pa*u*t f*i(m It ny xpxupknf 
irpfLXtftari. xa) *v3i rtUitmt i£ 
atayxns xara to Irtpt, aXXk *%Hnra* 
vwt xa) xara ro atrtxtifitttot xa) al 
*To%xrrixai rt*t Ti%t£t Uteaums m«f 
ft xvfiiftnrjxh xa) ri iar^txn ItUrt ya£ 
& V£K fmrn^iat Wtrtj&twvfftt 01 xar 
ahras tttgyootTts tif x\t&\not arofiai- 
tottrt. Schol. f. 4. b. Id a more ex- 
tensive sense Ivtafut appears sometimes 
to be used, signifying any natural or 
acquired faculty, or the organ by which 
it is exercised . For further observations 
upon this term, see Metaph. VIII. 
chap. 1. sq. p. 174. (Ed. Tauchn.) 

14. ftaraiat] If nature has implanted 
in us a desire of reaching to some final 



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6 ARISTOTELIS 

rayaOov kcu to dpiarop. (a/)' o5p Kal wpos top 
f&lov 77 yvoHTis aurov fi€ya\r)v e)(€i ponrqp, kol 
KaOdirep to£6tou o-kowop expires, fiSXXop av Tvy- 
\avotfi€v tov Scoptos ; el & outgo, ireipaTeop Twrco 
ye weptXafieip avro ri ttot earl kcu twos 7W5 

^e chief e7riOTT)fl(OV 7J 8vpdfl€(OP^) A6^€t€ 5* dp TTjS KVptXD- 
endofthe TOLTr)9 KCU fldXlOTa dpXlT€KT0VlK7)S. TOICLVT7) fi' ij 

T^pV- iro^tTiKTi <f>aiv€Tcu. Tipas yap etpcu XP € ® V T ® v 
caJ - i7ri<m)fi(ov ep tolls iroXecrt, kcu iroias eKaorovs 

pavOdveiv kcu ficypi twos, avrrj StaTao-o-et. opa- 10 
fiev 8e kcu tol9 kvripjOTaTas tS>v 8vpdfiea>p inro 
Tavrrjp ovaas, olop orpaTTjytKrjp, oiKOvopLiKrjVy 
prjTopLKrjv. xpoDpikvrjs 8c ravrrfs tols Xonrcus irpa- 
ktikois tg>p iirioTrfficiu, ert 8e po/ioOeTOvoy/s tl 8ei 
irpaTTtiv Kal tlpcop dircyeijOai, to Tavrrjs reXoy 15 

7T€pi€-)(Ol OP TOL T(OP oXX(OP, (OOT€ TOUT aP €17} 

TapOpdvinpop dyaOop. ei yap Kal TavTOP iortp . cpI 

end of all our energies, then it is probable hu pfon. xmiru »Ms it lyxutfrutt 

that there is such an end ; or otherwise # ftb tr^rrttt /uft pix\*t It) wi^«f 

we must suppose that nature has em- jfgw ov? At tin n»t It ro?t T»n*r«r 

ployed a superfluous degree of power, In** ym\ rnt it) ^Arru • y% nw 

has created instruments without any 1%»r rtvro yk\ itrn vi^ar ro ya{ 

matter or object to employ them on, rik» t *l£*s ir<r/». Compare de part, 

which is contrary to all those of her Animal. I. 1. p. 8. 4 ffat InxA w 

proceedings which we are able to trace. * M i7 *«?*-«. 

(•iiPtt yfy, St Qfut, p&vn* 4 $»** 7. ^^iri»r«ti*?r] *{xtumrArfi % 

*mu, Pol. I. 1. p. 4. Ed. Goettling.) r£t l*i*rnp*t **> f*2\k*t £;x'»*t rnt 

This argument, as the reader will re- vr*(i«w*f A ytm^vtm rtt«t %n*it 

member, is frequently employed by Urt *{»*rut l**mt. T$vv T Ur) t» 

Butler in his Analogy. Michelet mymih \**rv$»' #X*f •% *h Iptrw It 

quotes the following passage from the rj? Qvru **ry. I| k*itr»t »Zt r«5» 

Metaphysics II. 2. p. 37. (Ed. Tauch.) tlpipit*t It) rht *Mt Wtfrtpnt *1*th 

to «$ htxa riXot, riwvt Hi l fit) Akk$v ri £nr$6f*ttit Step* (sc r»fU). it? y*£ 

hi**, ctXXk riXk* ixiino. £rr tl pit ravmt rSt tr^irmt *£X,*f **) *iri£t 

Ifrou rtitvrct ro ir%*rot, »vz term ittmt itmpirtxtr xot) yet( mm) t> kymilt 

&TU£*t. tl 3) fiii&t Tuwnt, $u* term *«) ri »Z httta It rSt mlrwt Irrit. 

ri $$ ?»!»«. 'AXX' »l to a'trupt ww«t/»- Metaph. I. 2. p. 5. 



r%( kavfdttuftv IZctifvvrii rnt r$u aya- 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 1. 7 

kou woXet, fi€i(fip ye kcu reXewrepop to ttj? iroXew 
<j>ali/€T<u kolL Xafielp kol <r<o£eip' ayanrrjrop pip yap 
kcu ipl /wpcp, KaXXiop Se kou Oetorepop edpet kcu 
TroXecip. tj pep oip peOoftos tovtcop tyUrou, iroXi- 
&Ti/crj ri9 ovcra. 

Aeyocro & ap Ixapm, el Kara tt)p wroKetpepriPffturtot 
vXr/p Scaaa(pT)d€ir)' to yap aucpifie? ov\ o/ioiav being c©n- 



3. Mm *«i WXm»] Thus then 
we have arrived at three conclusions. 
I. That there is some perfect and ulti- 
mate end of all human actions. II. 
That since it is conducive to the per- 
fection of our being, it deserves to be 
investigated. III. That it is the end 
of the political science; and conse- 
quently the good of man, as man, 
(rav^gwwvro ibymiif.) 

Aristotle now proceeds to explain 
the nature of the argument, which is 
to be employed in this treatise, — how 
it is to be received, — and by whom. 

4. nXtrutri r/f] A part of the 
political Science. Mtfot lrr)» «^«, e»$ 
Utxt, xai a£%n n wig) «•* Kin «t*yfim- 
ru« Tfif +t*jrtxnt' r» ¥ ik$t km) rht 
i*mt»fumr itxams 2$*ti £» put ?£•» fl 
WfaypmTti* «v* Alixttr ocXXk *$Xin- 
*w. Mag. Mor. p. 1. (Ed. Tauchn.) 

Declarat Aristoteles, ethics et po- 
litic© eundem esse finem j qusret enim 
utraque summum bonum, quod sine 
virtute adipisci non possumus. Sed 
etiam altera sine altera ne existere 
quidem potest. Politics enim opus 
est virtute smgulorum, qus ipsa in 
societate tantum hominum effichur et 
cotitur. Est igitur ethice %wuput t qus 
in politica sola ad Wi^yum* perducitur. 
De fine bonorum et virtute adipiscenda 
locuturi veteres philosophi jam inde a 
Pythagora, ut dicit Zellius, " nun- 
quam homines sibi informant solitarios 



et a commcrcio rerum publicamm 
sejunctos." Quod Aristoteles ita ex- 
plicat loco celeberrimo Politicorum. 
(1. 2. p. 4. Ed. Goettling.) " Civita- 
tem igitur singulis hominibus esse pri- 
orem perspicuum est. Si enim singuli 
separati non sint satis instruct! bonis 
(mvT*t*m) similiter atque alis partes 
ad totum se habebunt. Nam sublato 
toto non est pes neque manus." Sic 
nee singuli civitate sublata existere 
possunt. Quocirca ambs scicntis 
ethice et politica, arctissimo vinculo 
inter se cohsrent, ita ut ana sint plane 
eademque disciplina, sicut in fine 
Ethicorum Nicomacheorum et initio 
M. Moralium a philosopho exponitur. 
Ex quo factum est ut hi libri de Mori- 
bus cum opere de Republica unum 
corpus efficiant Conjunctionem illam 
optime in sua civitate expressit Plato, 
cum Stoici et Epicurei politica neglecta 
soli ethics operam dederint, Aristoteles 
autem et diversitatem et conjunctionem 
solus perspexerit. Eustratius: wh 
ravrfonrm *«) rht itaQfbt fa*t mfip*t 
iia ravrvf %t mvrtt wgif «W» inligirm 
n tvkupwti* *t rix»t dim *tXj*t*nt 
tfyovf nitnnt Aput, **) nktrnuit kxxZt* 
MICH. 

7. fo*v] Skn and «<r«*i/^i>*» 
generally signify the subject matter or 
substratum in which a thing inheres, 
and without which it cannot exist. 
Thus Aristotle, in his treatise De 



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8 ARISTOTELIS 

tingent, will eV air act toIs Xoyois €7ri^qrrjT€Ov y Gxrirep ovS cV 

not admit of „ , K K K x , , 

scientific T019 0rjfU0Vpy0Vfl€V0lS. TCL 0€ KCtAa KOU TO, OlKOlOj 
reasoning. T t y „ , v 

Wept <OV 7) 7T0AITLK7I <rK07T€lTCU 9 TO<jaVTt)V €%€l 01a- 

<f>opav teal irXavqv g>ot€ SoksIv vopxo puovov elvcu, 
(f>v<T€L 8* fir). Toiavrqv 8e riva TrXairqv e\€i Kaib 
rdyada Sea to ttoXXois ' avfifiaiveiv fiXafia? air 
avriov' rj8rj yap tu/€? air&XovTO Sid ttXovtov, 
erepot 8e 81 dvSpetav. ayawqrov oiv 7repl toiov- 

T(OV KOU €K TOlOVT(DV XtyOVTa$ ira\vXS>9 KCLl TVTTCp 

raXrjOls ivSeiKvvcrdai, kou irtpl rS>v &s eiri to iroXv 10 
kou 4k toiovt<ov XeyovTas Toiavra Kal avinrtpai- 

And there- V€<T0ai. Toi> OVTOV Se TpOlTOV KOU aTTo8t)(eO'6cU 

fore our v „ „ , ^ , , 

hearers ypecov etcaoTov Tcov Xeyofiewov Treiraioevfievov yap 

must be , , v „ i fl \ » > « /j» * 

those who tOTIV €7Tl TOCTOVTOV TaKpip€9 eiTl(fr)T€lV KOJtf tKaOTOV 

can and , *>* # < ' ± ' » * ' 

will duly yevos, €(p ocrov rj tov irpaypxLTOS (puo-19 eirioe^eTOLi 15 
such argu- TrapairXrjcriov yap (f)atv€Tai fiaOrjfiarLKOV T€ iriOavo- 
Xoyovvro? airoSexeaOai kou prjTopiKov aTro8ei£ei9 



Anima, illustrates it by a familiar 
instance. 'O t tyJaXpos Skti ty%v$, 
ifr **oXiT$urns $ »bx Ivrn i^iaXftis *Xn* 
ifuttvfuts. p. 27. (Ed. Tauch.) See 
also the Categories: If vroxupir? ft 
kiyx>, i tt rm ftfi is pi^ot bvag^vt 
aivtartt X U V* ^ Htl T0 " ^* V i* Tif ' J" 
h r)g y^appartxh h vroxupitv pit 
Wrt tv i»xv- P- 27 - (Ed- Tauch.) 

"With reference to the passage before 
us the Scholiast observes; 3xn i<p' 
'ixawrns jMJihv tut) ri%ttif Xtytrai rl 
vtttxt/ffUur aurnt wifi 2 xarctyinrm 
vToxtifHtet 3i rn r\4t*n xiti iroXtrtxn r» 
it /3/y Ur) * {ay para, xet) xl n-t^rxvrcc 
rSf «F^*<r»> *%*\n* r\ xa) Wt^yuxt. 
Therefore here Skn is the object rather 
than the subject matter. 

1. i» ntj itftMzycvfiiwf] In the 



creative arts. Itffutvgytxxt 2} kiyctrxi 
T*%vxt at mnrtxai, xa) 2t)fuou£y$t/fAtt* 
tx b* alvmt etn'onXovfiiret i^y*. Schol. 
Thus in these arts the same degree 
of accuracy is not required. The 
material of the statuary is more un- 
manageable than that of the painter, 
and consequently less exactness is re- 
quired from the one than the other. 

10. Itbtlxwffiou] UhixTurJM is put 
in opposition to a,*ofoix9vr4xt according 
to Eustratius : **Shu\it pit ykx x*j*(£s 
xx) &i(Zett*{ ro gtirovfiitov tra^terx. 
tvlufys $ta <r<f*f ixrtKrwrtM xa) (upfow* 
xa) ipfeiftvv. 

— <r«j) r£t if It) re w»XvJ "And 
speaking generally on contingent matter, 
from contingent premisses to be allowed 
to draw contingent conclusions," 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 1. 9 

aircuTtiv. €KOOTOs 8e Kpivet tcaXco? a yiixoaKei, kou 
tovtcw early ayaBos Kpvrqs. Kajff Zkclotop apa 6 
7r€7rai8evjA€i>os, wttXcos & 6 ircpl irav weirouSevfiepos. 

8cO T7J9 TToXlTlKT)? OVK €OTLV OLK6LO? OKpOCLTr)? 6 

bv4o? a7T€ipo9 yap t£>v /caret rov fiiov irpdijewv, ol 

\6yOl & €K TOVTODV KCLl TT€pl TOVTODV. €TL fi« TOtf 

iraBsaiv aKoXovOrjTtKos tov fxaralcof <xkov<t€tcu kou 
av<D<f)€\G>$, €7T€i8r) to TeXos lariv ov yv&ais aXXa 
Trpafys. 8ca(f)€p€L # ovOev veos rrjv r)XiKiav r) to 

10 rjOo? vtapos* ov yap irapa top ypovov r) eXXeiyfn?, 
aXXa 81a to Kara ttoBos £qv kou 8uok€w eKourra. 
T0I9 yap tolovtoi9 avovrjTOs r) yvGxris ylveTOU, 
Kaflairep tois aKpaTeaip' T019 8e Kara Xoyov ray 
opeijei? iroiovpLtvoLs Kal irpdrrova-L iroXveofaXe? av 

15 £177 to irepl tovtcdv elSevai. Kal irepl p,ev aKpoarov, 

KOU 7TC0? aTT08€KT€0V, KOU Tl 7TpOTldep.eda, 7T€(f)pOl- 

fudcrOco TOcravTa. 



3. rtvcuhvpitot] Experienced. "AAA* 
fih ytZft's \*rn 4 zetra ri irirrarfeu 
xa) &\\n h xark to vriiretititio'fai. tins 
**Xuiru£i* our* ixatirnrx rSjf xix<wf*>i*tf 
ira^i^tTMi *£0{ r$ xtftut if/Ss ret xark 
rets Wirrnpas xa* ras r*x* a t aron- 
Xovfittet ras iutpirixas xa) tr^axriuas 
xa) **\i<rix«.f. Schol. See also de 
part. Animal. I. 1. p. 1. and. the 
Metaph. IV. c. 4. p. 61+ *E*rt ya^ 
iretihofia r) ftb ytwxu$ riivt 3i? 



inrttv avftufyt, xa) ritm $v $«. 

5. o fits] Following his passions, 
and consequently not exercising his 
reason, at least not upon the subject of 
morals as far as they tend to practice : 
therefore having no experience of them 
he is incapable of judging of them. 
The eye of his soul is darkened and 
must be exercised before it can see and 
discriminate. (See below, VI. 6 and 
7, near the end.) 



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10 ARISTOTELIS 



CHAP. II. 

The different notions of Happiness briefly considered. 

Thoajgu- AEH2MEN tf araAa/3oj/re*, areMj ira<ra2 
8U ™ edfrom y^(3<7iy kcu 7rpoalp€<TL? dyaOov twos optyeTou, tl 
iarw oh Xeyofiev ttjv iroXiriKqv tyUcrOai kcu tl 

Nominal TO irdvT&V aKpOTOTOV 7W TTpCLKT&V dyaficQV. OVO- 

Definition \ i *v « v ~ x / « x 

ofHappi- flOiTL p.€V OVV <r\€OOV V7TO TCOV TT\€LOT(OV o/xoao-5 
ness. ~ . * n »e> / v « x x * ^ * 

yeirai ttjv yap evdai/JLOviav tcai ot 7roAAot kcu ol 
XapUvrer XeyovcriVy to & e§ Ijiv kcu to ed wpaTTeiu 
tovtov inroXap.{Jdi>ovo'i Ttf evSaipaveiv. 7T€pl 8e 
Ttjs evUcupLOvlas, tl eoriv, dpxf>Lcr/3rjTovo-L kcu oi\ 

Theincon- OflOUOS Ol 7ToXXol TOLS (TO^Ol? aTToblboCUTLV. Ol fl€V 10 
sistencyof > ~» ~ \ , «e «* \ * 

our notions yap TG>V €Vapy(OV Tl KCU (pavepCDV, OtOV rjOOVTJV 7) 
respecting x « * / v NN *J *x x x x ' a* n 

it. ttXovtov r) Tip,r)v, aXXot o aXXo, 7roAAa/cts' oe /cat 

6 avrof erepov' voarjcras p,ev yap vyUiav, irevo- 
fievos Se ttXovtov* avveiSoTef & eavTols ayvoiav 
tow fieya ti /cat virep ovtovs Xeyovras Oav/xd- is 
fyvcriv. €vloi 8 (povTo irapd tol ttoXXol raOra 
dyaOa aXXo tl Kaff avTO eivcu y o /cat TOtaSe ttoxtlv 
aw to v iori tov etvcu dyaOd. dnrdxras pXv o5i> 
iijeTafieiv tw Solja? pxtraioTepop tenor l<TTiv y t/ca- 
vov Se ras* pjdXiora hrnroXa^ovcras rj SoKOvaaszo 
e\€iu Tiva Xoyov. 



Resuming our subject, we pro- or prejudices. One calls it pleasure, 

ceed to discover the definition of Hap- another honour, a third virtue, a fourth 

piness. Now all men call it iv £?» or money, a fifth abstract good. To all 

tv it par rut, but when they come to of which there are many objections, 
explain their notion of tZ, all are at 17. $XXc rt %ui aorS] The opinion 

variance ; every person interpreting it of Plato ; which is more fully discussed 

according to his situation, life, manners, in the next chapter. 

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ETH1C0RUM LIB. I. 2. 



11 



M^ \av0aveTG> 8 77/xay ort 8ia<f>4pov<rip oi a9roTwome- 
tow apx&v Xoyot mt 01 em ras ap\a$ cv yap Katinvestiga- 
IlXdroyi/ r)7r6p€i tovto koll i^/jrety wortpov thro t&v irrlrmmii 

> t A » \ \ » ' » «cfc/ tf » « quo : 

apXCOV 7) €7Tt TW apXW eOTIV rj OOOf, CO(nr€p €1^2. Terminus 

5t<£ OTdSlCp 0L7TO T<0V ajBXoOtT&V €7TL TO 7T€pa? TJ* *"**' 

avdiraXiv. dp/creov fiev oiv airo tS>v yvaplfUDv, 
ravra 8e Sirrcbf' tol filv yap rjfuv tcl 8 dirXw. 
to-<D9 o?>v rjpxv ye dptxriov airo t5>v r/fiiv yvcopl/xcov. 
810 Set toZs eOecriv rjxBat kolXw tov irepl kclX&v 
lOjcat 8iKai<ov teal 0X109 tS>v ttoXitikcov aKOvaofievov 
iKava)?. dpxv ydp to otC koL ei tovto (faaivovro 



2. &%«'] All £££«} and xtnx are 
reduced under four heads : sc. 

I. Efficient; unde profluit motus: 

II. Finalis; cujus gratia cetera 
fiunt : ri •$ 7mm t xxs re ay edit. 

III. Materialis; quod est primum 
subjectum : % okn xx) ri iwxttfitrot. 

IV. Formalis; id quo res habet esse. 
h ovttet xx) ri rl h iTfaw.— SeeMetaph. 
I. 3. p. 7. 

3. nxsm] See the end of the 6th 
Book of the Republic. 

3. x*i rSt xtx»* 3 M] " It is the 
difference, in short, which modern 
writers commonly mark by the terms 
analysis and synthesis. In the former, 
we take the facts of human nature as 
we find them, and resolve them into 
the principles and laws of our nature ; 
in the other, we assume certain general 
truths as the elements of our reasoning, 
and deduce the particular rules of 
conduct from them. We have apposite 
illustrations of these different methods 
in the works of Clarke and of Butler." 
Hampden's M. P. Lectures, p. 241. 

7. ravx* ft itrrZs] Compare 
Analyt. Post. I» 2. p/ 148. (Ed. 



Tauch.) *{««{* t for) xx) ytmyfut- 
ra l* t'%"f* *£ Y^i rxvriv «*£•«?£•» rj 

tpvru xx) *£9$ hpat t^irt^tr suet yym- 
£tft#ri£ot xx) npTr yw^ifuirt^et. Xiyu 
ft w{*< n/sxs fA* *{irt£» xm) ytmp/i*- 
rifx rx lyyvrtpt rns x\*H*t*t' JhrXsis 
ft <rg«rt£a xx) ym^tfutrt^x rx vra^m- 
rtpi. lert ft m-0^a>raru rx xxiiXeo 
pxXjerx* lyyvrxret ft rx xxfixxfr*. 
See also Ammonias on the Categories, 
De Substantia: and Phys. Ausc. I. 1. 
with the learned Commentary of Sim- 
plicius, f. 4. 

11. ri trt] Znrw/uv rirrxfx' ri 
In, ri Wrt, i/ ten, ri lrr/r. trxi ptv 
yx{ rirtpt rftt 9 rSlt {tirSptt . . . #<#», 
x'irt^at izXitxu o %\tot % $8 ; re trt %*- 
rev fiit. — tlrxt ft ttiSpif ri trt ri e\irt 
ZuravfAtt. $jot t tftirt$ on IxXtttru . . . ri 
liirt isXt/<ru . . . fyrivfu*. fax ft &\\»v 
rpTov Inrovfttf «T«», u tern f} p& \ert . . . 
H§f. ytitrtg ft »rt ieri, rl ten {ursvput. 
eJov, rl »tif Irn Mot; Post Anal. II. 1. 
p. 202. Now since, in the system and 
proceedings of nature, the cause (r) 
h&rt) is the x£%ii and ywppu*rt£x to 
her, for she commences with it; but 
to man, sometimes the cause {re 
$//<r/), as in mathematics, and some- 



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12 



ARISTOTELIS 



dpKOVW(09, ovSep 7rpo<r8€r)<T€i rod Sioti. 6 8e 

TOIOVTOS 7) €\€L 7) Xdfiot OLV dp\OS pa$UD9. Cp &€ 

firjSerepop \mdp\€i tovtcop, aKOvadrco t£>p 'Hctio- 

8oV* 

oiros fMV nav&gurros o$ *vto$ 'kolvtol voijotj, 5 

o$ Off xf /AiyT avroj vowj prp otAAou ctxouoov 
Iv fo/A<» p*\kqrou 9 6 8* a&r ot^pyjios avijg. 

^m 1 ? 601 Hftw fie Xlycofiep oOep irdpe^4fir]fi€P. to yap 3 
dyaOop kou ttjp evSoufiopiap ovk dXoycos eoltcacrip 10 

€IC T(Sl> jSlW V7T0AafJifidl>€lV 01 fl€P 7roX\ol KCU 
<{)OpTlK(OTaTOL TTJP t)8oPT]P, Su> KOU TOP fSlOV dya- 

Tracri top diroXavcmKOP. Tptls yap dcri fidXiora 



times the matters of fact, the effects 
(r& •«), as in morals and politics ; and 
we ought to commence from those 
things which are better known to us : 
therefore this, being a moral treatise, 
is analytical, commencing with the 
{to tin), with actions and affections 
from which the habits («w *{#«<) of 
moral conduct spring. These lead on 
to perfect energies, and thence to hap- 
piness, the final end and Afx* of all 
things. Aristotle has adopted this 
method as being the same which we 
must follow in practice, commencing 
with actions and proceeding to habits. 
Since, therefore, we commence from 
certain things which are supposed to 
be granted, from things known to us, 
the reader of this treatise must at least 
be able to judge of these things, and 
have a competent knowledge of them. 
But he only can judge i rurmhvpim 
«ri{) rat nxra rh &t$t V{«guf . 

1. ovth *£erhwu rov hirt] As 
being self-evident. Thus if a person 



has learnt to overcome vicious appetites, 
he will assent at once, when he is told 
that temperate habits are produced by 
temperate acts, and will not wait to 
inquire why. 

2. &?%*<] That is, the effect*, in this 
treatise. Since we commence with 
effects. 

3.'Hr<iW] SeeOp.etDi.v.29l— 6. 

9. n/*i7f Yt] Error eorum quorum 
opiniones hoc capite Aristoteles refutat, 
in eo consistit, quod unum alterumque 
naturalis hominis appetitum seu finem 
pro summo habeant bono : error Pla- 
tonis est contra, summum bonum seu 
ideam boni prorsus ab istis naturalis ho- 
minis finibus sejungere j cum vera sit 
sententia, quam secutus est Aristoteles, 
bonum in regendis et ad rationem per- 
ducendis appetitibus ponere. MICH. 

13. t{u$] The first and most im- 
perfect, in whom appetite has the chief 
influence; the second, with whom 
appetite and reason govern with di- 
vided sway ; the third, with whom life 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 8. 18 

oi irpovxovres, o re vvv elprjfievo? teal 6 iroXiTitcb? 

KOU rpiTO? 6 OetDprjTlKOf. Ot fl€V oiv 7TO AA(K Not plea- 

x ~ > * * / ft j. f r\ ' ,ure » in< * 

iravreXax apopa7roocooei9 (pcuvovrat pocfajparcov why. 
fiiov wpoatpovftevot, rvy\avovat 8e Xoyov 8ia to 
57roXAow rG>v ev rais el~ov<riai? bpuoioiraJdeiv *2ap8a- 
vairaXcp. OX 8e \apiepre9 kou irpaucnKoX rifirjv' Not honour, 

rod yap 7to\itikov fiiov ar^eSou rovro reXos. <f)al- 
verai 8 eTriiroXoLorepov elvat rod ^qrovpAvov 9 
Sokcl yap ev roh Tipjcocri pJSXXov etvcu 7} ev r<p 

10 TL/JLGOfJL€V<p, TOLya0OV he OIKZIQV Tl KCU 8v(Ta<f)alp€TOV 

elvat fiawevofieOa. en # eotKaat rr/v rtfirjv 8uo- 
Ketv, tva TnoTevGxriv eavrovs ayadov? etvaC farovo-t 
yovv vtto rcov <f>povipxov nfiaaOai, Kal Trap oly 
yiyvcocrKOvrat, kou eir apery' hrjXov oftv on Kara 

lb ye rovrovs 77 apery Kpeirrcov. Ta)(a Se kou Not virtue, 

/xaXXov av rts reXo? rod ttoXltlkov fitov ravrrjv 
wroXafiot. fyaiverat he areXearepa Kal avrrf' 
SoKel yap evhe^eaOat Kal Kadevhetv e\ovra rqv 
aperf)v y tj dirpaKretv hta fitov, Kal irpos rovroi? 

20 KOKonraOeiv Kal dru\etv rd fiey terra* rbv h* ovrco 
ftovra ovhets av evhatpLovio-etev, el pj) Oeatv hta- 
<j>vXarr(DV. Kal irepi fiev rovfeov aXt?' iKavm 



is free from the storms of passion, and virtue is a habit only, it is incomplete 

brute appetite has no influence. in itself : and cannot be happiness 

11. futtrtvifAtiti] Upon the use of which is an energy (iZ *£«r««.) 

this word, see Stallbaum's note on the 21. 1/ ph fan tui$v\&TTvf] fats Ji 

Charmides of Plato, p. 148. or the ir«» Mkn^tf *«(«3«£«f — suitor ft w» 

Repub. I. p. 349. A. **tT* rk 3<«Xi«rjx& fats mmXtufrm. 

13. yvr] As a proof of this. Such Topics, I. 9. p. 107. (Ed. Tauch.) 

is the force of this word universally The Stoics did however, in after times, 

with Thucydides ; generally with affirm the sufficiency of Virtue alone 

Aristotle: unless the exceptions are for constituting Happiness. See the 

corruptions. Second Paradox of Cicero. 

17. irtXteri?* x«) aim] Since 



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14 



ABISTOTELIS 



and why. 



yap kcu ev rots eyKvuXloi? elptjrcu ir€pt airr&v. 
rptTOf It €<rr\v 6 Oecoprp-uco^y wept o5 rrfv enri- 

Not money, <TK€^LV €P TOi$ €7TO/JL€POt9 7rOlTJ<r6fJL€0a. 'O fie 

XpTj/juxTiorri? /3lcuo9 rt? tarty, kcu 6 7r\ovros 
SrjXop ore ov to {j/tov/uvop dyaBov' xPV (rc / xol/ ^ 
yap kcu aXXov \apiv. Sto p£XXop ra irportpov 
XeyOlpra riXtf tis av imoXafioC 8i aura yap 
ayceirarcu. (fraurercu & ov& iK€tpa' kcutol ttoXXol 
Xoyoi 7rpo? aura Karafie^Xrjirrcu. ravra p*v oSv 



10 



CHAP. III. 

The chief Good of man is not the ideal Good. 



Plato's idea TO #€ koBoXov fieXriov ureas hriaKfycurdcu KCU 4 



of Good 



oi uooa »~~x' / ' 

examined. OUarOprjaCU 7TC&9 A€y€TCU, KCUW€p TTpOCaVTOVS TTjS 



1. \ynvM\utt] Of the lyuvuXm see 
Buhle •« De libris Arista*, exotericis. 
&c" p. 133. as published in the first 
toI. of Arist. Works, Bipont. 1791. 
His opinion is, that they correspond with 
the Xfym tympnti, being delivered to 
his disciples and hearers in a certain 
course or routine. 'EymrnXm ffX*#»frf- 
futrm MtX«r(Aristoteles) rk tutrk tm&i 
kit k{x*f a , »XXtitt *prJipum irnm ami 
lZ*Ttpxk *m\ui i2m#». The subjects 
which they included were, gymnastics, 
dancing, painting, music (in a strict 
sense), grammar (in an extended 
sense), geometry, arithmetic, and 
sometimes rhetoric. Michelet has a 
long disquisition on this word in his 
notes to the Ethics. Berolini, 1835. 

Chap. III. 
The principal argument of this 



chapter may be resolved into the 
following hypothetical syllogism. 

If there be more definitions of Good 
than one, there are more Goods than 
one, (i. e. the notion of the one Ideal 
Good being the only Good, is not true.) 

There are more definitions of Good 
than one ; therefore. 

The doctrine of the Ideal Good is 
not true. 

The rest of the Chapter is then taken 
up with proving the minor, which of 
course must be the conclusion of every 
syllogism. 

In the first part Aristotle considers 
the Idea in reference to all goods: in 
the second, in reference merely to ab- 
solute goods. 

11. ri o% xmJikeo] In reference to 
this theory of Plato, the Logicians 
divided Genus into universale post mvlta 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. S. 



15 



TOiavrrj? {flrrjo'e&s yipo/ieprj? Sea to <f>i\ov? apSpa? 
eiaayayetp to. elSr). So^eie & op taw fieXrtop 
eipai koc Seep eiri <rayrqpia ye rrjs aXrjOeias kol tcl 
oiiceia dpoupcip, aAAoo? re kcu (fttXosrocpov? optos' 
$a/jxf>oip yap optoip <f)i\oip otrtop irporifuip ttjp 
aXrj&eiap. Oi 8t) KOfiicravres ttjp So^op rwbrqp First proof 

of the mi- 
oor. 



mid universale antemulta. Plato used 
the terms Genus and Species promis- 
cuously to express fti«. It is here em- 
ployed in the latter sense. 

5. *fTi(AMt Tii> AXtffaat] More is 
conveyed in this passage than appears 
at first sight. For Plato in the com- 
mencement of the tenth book of his 
Republic, when he brings forward his 
reasons why Homer should not be ad- 
mitted into his Commonwealth, as all 
imitative poetry is pernicious to the in- 
tellect (x*&n tatxit itftci *&tra ra roi- 
*5t* rns rSf ausvifrut }iatotaf), be- 
fore he enters into a discussion, which 
seems to detract from the merits and 
glory of so great a poet, makes the fol- 
lowing apology. 'PnrUt fr T \yo>. xeti- 
ra 6)t\i* yi vis fit xa) a.fia>( i« vaihtf 
%Xfiwtt 4 , t£t t Ofi4puatr$xmXvtt kiyitv.-— 
&XX* tit ya.% **£• y% t« aXnhlotf rtfiff- 
rus «»fl{, &XX* 3 xiyu, fnritf. To this 
passage Aristotle seems silently to refer, 
as if implying, that the same indulgence 
which Plato claimed for attacking Ho- 
mer, ought to be allowed to himself 
when examining the theories of Plato. 

6. el ft X4fi'i**frtf] All the other 
Categories are subsequent to Essence 
(«&*/«). But good is predicated in Es- 
sence as well as in all the other Cate- 
gories. Good therefore is predicated in 
priority and posteriority: and conse- 
quently there is no one cft« of good 
more than there is of number. 2dly, 
since genus is predicated of things dif- 
fering in species, and species of things 



differing in number, of which it is 
equally predicated at all times, it is 
clear that as far as numbers exist ac- 
cording to priority and posteriority, 
there can be no species or common 
noun of number. Furthermore, as 
numbers as far as they exist in priority 
and posteriority are relative, their sum- 
mum genus must necessarily be in the 
category of Relation (*g«* n) ; but the 
Idea of Plato is the summum genus in 
the Category of Essence (*J*m), being 
r$ SfT*s «. See Met I. 7. p. 27. xark 
% to aretyttauoi %a) rk§ ?•£«; **f <rif ) 
»vrw (the Ideas), si itvt ut0%nrk rk 
i72ff, rS$ eueiSt kfmyutuot Itutt ifau 
fMMt. Consequently there is no Idea of 
numbers. 

The following is Trendelenburg's re- 
mark upon this obscure passage, which 
will be considered at greater length in 
the Appendix. " Ethica N. I. 4. (« 
7\ MopirafTtf, &c.) per se obscura et 
difficilia, collato vero alio loco 
(Metapb. xiii. 6. M. p. 271.) longe 
difficiliora, .... accuratius tractanda 
erunt. Hoc vero potissimum .... sibi 
velle videntur, prius et posterius, quo- 
rum alterum alterius est conditio in 
ideas non esse admissa; unde nee 
numerorum vulgarium quorum alii ex 
aliis gignuntur ideoque alii aliis sunt 
priores vel posteriores, unam quandam 
ideam factam esse. Qua? si est senten- 
tia, singulorum numerorum, in quibus 
non est prius et posterius, ideas esse 
posse, non excluditur." Trend, p. 69. 



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16 ARISTOTELIS 

Because OVK klTo'lOW ISea? €V oh TO TTpOTtpOV KOI TO VOTC- 

Goodispos- ^. _ , >tkX ^ » /i *» • &/ 

teriorand pOV iXeyOV, 8l07T€p OVO€ T<OV apiUfiXOV lO€CLV KCLT€- 

<TK€vaQ>v to o ayauov Xeyerau Kai ev Ttp tl eori 

KOU €V T$ TTOUp KOU €V T$ Wp09 Tl, TO &€ KOjff OVTO 

kou fj ova la wpoTtpov rrj (f>v<rei tov 7rpo9 tC irapa- 5 
(pvaSt yap tout eoiKt kou avfxfiefirjKOTi tov ovto?, 
2d Proof. Sot ovk av eirj koivjj ti? earl tovtoov Idea. Etc 

Different * \ * a s * x ' ~ * / \ \ » 

definitions €7T€i Tayaffov i<raxm XeytTai T<p ovTi \Kai yap ev 

of Good in ~ / N / « « /i ^ \ « ~ \ » 

the different TCp TL Xey€TCU, OlOV O U€0$ Kai O VOVS, KOU €V TCp 

categories. <* c > / \ » ~ ~ \ / x> 

TTOico ai apeTat, Kat ev T<p iroato to fxerpiov, Kai ev 10 
r£ 7rpo? ti to yprjo-iixov, kou ev yj>ov<$ xaipos, Kal 
ev Towcp SlaiTa, Kal erepa T0iavra) 9 SrjXov cay ovk 
av eit] koivov ti koBoXov kou ev' ov yap av eXeyeT 
ev iraaais tcu? KaTTjyoplais, aAX* ev fiia fiovr/. 
3d Proof. En & eirei t&v Kara piav ISeav fiia kou ewiorrjfirfy 15 

Different v „ , t , * * , , , . 

definitions Kai tcov ayoufoov airavr&v rfv av fiia ti$ eiriorqiAT) 

of Good ^^, v xxv\~«\/ / 

under the WV €101 7T0AXai Kai T(OV VTTO flUlV KOTTjyopiaV, 
same cate- <? „ , , > , , , 

gory. OIOV KCUpOV €V 7T0Xe/JUp fl€V OTpaTrfflKl), €V V0(T<p 

8 laTpiKT), KCU TOV fl€TpiOV €V TpO(f)rj fl€V laTpiKT}, 

The Idea, ev 7T0V019 Se yVflVOUTTlKT). ' KirOp-qO'eie S CLV Tl$ 20 

and that of , * a '\ \ ' > ' * 

which it is Tl 7TOT€ KOU pOVXoVTOU Xey€lV aVTO€KOOTOV y €l7T€p 



12. Ilmtra] rmt It f «v Myofiu. the Ideas ; upon them only can real 

Paraph. science be employed. Each science 

15. /»/* *ai l«vrrrf/ct»r] Plato, fol- has its peculiar object matter, and 

lowing the tenets of Cratylus and He- consequently each Idea has its appro- 

raclitus, asserted that the objects of priate science. If therefore there is but 

sense could never be the objects of one Idea of Good, there can only be 

science, as being in a continual flux ; one science of it. See Timsus, p. 

mt irafrut rZt mrtnrS* £«) fttmt, 28—9. Parm. 134. Cic. Tusc. I. 24. 

*«} irtrr*fin$ vrtfi rnltrOf w* atfrnt. Acad. 1. 8. 

Arist. Met. I. 6. Compare xiii. 9. 21. *vr#i*flwr#r] Ulo *M nominibus 

p. 288. Sittu fih yot£ rSf *aj«\ev ov% prsfixo eorum ideam indicari Aristo- 

Urn \xi9r4ipn* Xm^m. teles luculenter docet, Metaph. VII. 

Real essence he attributed only to 16. Z. p. 161. quiet Platonis usus in 

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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 3. 



IT 



& re avToavOpanrcp kcu avBpanrtp eh kolL 6 avro? the /<*«, 

N / t\e ~» ' /l ' * * * /l ■*• etSeB- 

Aoyoy €otiv o tov avupoyjrov. -g yap avupanros, tiaiiy the 
oudej/ Sioia-ovaip' el & ovtcos, ov& tf ayaOov. 
dXXa fitjv ovSe rep atdtov elvou pJSXKov ayaOov 
Zecrrou, €t7rep /xrjSe Xev/corcpov to TroXv\poj/tov tov 

£(f)T]fJL€pOV. WtOaVWTepOV 8 eoitCtWU/ Ol Hv0a- The opinion 

yopeiot Xeyeu/ wept olvtov, ti0€vt€9 tv rrj tg>v thagorean* 



Sophista, Phaedone, &c. Aristoteles 
ncut nostro loco, ita pluribus voce 
MUT»ixtwr»9 utitur ut universam ideam 
denotet. Cf. Mag. Mor. i. 1. Metaph. 
i. 6. and xiii. 8. M. p. 281. (Brand.) 
Quam ideas vocands rationem sive 
Aristoteles invenit, sive accepit (apud 
Platonem autem legere non memini) 
hoc subtiliter sane, quod ideis pro- 
prium est, comprehenditur. Id enim 
in ea conjunctnm, ut idea, quamquam 
genus et communis definitio, ad unum 
tamen et certam formam (Ww) 
revocetur, ut generalis notio solum- 
modo in cogitando sita et singularis 
species ex intuendo nata in unum 
coalescant, neutra vero restinguatur. 
Trendelenburg de Ideis, &c. p. 39. 

3. »ut $ ky$h~\ But granting there 
is such a thing as an Ideal Good, the 
examination of it cannot be of any 
service, for if one and the same defini- 
tion apply to two things, then those 
two things are not essentially different ; 
consequently the ideal differs nothing 
from the particular and ctsthetical 
Good. Neither does it make any 
essential difference, as Plato thought, 
that the first is eternal, the other not ; 
for duration constitutes no specific dif- 
ference. For whiteness is not more 
essentially white, whether it exist one 
day or a thousand years. 

n Vi yt ab*t* oVSi paXk** •bf'm X\yt- 
rmt »vTt Zrr$v- 6vt\ yet{i etttptrtf pmX- 



Ao tut &*ipttrtt f} r^orf^ay Xiytrw ovii 
yl rm &XXv9 obftt Uet %U\t obelm' 
£m obx Sit Wtiixtr* ti tlffU <rh fimXXn 
mm) t> frm. Arist. Cat. iii. p. 34. 
(Ed. Tauch.) 

7. rjf r£p kymJSt *ttmt%if] The 
Pythagoreans held, that the elements 
of numbers (r* *£t A{iPf*m mtxttm) 
were the elements of all things (r£» 
itrmt vat rut). Thus they supposed that 
such and such a combination (wiit) 
of numbers constituted justice ; another, 
the soul and intelligence ; another, op- 
portunity; and so on. They thought 
that number was not only the material 
and efficient, but also the formal cause 
of all things. The elements of number 
they called odd and even ; unity, ac- 
cording to them, was formed of both 
of these, being both odd and even, and 
number of unity. But others of them 
thought there were ten principles of 
all tilings, which they exemplified in 
the following column, generally called 
the *um»x**> of the Pythagoreans. 
tri^at, Urupr 

tt t wXnfof 
fafyit, £g/rrt{«v* 
tl^tt, 6n\v 
ripfuot, xttovfUt$v* 
tttv, **fAtrvXov 
QSg, ffxortf 
kyttiit, xetxit' " 
rtT(*yvw t Iri^mmif . 



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18 



ARISTOTELIS 



amd of ayaBSyv avoTOiyia to €v' oh 8r/ teat ^irevavmros 
£ircuco\ov07)(rai 8ok€i. dXXa irepi fi€V tovtwv aXXo? 

l. Objcc- eoTOD Aoyor. Toey 8e XexOetatv apxf>to-f$r)Tr)<ris 

Ti9 v7ro<f)cuvcTCU Sta to fir/ wep\ wavro? ayaOov 
tow Xoyov? €lpf)<r0ai> XeyeaOat 8e Kajff ev clSosb 
to, koj0 9 avra Suoicopjeva /cat aycnr<o/i€va, to. 8e 
woirfTiKa tovtcov tj (frvXajcrtfcd 7r«w tj t&v ivavruov 
tccoXvTiKa Sta Tavra XeyeaOat koli Tpoirov aXXov. 

Its answer. ArjXoV OVV OTt SlTTCOS XeyOlT OV TayaJda, KOU Td 

fiev Kajff avTci, Oarepa 8e Sta Tavra. ytopio'avTes \o 
ofiv otto t&v Gxf>eXipjcov tol Kajff avra o-Kesjr&fieOa 
€t Xtyerat Kara piav ISeav. Kajff avra 8e woia Oeirj 
Tts av ; rj' oaa kou povovpeva SicoKerat, otov to 
<f)pov€tv Kat bpdv KOt r/Sovai Ttve? kou Tt/nai ; 
Tavra yap el teal St aXXo Tt Sudko/icv, opxos row 15 
Ka£t avra ayafiwv Oeirj Tt? av. ij ov& aXXo ovSev 



The invention of this table is attri- 
buted by some to Alcmaeon of Crotona. 
See Arist Metaph. i. 5. 

1. Ivnvrtwvos] Diog. Laertius (v. 
$. 25.) Aristotelem singularem libram 
de Speusippo scripsisse afBrmat. Doc- 
trina Speusippi, quam hoc loco respicit, 
exponitur forsan in Metaph. vii. 2. 
(p. 129. Ed. Tanch.) Jn^<r« ft 
xai *Xtlo0t •if'taf, a*i rtv i*&; i(£4- 
ptwot, tuti &£%kf Ixdrmt •**!*§ AXXm 
ph it^jfuit, &Wm 7H ftoytim, i*ttv* 
$u%nt' xa) rovrtf o*h rit rffoot linx- 
rtmi rkt av<rUf. xii. 7. (p. 250.) tfi 
ft vroXaftfl&vewii &*<*%£ al Tlvtcvyiput 
xx) X*twri'T<rof ve fymi xa) fuiXXtrrei 
f*fl U a^xv *"** lib rl xa) r»» f iw£v 
xa) T*t £**>» rkf &?%af atria ph iTnm 
to ft xaXcf xat to riXtut it rots i* 
vvriy wx itfvt Jotvcu. Bonum Speu- 
sippo nerape non tantum unum ab- 



stractum neqne in initio est ante multa, 
sed finis. MICH. 

3. apfir&nrn**] A disciple of 
Plato objects to Aristotle's arguments, 
because Aristotle has made no distinc- 
tion between what are properly and 
what improperly called Goods. Aris- 
totle then applies the same reasoning 
to that class of Goods which the Pla- 
tonist allows to be properly so called, 
the self-eligible : and even then, says 
Aristotle, they will not all come under 
one and the same definition. For 
instance, the intellectual faculties* 
sight and so on : either these must be 
self-eligible ; or nothing else than the 
Idea is so. That is, there will be an 
empty species (*R*), a species or 
nomeii universale, to which no indi- 
viduals are referable. 



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ETHICOHUM LIB. I. 3. 19 

irXrjv rrjs I84as ; ©ore parouop earou to el&os. 

€1 8e KCU TCLVT tOTl TtoP KOjff aVTOL, TOP TUyadoV 

Xoyop kv airaaiw airrois top ovtop ifjufxtipcadai 
Serjo-ci, KaJOairtp ip x L ° vi * a * yfnftfivOup top ttjs 
SAevKOTTjToe. TifiSjs Se kou (frpoprjaew kcu rfiopfp 
erepot kou Siaxfrepopres ol Xoyot Taury y ayaffd. 
ovk eoTiP apa to ayadop koipop tl Kara plop iSecw. 
9 AAAa irm 8r} Xeyerou ; ov yap eoacc toi? ye euro 2. Objec- 

TVyjIS OflCOPVfLOl?. aXX dpa y€ Tip d(p €POS it* answer. 

10 €ipcu 9 rj irpos €P oTrapra ovpreXeip, rj pxxXXop icar 
dpaXoyiap ; m yap 4p o-dpart (hfns, ip V^Xtf 
w, kou aXXo $7) ip aX\<p. dXX tcroof Tavra pJep 
axJHTeop to pvp % il-aKptfiovp yap inrep avraip aXXys 

av tuq (f)LXocrO(f>iaS OLK€iJQT€pOP. 'O/IOtW Se KOU Dismissal 

v ~ ,£/ . , \ \v « \ ^ofthesub- 

XbTrepi TT/s iotas €i yap Kai ccttip ep tl to icoa/y ject, with 
Karqyopovpepop ayauop rj \(opiOTOP tl avro Kaff r*\ remarks. 
avTOy SrjXop w ovk ap etrj irpcucTOP ovSe kt^top 
avOpamcp' pvp Se tolovtop ti {jjtutou. Taya 8c 
T(p 8oi-€t€P ap fSeXnop eipcu ypcoplfap avro irpos 



7. ixxl *St] But if there be so describing Plato's doctrine of Ideas, 
many things which we call Good, and says : rk pit ratadra r«» •»«** (sc. 
yet these are all different and cannot Universals) ftia$ *£wy'«pwri, <rk T 
be referred to one common species, eu<rfar* ntf r* «-«{£ rttvrec *a) xark 
how is it that we call them all by the r*vr* xiywtau trdrra nark fiiitfyf 
same name Good 9 Does not their hav- y&z «Tmm rk *o\\k r£t evwwpm 
ing one and the same name, shew (Uni vocal) ipw»f*m «••?# ifttfi. Here 
that there is one common essence piSi&t evidently denotes the rela- 
running through the whole of them 1 tion of an individual to its species, 

Aristotle replies, No ; that they are or a species to its genus, &c. being 

so called perhaps from all contributing continually used in this sense. See 

to one common end, (Happiness) ; or Porphyry's Isagog. z. 3. zi. 3. pas- 

perhaps from analogy. sim. 

8. rvxtit Ipuiupts] This appears 10. h ttywrt fyt$~\ A favourite ex- 
to have reference and to throw some pression with Aristotle. Compare Top. 
light on that very obscure passage in p. 117. (Ed. Tauch.) in tyis I* 
the Met. i. 6. p. 19* where Aristotle, ixpUXfiy t»vg U -^uxv- 

c2 



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80 ARISTOTELIS 

ra kttjtol kou irpcucra rwp ayadtov* olop yap irapa- 
Sety/jui rovr e\ovr€s fiaXkov claofuOa /cat ra rfplp 

At variance ayatfa, KOLV €l8cDfJL€P, €7TlT€vlj6fl€0a OLVTGW. Tilda- 

withourex- , N 9 v x t , v x 

-peneDce. POTTJTa fl€P OVV €\€l TlPa O AOyOf, €OlK€ 0€ TCUS 

cmorr/ficus huKJxoveZv' iraarou yap ayaOov tipo9& . 
i<f>i€ft€vai kou to ipSee? hnfyjrovo'ai TrapaXeiTrovcri 
TTfV ypGxrvp avrov. koutoi fSo-qdrjfia ttjXikovtop 
airapras row r*xpira$ aypocip kou p.r)8 eirifyjreip 
ovk €v\oyou. airopop 5c ical ri Gxf>€\r)0r/<r€Tcu 
v(f)dirrr)9 r/ t€ktg>p irpo? njp avrov re^prfp €ida>9 10 
avro rayaBoVj rj 7rw iarpuccSrepo? rj arpaTqyiKGt- 
repos carat 6 rrjp ideap avrrfp rcdcaftepo?. <f>al- 
pcrai fiep yap ovSc ttjp vyUuzp ovrm eino-KOTrsZp 
6 larposy aAAa ttjp apOpwTrov, /aoXXop 8 tow ttjp 
rovdc' Kaff tKOOTOP yap larpevec. kou irepl fieplb 

TOVTOUP €7rl TOaOVTOP eipT)(T0(0* 



CHAP. IV. 

Of certain qualities and conditions requisite to Happiness. 

tatffht nAAIN 8 6Trape\6<DiL€P cVt to ^qrov^popb 
from ment QVotiw* Tl 7r07 ' 9 av 6 "7- <t>^iper€u ft€P yap aXXo 

Chap. I. 

1. «*{&u<yfia] As Plato had as- ing the subject, by considering certain 

serted in his Republic. See particu- conditions and qualities which belong 

larly, p. 505. 596, sq. This is more to it ; for which he appears to be 

fully confuted in Metaph. xii. 5. indebted to the Philibus of Plato, 

p. 269. This is his usual way of proceeding; 

10. vfdrrnt 8 rt*r*r] See Plato's describing first those parts of the defini* 

Bepub. p. 596. tion which are common and better 

known, and afterwards advancing to 

Ch a p. I V. what is peculiar and essential . ?«»i ft 

Aristotle now proceeds to his own •» pint ri ri Wrt yvSttu xpfiptr iTmu 

definition of Happiness : first narrow- *{$ ( r) tu/tfrtu rk$ etlrmt tm r*<u/3i- 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 4. Si 

ep aXXy irpai^t, kcu Teyyrf aXXo yap iv iarpucjj 
kcu aTparqyLK^ kcu reus Xonrcus opoico?. ri oip 
iKaxrrqs rayaBov ; 17 o5 yapw to, Xonra Trpar- 
t€tou ; rovro $' 4p iarpucjj pep vyUta, ep orpanj" 
Syucr) de p'ucq, 4p ocKoSoptfcfj It otKta, ep dXXcp & 
aXAo, ep avrdoij de Trpajjct /cat Trpoaipeaei to 
T€Xo9* 70vtov yap €P€Ka ra Xonra irparrovo'i 
names, coot ei ti t£>p irpaKT&p awdprtop earl 
reXos, tovt ap elrf to TrpaKrov ayaBoVy el &e 
10 TrXelco j ravra. ptrafiaLvcov Sr/ o Xoyos eis toutop 
axf>iKTai. tovto 8 eri pSXXop Siacra<f>rjaai iretpa- 
reop. 'Eirel Se ttX^Uo (fntipeTat ra TeXrj, rov- That the 

*><//)' *» * « \ ~ bestGoodis 

tg>p axpovpeda riva ot erepa, oiop 7taovtop nxuirmm, 

» N \ \ «f N \ v 5k« N « 9 v andinwhat 

avAovs tcai 0X&9 ra opyava, Stjaop cos ovk cartway. 

Xbiravra TtXeia' to & aptorov TeXetOP ti fyaiverau 
<oor ei pep eorip ep ti popop TeXeuop, tovt op jut] 
to {flTovpcpop, ei Be rrXeioDj to TeXetOTaTOP tovtcop. 
TtXeioTepop Be Xeyopep to Kaff axnro Skoktop tov 
$i erepop kcu to prjBeirore Bt aXXo alperov t&p 

?qkcu Kaff aura kcu Sea tovO' alpercov, kcu clttXw 8r} 
reXeiop to koB 9 avro alperop act icat prfBeiroTe Bi 
aXXo. toiovtop S f) evBaipopla /jloXlot elpai BoKep 

&ti*ir*t ran tvr'uug, . . iXX* *•) £*g- is the most final Good t 

*mk*t ra r»f*£t&n%irm rvfifimXXtrmt 12. tad fc wXttm] Ea partfeione USU8 

fdym fit^ot *{$( re %ftn*m ri ri Urir est et Plato, Repub. II. in principio. 

iTuKf ykt l X *p» i*Mir*t **rk rht Et Cicero, Invent. II. in extremo. 

f*tr**Ut « H ) rS* 9»i4>%$n%irm* (the Eadem partitione primus ni fallor usus 

pha?nomena),^«ri»wf UrSt *Xiiwrm 9 est Archytas ut est apud Stobseum, 

rWi »ai tri e ) rnt »UU f typi* ri Xi- CHI. GIPH. 

yw tri xiXXtrr*. De Aniraa, i. 2 1 . p*li*Tt V iXX§] " Quaerimus 

1,11. igitur quid sit extremum, quid ultimum 

10. /tir«j3c/wf] By digressing hat bonorum, quod omnium philosophoram 

come to the same point ; viz. That the sententia, tale debet esse ut ad id om- 

chief Good is most final (riXu/nmi.) nia referri oporteat : ipsum autem 

The question therefore now is ; What nusquam." Cicero de Fin. I. 9. 

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22 ARISTOTELIS 

ravrrj¥ yap oupovfi€0a a« Si avrr/v kou ovderrort 
Si aXXo. rifirjv Sk Kai rjSovrjv /cat vovv kou nraucrav 
aperrjv alpov/x€0a p.kv kou Si aura (jiiiOcvbs yap 
onrofkuvovros iXoi/ieff op tKaorov avr&p), alpov- 
ft€0a Sc koi rfJ9 cvSaifiovia? yapiv, Sia rovr&vb 
\moXap$avovr*s cvSai/JLOvrjaeiv. ttjp I? evSaipLOviav 
ovSel? cupeirai rovroov X ( *P ll/ 9 °^ 0X0*9 Si aXXo. 
•Awm" 1 ® a * P€TaL &* * a * ** ^^ avrapK€ias to avro avpr 
fiaiveiv. to yap tcXciov ayaOov avrapKe? tivai 
Sokci. to & avraptce? Xeyoficv ovk avrip fiovto r^io 
tfovri fiiov fiov(0TrfP 9 dXXa Kai yovevai koi t£kvoi$ 
koi yvvaiKi kou 0X0*9 tois <f>iXois Kai TroXvrai?, 
inrtiSrj <f)v<r€i ttoXitikos avOpomos. tovtodv Se 

Xrf7TT€0? 0p09 W €7r€KT€lP0UTl yap €71"! T0V9 y0P€l9 

Kai tow airoyovovs Kai t&v <f>iXo»v tovs <f>iXov?\& 
cir aireipov irpotiaiv. aXXa tovto fxev tlaavdis 
iiriaKenTeov, to S 9 a&rapKCS TiOefieu h fiovovfievov 
alperov TTOiel top fiiov Kai firjSevof ivSea' toiovtov 
S\ tt/v evSaifioviav ol6fi€0a cipou. eri 8c iravrtov 



16. uVwiffo] Qui modus quis sit hoc is more eligible than without it. But if 

loco non explicat : sed fiV«tftf , hoc est Happiness ismo8teligible(o/£tr«>r«nr), 

posterius infra, nempe Lib. II. cap. 8. to say the addition of some other good 

et Polit. IV. c. 11. ut ego quidem increases that eligibility is to say that 

existimo : nam iis in locis bonorum a thing can be more eligible than what 

fortune mediocritatem quandam non is most eligible, which seems to be ab- 

excellentiam viro bono necessariam surd. According to Giphanius, Aris- 

utilemque esse ostendit GIFH. totle distinguishes Goods into two 

19. irt ft «•«*«••>»] Compare X. 2. kinds, rtm^^i^i»a and ^ *vta£t4- 

attsw ya£ irprrUiiwt •»«•• rmyafi* fuvfat* — Dicuntur bona quacdam esse 

•4£tr«ri{«» ylnrtcu. InXn Y «f §vY rvtapJfuvfMtm qua aliis addita eorum 

3XX« «vft» ritymin Af ttn, i ptr* rit* quibus adjiciuntur numerum et curau- 

rUf xm/etir lay* f*f*i£tr*Tt£o*yi>trtu. lum augent eaque excrescere faciunt : 

This passage is generally so interpreted, ut prudenti* addita nobilitas reddit pni- 

as if Aristotle intended to say that Hap- dentut bonum cumulatius. — ph rw«- 

piness being united with any other good erfpovptva sunt ea quae aliis adjecta ea 



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ETHICORUM LIB- I. 5. 



2S 



alpert&Tarqv firj avvapiOyuovyiAvqV) (rvvapL0fjLOVfi€W)P 
de SrjXop m alperayrcpav fura tov €ka\iarov tSm 
ayad£>v m wrepoxv y&P ayaOcov yiverat to 7r/>ocr- 
Ti0€fi€i/ov 9 ayaOiov 8k to fiei£ov aiperarrtpov ac*. 
SrcXctoj/ 8tj rt (fxtLvercu kou avraptct? tj evSatfiovia, 
7W irpaKTcJov ovaa reAos. 



CHAP. V. 

The definition of Happiness. 

6 AAA' ura>$ tt)v fiep cvScuftovlap to a/ncrrov The defi- 
Xeyeiv bfioXoyovfievov rt (pali/trac, iroOetTou 8* Happiness 



non augent. v. g. doctrince addita per- 
ceptio non auget doctrince bonum, quia 
doctrina in se contiaet perceptionem.— 
Et sic Aristoteles hoc verbo usus est 
hoc loco, et Rhet. II. 37. et Mag. M or. 
1. 2. Idem valet *vy»pn*4tu quo verbo 
usi sunt interpretes hie Eustratius et in 
Topic, iii. Alexander. Explicate, jam 
verbi rations, sciendum praeterea est 
plura bona paucioribus esse antepo- 
nenda (Arist. Top. hi.) nisi sint ex 
eo genere qnod diximus esse ph rw- 
*#4(n6(UHt. Nam in his ea regula 
locum non habet, ut recte eo loco 
Alexander. V.g. bona valet udo et curatio 
et si plura sunt bona, tamen non sunt 
magis expetenda quam una bona vale- 
tudo. Sic beatitudo et virtutes plura 
sunt bona, non tamen optabiliora quam 
sola beatitvdo, propterea quod eas bea- 
titudo omnes in se complectitur. Nunc 
qu&ritur, ex quo genere sit beatitudo, 
et ait Aristoteles esse ex us quae diximus 
ftn avta^fcwfitm, hac usus conclusione 
a repugnantibus : 

Si beatitudo est *w*pffievpiti$ ergo 



cum altero vel minimo bono conjuncta 
erit magis expetenda; i. e> non erit 
summe expetenda per se ; 

Falfium est secundum, ergo et 
primum. Qua) Stoicorum ruerit sen- 
tentia de hac re vid. Cic. De Finibus 
iii. iv. 

The natural and obvious inter- 
pretation, however, that Happiness 
is increased by the addition of other 
Goods* seems countenanced by the 
following passages from Cicero : " De 
summo quidem, atque naturali bdno 
sic agunt [sc. Peripatetici] : cetera 
autem pertinere ad id putant, aut 
adaugendum aut tuendum ut divitias, 
ut opes,ut gloriam, ut gratiam." Acad* 
i. 5. " Omnis ilia antiqua philosophia 
sensit in una virtute esse positam bear 
tarn vitam: nee tamen beaiissimam 
nisi adjungerentur et corporis et cetera 
... ad virtutis usum idonea." lb. c 6- 

Chap. V. 
All men seem to agree in calling 
ivheupni* iv &fr or d ^rw; but 



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24 



ARISTOTELIS 



investi- 
gated and 
settled. 



evapyeorepov ti ecrriv eri Xeydrjvcu. ra\a 8tj 
yivoir av tovt\ el \r}<f>0elr] to epyov rov avOpco- 
7rov. axnrep yap avXrjrfj kcu ayaXpxtrcrrroL^ kcu 
iravri Te\virriy kcu o\<d? cov early epyov ti kcu 
Trpa£i$, ev r<p epyco Sotcei rayaJdov eivai kcu to efi, 6 
ovrco do£eiev av kcu avOpcwrcp, eXirep eart ti epyov 
avToO. TtoTepov o5v tcktovo? fiev kcu otcutcW eariv 



when they come to explain their notions 
of this tZ all are at variance, interpret- 
ing it according to their different situa- 
tions and habits of life. One man calls 
it pleasure, another honour, a third 
virtue, a fourth wealth, others again an 
abstract Good. But all these opinions 
are not and cannot at once be true ; 
we have shown how they cannot ; we 
have not therefore advanced further 
into our inquiry as to the nature of 
Happiness (the «■•' rt #») by this di- 
gression (pfra/WMw), and must there- 
fore commence afresh by examining 
what tvhufiiti*, that is, what the tS of 
man in reality is. 

In what then is the tZ of every thing 
to be found ? Plainly in the perfect per- 
formance of the object of its being (its 
1(y*f)', and consequently to discover 
what the tZ of every thing is, we must 
first discover its 1(yot, and therefore to 
discover what is the tv of man we must 
discover his X^yn. 

Now as every thing has only one 
fyyt (for nature does not act like man, 
making one instrument for two uses), 
it is clear that the X^y§w must be that 
which essentially distinguishes one thing 
from another, constituting its logical 
differentia ; consequently to discover 
the ifyt of man, we must discover his 
logical differentia. 

What then is the differentia of man ? 
Man is distinguished from mere sub- 



stance by vegetation ; from plants by 
animation ; from animals by rationality 
or t'le exercise of reason. Consequently 
the %tyi of man is an energy accord- 
ing to reason, and his %Z will be that 
energy performed perfectly (**r £f«- 
n»»\ or rather ««r* it^Urnf kprn*. If 
therefore this be tv. then tv gift (as life 
is an Ifi^ytm *lvxps) % will be an energy 
of the soul according to the best virtue ; 
dropping the word rationality as in- 
eluded under the term *p<rn. Now 
the whole of this argument has pro- 
ceeded on this supposition, that man 
has an X^yn, which however we might 
be induced to grant, from considering 
that each part of man has a peculiar 
employment (f^yo), and therefore the 
whole, as a whole, has in all proba- 
bility also. 

The Happiness therefore of man is 
an energy of the sotU according to the 
best virtue. But as {he reasoning by 
which Aristotle arrives at this conclu- 
sion, starting on a presumption, a strong 
one it may be said, that man has 
an i?yn> is not necessarily conclusive, 
Aristotle deems it requisite again to 
caution his readers against expecting 
pure demonstration on moral subjects. 

7. w'wtpi *Zt] See Plato's Re- 
publica, p. 40. (Ed. Tauch.) fesum 
r#) iImu <«*«*#* t^ym— "Kfiuyt.— - r A{« 
$Zf r§vv§ &f hint **) 5Vr#w *m) AkXtv 
ir»v§V9 X^ytt, S Jit it pitf ixt/if Wwji 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 5. 25 

€pya riva kcu it partes, avOpamov S ovSeu cotip, 
aX\' apyop ire<f>vK€p; y KaBairep 6<j>6a\px>v kcu 
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(pcuveTai ri epyov, ovrco kcu avOpdmov irapa iravra 
6 ravra dcirj tis op epyop ri ; ri oiv 8r) tovt op citj 
wore; to flip yap (rjp koipop tlvat (fxtivtrau kcu 
rot? (j>vroi9y {jqntTCU &€ to tSiop. a<f>opi<TTCOv dpa 

TTjV dp€7TTlKTJV KOI CLv]~7)TlK7IV &>T)V. €7TO/JL€P7) 5c 

axa-drfTiicq ti? clp €117, fyaipcrai 8e kcu avrrj kocpt/ 

10 kcu i7nr<p kcu /Sot kcu rrcurri £^>. XelmTcu 8r) 
irpcLKTucq tis tov Xoyop tyovrof. T0VT0V 8* TO 
fjLtv a>9 hruirtiBes Xoycp, to 8' ©9 fypv kcu &a- 
poovfttpov. Sittw 8c kcu TcdJTqs Xtyoftewp Ttjv 
kot ipepycuzp Oercop* Kvpuorcpov yap avnj Sokcl 

15\€y€O-0ai. ei 8' iarlp epyov avOpamov y^vyrjs ipep- 
yeia Kara Xoyov 17 firj apcv Xoyov, to 8' avro (fnt/ieu 
epyov elpou Tip yivei tovSc Kal TOvSe orrov8cuov, 
(jooirep KiOapiarov kcu oirovSaiov KiOaptorov, kcu- 
an-Xto? 8tj tout erri iravT&p), Trpo<m6*p.£vr)$ Trj? 

20#car' aperrfv VTrepoyrjs wpos to cpyov, (judaptorov 
fiev yap to KiOapifav, owovSaiov 8c to €#), ei 8* 
ovrw, avOpwirov 8e Ttdefiep epyop (pnjv Tipa, 
TavTTjv 8c yjrv)(T]9 evepyeiav kcu irpaijei? ficTa Xoyov, 
cnrovSaiov 8' dpSpos ei Tavra kcu. KaXm, (eKaorop 

25 8 J ei Kara ttjv oIkclop aptTr/p airoTeXeurcu)' ei 8' 

th, n fyrra ; . . ."Erf orv &v 3XAy *•£• fxty** . . . Vvxns fnrifUf X^yt 

1t»$$ ft iftrnXfUtf 1 Ov }ttrm — T/ ft ; iTku ;— MdXtrrm y If*.— Ov»§th mm) 

mnitrmt iXXv ft ** iy \ — OVl* f*Zt.—- «ftr*9 Qapif mm-^uxnf iTmm;— <t>* ft.it. 

Oimuh %t*&Kt »» Tmvrm Mr** fmjfttf 21. r«*«nl«/«ir] See note p. 33. 

i ( ym Jtxt ; . . . Ovxtvt **) tyrji h*t7 Good and ill constitutes not an essen- 

r« iTnm \*&*ry. f*n *$A t^y§9 n wp*~ tial difference in an act. 

rtrmxrmt ; . . . *l4i )i, pgrk rmvrm 25. **rk rk* •Utimt J^tr^t] By 

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26 



ABISTOTELIS 



ovtg), to avOparmvov ayaBov ^tvyrj^ ipcpytta ylpertu 
kolt aperrjp. el 8e wXelovs at aperai, Kara ttjp 
apicrnjp kou TeXeioTarriP. en 8' £p fiup reXeup. 
fjua yap x € ^ l ^ u ^°P °v iroi€i 9 ovSe fiia rfpApa" 
ovtco &€ ovde puaxapiov ko\ evSaifioi/a pla yftepab 
Some re- ov8' oXtyo? ypopo?. 1T.€ ptyeypaxMko fl€U ovv 

marks upon . / #k *» \ v » #% <-» 

the nature TCLyoBoP TaVTTf OU yap UrtOS VTTOTVTTGHTOU 7rp&rov, 

Of thlS W- 9/iJ ff 9 / ■ fe / *» fc> A N 3 tm 

vestigation. eta varepop apaypayou. oogeie O OP TTaPTbf €LPat / 
irpoayayclp kou StapOpaxrai ra kclXcd? tyopra rfj 
7T€ptypa(f>rjy kou 6 yqpopos twp toiovt&p evpenjs r)LQ 
ovpepybf ayaBos upou. o0€P kou t<op t€\p&p ye- 
yopaxFLP ou iiriSocrcis 9 Traprbs yap irpoadelpou to 
eXXehrop. fieftpfjaOai 8e kou t&p TrpoeLprjiiev&v XPV> 
kou ttjp cucplfoiap fiij Ofwicos kv airaxrip hcifartipj 
aAA' ip €KaoT0i9 Kara ttjp \moK^ipipr\p vXrjp kou 15 
irri too-ovtop 4(f> 9 o<rop oIk&op rg fi€0o8<p. koi yap 

T€KTO)P KOI y€(Ofl€Tpr)9 SiafepOPTCDf €7Tl(j]TOV(n TTJP 



reason of its proper excellence ; since, 
as he afterwards shows, actions done 
by chance or outward force are not 
good actions. See that subject dis- 
cussed, ii. 3 and 5. 

3. lv /J/f rtXtif] A similar defini- 
tion was afterwards adopted by Potamon 
of Alexandria, the founder of the Ec- 
lectic philosophy. ri\t Ji u*u if* J 
w»9r» &mfi£trmi, £«&» xmret «•«#•«» 
£gfrj|v rtktUf, 9vx &nv rSw r«S 9*(sm*h 
mmt* ftot mymiSf urn) rSw \xrof. Diog. 
LaerUi. §.21.p. 10. Ed. Tauch. 

— - 0/y rtXi/y] riXu« y 1* f7« 
X&"* ♦» l>4f»ir## £m7. Mag. Moral, 
p. 10. But this life would, surely, be 
perfect, when a man has acquired the 
perfect habits which produce these 
energies (in?yux4 tyxnt *«r a^treif), 



see p. 13, 20 ; and these fgw will be 
perfect when pleasure arises from the 
exertion of them. See ii. 2. If a 
person then can reach this state of 
perfect habits, he will be a perfectly 
happy man j if not, then no further than 
he can reach it. But Aristotle does 
not appear to think that this happiness 
is perfectly attainable by man, at least 
in this present life. See x. 5. This 
notion of rixtut is also confirmed 
by the definition which Aristotle con- 
stantly gives of that term. Thus in his 
Phys. A use. vii. 3. he observes : 4 
ph igsrft TtKumrii «# Writ' ?r«v [y*{] 
Xdfim % riiv hurrw £{irft» rirt Xiytrtu 
rikutf l***r$9. rirt y*{ l*rt pdXtrra 
ri xmrk Qvetr jSetrtf xv*k$s viXju§f, 
§r*fp**i*rm yimrm *u*X*( fiiXrims. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 5. 



97 



opOrfv' 6 (lev yap k<f>' ocrov XPV^f 17 ! w/w to Zpyop, 
6 8e rl korw y\ irolov tC OeaTTjs yap TaXqOovs. 
top avrov 8r) rpoirov kou kp rois aKXois 7ronjrkop 9 
07T(ds firj ra irapepya tg>p €pya>p ttXclg) ylypr/rcu. 
&ovk amairqreov 8' ovSe tt/p cur lav kp airaariv 
bfiouos, aX\' ifcavbp tv Tiari to oti 8€i\0i}pai 
tcaXco?, olop teal irepl Ta$ ap\as* to 8* oti irpSrrov 
Kai apyi)* t£>p ap^&p 8 ai flip kiray&yji Oc&povp- 
rat, ai 8* ax<rdri<rsi) ai 8* kdurpxp tipl, Kai aXXou 
10 5' aAAew. fjL€TL€vat 8e TretpaTeop kKOoras y 7T€<f>u- 
kcutlv, kolL oirov8(WT€ov .otto? bptaOmrt /caAa>?* 
fieyaXr/p yap e)(ovart po7rrjp 7rpb? ra eirop&va. SokcI 
yap ttXclop r) fjfiiav iravrbs eipai rj apx*}> K <*i 
woXXa avpjfyavq yipeaOai 8i' avrrjs tS>p £77x01/- 

15fJLCPa)P. 



7. «T«f xai srigi] Am in first princi- 
ples. •< y*( Znrfropir rm bgfi* ttlrimit, 
iv&i'X'oTt a&ofidx, iXX* W fatten 
fraluvptia,. Paraph. 

9. mi 5* Ut^fUf] UurfAtf t% ai «£g«i 
r§u ttfixov yitei*»9freu. mm) ya^ alv- 
tarof tU ywnt lAlfjV raw <ri$ a^srtit 
Xiya/9, fih U Itu yiMfitvM rSt *wov 
3«T*v *{a£ut9 Ka) it* rtvr* Qat- 



nreu «*Xm» «f ri nfurv rnf a*M%tms 
%wmv$tu r*» *t%hf ami wXkm rm 
£tir»vf*it*t XpQmtn yinriat If avrm' 
U ya£ rn *4t£nt *prm*u ad h i{X,* 
irafaXaa^dnrar A R f***i"* *{irm*tt t 
ri <r«v Swarms rnt a*M$,%ms #£•)/>. 
Km) U»( ti mm) }/ 5AAh» xir'iat, kixh 
**i hit revr$ pi%»f tutXurm, Paraph. 



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28 ARISTOTELIS 



CHAP. VI. 

How far this definition of Happiness agrees with the correct opinions 
of mankind. 

Happiness 2KEHTEON Stf 7T6/U OLVTTjS OV fJUOVOV €/C TOv9 

4»*£. av/jL7T€paafiaT09 /cat ££ cou 6 \6yos, dXXa kcu 4k f£>v 
\€yo/i€iKDV irepl avrrjs' r$ fi€U yap aXrjOei iravra 
(TvvabtL ra inrapyovray r^> 5c \jrtv8el ra\v 8ia- 
(fxayvei Ta\r/0€$. v€V€fir)/i€va>v 8t) raw ayaB&v Tpiyr), 5 
/cat t&v i*jev 4ktos Xcyofiev&p tg>v 8* Trepi tyvyrjv 
/cat (rco/xa, ra 7T€pl ^vyrfv Kvpmrara Xeyofiev kcu 
fwXiara ayada. ra$ 8c Trpaijeis kou ras tvtpyelas 
ras i/wx*/cas 7r€ P^ ^XV V Ti0€fi€p. awrre /caAa>? op 
Xeyotro Kara y* ravrrfv rrfv 86£av iraXcuav o&rai/io 
*at 6fio\oyovfi€vr)v wro raw <f>L\oaro(f)ovT(op. 

It is an 9 Op0W 8c KCU OTl TTpajjciS TlVt? \4yOVTCU KCU 

ipepyeiou to tcXo? ovtg> yap t&v wepl tyvyrfv 
ayaO&v yivercu, kcu ov tg>vAkt6$. avvaSei 8e T(p 

Aristotle now proceeds to analyse from which that definition or conclusion 

his definition, which occupies the rest teas derived. »i pirn rit 0£<#yt}» murni 

of the Treatise. In the 2d Chap, the Igirifwvr*; *m) rabt Xiy§ot r»vt *vp~ 

opinions of which the consideration is «•!£««•«* r«; *vr$f . Paraph, 
resumed in this chapter were shewn to 3. «trrm rk uT*£%$Tra] All that 

be more or less incorrect, not wholly is real, i yk^ U r? Xiy* ri kXniif 

destitute of truth. In this chapter vm 4 Z«*$f h rj ^iypmrt 7r«v 

Aristotle shews, that whatever was cor- »St rk WAg^nr* r$ ^Ay/tart *utmhf 

rect in those opinions accords with his ™*V wto) *vr$u Xty»fiirt t tnX$t At «7*» 

definition, rrfrm* % rk pit *§XXA »mi for kxMnt i xlyt Urh. Schol. 
**X*f) Xtyfon, rk ft Ixlyi mm) ivfcgM 5. nnfinfiiwf] A division which 

&fi(tc $vhri(4V( ft rtvratr tff\$y$t fc«- originated with the Pythagoreans, and 

p*?r*tut rut 7x«t kxx* h yi n fi »«} was adopted by the Peripatetics. See 

rk tXurra. xmr$(t»vt. p. 29, 8. Cicero's Acad. i. 5. Tusc. v. 85. 

2. Ig Zf i xiyi] The premim 14. #t r«v Inrit] If Happiness be a 

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In^yum. 



ETHICORUM LIB. I. 6. 89 

XoyCO KOU TO €$ tf)V KOU TO c3 TTpOLTTtlV TOP €v8ot- 

fiova* oytSbv yap evfata Ti9 dprjTou kou tinrpaj^ia. 

9 tyaiverai 8c icat tol hn^rfTovpueva irepi ttjv cu8at/to- au **q tt «: 
viav anravO xrirapyetv Ttp Xe^Osm. toi? puev ya/> *»*«**»- 
6 apery, tois 0€ (ppowjo-i?, aAAoi? oc cro0ea rip ctJ*u p«e». 
doic€i 9 rot* 5c raSra ^ tovtg>v tl fieff ySovfjs 17 ovk 
aj/cu ySovr}?' Zrepoc 8* /cat r^y iicrbf evenjplau 
arr/jL7rapaXafifidpovatp. tovtodv 8c to. puev ttoXXo\ 
icat iraXouo\ Xeyovaiv, tol Se oXiyot kou ci/8o£ot 

10 av8pts % ov8eTepovs 8c tovtcov evXoyov Stafjuzpravciv 
tois 0X019, dXX 9 ci> ye ti tj kou tol 7rActara /caro/>- 
Oovv. T019 /tcj/ odv Xcyovai ttiv dpernv ni. As bring 

tsf , « x / . > ' vi^tUe, ™* 

apcrrjp Tiva ovwpoof torus o Xoyo? toluttjs yap » »«« 

nMuttm but 

ioriv 7] KaT avrr/u ivepycia. 8ta0cpct 8c tow? oi; active vir- 
\bpuKpbv cV icr^o-ct ^ xPV a€l ™ oipioTOv irrroXafi- 
pavtiv kcu ev egei rj evepyeia. ttjv fieu yap egiv 
cV8€j(crat fir/Sep ayaOov a7rorcActi> VTrap\ov(rav 9 
olov Tip KoOevdovri r/ teal aXXw 7ra>9 ^^rjpyrfKOTiy 

good of the soul, it must be an energy virtue is Happiness, is attributed to 

of the soul, because the soul does not Socrates, as also to Zeno and the Cy- 

exist unless it energizes. 2. If Happi- nics. (See Clem. Alex. ii. 199. Ed. 

ness be an energy, it must be a good of Klotz. Plato, Gorgias p. 507, sq. 

the soul, for the soul is the only prin- Cic. Ac. i. 10.) The second, that 

ciple of energy or action. fc«W<f is Happiness, is also attri- 

2. t&£«*«] The same etymological buted to Socrates. (See vi. 10. and 
argument is used by Plato in his the Phedon, p. 69.) The third, that 
Gorgias, p. 507. in the Charmides, w«$lm is Happiness, to Thales and 
p. 172. where for other passages see Anaxagoras. (Eud. Eth. p. 100.) The 
the notes either of Heindorf or Stall- fourth, that it was not without plea* 

baum. See also Chap. viii. and note sure, to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics ; Jf\ >g 

1. (Diog. Laert. ii. 75 ) and subse- /' ''™. 

3. rk trforoiftifit] The qualities quently to Callipho. (See Cic. de Fin. 
required in happiness. ii. 11. Clem. Alex. ii. p. 198.) Of 

4. TM# plf] These different opinions the last opinion was Xenocrates the 
concerning Happiness are likewise Chalcedonian, the friend and disciple 
enumerated in the Eudem. Ethics, of Plato. (See Clemens, ib. p. 202. 
p. 103. (Ed. Tauch.) The first, that Wynpersse de Xenocrate, p. 178.) 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



80 ARISTOTELIS 

rrjp 8* epepyeiap ov\ olop re' rrpa^ei yap ££ 
avaytajs, kcu ev irpd^ei. axrirep & 'OXvpnricuriv 
o&x ol koXKiotoi kou icrxypoTaroi areifxivovyrai 
oAA' oi aya>pi^6fiepoi (tovtgop yap rives pikgxtiv), 
ovtc* Kal twp kv rep fiup kolX&p KayaBtov ol irpar-S 

2. In being TOPT€9 6p0CO9 eTTqfSoXoi yiyPOPTOl* E<7Tl Se 

essentially f , „ , % , x x % 

pleasant. Kat o pvos avrcop Kaff avrop tjovs. to puep yap 
rfie<r$cu tAp ^v\uc&Vy eKaortp 8 early r/Sv irpos 
b Xeyerat (piAorotovros, olop hnros pip ry 0i- 
Xanrtpy Oeapja he rxp <f>iXo0€&pcp' top avrop &10 
Tpoirop kcu ra Sikouu r<j> <f>iXodiKaup teal oAaw 
ra icar aperrjp ry (f>tXapercp. rois fiep odp ttoA- 
Aoiy ra i/dca pAyera* Sia to p.rj (f>vaei roiaUr 
cipou, T019 8e (fnXoKaXoif eorlv rjSea ra (ftvcrei 
rjSea. TOiavra 8 ou $car aperr/p irpaj-ets, axrre #call5 
tovtoi9 eioiv rjbelcu kcu Kaff auras, ovdep Sri 
irpo&Seirai TTJ9 r/Sopijs 6 fiios clutcov coairep irepi- 
awrQV Two?, aXX! e\ei tijp tjSoptjp ep eavrco. irpos 
rois elprjfiepois yqtp ovtf eorlp ayaOo? 6 fiy \aipa>p 
reus KaXals Trpa^eaip' ovre yap SIkoiop ovSeh op 20 
emoi top firj yaipopra r<£ SiKaiowpayeip, our 
eXevOepiop top firj \aipopra rah eXevOepiois 
nrpd^eaip' Ofioico? 8e Kal eirl t£>p dXXcop. el IS 
ovra> 9 ko0' auras av elep at Kar aperr/p irpa^eis 

3. In con- rideiai. 'AAAa uvp Kal ayaBal ye kou KaXaL 25 

taining all s , t « y 

excellent Kat fiaXiara rovTiop eKaorop, earep KaXcos Kplvei 

qualities. ' 

8. ftsrfa] As being an energy or pendebantur. VICTOR. 
at least inseparably allied to it. 26. %Ui(] If, as is the fact. This 

17. «*f^M»mv] As an amulet. *t£t- particle gives a precision and firmness 

«Srr« enim haec Greci vocabant qua to the word to which it belongs. See 

a superstitiosis mulieribus infantium some ingenious remarks upon it in 

collo ad fascinationes amoliendas ap- Mr. Sewell's Hora Philol. p. 42. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 6. 81 

irepi ahr&v 6 awovSeuos* Kplvti 8 w ehro/itv. 
apiorov apa kcu kolWiotov kou tJSiotov rf evScu- 
pjovia, kcu ov Suoptarcu ravra Kara to At/Xiokop 
erriypafifia' 

5 xoAAiorov to foxaiOTOTOv, kmorov o* uy wt/rfiV 

jjo*iorov 8e we^u^' o3 tij egat to Tt^fTv. 

airavra yap virapyti ravra reus apurraus ivepyucus" 
ravras 8e, r/ piap tovtodv tt)p dpUmjv, (fxifiiv 
€ivai ttjv cvSoupoviav. <&alverai 8 opsone /col Yet it r«- 

10 rS>v itcros ayaB&v irpocrSeofiew), KoBaarep tciropuev* extern*! 

* * f \*>«/fc \ N \ / good*. 

aovvarov yap ff ov paoiov ra tcaAa irparrcur 
axppriyqrov ovra. voXXa /i€V yap Trparrerou, 
KaOairep Si opyav&v, Sia (f)i\cop kou irXovrov kou 
iroXiriKT)? Svvdfieco?' €VL(OV 8* rrfrcop^voi pinralvovai 
15 ro pxiKapioV) oiov €vy€V€ia9 9 evrtKvias, KaKkov? 
ov iravv yap evSaipovtKO? 6 tt/v IBeav Travaioyr\$ 
r) Svayevr/? rj /xoiwn/y kou areKvos, en 8 lar<o$ 



27. *{/»«— i r*#i*«Tw] The good dicerent. GIPH. But Theophrastus 

man is the rule and measure of all carried out this doctrine to a far greater 

things : whatever he says is true. He extent than his master : asserting that 

says that energies according to virtues with ill fortune, or grief, or bodily 

are the noblest, the most pleasant, the pain, Happiness could by no means 

most excellent of all things; therefore, consist, (conjungi beatam vitam nullo 

this definition of Happiness, as consisting modo posse putavit Cic. de Fin. v. 

of such energies, has all these qualities. 26. and Acad. i. 9. with the notes of 

4. vytainn] Compare the mXtn in Goerenz.) But according to Aristotle, 

Athenaeus, 694. E. and Plato's Gorg. Happiness requires external goods, not 

p. 44. n. Stallb. as part of its essence, but its instru- 

8. Qainrai * Zf&#t] Certum est ments. Sciences and arts are in them- 

Aristotelem et Peripateticos omnes et selves perfect : the science of physic is 

in primis Theophrastum (quern gravis- in itself perfect, yet cannot be exercised 

sime reprehendit hoc nomine Cicero without external means, as drugs, &c. 

de Finibus, v. 5. et Tuscul. v. 30.) yet no one would say that these make 

multum his bonis tribuisse adeo ut sine part of the science of physic. See Cic. 

iis beathudinem non consistere posse Acad. I. 6. 



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32 



ARISTOTELIS 



V 



7Jttov 9 el T<p TrdyKOKOi ttouScs eiev y <f)t\oi> 
ayadol ovres tsOvoxtiv. KaOanrtp odv elirofiev, eotice 
TrpoaSetcrdou koi ttjs roiavrr)? evrjfxepia?' oQev cZy 
ravro TaTTOvaiv ivioi Trjv €vrv\iav rjj cvSaipovla, 
crcpot 8e tt)v aperrjP. 5 



CHAP. VII. 

Whether man is the cause of his own happiness or not. 

onu^*" O0EN kcu airoparai irorepov iari fioOr/rov 10 

ness. * tOlOTOV 7J oXAo)? 7TG)9 acrKTJTOV, Tj KOLTOL TLVOL 

delay (tolpav i) kcu Sta rvyrjv 7rapayii/erai. el p&v 



23. 1mm] The Cyrenaics, and subse- 
quently the Epicureans; trips the 
Cynics, and the Stoics. Mich. 

Chap. VII. 

After having discussed the definition 
of Happiness, and considered it in the 
Category of Mm % Aristotle now pro- 
ceeds to examine it in reference to the 
other Categories. In this chapter of 
its efficient cause h &{%h Uu h xinmt. 
In the next «*«rf. In the 8th, t^is 
n. In the 9th, *m». In the 10th, 
«•«/. All which accidentia arise out of 
the definition, and are of great service 
in clearing and explaining it. 

The question discussed in this chap- 
ter arises from the final remarks of the 
last: for since external goods are 
needful to Happiness, insomuch that 
some have considered them as an 
essential part of it, we must imme- 
diately inquire whether it arises from 
external or internal causes. Aristotle 
says, granting that both may have an 
influence in producing it, the consider- 



ation of the first is no part of a moral 
or political treatise. That man it the 
cause of his own happiness, is clear 
from its falling in with the general 
feeling and practice of mankind as 
exemplified in the conduct of legisla- 
tors; and also from the definition 
which we have formed of it in our 
Fifth Chapter. 

7. 4$ia9 ft$7{*v] He glances at 
Plato, who in his dialogue of Meno, 
p. 93, rejecting all other causes, as- 
serted that God only was the cause of 
virtue, and consequently Happiness. 
(See, however, Stallbaum's Introduc- 
tion to the Protagoras and the Laches.) 
Of course it is not to be imagined that 
the different and conflicting opinions 
respecting the origin and nature of vir- 
tue put forth by Plato in these dia- 
logues were seriously held by him. 
What were Plato's real opinions we 
have yet to learn. For the object of 
almost all his dialogues, particularly 
on this subject, was not to build new 
theories, but to expose the emptiness 
and folly of such as were already 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 7. 



S3 



odv kcu aXXo n tori Oecov Stoprjfui avOpdnrovSy 
evXoyov kcu ttjv €i)8aifiopiav dcoaSorov etvcu, kcu 
fiaXicrra tS>v avOpamivcov ocrcp fieXnarov. aXXa 
tovto (lev lacos aXkrjs av eirj aTcc'i/rea)? otKeiorepoVj 
hfyaiverai 8e Kav el fir/ OtoTrefnrros ioriv aXXa 8t* 
dpcrr/v Kai nva fiddrjcriv r/ aatcrjcrtv 7rapayiv€rcu 9 
tcov Ouorarcov elvaC to yap rqs apcTrjs aOXov 
kou reXos apiorop eivcu <f>aiv€T(u kcu Ouov ri kcu 
fiaKapiov. eirj 8' av kcu ttoXvkolvov' Svvarov yap 
10 xmapigai iracri rois fir/ Trenrqp<&p.£vois irpo? aperrjv 

8ia Two? fiaOrjaecDS Kal eTrifxcXelas. Ei tf iarlv Notchance; 

ovrco peXrtov r) ma rvyrjv evoaifiovuv, evXoyov 

€)(€LV OVTCD9, €?7T6/0 TO, Kara <j>V<riV> G>9 ol6v T€ 



popular. To clear the ground for 
true philosophy, and a right apprehen- 
sion of things by the removal of error 
and prejudice, by showing men how 
little they knew of those very things of 
which they fancied they knew most. 
Thus illustrating the interpretation of 
the Delphic oracle given by his mas- 
ter Socrates. Who being asked, why 
Apollo had declared him to be the 
wisest man of Greece; replied, that 
whereas others thought they knew 
something, he was convinced he knew 
nothing. See Cicero's Acad. i. 4. 

9. veXuxuw] And must be common 
to all: which it would not be, if the 
Gods only were the authors of it. 

13. tftri{ — *i$vMtf] If, as is the 
fact, things according to nature are, 
and are so produced, as is the best way 
possible for them to be. In reasoning 
upon morals, Plato and Aristotle were 
perhaps, the first of all philosophers 
who considered things not as they are, 
but as they ought to be ; not as they 
actually appear to us externally, and 



upon a superficial view, but as they 
would appear if their tendencies were 
allowed unlimited scope. The argu- 
ment from final causes was perfectly 
understood and recognized, and was 
carried out to its fullest extent in the 
Republic of Plato, particularly in the 
discussion concerning Justice and In- 
justice. From this view of the trans- 
cendental nature of moral philosophy, 
from seeing that man's moral energies 
are in this present life confined and 
pinioned, and that vice is an imper- 
fect and unnatural state, Aristotle 
assumed it for an indisputable fact, 
that whatever is best, is natural, and 
conversely whatever is natural, is 
best. On the same ground, he con- 
stantly refers to the good man, his prin- 
ciples and actions, as the standard 
and criterion of all moral truth, he 
alone being in a state of nature, and 
alone, from the standard within him- 
self, capable oi judging of what is 
right and wrong. (}« r«*«-i7» ir r»T§ 
xmrk Qvnv \%*tm paWo* r* $v*u, zm) 



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34 



ARISTOTELIS 



KoXXlOTCL *X €iP l OVT<0 7T€<f)VK€V. 6fJLol(0$ 8e KQU TQ. 

Kara rlyyr\v koi iraaav curlew, kou fiaAiora Kara 

ttjv apiorrjv* to 8e p£yi&TOV kou kolKXlotov 

Proved also eVir/je^at Tvyrj Xiav nXr/fi/ieXes av etrj. 2iyx- 

Definition, (f}aj/€$ & €OtI KOU €K TOV XoyOV TO (flTOVfJLCPOV* 5 

eifyr/rou yap ^vyrjs ivepyeta kwt aperr/v irova to. 

Ttbv 8e Xomtbv ayad&v ra fiev imapytiv avayKaiov, 

ra 8c avvepya kcu xp^atfia 7r4(f>VK€v opyaviK(o$. 

And from 'OfioXoyovfiei/a 8e ravr av eirj teal tois kv apyrf 

the end of TO yap T7J9 7roXlTlK7)9 TeXo? OLpKTTOV €Tl&€fl€V, 10 
cal Science. aVTTj 8e irXuaTtfV i7TLfl€X€taV 7TOl€LTai TOV 7TOIOV9 

Tiva? kou dyaOov? tovs iroXiras iroirjcrai kou 

7TpaKTlKOV9 TG>V KOlX£>V. €LKOTG)$ OVV OVT€ fioVV 

ovt€ twirov ovt€ aXXo t£>v focov ovSev evSai/iov 
Xeyo/iev' ovSev yap ovtcdv olop re Koivayvrjo-ai 15 
Totavrrf? evepyeia?. 81a ravrr/u 8e tt/u ouriav ovSe 



jSfX«wr« tiaxt'ifitftv xot) Kara rSfut 
Mai uaret *po%n* idf**** tut^nrUt. 
Pol. i. 2.) Equally as Plato, he 
conceived that man when depraved 
by vice, when his moral tendencies 
were perverted or prevented from 
developing themselves, was no more 
in a state of nature, than a tree 
whose growth has been stunted, whose 
leaves are become discoloured from 
disease, can be considered in its natu- 
ral condition; nor would it be more 
unphilosophical to draw inferences 
from such a specimen as to the nature 
of trees, than it would be to argue 
as to the nature of man, his ipy* or 
his habit, from what is generally and 
incorrectly considered to be his natural 
condition. Phys. A use. in. 3 — 9. vii. 3. 
Metaph. i. 3. Cic. Acad. i. 5 and 6. 



and Butler's ii. Serm. on Human 
Nature. 

4. rvxy] Since Happiness is a 
most excellent effect, it is contrary to 
analogy to attribute its production to 
an ignoble cause, to chance. For in 
all other cases, in nature and art, 
effects the most perfect are produced 
in the best way for them to be pro- 
duced, that is to say, from the best 
causes, or causes which have the best 
tendency to produce them. It is pro- 
bable, therefore, that as Happiness is 
the most perfect and valuable of all 
effects, it is produced by such a 
cause. 

9. v$7c b •{%$] With what teas 
said at the commencement of the trea- 
tise. Namely, that the chief Good, or 
Happiness, is the end of the Political 
Science. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 8. S5 

naif evSaifuop €<rrip m ovttco yap irpaKTUcb? r&v 
Toiovrtov 8ia ttjp rjXtKiap' ol 8e Xcyofiepot Sta rrfp 
iXiriSa fiaKapl£ovrat. Sci yap, aoirep ctiro/icp, 
teal aperr}? reXelav teal (3iov rcXetov. 7roXXal yap 
& fiervtfioXal ylvovrax kcu Trauroiat r6\at Kara top 
&iop, teal ip8€\(erat top fiaXicrr cvOrjpovpra /t€- 
yaXcus <rvfi(f)opai? 7T€pnr€(r€tp erfi yrjpay?, /caOcnrep 

€P TOI? TJpmKOL? 7T€pl TlptdflOV flU0€V€Tat' TOP $€ 

Toiavrai? xprjcrafiepop rv\ a ^ ***> rcXcvrrjaapra 
10 aOXlco? ovSel? evSat/iopifiet. 



CHAP. VIII. 

Whether internal prosperity be an adjunct of, or essential to, 
Happiness. 

11 ITOTEPON odp oi>& aXXop ovSepa av6 pa- The opinio* 

»a / cf * y~ % v* ' v °' Solon in 

ir<op evdaifioPKrreop cos* ov gg, Kara ZoXeopa favour of 



Having observed in the last chapter, \%m rZv ifinn^uf ku) *{nrfit/Ttg*t 4 
that he who dies involved in the greatest Qptipaif r*7t **tt*-ahU™i{ <pi<ri<n x*i 
misfortunes could not be called happy, Vo\out »b% jVr«t rut &*ohi%u>r hk 
Aristotle is led further to enquire, can y«£ ri %x Uf 1* r *»f ty***"*'** •/*/** 
no one then be happy whilst he lives, i^Sn* htf»i. vi. 9. ult. Hence the 
since all are subject to die in such very general reference both in Plato 
calamities'! Solon affirmed that no one and Aristotle to proverbs and the say- 
could. The truth of which opinion ings of the poets : and the constant 
must now be examined. For if it be recurrence to nominal definitions as 
true, that external prosperity is euential expressing the general sense of man- 
to Happiness, it ought to have been kind, as records of their analysis and 
included in the definition, and it is observation. See Cic. Acad. i. 8. 
wrong to consider it as a mere ad- p. 29, 2. n. 

junct. And here it is worthy to be 11. wirx^v »Zt] De hac questione 

observed, the attention paid by the multa extant veterum testimonia in 

ancient philosophers to the opinions utramque partem.— Plato quoque in 

and sayings of the wise, and of the gene- Epinomide existimat in hac vita nemi- 

rality of mankind ; according to Aris- nem pfster sapientem esse beatum, 

totle's own sentiments, Jm h7 «f»r- post mortem autem alios quogua qui 

d2 



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86 ARISTOTELIS 

external $% yj)€<DV TCXo? OpSiP ; €1 &€ 8fJ KOU 0€T€OP 
discussed. OVTCD?, apa /€ KOU €OTlP CvSaifUDP TOT€ €7T€l8aV 

diroOdpy ; rj tovto ye TraireAaJy aroirov, aWco? 
re kou rots Xeyovap tjjjup ipcpyetdp riva tt)p 
€v8atfJLOPiav ; el 8e firj Xeyoficp top T€0P€&rah 
evSalfJLOPa, firjSc ^oXoop tovto &ovX€tou 9 aXX* ore 
TJ)PtKavra dp Tt? our(f>aXm fJUZKapiaeiep avdpamov 

CDS' €KTOf tjSrj TG>P KOK&P OPTOL KOU T&P SvOTVffl 
fJUZTGDP, €\€t f**V KOU TOUT dfl^lO-fi^TrjO'lp TIPGL* 

8ok€l yap elpai ti ry TtOpe&n kou kolkop kcu 10 
dyaBoPy ehrcp kcu to> tfipri jit} ouaOapofiepcp Se, 

diOP TtfJLCU KOU CLTlflicU KOI T€KP(DP KOU oXcO? OLTTO- 

yopcDP €V7rpa£tou re kou 8varrvxwu> diropiap 8e 
kou Tavra irapcxci' T<p yap fiaKaplcos fiefiuoKOTL 
fi€XP l YVP ** KaL TcXcvrrjo-aPTt Kara Xoyop epSe-is 
\€tou 7roXXd? ficrafioXd? <rv/JLfiaiP€ip wepl tow 
iKydpovsy Kal tow p.€P avra>p dyadow elpai kou 
tv\(UP fiiov tov Kar d£iap 9 tow & 4% kpaPTias. 
SfjXop & otl kou Toi? diroary]pacri 7rpo9 tow 
yovtis 7raPTo8a7T(09 *X €ll/ a ^"°W ipSexercu. otowop^o 
8rj yipoiT civ j el <rvfifi€TafidXAoi Kal 6 T€0pe<6s 
kou ylpocTO 6t€ flip €v8alfia)P ttolXlp 8 dOXios. 
otottop 8e Kal to /irjStP firfS iwi Tipa xpovop 



vixerant et sapientes maxime. Cum significak Sed hie de tempore non* 

Aristotele faciunt Stoici. (Cic. de nulli accipiunt : hoc est, fieri posse 

Finib. iii. 22.) Et Cicero ipse. (lb. ii. longo temporis intervallo, ut liberi a 

27.) GIPH. This question is dis- parentibus suis et majoribus degene- 

cussed by Cicero in the passages above rent : ut avus fortasse fuerit vir bonus, 

quoted. nepos nequam. Ego cum Eustratio 

15, xara \ty$t] In a state of prospe- a*i<rrtif*a idem quod awreifn, hoc 

rity in accordance with his life. est degenerationem seu defectionem a 

19* r§7g krtrrnpmtt] itwiwrn/ut parentum moribus, valere existimo. 

plerumque loci intervallum et spatium GIPH. See Aristot. Rhet. ii. 15. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 8. 87 

crvviKVtlcrOcu ra tS>p tuyoiKov toT? yopcvatp. aAA* 
kiraviriov kiri to irporepov a7roprj0ep* ro^a yap 

av 0€COp7)0€ir) KCU TO PVP €7Tl£r]TOVfl€POP i£ itcuvov. 

E2 8rj to Te\os bpap Set kcu tot€ fjuiKapifap&oioit* opi- 
$€Kacrroi> ov\ (09 ovra jiaKapiop aAA ori wpoTepopdnctdad 

TIP, 7TG)S OVK CLT07TOP, €C OT tOTlP CVOOUfJUOPy flT] 

aXriOeva-eTou /car avrou to xmdpyop 8ta to firf 
fiovXeaOai tovs tjbpras cvSoufiopifap Sea tcl? 
li€Taf3o\d?, /ecu 8ta to /jlopi/wp ti tjjp tvSaijiopiap 
tOV7r€i\7j<l>€pai kou fir/ScLfim? €Vfi€Taj3oXop^ ray 8e 
Tv\a$ 7roWa.Ki9 apoucvKXeto-Ocu 7rep\ tovs avrovs ; 
SfjXop yap a>? el o-vpaKoXovdoirjficp rats* Tvyous, 
top avrop evSaifiopa kou ttolKlv aOXtop ipovficp 
7roXXatas, ^apjouXeoprd Ttpa top evSaifiopa airo- 

\6(f>aipOPT€9 Kal (TOjdpm l8pUfl€POP. H TO fl€P External 

tvus tvx<u9 iiraKoXovdeip ovSafiob? opOop' ov yap do part of 

* / \ * * ~ »xx * * ~ ' Happiness. 

ep Tavrai? to ev tj /ea/eo)?, aAAa wpoo-oeiTai tovtcdp 
6 apQpunriPO? jS/oy, KaQairtp €i7raji€P, Kvpiai & 
elaip al tear apenjp ipepyecai tt}? evSaifiopia?, at 
20^ evaprcai tov ipaPTtov. fiapTvpel 8e T<p Xoycp 
Kal to pvp 8iaTropr)04p. 7repl ovScp yap ovtcos 



16. eb ya^ h ravratt ri tv j x««*f] Spcurippo, Polemone. Sed mihi vi- 
Cicero, following the Stoics, went far- dentur etiara beatissimi. quid enim 
ther, and asserted the sufficiency of deest ad beate vivendum ei qui confi- 
virtue alone to make a man happy , ditsuis bonis 1 aut qui diffidit beatus 
denying the doctrine both of Solon and esse qui potest 1 at diffidat necesse est 
Aristotle. Thus he argues in his Tusc. qui bona dividit tripertito. Qui enim 
Disput. v. 13. " Et si omne beatum potent aut corporis firmitate aut for- 
est, cui nihil deest, et quod in suo tunas stabilitate confidere? atqui nisi 
genere expletum atque cumulatum est, stabili et fixo et permanente bono bea- 
idque virtutis est proprium : certe om- tus esse nemo potest." See also 
nes virtutis compotes beati sunt. Et Wynpersse Dissert, de Xenocrate 
hoc quidem mihi cum Bruto conve- Chalcedonio (Lugd. Bat 1822.) p. 
nit, item cum Aristotele, Xenocrate, 174, sq. 



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38 ' ARISTOTELIS 

virdpxet rcoj/ dvOpamivcov tpycov fitfkuorqs g>? 
irepl tol9 ivepyelaf ras kclt dperr/p' fiovLfuorepai 
yap kou T(bv eiriorriiicov avrat 8okov<tiv eivcu* 
tovtcov 8 avrS>v ax rtfiKorarat fiovifiatTarcu Sea 
to fiaXiara Kal crvv*\£crTaTa Karaiflv kv avTalsb 
tovs pjaicapLovs' tovto yap eoucev airly rod fJLt) 
yiyvtaOai wepl aura Xf}0r)v. vwdp^ei Srj to {jjtov- 
ficvov ra> evSaifiovi, Kal eorai Sea fitov toiovtos" 
del yap r) pjakiaTa irdvT<ov wpa^t kou Oecopr/O'ei 
Ta Kar dp€Tr/v, Kal ray Tv\as otaei KaXAurra Kal 10 
iravrrji iravTW ifijieXob? o y w dXrjOcbs dyaOos 
in what *<u TtTpaycovos dvev \f/6yov. IIoAAg>i> 8e yivo- 

way good / \/ n*'jl' 'n \ 

or ill for- fiepcov Kara Tvyj)v Kai oiacpepoi/Tcop fieyevei koi 

tune can / \\ \«> / «/ 

affect Hap- fUKpOT7)Tl, Ta fl€V fJLlKpa T(DV €VTV\7]pLaTCOV, O/JLOUD? 

piness. &\ \ ~ > / a~\ f • ~ e N . 

r 0€ Kai T(DV aVTLK€ipL€V(0V) OT)AOV (OS OU 7T0l€l pOTT7)V 15 

tyjs &rjs> tol 8e fieyaXa kou 7ioAAa yvyvbp.tva 
pkv eft fxaKapL&Tepov top filoi> 7T0i7)O'€t (/cat yap 

aVTa aVP€7TLK0afl€tP 7T€(f)VK€V 9 Kal T) XPV "^ avTtov 

kolXtj koi <nrov8aia ylyveTat), avdiraXiv 8c crvpr 
{Jaivoi/Ta OXtfiei Kal AtyzatWrat to /xaKapiov' 20 
Xvwas T€ yap €7n(f)€p€i Kal €fi7ro8i^eL 7roXAals 
tvtpytiais. ojuos 8e Kal Iv tovtoi? StaXd/nret to 
KaXoi/y €7T€i8dv (frcpy tis evKoXcos 7roXXa? KOU 



2. fiovifjLvnoHi) Because the opera- Stobsus, i. p. 40. Gaisf. 

tion and exercise of Virtue is conti- 20. r§ {tA.»&$iv*\ «>$£« ft »vx Urt 

nually called into action. fth eb xctxor ippuveu, St Av otft-n^aiot 

12. rtT{dy*vos] See Stallbaum on cv^tpo^a x%6i\y. Plato, from Simo- 

Plato's Protag. p. 339. B. nides, Protag. p. 344. C. Where see 

20. Xvfiaivireti] Compare Archytas more upon this subject. 

De bono viro : votoi paxga.) 9Mfx.ot.rot 24. <pigy ns~\ Compare Archytas, 

*#) vn^cufftti a,lf6ara.£n»i u*9f*et£ctivovrt ib. p. 19. o ot.ya.6os av«£ eirm haxurtu 

rkf ivtaXuat v*t tfi*ifMMt*s. Frag. wtr tvru%ia9 tlm^ tea) e ry r*p<tTi 

Pythag. p. 15. Ed. Gale. 1671. x*\Z f i X m %m p*fc«ki»f, not y*t 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 8. 99 

fieydXa? arv\ia9j fir/ 8t dpaXyqaiaPy aXXa yep- 
vaSa? cop kcu pieyaXcy^v\09. el & elaip at epepyeuu 
Kvpiou Tqs far)?, KaOdnrep ehrofiePy ovSeh dp 
yivoiro t<op puaKapicop aOXtos' ovSeiroTe yap Trpa^ei 
6 ret pacrqra kcu <f)avXa. top yap d>9 akr)0u>9 dyaOop 
/cat €fi(f>popa wda-as oiofxeOa ra? Tvyas evayrfpuo- 
pcos <j)epetp kcu €K tcop xmapypprcop del ra /caA- 
Xiara TrpdrretPy KaBdirep kcu oTparrjyop dyaffop 
ra> irapoPTi arpaT07re8(p xprjadat iroXepuKcoTaTa 

10 Kal (TKVTOTOpLOP €/C TCOP 8o0€PTG)P CTKVTCOP KoX- 

Xicttop V7r68r)fia irotelp' top avrop 8e Tpairop kcu 
tovs aXXov? Te^piTa? airapras. e\ 8 ovtcos, aOXtos 
fiep oi)8eiroTe yepovr ap 6 evSaificoPy ov fir/p 
pcLKCLpios ye 9 ap HpiafiiKais Tv\ai$ irepnrecrr). 

\bOv8e 8rj 7TOLKtXo$ ye Kal eu/xcrajSoAoy" ovtc yap Happiness 
€K ttjs ei)8aipLOpia$ KiprjOrjaeTai paSiW, ov& wrobie. 
tS>p tv\6pt(op aTvyr)p.dTcop aAA* viro fieyaXcop kou 
WoXAcbp, €K Te tcop tolovtcop ovk ap yepoiTO iraXip 
evSalfxcop ep oXiyco ypopcp, aAA' enrepy ep 7roXX<p 

IOtipI Kal TeXelcpy jieyaXcop Kal kckXcop ep avTcp 
yepofxepos eirrjfioXos. ti odp KcoXvec Xeyeip ev8al- 
fiopa top /car dpeTtjp TeXelap epepyovpTa kolL tois 
Iktos dyaOoh iKapibs Ke\oprfyqp.epoPy fxr/ top 



fount ol'ot ti xa) 6»\vo% xa) $v%»f vro- as his paint, brushes, and ease) to the 

pint, xa.) fidf»t fyeti ftiya, *a) <ro\Xa( artist ; for though he has the faculty 

kriptt tvxt{£s &*9ftint **xo**4ti*s* -within himself, and these are no part 

Stobaeus, i. p. 44. of it, yet he cannot exercise it without 

22. r»7s \**U ky*tut\ The discus- them. External goods, therefore, are 

sion of this question, how far external requisite to Happiness, as means for 

goods are requisite to Happiness, is the development, employment, and 

necessarily incomplete at this stage of preservation of its energies. Until, 

the inquiry. External goods are re- however, it has been determined in 

quisite to Happiness as instruments : what energies, and according to what 



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the dead. 



40 ARISTOTELIS 

TV\6vra ypovov aXXa rtXeiov ficov ; rj irpoaOeriov 
kou fJiaxrofievov ourco kcu reXevrrjaoura Kara 
XoyoPy iweiSr/ to fieXXov a(f>ou/€s r/fjuv 9 ttjv €v8ou~ 
fiopiav 8e rcAoy kou TtXetov ride/iev Travry 7raprcD9. 

€1 8 OVTG), fJLOLKapiOVS CpOV/JL€l> T&V £<OPT(DV OLS 5 

imapxti kou wrdpljei tol Xe\0€ura y putKapiov? 8 

avQpumovs:. kou 7repl fiev tovtcov iwi tocovtop 

iiow(nr ihtStcopladco. Tas* 8e tcov airoyovcov royas teal 

or adversity TCOV <f>iXo)V aTTOLVTCOV TO fl€V flT]8oTlOVV aVflfidX- 
can affect XecOcU XldV a(f)lXoV <f)aiV€T0U KCU T&1$ 8o£cU9 jq 

ivavriov" iroXXcov 8e kou iravrolas i\6vTcov 8ia- 
(popa? tcov avfifiouvovrcov, kou tcov fiev fiaXXov 

CTVVlKVOVfJLeVCOV TCOV 8 f)TT0Vy Kaff eKOLOTOV fl€V 

Stcupeiv puiKpop kou anripavTOv <j)aLi/€Tou, kolOoXov 
8e Xe\0kv kcu tvttco tol\ av tKavm fypi. el 677,15 
KaOairep kcu tcov wcpl uvtov aTvyrfpjiTCov tol fiev 

€\€t Tl j3pi0OS KOU pOTTTjV TTpOS TOV filOV TOL 8 
i\a(f)pOT€pOl? €01K€V 9 OVTCO KOU TOL 7T€p\ TOV? <j)lX0VS 

Ofwifos anravraS) Siacpepec 8e tcov iraQcov eKacrrov 
7repl tfit>VTCL$ 7) TeXevrrjarai/Tas crvfifiaiveiv 7roXv20 



virtues, Happiness principally consists, means are not extensively requisite 
it cannot be determined how far ex- even as instruments; and that few 
ternal means are requisite to it. For people are so situated as not to possess 
should it hereafter appear that Hap- them to a sufficient degree for the at- 
piness principally consists in the intel- tainment and preservation of Happi- 
lectual energies which can operate ness. The reader must rest satisfied 
without external means, and in the with thus much of this argument, till 
moral energies no further than as man he arrives at the tenth Book, 
is an imperfect being ; and if, for the 8. arayitut ru%*i] Having ex- 
employment even of the moral ener- plained the principal question, he re- 
gies, but little means are requisite, (as turns to the other mentioned at p. 
the Widow was just, pious, and gene- 36, 10. whether the prosperity or 
rous, even with her two mites,) it will adversity of friends and relatives affect 
be immediately seen that external the dead. 



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ETHICOHUM LIB. I. 8. 41 

paWov r) ra irapdvopxL kcu Sciva Trpoxmdpytiv lv 
tolls rpaycpSious rj irparr^cOaxy cvXkoyiareov 8rj 
kcu ravrrjv tj)v Stacpopdv, fiaXKov 5* tcrcos to 
Stair opelcrOou irtpl tovs KCKjirjKOTas el twos dya0ov 

6 KOLVCOVOVCTLV 7) TCOV aWlK€lfl€VO>P' €OlK€ yap €K 

tovtcov el kcu SuKuetTat 7rpos avrovs ortovv y €?r 
dyoudov elre Towapriov, a(j>avp6v ti kcu puKpov r) 
airX&s rj ifceivocs elpou, cl 8c pr/, tocovtov yc 

KCU TOIOVTOV GHTT6 fir) TTOICIV €v8aiflOV(L? TOVf fltj 

\0ovras firjSe tov? ovtos d(f)cup€taOcu to ficucaptov. 
o-vfifiaWeo-Oou plv oiv ti <f>aivovrcu tols /c€/c- 
prjKoaiv ou €V7rpa£icu tcov (f)i\(Di>> bpuoixw 81 kcu 
ou SvoTrpaijlaiy TOiavTa 8e kcu Tr/XtKavra axrre 
pr/Tc tow evSatpova? firj tv&aipavas iroieiv firjT 

l5aAAo tS>v toiovtwp prjSev. 



CHAP. IX. 

In what class of Goods Happiness ought to be placed. 

12 AIQPI2MENQN 8e tovtodv iirto-Ke^nofieda wepl Htppineu 

»* / / » > v * not of the 

tt/9 evoaifiovcas woTepa tcdv €7ratV€Ta>v ecmv ^fo^M**. 

1. *pv**tx,in~\ To eii$t before it which occupies the next six book*, 

the play. As, for instance, in the Aristotle interposes a question con- 

(Edipus Coloneus of Sophocles, where earning the dignity of Happiness, and 

(Edipus is brought upon the stage, enquires among what class of Goods it 

having already committed the dreadful is to be placed : whether among the 

deeds upon which the play turns, faculties, the praiseworthy, or the ho- 

Such are also many of the plays of nourable. !«••) yk^ rSt kymim rk ph 

Euripides, where the previous history turn $»p\t rk ft M{**n*, mm) rk /*» 

of the plot is narrated in the pro- turn rifum xtyefui, At fcr^##»r« &r)f 

logue. f*«4Mi>, *«) rifAnt iik rnt vwtp%k* 

ifyovptt*' irmttrk ft rk kdgiLrit*, it 

Chap. IX. ro % rtM m*4mi pl» Xuwf/um Wm'twt ft 

Before proceeding further in his pi™ r^iww tie) ft mm) trt§* 

Analysis, and examining that part of M^rmi pi* **\ *mur», Irtytf •«{/• 

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4* ARISTOtELIS 

fidWop r&v TifiUov' SrjXop yap ore tcop y€ 

Nor of the SvPOfJUHOP OVK tOTlP. Q>aiv€TOLl Srf ITOLP TO 

€7TCUP€T0P TCp 7TOLOP TI €CP(Ll KOLl TTpOf TI 7TG>? 

€X*ip €iraiP€i<r0cu' top yap SiKaiop teal top 
dpSpeiop kcu oXcos top ayaBop kcu ttjp dperrjpb 
€7rcupovfX€P Sid tol$ irpdijei? kcu tol epya, kcu top 
loyvpop Kai top SpopxKOP kcu tcop aXXcop €Ka&TOP 
t$ iroiop Ttpa 7re<f>VK€Pai teal €X €lp 7rft>s ' 7rpb? aya- 
Bop ti koll oirovSalop. SrjXop Se tovto kcu e#c tcop 
7T€pl tow 0€ov? €7raipcop' yeXoioi yap cj>aipoprailo 
irpo? r/fia? dpa(f>€p6fi€P0i, tovto Se avfifiaipei Sid 
to yipecrOai tow iwaipov^ 81 ava(f)opa?, coenrep 
eiwafiep. el & £otIp 6 hraxpos; tcop toiovtcop, 
SrjXop oti tS>p dpioTcop ovk etrrip eTraipo?, dXXa 
fxeitpp ti kcu fieXTiop, KaOdrrep kcu <f)aiP€Tcu' tovs 15 
T€ ykp deovs ftaKapifiofiep Kal evSaijiopi&fiep Kal 
tcop dpSpcop tov9 OcioraTOVs ficucapi^oftep. bfioicos 
8e Kal tcop dyaOtop' ovSei? yap tt/p evSaifiopiap 
€7raipei KaBdwep to SUaiop, dXX* afr Oeiorepop ti 
Kal fieXTiop fxaKapi^ei. 8oK€i 8e Kal Et®o£o£20 
koXco? arvprjyoprjcrai 7repl tcop dpicrTeicop 777 



fytra )ij St *«i Murotfmn Mtxtfrnt xx) y'tnttat th%xifAit 9 rat svrv%txt- *a) 

apxprxtut, km) tt* r»vn iota* put Xsyi- hx rsvr» U 3w raurmt x ai4pi*itm 

fAtv*. St rttxs *"* Tt%ut9 vxt^x** *fowf**ff* evyxifaXxttoreu, Irww ri 

tv(t7t, . . £firu it rift rourttt rht ivixt- xxi fixHa^ssfiS Waif* pit rS t£ *{*" 

pstiat raxriot. — ««2 <ri ftit titxt ecurh rxs, ftxxxft^pS 2) rS J| svtv%sxs.' rat 

rttm rSt o*utxpu*t atraypuu, trt fi*Y p,\t St itpruf %%u ^ rat fasmt fio7(at, 

WmfA^9<ri^u. kpMpfou* ya{ f tulai- rat li ivrv%l*t 9 h« rap itmm. — 

(A$ta olx, ItVixtrat vttri rit liUmifium. Fragm. Pyth. p. 3. Stob. iii. 339. 

Eustrat. See note p. 5, 1 . See also Archytas ib. p. 15. Stob. 

17. ftanM^afjut] Compare Hip- i. 40. 
podamus de Beat, i 31 Ztfyuw* •&*• 21. *tntiy »$***] To have advocated 

vtf, $Uu tVhmiftmt, «XX« /cukAwh **' the claims of pleasure to the aperux: BC. 

*£§9§Us wriiitrtu, *tr\ (tit rl y\t%- to have claimed for it the praise of being 

W«# aymttf, r£t m^trSf wsr) e% *i - the tnoit, excellent of all things. 



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ETHICOllUM LIB. I. 10. 4S 

7)$ovr} m to yap fir) iirouvdaOat t&p ayaff&p oiaap 
ixrjvveiv <pero on xpurrop icrrt t&p ciraiver&v, 

TOtOVTOP 5* €IP0U TOP 0€OP KCU Taya0OP' ITpOS 

TavTO, yap kou raXXa dva<f)€p€<T0ai. 6 fi€P yap 
bewaipo? T7]9 ap€TrJ9' irpaKTUCoX yap t£>p koX<op 
awo TOUTifS' tcl 8 eyKcojua t&p tpytap bpjouos kcu 
t&p <ra>fJLaTiKG)P Kal t&p tyvyiK&v. 'AAAa raSraButofthe 
flip %<rcos oiKetoTepop iljaKpifiovp toi? irep\ to. 
iytccbfjua 7T€7ropr)/i€POi9 9 rj/up Se 8fj\op c#c t&p 
\0€lpr)fi€P€OP oti iarrip r\ evSaifiopia t&p Tifiuop kcu 
TeXeicop. eouce tf ovroos *X etv Kai ^ta ™ ccpcu 
apxv' Tavrrj9 yap yapw tcl Xonra irapra Traprts 
7rpaTTOfi€P 9 tt/p apxrjp Se Kal to cutiop t&p 
ayad&p rifuop tl icai Oelop Tidefiep. 



CHAP. X. 

Of Virtue. 

13 EIIEI 5* iorip rj evSaifiopia yfsvxfjs kvipyzia n ei 

» > \ N / \ j « » /. deration of 

TC? KaT ap€T7}P T€A€iaP, 7T€/0t aptT7]$ e7riO , K€7TT€OP Virtue re- 
quisite. 

10. rtftimt tuu «Xi**r»] rifAm y, in It was said that Happiness is an 

!*«f itVuV np£v otiut tyOfi h»u y*. energy of the soul according to Virtue, 

SiT«» yk{ mymin *ov rtftn- vm & u*»£* or the best of the Virtues : what then 

•ttf» riftff. Plato de Leg. 727. By Virtue is, now remains to be consi- 

this Aristotle indistinctly indicates that dered. Until this be known, no prac- 

Happiness is *•?/«. See vi. 6. x. 6. tical benefit can be derived from this 

treatise. For how can we act accord- 
ing to Virtue, till we know what Vir- 

Chap. X. tue is, much less according to the best 

Having proceeded thus far in analys- Virtues? This then remains to be 

ing his Definition of Happiness, Aris- discovered what Virtue is, and then 

totle is now brought to the examination what are the beU Virtues, 
of a most important part.of it. * Now the term Virtue (Afirii) is ap,- 

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Soul. 



44 ARISTOTELIS 

ra\a yap ovtg>? av fJeXnov kolI irepl tt}? evScu- 
pjovias Beaprjo'cufiev. Sotcei 8e kou 6 tear aXrjOetav 
iroXtTtKO? irep\ Tavrqv fiaXtara ireirovrjaOcu: fiov- 
Aerai yap tovs iroXtTas ayaBovs iroieiv teal t<dv ^ 
vopxov vm/Koov^. irapaSeiyfia fie tovtodv e\0fi€v^ 
tov? Kprjrwv kou AaKcdou/xovioDV vofioOfras, kou 

€1 TlVeS €TCpOL TOtOVTOt y€y€V7)VTCU. €1 Sc Ttj? 

7ro\iTiKrj? ioTtv 17 aK€\jn9 avrr/y SijXov on yivoiT 
av 7) ^qryjats Kara tt\v ££ &PXV* Trpoaipeatv. irepi 
apcrr}? $€ €7riaK€7rr€OP avOpayjrivrjs SrjXov on' io 
kou yap rayadov avOpdmivov iforov/iev kou tt/v 
Not that of evSou/ioviav dvOpamivrfv. 'Apenjv 8e Xeyofiev 

the Body, , s , s y 

but the avupGymvrjv ov Tt)v tov o-coparo? aAAa ttjv Tqs 
y h J X?l*' Ka * T V P evSoufioviav Se tyvyrjs evepyeiav 
Xeyo/iep. el 8k ravff ovrtos *X €L > 8rjXov on Set 15 

TOV TToXlTLKOV €t8eV0U TOOS TOL 7T€p\ foxr/V, GXTJTep 

kou tov 6<f)0aXfiow Oepairevaovra /cat irav crco/ma, 
kou /jlSXXov o<r<p nfiixoTepa kou {JeXricov tj ttoXi- 
tikt) ttjs larpiKrjs. t£>v 8 laTpcov ot \apUvT€9 
TroXXa irpaypjaTevovrai irep\ Trfv tov crcopxiTO? 20 



plied equally to inanimate as animate will be requisite to consider the nature 
things : meaning no more than the per- of the soul ; for if this be of more parts 
fection of their nature, or that quality than one and they be distinct, virtue 
which causes and enables them per- will probably be of more kinds than 
fectly to execute, the t^yn or object of one. For if each part has its praise- 
their being. But we are not seeking worthy habits, then each part must 
Virtue in this general sense, but the have its peculiar virtues, 
peculiar Virtue of man, which must 9. ig &£g«if ] £m 2sfr*i>, trt h tymrtt 
consequently inhere in some part pe- mum kn*\*v4it Ȥ tin rtf ig ǣgw too 
culiar to him from all other animals, x'vyv rx«*y- h y*t \*ut»t «•«$! «••» 
inasmuch as his t^yn is distinct from riXtvs mt «r*;u«*ijf. Paraph, 
all other animals; and such is the 17. ipimXfMvt] This simile is taken 
rational soul. Before, therefore, we from Plato. See the beautiful pas- 
can discover the nature of Virtue, it sage in the Charmides, p. 156. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. I. 10. 45 

yVGKTlP. Qt(OpV)T€OP St/ KOlI Ttp TToXlTlKCp TTCpl Therefor* 

*h*Xfif9 0€G)pr)T€Ol/ $€ TOVTG)V X^P lv 9 KaL € 0' 0<TOV of the Soul 
LKOLVCDS €X«£ 7Tp09 TGL £r)TOVfl€Va* TO yap €7Tt considered. 

irXelov el-cucpifiovv epycoSecrrepov icr&f earl r&v 
&7rpoK€ifi€i/a>i/. Aeyerac 8e irepl avrrj? /cat €i> The soul is 

~ •> ~ x / j/ v v divided 

TOtS €£(DT€piKOl$ AOyOl? dpKOVVTCO? €Via 9 KOLI X/"?" into » 

/ »~? \\v x » ~ ? \ I. Rational. 

<JT€OV CLVTOIS. OtOV TO fl€V aXoyOV aVTfjS €lVOl, TO II. Irra- 

Se Xoyov €\ov. TavTa 8e iroTtpov Steopiorat l ° a 
Kadairep to. tov orcoparo^ puopia /cat irav to 
10 fiepiorov, 7) Ttp Xoy<p 8vo icrrlv dyppitrra ire<f>v- 
k6tol KoBanrtp iv rfj Trepifapela to Kvprov /cat to 

KOlXov, OvOtV 8ta<j)€p€l 7Tp09 TO irapov. Tod Irrational 

» x / cv\\\v ~ \ , « x/ subdivided 

aXoyov oe to p.ev eoiKe KOiv<p /cat <f>VTiKcp 9 Aeycomto; l. 
Se to cutiov tov Tpe(j)€o-0ai /cat av£eo-0ai' Tqv eg€ * ? * 
XbTOLavrqv yap hvvap.iv ttj9 tyvyrjs iv anracri T019 

Tp€(f>Ofl€VOt9 0€L7) TC9 OV KCU iv TOl? i/JL&pVOlf, TTJV 

avrqv 81 Tavrr/v /cat iv toZs TtXeioi? evXoyc&Tepov 
yap 77 aXXrjv Tivd. TavTqs fiev oSv Koivrf tis apery 
teal ovk avOpamlvr) <f>aiveTat m 8ok€l yap iv tol9 
20v7rvoi9 ivepyetv pAXtora to popiov tovto /cat 77 
Svvapc? airnfy 6 & dyaOo? /cat /ca/co? 17/ctcrra 
SiaSrjXoL Kaff xmvov, oOev (pacriv ovSev 8ia<f>ip€iv 
to fjpurv tov (3lov tow evSatpovas tcdv dOXi&v. 



7. r§ f*\t Aktyof] This division consider that the soul was really divisi- 

originated with Plato. See Mag. Mor. ble, or that the rational part of it dif- 

p. 2. and the De Repub. iv. p. 349. fered from the irrational as one member 

For the opinions of philosophers pre- of the body from another. In the 

vious to Aristotle touching the soul, passage alluded to, he shows the ab- 

see Aristotle De Anima, i. 2. And surdity which must necessarily result 

for the subject here discussed, lb. from instituting such a division as this, 

ii. 2. and iii. 9. From this latter which Plato appears to have done, 

place we learn that Aristotle did not See also Trend, de Anima, p. 52ft. 



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46 ARISTOTELIS 

ovpfiaivei 8e tovto eucoror* apyia yap ecmv 6 
vttvos rf}? faxv* V ^y^ou airovSala Kal <f>avXr], 
irXr/v el 7rr/ Kara puKpov SuKvovvrai rives to>v 
KLvr/crecov, Kal ravrrj fieXriQ) ytverou tol (jxurrdcr- 
fiara rtov emeuc&v r/ twv tv\ovtg)v. aXXa ireplb 
pev tovtgdv aAt?, kou to OpeiTTtKOP karioV) eiretBrf 

2. Appeti- ttjs dvOpamua}? aperrjf apotpov 7re<j)VKev. Ecu/ce 

fie kou aXXrj tls <j)v<ri9 rrjs tyv\ri$ aXoyos eivai 9 
fiere^ovcra pevroi 7177 Xoyov. tov yap eynparow 
kou oKparovs tov Xoyov kou tt)$ yjfvxys to Xoyov 10 
€\ov eirouvovpev' opOtos yap kou iirl to. fieXnora 
TrapoLKaXeC <j)ouv€Tai ft ev avTols kou aXXo tc 
irapa tov Xoyov 7re<f)VK0S, b pA\eTai T€ kou 
dvriTelvei T(p Xoycp. aTe\v&s yap Kofiairep tol 
irapoLXeXvpeva tov crcoparo? pop La eh tol 8e£id\5 
irpocupovpevoov Kivfjaou TOvvavTiov eh tol apiorepa 
irapoufyepeTOUj kou iiri tt)$ tyvyrjs ovtcos' eni Tavav- 
Tia yap ai oppal tG>v aKpaT&v. aXX 9 ev toIs 
awpacri pev bp&pev to irapa(j>ep6pev6Py eirl Se 
Trjs yjsvxv? °VX bpoopev. iora>$ & ovSev tjttov Kal 20 
Ip rfj yffvxg vopicrTeov elvai tl irapa tov Xoyov, 
evavrcovpevov TovTcp Kal avrtfiaivov. 7rc3? & 

which lat- €T€pov 9 ovSev 8ta(f>epec. Aoyov 8e Kal tovto 

ter may in., . , or y . n 

one pomt of (paiveTai perexeiv, (Dowep eiiropev ireioap\eL 

view be ^ ~ x ' ^ ~ > ~ v^v 

considered yOVV TG> AOy(p TO TOV eyKpOTOVS. €Tl tO"0)S , 25 
rational* »//> \ ~ / » \ > 

*vr)KO(0T€pov eon to tov aaxppovos Kai av- 
Speiov' iravra yap 6po<fxovet tg> Xoyco. (fyaiveTai 
Stj Kal to aXoyov Scttov. to pev yap <f)VTtKOv 
ovSapxo? KOLvoavei Xoyov, to & einOvprjTLKOv kou 

oX(0? opeKTIKOV p€T€)(€l 7TCD? 9 Tj KaTTjKOOV €OTLV 30 

avrov kou TreiQapyjLKOV. ovtod 8r/ Kal tov iraTpos 



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ETHICORUM LIB, I. 10. 



47 



kou r&v <j>iXa>v <f>a/jL€v *X €iV ^oyov 9 kou ov\ wnrep 
t&v fiaffrjfjLaTiKcbi/. on fie iruOerai tt(o$ vtto Xoyov 
to aXoyov, firjvvec kou r) vovO€T7)<ri? kou iraxm 
kirvrip^avs re kou irapaKXr)<r(,9. u Se XPV Ka * 

&TOVTO <j)aVOU XoyOV €\€LV 9 SlTTOV €OTOU KOU TO 
Xoyov *XOV, TO Jl€V KVpUQ? KOU €V aVT^y TO 5* 

(OOTTCp TOV TTOLTpOS OKOVOTIKOV Tt. AlOpl^CTGU Virtue di- 

jnx n « > y y \ js i k / .vidcdac- 

0€ KCU 7) ap€TT) KOLTa TTjV OiatyOpOLV TaVTTfV cording to 



1. xJyw] Using the words xiytt 
%X%n in such a sense, as when we say, 
the son has the reason of his father, 
when he obeys his father : and not in 



mathematicians. 

7. 1ia,Q»t&f] According to the sense 
in which you understand the Diffe- 
rentia, you will make a different divi- 



the sense that the words are used by sion of the Soul. 



I. If by Rational you mean obedient to Reason, you will divide thus ; 
The Soul. 



r — 

Irrational. 



1. Vegetative. 



I 
2. Appetitive, when 
not obeying rea- 
son ; E. g. in the 
Intemperate, &c. 



i 

Rational. 



( 

1. Appetitive, 
when obedient 
to reason ; £. g. 
the Temperate. 



2. Intellectual, 

mvrif.) 



JI. If by Rational you mean exercising Reason, you will divide thus ; 
The Soul. 



r 



Irrational. 
J 



i. 

1. Vegetative 

Its good Vtif,OT 
virtue, good 
growth. 



II. 

2. Appetitive 

(•£l«r4K0l>). 

Its good ff&f, 
or virtue, perfect 
subjection to 



Rational. 



( 

III. 

. Deliberative 

Its virtue fti- 



) 
IV. 

Scientific (In- 

Its virtue, *•- 
pirn. 



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48 



ARIST. ETH. LIB. 1. 10. 



tiMMdWU Xeyoftev yap avrmv ras /icv SiavovjTucas ray 8e 
Soul, into riducas, <TO<f>lav ficv kcu ovveaiv koi <ppovrf<riv 

I. Mortlt _ . i^\\ 1/ 

II. Intel- SiavorjTLKas, eXevOeptorr/Ta oe Kou o-axppoavvrjv 

JCClUai. . \ *h V/l ' x I 

r/Vucas. Xeyovres yap ir^pi rov rjOovs ov Xcyojiev 
ori <ro<f>o? rj ovveros aAA' on irpiios r/ <rG><f>pG>v 9 s 
eircuvovfiev fie kolL top <ro<f>bv Kara rrfv etjiv 9 rG>v 
e£e<oi> fie ray iircuveras aperas Xeyopev. 



Under II. and III. combined fell all 
the moral Virtues. Perfect moral vir- 
tue is, when the £<••&* of the one, and 
the fgjffirtf of the other, are in per- 
fect Harmony. Since, therefore, Hap- 
piness was defined to be an energy of 
the soul according to Virtue, or the 
best Virtues, we may now develope 
the Definition, and say that Happiness 
is an energy of the Soul according to 
tyA*r<f and r«f/« in a perfect life, 
&c. 

4. xiynvu y&*] Aristotle subjoins 
this remark, to show that the moral 
and intellectual virtues are really dis- 
tinct, a doctrine virtually denied by 
Socrates, and oppugned by Plato, both 
in the Menon and Protagoras. 

The argument is an induction. If, 
when we praise a man for his moral 



habits, we never call him wise, pru- 
dent, &c. then wisdom, prudence, &c. 
are not moral habits. We never do 
call him wise, &c. when we praise his 
moral habits; therefore, &c. The 
same argument to the intellectual 
habits. 

6. WmttovfAit — t#» ro^o] Here again 
the author of the Mag. Mor. p. 12. 
differs from Aristotle. For after ob- 
serving that in the rational part of the 
soul are produced ft§m*ig t kyxfam, 
f$fs*, thfuJum, fitftpt) **) rk r$mvrmr 
and in the irrational r*0{#ri/wi, 2umu«- 
rvtn, inlym, *•) iem tfaXmt r«v Ht»Pt 
loKturtf Wtunra) iTnu* he immediately 
subjoins, nark yk^ rmurm* (sc. the 
moral virtues) WmtttrA Xiyifuim, nmrk 
Jl rkt rtv r## Xiyr %x»**H »Mt 
Wmnsrm. 



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INTRODUCTION TO BOOK II. 



In the previous book it has been shown that Virtue 
is essential to Happiness • ; before therefore we can 
attain to Happiness, we must first inquire into the 
nature of Virtue. But since all systematic treatises 
should commence with that which is easier and more 
familiar, Aristotle, repeating the division of Virtue 
mentioned in the last chapter, first proceeds to the ex- 
amination of the Moral Virtues, which are more known 
and dispose us better for the reception of the Intel- 
lectual. This investigation occupies the four succeeding 
Books. 

The following book is divided into three parts : 
. I. The investigation of the origin of Moral Virtue. 
II. The definition of Moral Virtue. 
III. The application of that definition to particulars. 

In considering the first division of his subject, Aristotle 
tacitly refutes much of the doctrines of the Sophists. 
So long had these pretenders to universal knowledge 
been accustomed to trifle with words, and to argue 
indifferently upon either sides of a question, that at last 
they ventured to deny that there was any thing fixed or 
certain, or any real distinction between virtue and vice. 
The dogmas of the early philosophers, by which they 
endeavoured to solve the difficulties which encountered 
them in their physical enquiries, the Sophists applied 
to morals. Protagoras,' the disciple of the celebrated 
Democritus b , to whom Aristotle not unfrequently re- 
fers, asserted that man was the measure of all things d , 

a $ U X** fot{yu« x*T&£trtf. p. 26, if £f« alec fit* £» \fto) ^atrtreura. *£*y- 

1. See also n. futrtt iThm, ruavrm ph foro lfM>), oTa 

b See Clem. Alex. Strom, i. §. 64. V at r»/, rttttvr* f *Z r«i. Cratylus 

c «*>*•{ n^mrmyo^as JXiyi, \iyvt p. 385. £. 11. Stallb. 386. C Com- 

*a9T$tf xz*t(*»T*t pirpp tTteci affi^mmy pare also Theaet. 152. A. where thb 

£ 

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60 INTRODUCTION. 

that all things were in a continual change, that there 
was no other science except that of the senses' 1 , and 
no other criterion of truth*. Thence it was inferred 
that truth was whatever any one thought it to be, and 
consequently that no one could form false opinions/ 

Following these principles they asserted that Virtue 
and Justice did not exist by nature, but merely by 
arbitrary enactments *, that one thing was beautiful and 
excellent by nature, another thing by law : they denied 
the existence of natural justice or moral sense, affirming 
that the will of the stronger was the rule of right ; 
that obedience to nature dictated the unlimited gratifica- 
tion of the desires ; in short, that he who was the greatest 
tyrant, and had the fullest means of gratifying every 
appetite, and followed the dictates of those appetites im- 
plicitly, was most in a state of nature, and possessed 
the greatest share of Happiness \ 

From this to the next step the transition was easy, 
that no one acted justly except he was induced to it 
by the hope of reward, or the dread of punishment. 
That justice was a mutual compact extorted by the fear 
of mankind. That Virtue was surrounded with pain and 
labour 1 , that the pretender to it was as equally virtuous 
as the real possessor of it, and that he who acted 
virtuously merely from fear of the laws, was equally as 

dictum is explained and refuted. See «X«ti». ArisL Met iii. 5. p. 75. 

particularly, 161. D. 171. C. 177. Compare also Thesst. 161. D. ix^rm 

C. sq. Diog. Laert ix. $. 51 ; and aXnAt Xwrm i if )< v a\rinru*< )«£«??» 

Menag. ib. Sext. Emp. Hyp. i. 32 ; *«} pin ri ixxstf «Mt ix\t jSiXnw 

and Geel's Hist. Soph. p. 92. ltm»(int, pnrt rh h%*t *»t<«ri{«* Urm 

4 Wurnftn §h% &XX§ ri Urh n Wnxty***** ?«{« rh \rtptt, itfk 4 

aMnns. Plato's Theaet 160. -^utnt, AkX i *»X.\A*$ tt^nrm, avrit 

• These notions he appears to have «-• avrw ?*«m* fJttf 2*g«su. rmSrm 
derived from his master. See the ft watrm fy* **) «X*/*. See also Cic. 
Metaph. Hi. 5. p. 76. %• LnpUx^rif Acad. ii. 46. 

yi fin, thru 0vA> tTtm *X»A< n V" g «& $Uu iUu ft pint. Schol. in 

y £hx»r. Compare also Cic. Acad. Theaet. 166. E. 

i. 12. ii. 23. and Sext. Emp. adv. * De Legg. 288. Repub. i. and ii. 

Math. vii. $. 135. i fc* *$«, U<mfc»ri«» »M ft If 

* » % Ms ^ivKi *&{u. Thesst 167. mMr ftvnrU,, if h goferi*. Rep. 
Euthyd. 286. rk *«»mr« ttrntra irrh 368. 



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INTRODUCTION. 51 

virtuous as he who acted from principle; and, conse- 
quently, that men were to be judged wise, brave, just, 
and temperate, not from possessing the habits of wisdom, 
courage, justice, and temperance, but by performing the 
external acts. 

These notions are indirectly refuted throughout the fol- 
lowing book, and with them other opinions on the same 
subject advanced by Plato, in several of his dialogues, 
particularly in the Menon, Phaedrus, Protagoras, and 
Phsedon ; where it is asserted that the moral virtues are 
not produced in us by teaching or nature, but that they 
are the gift of the divinity. According to Plato, the soul 
in its original state traversed Heaven with the Gods, 
contemplating the real essence of every Virtue, both 
speculative and practical, and when enclosed in the body 
did not lose those virtues, but reacquired the use of 
them by habit and exercise. 

Aristotle, omitting all consideration of the divine 
origin of Virtue, as foreign to this treatise, only inquires 
whether they are produced by teaching, habit, or nature? 
And the sum of his reasoning is, that nature and teach- 
ing have some, but habit the greatest share in producing 
them. We are by nature, he says, endowed with an 
aptitude for the reception of moral virtue, — which apti- 
tude he calls natural virtue in the last chapter of the 
Sixth book. Instruction and knowledge only teach us 
how to direct our actions, how to distinguish the good 
from the bad, and order our conduct for the attain- 
ment of Happiness ; but as these are of only minor 
importance to the acquisition of Virtue, we infer that 
habit has the greatest share in its production. The 
Stoics, differing both from Plato and Aristotle, agreeing 
with them however in many points, rejected the division 
of the soul into rational and irrational, which the former 
had adopted k and placed all the virtues in the rational 



* See Cicero Acad, i* 10, and Plu- &\*yy )t«<p»(* rm *«} <pv<ru ^urff 
tarch. de Virt. Mor. ix. 32. Hutten. r§u Xoytxiiu hemxpftivot *&*« «■• «M 

e2 



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52 



INTRODUCTION. 



part of the soul ; and made the goodness or turpitude of 
actions consist in the truth or falsity of the judgment. 
They attributed accordingly almost every thing to in- 
struction 1 and but little to habit. They taught that the 
seeds or sparks of Virtue, which they called xotva* hwoi*i, 
and Cicero the " semina innata virtutum™" were innate, 
that these when fostered by right education, become per- 
fect Virtue, but if depraved by the contrary, these sparks 
are extinguished, and vice springs up in their room. Such 
an opinion was wholly at variance with the tenets of Aris- 
totle, according to whom the soul possesses the capacities 
for receiving and retaining Virtue; as Cicero correctly 
expresses it, " ad comprehendam ingeniis virtu tern 
idonea"," but not the incipient and undeveloped habits. 

fhis book divides itself into the following parts. In 
the 1st chapter, Aristotle treats of the efficient cause of 
Virtue ; in the 2nd and 3rd, of its object-matter ; in the 
4th and 5th, of its definition; in the 6th, he applies 
the definition to particular cases ; and in the 7th and 
8th, explains certain questions respecting the mean. 



*o) kytfuwUi) liiXso rpwipiff. They 
differed also from the earlier philo- 
sophers in banishing all emotions from 
the breast of the wise and good man. 
(See Cic. Acad. ii. 44.) Consequently 
they did not consider moral virtue to 
consist in the proper regulation of the 
passions. 

1 See Diog. Laert. vii. 91, and 
Fischer in ^Eschin. Socrat p. 21. 

n Tusculan. Disp. iii. 2. De Fin. 



v. 15. 

n Est enim natura sic generate vis 
hominis ut ad omnem virtutem per- 
cipiendam facta videatur : ob eamque 
causam parvi virtutum simulacra, 
quarum in se habent semina, sine 
doctrina moventur. Sunt enim prima 
elementa naturae ; quibus auctis, vir- 
tues quasi carmen efficitur. Cic. de 
Fin. v. 15. Compare also c. 21. and 
Acad. i. 5. 



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ARISTOTELIS 

ETHICA NICOMACHEA. 

LIB. II. 

CHAP. I. 

Of the causes of the origin and decay of moral virtue — that it is a 
habit produced by a repetition of certain actions — that the actions 
and habits reciprocally operate on each other. 

AITTH2 8e TTjS aperrjS OV<rr]S, TTjS fl€V Stai/OT]- Difference 
- fs\ >a ~ <** \n n ~ oftheMoral 

TIKTJ9 TT)9 Oe T)UUCT)9 9 T) fl€V OtaVOTJTlKT) TO 7TA€lOV and Intel - 

€* Si&aorKaXla? e\€i kou nqv ytveaiv kou ttjv Virtues. 
avjjrjcriv, 8to7T€p efnreiplas Setrat kou ypovov" rj 
(>8 rj0itcr/ e£ e0ov9 7T€piyli/€Tou 9 odeu kou rovi/o/xa 



1. AirrJJj] $t7 &£* . . . *iZrw vitlft 
*prne liViiV, ri r% Ian xa) \x rivet* 
yinrms. obftv yot£ Iretg tytkat tfiitat 
fth rhv a^trvv, *Zf Tt &v xxi Ix riven 
fth i-rattif. Ov yct£ petat %<r»t tUfai/a* 
ri %<rrt etf*u*1m 3t7, iXka xa) Ix rivvt 
ivrt rxiypxefai Sip* y*{ itbnffeu fieuXi 
(id*, xa) etttra) tlteu rotevrei. Mag. 
Moral, p. 1. 

2. ri m-XtTov] Intellectual virtue is 
not entirely produced by teaching. For 
some men are born with a greater de- 
gree of natural wisdom and genius than 
others, and have a greater natural apti- 
tude to acquire and perfect these virtues. 



4. nitxh Ig tieet] xa) ri 3i7 ret 
vaXXa Xiytn; xa) ya^ to %fa$ Moc 
irr) *oXv%£ottef xtti rat nftxat aprae 
Utxetg &v rtt y.iyn, §ux &* n vknpptXtT* 
Sigmv. Plutarch, de Liberia Educ. vol. 
vii. p. 8. ed. Hutten. 

The word $frs (moral character), 
is derived from U§t (habit), and the 
nfiixal afirat are called Utxttl. But 
they are very distinct : for the Hot is 
the energy, but the *\$e$ is a quality pro- 
duced by this energy in the moral or 
pathetical (vodnrtxn) part of the soul. 
It is the end and If^yo (object) of 
the. 



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54 ARISTOTELIS 

The Moral e(TY7)K€ fJUKpOP irap€KK\lPOP OTTO TOV clfcw. 'E£ 

Virtuei are & „ „ 9 m , 

not given us 5 KOLl OTlXoV OTt OVO€Uia T(OV TIUlKtOV CLD€T(OV <bv<T€l 
by nature. f „ , , ^ > ~ // v 

i. Because ^^uj; cyyiycrcu ovaev yap T&v (pvcrei OVTG>V 

tered by a\\<D? iOl&TOU, olov 6 XlOoS <f>VCT€l KOLTtO <f>€p6fJL€l>OS 

ovk clv iOicrdtli] av<o <f)€p€<r0ai, ov& av fivpioKisb 
olvtov eOLtjg ti$ ava> piirredv, ov8t to irvp #caro>, 
ovtf aXXo ovSev rS>v aXXoo? 7T€(f>VKOTa)P aXXcos av 
idiaOeiT]. out apa (pvaei ovt€ irapa <f>vcriv iyyl- 
vovrai ai aperaiy aXAa 7T€<f>VKoari puev rjfiiv 84£axr- 

2. Because $at aVTOSy T€X€lOVfl€VOl9 &€ SlOL TOV €0OV9. En 10 

perform oCTd fl&V (pva€L TjflLV 7rapayu/€TOl, TClf 0wafl€l9 
the acts / / yi /\ <t ^^^ 

before we TOVT(OV 7TpOT€pOV KOfJu£ofl€0a y VOT€pOV 0€ TOS 

virtues. tvepyeias anro8i8ofi€v. owep en\ tS>v alaOr/o-eaw 
SfjXoi/' ov yap €K rod iroWauu? ISeiv rj 7roXXaKi9 
aKOvaat rat,? aiadrjatif £\d{iofJL€i/, aXX* avawaXw 15 
€)(ovt€9 lyfificrapjeBa^ ov yprjaafi€V0L ea\Ofiev, ray 
S apera? Xafifiavopuev ivepyrfaavrts wporepov, 
&<r7T€p teal fari 7W aXXcov T€\v&v* a yap del 
fiaOovra? 7roi€?j/, ravra ttoiovvtss puavOavopuev^ 

OlOV 0lK080fWVVT€9 o'lKoSofJLOl yiVOVTCU K€LL KtdapL' 20 

fyvres KiOapiaraL ovtg> Se icai ra puev SUcua 
irpdrTOPT€9 Slkouol yu/6fi€0a, ra Se acoippova 

3. And this a-(o(f)pov€9j rot. & aySpeia dvSpeioi. MapTvpei 



3. §Mip—rSt fvm] The scholiast whilst it remains, their inclination to 

explains the r» rSt $v*u thus : §2 act remains likewise. If they be acted 

4 nXuirnt U f vnwr wt^iymrtu, $ on, unless the effect produced be such 

*uf*$vr*f •Ira. it rtj> \Utf n fia^vrnt, « as to remove their innate principle of 

0rrff» lwiyn*ftitn »t n Siimn /3X»- action, that natural inclination still 

mm S ytnun. Those things which remains. But if they be so acted on 

act naturally (Qv*u), either act only, that their innate principle of action be 

or act and are acted upon. If they entirely removed, they are no longer 

act only, from their energy their prin- natural. See Thos. Aquinas, in loc*. 
ciple of action is not changed; and " 



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ETHICOBUM LIB. II. 1. 55 

8e kou to yivopuevov 4v reus sroAcow* ol yap by the con- 

VOfl00€TOU TQVS TToXLtOS 40i{fiVT€$ TTOIOVCTIV OtyaJ&OVf, legislators. 

kou to fiw BovXrjfia irauro9 pofiodirov tovt 4otIp 9 

otroi 8e fir] ed avrb iroiovatv y afxaprdvovaiu' kou 

h 8ta(f>€p€t tovt<p iroXireia iroXireias, dyaOr) <f)avXrj$. 

V Er£ 4k T&V OLVTtOV KOU 8ta 7W aVTCOV KOU yiPerOUi. Became 
% x i zj / « / *\ x / .Virtue and 

Traaa apcrq kou (paeiperou, Ofioieo? 0€ kou T*\irq ViceCoppo- 

y \ /% ty \ * • /> \ y • x siteeffect») 

€#c yap tov KiuapiQeiv kcu ol ayaffot Kai 01 jrajcoiarepro- 

/ /% i • /x *\ \ * > *' ducedfrom 

ywovrai Ktaaptorai. avakoyov oe kou ol oikooo/jloi the tame 
10 kcu ol Xoiirol irdvres' 4k pXv yap tov ev ot#codq/i€U' cause. 
ayadol oIkoSo/jlol to-owou, 4k 8e tov kokow kokoL 
ci yap firj ovrm €*X €,/ j ovSev op €$€* tov 8i8d- 
£ovto9 9 aXXa iravrts av eyivovro ayadol tj kokoL 

OVTOD 8r/ KOI 4wl 7W dp€T(OV €\€l' irpOTTOVT^ yap 

15 ra 4v toIs avvaXXdypuaxn tois irpbs tow avdpco- 
TTovs ywbp&Qa ol p&v StKatoi ol $€ aSiKot, Trpar- 
tovtcs 8e tol 4v toIs Seivoi? Kal £0i£op,€i>oi <f>of$el- 
crOat rj Qappelv ol p&v dvSpeioi ol 5c SetXoL bfiouo? 
8e Kal ra wcpi ray eniOvpias e\€i koi tol 7T€pl tols 

20 opyas* ol p&v yap cra>(f)pov€s kou itpaoi ylvovrax y 
ol 5* (zkoXootoi koi opyikoij ol p&v 4k tov ovraxrl 
4v avrols avoujrp€<f)€o m 0ai 9 ol Se 4k tov ovtghtL 
Kal 4vl 8rj Xoy<p 4k t&v bfioicov ivepyei&v al eljti? 
yivovrou. 8ib Set tol? 4v€py€ta9 Troias diro8i8ovai* 

6. tri U «£? rnvrit] In nature the another class of habits, viz. the arts. 

same efficient cause cannot produce If the moral virtues are produced and 

two opposite effects. But actions do destroyed in the same way as the 

produce two opposite effects ; good ac- arts j but the arts, inasmuch as they 

tions produce virtue, bad actions de- are produced by energies, are not in- 

stroy it ; consequently nature is not the nate (*£ <pv*u) ; neither therefore are 

efficient cause of moral virtue. To the virtues. See Phys. Ausc. iv. 3. 
make his argument more plain, Aria- 24. avrMim] To perform energies 

totle uses an illustration drawn from of a certain quality. 



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66 



ARISTOTELIS 



Kara yap ras rovroav 8ia(f>opas okoXovOovctw ax 
eijeis. ov fJMCpop oiv Staipepet to ovtcds rj ovra>9 
ev0v9 £k v4cov edlfeordcuy dXXa irdpnroXv, fiaXXov 
0€ to wav. 



CHAP. II. 

That moral virtues are habits avoiding excess and defect — that they 
are perfect when we feel pleasure in exercising them — that their 
object matter (Z\n) is pleasure and pain. 



What kind 
of actions 
produce 
virtuous 
habits. 



EI1EI odv 77 Trapovora irpay/juiTeca ov Oe&piasfy 

€V€KCL IcTTLV (OOW€p Oil aXkoU (ov yap tv ei8(Dfl€V 

tL koriv rj apery <rK€7rTOfi€0a y aAA' tv dyaOoi 
yevcofieda, iirei ovSev av ?jv 6(f>eXo9 avTrjs), avay- 
kolov karri aKeyj/aaffai tol irepl tos irpdijeis, ww 
irpaKriov avTa? avTac yap eiat Kvpiai kcu tovXO 
iroid^ yeveaOai tols e&ts, KaOdirtp elprjKapiev. to 
fitv o\>v /caret top 6p6ov Xoyov irpaTTtiv kolvov 
kcu wroKelaOco, prjOrjaeTcu 5* vorepov irepl avrov, 



If then virtue be a habit, and every 
habit is produced by the repetition of 
single acts, and as are the acts such 
are the habits resulting from them ; it 
is plain that as virtue is a good habit, 
it must be produced by good ac- 
tions. 

What then are good actions? Till 
we know this we cannot acquire virtue, 
or proceed to practise the precepts of 
this treatise. 

Omitting at present the considera- 
tion, that they must be done according 
to right reason, we gather by an in- 



duction of several instances, that good 
actions are generally those which avoid 
excess and defect, and are in a mean *, 
consequently as the habit is similar to 
the acts by which it is produced, .virtue 
will be Tfys h ftirfrfin. This chapter 
divides itself into three parts ; 

The I. question, is; From what 
quality of actions are good habits pro- 
duced? 

II. How shall we know that we 
have attained them 1 

III. What is the object matter of 
them? 



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ETHICORUM LIB. II. 2. 57 

kcu ri kariv 6 opObs Aoyor, kcu itm e\€i 7rpo9 

tol9 aXXa? operas. 'E/tciifO 8e Trpohiopx>\oy*ur0<D,vuA>M* 

tf ~e \ ~ « N / / x t reasons 

OTl 7T09 7T€pi T(OV TTpOKTCOV AoyO? TWITCp KOI OVK ought only 

aKpiptD? ocpetAet Atyecr&cu, (oairep kcu kot a/>x a *qu»redina 
5€i7ro/i6j/ or* Kara n/i/ i/A^p oi Xoyoi oircuTqTtoi w&. 
ra 8* Iv tol9 irpojgea'i kcu to crvp,<f>€povra ovStv 
€<mjKos ex €i 9 wrirtp ov8e ra iyuwa. toiovtov 8 
ovtos tou KadoXov Xoyov, €n fiaXXov 6 irtpl twp 
Kaff €kooto Xoyos ovk i-yei TOKpifies' ovre yap 
\0v7to riyyt\v ovff wrb irapayyeXtav ovSepiav 7rt7TT€i 9 
Set & ovrov9 oel tovs itporrovros to 7rpbs top 

KdipOV (TK07r€lV, GKTTTep KCU €7Tl TT)9 loTptK7J9 €\€l 

KCU TTJ9 Kvf$€pVr)TlKrj9. OlXXo KOLTTep OVTQS TOIOVTOV 

TOV 7TOp6vTOS XoyOV 7T€LpOT€OV fior)0€LP. 

16 YipWTOV oZv TOVTO 0€<DpT)T€OP, OTL TO TO I a VTO 1. Actions 

7T€(f>VK€P V7TO €p8eia9 KCU V7r€pfioXi]9 (frfelpt^OU, excess and 
/* ~ \ e \ ^ >jl ~ ~jl ~ defect 

(bet yap V7rep tcdp acpavcov toi? (pavepoi? /xa/>- generally 

/ ~ a \ # » \ ** t / > ~ produce 

rupiois xpr)aaai) axnrep em r^y icryyos kol ttj9 good habiu. 
vyieias opco/iep* to re yap inrepfiaXXovTa yvfivaxrio 
20 /cat to iXAeiTTovra (f>0eipei ttjv iayyv. o/iouo? 8k 
kcu Ta iroTa kcu to aiTia 7rXeuo kcu iXaTrco 
ytvo/JL€va (f)delp€t ttjv vyietap, Ta 8e crvp.\Lerpa 
kcu iroiel kcu av£ei kcu creo^ei. ovrm odp kcu 



1. iftot koyof] Which subject is however, that virtue is a mean situated 

resumed in the sixth Book. between two vices, which are its 

10. <ra,^ayy\\mi\ Set of precepts. extremes, appears to be due to the 

16. Witiat xa) ingjSriiJif] Perhaps Pythagoreans. Compare Theages de 

Aristotle when introducing this argu- Virtu tibus : rZ fin hotrog •?&•• W- ri 

ment had in view the celebrated sen- ph v<ri^oka ri Ti lXku4>i{. »«) a j*lf 

tence, written by the seven wise men uirt^oXet re *xid* r»Z Vurrit Irriv k 

of Greece, and placed in the temple 5* tXXu^tt ri iXttrrev. k t &prk Tfyf 

of Apollo ; finSif Zyttt (See Plato's rlt Urt tou Ywrot. Frag. Pythag. p. 

Protag. p. 343. D. Clem. Alex. ii. 32. See also Fran. Patricii Diss, 

p. 45.) The merit of the discovery, Perip. p. 271. 



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08 ARISTOTELIS 

eVi orGXppoavvT)? kcu av8peia$ e^t kou t&p aXXcoy 
aper&p* o T€ yap iravra <f>evy<DV kou (froftovfiepQs 

KCU /JLt/SeV VlTO/JL€V(OV StlkoS yiVCTCU, T€ {ITjSw 

0X009 <j>o{$ovfi€PO? dXXa irpos iravra fiaSlfav 
dpaovs. bfiouos 81 kcu 6 puep vdaiff9 T)8ovrjs5 
ajroXavcop kcu firjSe/uw direxofiepos okoXclotos, 
6 8e iraaas (f>evycoPy (ocnrep oi aypoiKOi, avaicr- 
drjTO? ti$' <f>0€Lp€Tcu yap ij cr<o(f>pocrvjnj kou r\ 
apSpcia viro rrjs virepfioXrjs kou rrj? iWetyeatS) 

The same UWO 81 TTJ? fUaOTT/TO^ CT(o£<ETCU. 'AAA* OV W 

which fWPOP al y€P€CT€l9 KOU CLl av£tjo'€l$ KOi OU <j>dopal 

produce, , „ ,^ x « s ~ » ~ , »%\^ 

are pro- €K TCOV OVTCOP KOU WTO T(OV OVTCOP ytVOVTCU, OAAa 

the habits. KCU OU €P€py€UU €V TOl$ OVT019 GCOVTOU KCU yap 

iirl tS>p aXXcov tg>p (fravepcorepcov ovrm cx«, olov 
iirl rijf iarxyos* yiperou yap 4k tov iroXXr/vlb 
Tpo(f)rjv Xa/j.(iaP€LP kou iroXXovs irovovs {nroftevetv, 
kou fiaXiara Svvarou ravra irotelv 6 io"xypo$. ovtg> 
5* e)(€i kcu cttI t&v aper&v* €K re yap tov a7rcxccr- 
6tou tcov TjSovcov ytvofieOa <r(D<f)pov€s 9 teal yevoftevoi 
fjutXtoTa Swd/ieda airexeaOou avrebv. ofiolw Sezo 
Koi iirl ttj9 dvSpela?' €0i^6fi€vot yap KaTa(f>pov€tv 
t&v (frofiepebv kou wrofievetv aura yivofieOa av- 
Spetoi, Kal y€vofievoi /xaAiara Sw^aro/itda wro- 
fievetv tol (pofiepd. 



1. rtn iXXm *£»w] Of the rest of nature. The reason is essentially and 

the moral Virtues. For of the intel- absolutely good, and cannot therefore 

lectual Virtues there cannot be any be too highly cultivated. The appe- 

excess. But the moral Virtues, con- tite only relatively so, and when in 

sisting of reason and appetite go- any other state than that of modera- 

verned by reason, it is the object of tion, becomes a positive evil, 
philosophy not to expel the appetites, 6. ixokaer*] The intemperate : ei 

as wholly evil, but to make them sub- £?(«««(, the ascetic. See c. 6. 
servient to the better purposes of our 



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ETHICORUM LIB. II. £. 



59 



Srjpxfop 8e Set iroielaOou r&p eijecov ttjp im- ii. piea- 
yiPopApyp r/Soprjp rj Xwrr/p r <w epyot? 6 pep^nto 
yap airexo/Mevos t&p atopartK^p tjSop&p kou a imp the^rfec! 
tovt V x*ip*»> <rco<f>pa>p, 6 tf a X 06/iePO9 aKoXaar^hlb^ 
5kcu 6 fiep \nrofi€P(op ra Setpa kou xaip<op rj pjj 
Xinrov/iepos ye apSpelos, 6 Se Xxnrovpuepos SecXo?. 
Ilepl rjSopa? yap kou Xwra? earip rj rjdiicrj apery' m. piea- 
Sta pip yap ttjp rjSoprjp ra <f>avXa irparropuep, &a£££eob. 
8c ttjp Xvthjp rap kolX&p airexptuOa. 810 SeiTvu?*?' 

lofyflai nw €V0V9 4k pfop, <k 6 UXarcop (f^atp^J^! 
wrre x a W €LV Te *<"> ^vwelaOou oh Set' 17 yap***** *** 
opOr) wouSeia avrrj earlp. "Etc 8' ei aperou2. 

elai 7T€pl 7rpd^€i9 Kal 7rd0r)> Trapri 8e iradei kou 
iraay irpa^ei eirerat f/Soprj kou Xv7tt), Kal 81a 

I&tovt ap etrj 17 apery irep\ rjSopa? kou Xwras. 
Mtjpvovo-l 8e kou at KoXaaeis ywop&pai Sta roJ-3. 



7. *i e ? nhpms] D. Thomas I. Se- 
cunde Art 2. Qusst. 60. virtutem 
circa animi affectum versari dicit du- 
pliciter ; vel ut hunc producit actio- 
nique sua? habet annexum, vel ut 
eundem regit, qui est pro subjecta 
materia. Priore modo dictum est ab 
Aristotele omnes virtutes morales ver- 
sari circa voluptatem et dolorem. 
Quoniam virtutum habitus confor- 
mati cognoscuntur ex voluptate qua 
actionibus est adjuncta. Posteriore 
vero virtutes qusdam dicuntur ver- 
sari in regendis actionibus, ut justitia 
in emptione et venditione, Hberalitas 
in largitione pecuniae, alias in affecti- 
bus ut temperantia et continentia. 
Vid. Jac. Carpentaria in Alcin. In- 
stit. ii. p. 134. 

— foavas y*(\ Aristotle proves 
that pleasure and pain are the object- 



matter of virtue, by eight reasons. 
Four of which are derived from con- 
sidering virtue itself, four from the 
nature of man. In another Trea- 
tise Aristotle thus discusses the 
same subject : <?«-««•« n fanh m^trh 
*i() Olnkf mm) Xwrmg rkg *mpm*tmm*fr 
mZrau ft ft U vy v^mrruv, j} it rf 
(*%(uMm % 4 U ry iXr/(fi». mi fAt §St 
l» rj *(d%u mmrk rnv mlrimrn uW, 
£*** »*• uMnrw m»s suntrtm. mi V 
U xn fAtnpn mm) r n Ikirftt art rrnvrtn 
tl*i, 4 ymf dim, ivmin ptfivttfitivu %ld*rmt, 
£ iXri{ovru eJec ftinvvtf. 3*t mtdymm 
irmvm* *vi9 rttaurnt ntovnf far* r£w 
altrfnrm ytynrteu. Phys. Ausc. vii. 3. 
See Mag. Mor. p. 13. 

10. nxir*r»] See Plato de Leg. 
p. 653. and Simplicius upon Aristot. 
Phys. Ausc. f. 149. 



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60 ARISTOTELIS 

T(ov m larpetat yap rivis tiaiVy al 8e iarpelau Sea 
4'TG>v ipavTtoDP 7T€<f>VKCuri ylpeaOai. v En, coy /cat 
irportpov ehrofiev, iraxra yfrvxrjs *£tf> v<j>' olxov 
7T€(f>vK€ yipeadai yelpcov kou fieXrioov, 7rpbs ravra 
Koi irepl ravra tt/p (f)vcrip €\€C 8t t)8opos 8c koi 5 
\v7ra9 (JhzvXou ylpoprai, r<p Sudkcip ravras /cat 

1 / * A % ft ~ A tf % ft « * c » ft « * 

(pevyetv, f) ay fir} 0€i rj or* ov 0€i r) a>y ov Set 7) 
6craj(G>y aXXeoy xnro rod Xoyov Siopifierai ra 
roiavra. 810 kou 6pl£oprcu ray aperas airajBeias 
Tivas kou -qpefiia? ovk €tJ 8e, bri airXm XeyovaiPy 10 
aAA oux <w 0€4 koi coy 01; 0€i, #ea* ore, /cat oca 
aXXa irpooriOerai* xmoKtirai apa r) apery eipat 
7) rotavrrf ircpl t)8opos kcu Xviras t&p fSeXrloT&p 
5-7rpaKriK7/ 9 7) 8e Aca/aa rovpapriop. Tepoiro & 

ap 7) flip Kal €K rovr&p (f>apepop ert irtpl rebp 15 
avrcop. rpicov yap optojp twp eiy ray aipeaei? 
Kal rpicop tg>p €19 ray 0vyay, kolXov avfi(f>€popT09 



13. «£*« $t/%nf tfyt] See 55, 6. re ^ er to the Stoics who existed not as 

Every moral habit of the soul de- * sect until a later period, but to 

rives its complexion from the kind of opinions disseminated by Socrates, and 

acts by which it is improved or dete- afterwards adopted by the Stoics and 

riorated. and employs itself upon others. 

them. But these are pleasure and 9 - %%•***] The Cynics, from 
pain; in pursuing pleasure or avoid- wnom the Stoics borrowed this tenet, 
ing pain, when or as we ought not, But he alludes particularly to Speu- 
we acquire vicious habits; in pur- sippus, who according to Clem. Alex- 
suing or avoiding them when and and. .(Strom, ii. p. 202.) introduced 
as we ought, we acquire virtuous the word &§%*>n*i* afterwards used by 
habits. Virtue moderates and directs the Epicureans. So also Democritus 
the perturbations occasioned by plea- according to Diog. Laert. ix. §. 45. 
sure or pain, hence Virtue was called ***** * «&« **• &»&•', •* «*» «M» 
by the Stoics an apathy or serenity '**•«» *V **•»? * *«■» *•&•&*** 
(typta). But in that they called it l&M&w*, **>•« *«* fa y*k*f£t *«* 
an apathy absolutely without reference tvrmtSt h +*xfr htyu, M fwhiit 
to a mean, or consideration of different ta^mfiivn &&•* * turfm/MtUs n 
circumstances, this definition is incor- iXX$u rtdt «ai»»t. See Michelet in 
rect. Aristotle of course does not loco. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. II. 8. 61 

r)8eos, kcu rpubv tG>v evavrlxov, cuoypov fiXafiepov 
Xwnjpov, wepl irdvra pkv ravra b dyatio? *caro/>- 

OCDTLKOS koTLV 6 8e KCLKO? dfJLapT7)TLK09> ftoXlOTd 
$€ 7T€pl TTjV rjbovrjV* KOIVT) T€ yap OLVTq TOtf 

sftpois, kcu watcri toZs inrb ttjv cupeaiv wapa/co- 
XovOeZ" kcu yap to koXov kcu to aropjfyepov r]8v 
<j)aiv€Tcu. En # eVc vqirlov iraaiv riplv avvre-e. 

Opairrcu* 810 x a ^ €7r ^ p awoTptyao'Ocu tovto to 
iraJdos €yK€Xp<DafJL€i/ov t$ f}up. Kavovt{ftfievT. 

10 8e KOU TOL9 7Tpd^€L9y 01 fl€V IXaXkoV Ol 5* rjTTOV, 

rjSovy kcu Xviry' Sid tovt oiv avayKaZov elvcu 
irepl tolvto, tt]v irdaav TrpaypuareLav* ov yap 
fiLKpov eh tols irpd^ets ed r/ kglkco? yaipew kcu 
XinrelaQcu. En 8k xaXeirwrepov rj8ovy fia-8. 

\b\ea6cu r/ dv/jxp, KaBdirep (frrjcrlv 'H/oaieAerroy, irepl 
8e to \cLXe7rdyrepov del Kal Teyyt) ylverax kcu 
aperi)* kcu yap to ei fteXriov ev tovtcj). (Sore Kal 
Sid tovto irepl rjSovas Kal Xviras iraaa ij irpay- 
fiareta kcu rfj apery Kal Ttj 7roXiTucr}' 6 fiev yap 

20 ed tovtoc9 xptofievos dyados eorat, 6 8e kokco? 
KaKOS. oti fiev odv eorlv tj dpeTrj irepl rfSovas 
kcu Xviras, Kal oti e£ d*v ylveTai, wro tovtcov 
kcu av^eTai kcu (f)0eipeTai pr) ©cj-ai/Vcw yivopLev&v, 
kcu oti e£ a>v eyeveTOj irepl raura kcu ei/epyeZj 

25elpr)cr0(D. 

15. 'H^dxkurof] taxi ft %ak , H^«- Eud. ii. 7. Aristot. Pol. v. 10. See 

*Xuro< \iyut th rht lr%v* r»v tvfUu also Plutarch, «i(i fafynwius. ix. p. 

fiXiypeif, ort Xuvrn^a h K*X.vft( «tvr»u' 434. Hutten. 
X*Xt<rer y*t* fnet, ivpijt ^mb#m*« Kth. 



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6* ARISTOTELIS 

CHAP. III. 

The distinction between doing virtuous aeU and doing virtuotuly. 

objectioD. AIIOPH2EIE 8 f av ri$ 9 7rm Xeyopuev oti Set 3 
ra fuv dcKcua irpdrrovras SiKalov? yive<rdcu 9 rd 
8e craxfipova crcocfrpova?' ei yap irpdrrovai ra 
Slkouz teal ra <ra(f)pova 9 r(8rj eicrl Slkcuol kcu 
crdtypovts, (oairep el ra ypapLpjariKa teal ra pov-5 

Answer: cuca 9 ypap.pjariKoi kcu fwvo-iKoL H ov8' eir\ 

that even ** « *r v » & / \ 

fa the arts rcov re^fytov ovrtos *X €L 9 €voe\ercu yap ypapr 

somewhat* PULTUCOV Tl 7TOlT]<rai KCU &TTO TV)(r)$ KCU aX\0V 

SetWn^ 1 inroOepLevov. rore obv earcu ypap.puaTiKO$ 9 eav 
^^f; kcu ypap-pariKOV ri iroiTjoy Kal ypa/ifiariKm' 10 
JJSt* 11 rovro 8' earl ro Kara ttjv ev avr<p ypafipxtrucqv. 
2.Th«cates"Ert ovtf ojjlolov eariv cVl ra>v re\v£>v kcu t&v 

are not , A % x % « \ ~ ~ / 

similar, apercov ra fiev yap wro rcov reyycov ytvofuva 
ro ei €j(€i ev avroi$ 9 apicel odv ravrd ncos e\ovra 
yeveadaC ra 8e Kara tot dperots ytvo/ieva owe 15 
eav aura ire*? e\7/ 9 SiKauos r) <T<o(f)p6vco$ irpdrrerou, 
aXXa koI eav 6 irpdrr(ov iras e\(ov 7rpdrrg 9 irpwov 
/lev eav el8a>9 9 eireir eav Trpocupovpuevo$ 9 kcu 
7rpoaipov/i€vos 8t avrd 9 to 8e rptrov kcu eav 
fiefiaiG)? koI dfJL€TaKiV7)T(D9 e\cov irpdrrjf ravra20 
8e irpos p*v to rats aAAay re^va? e\€iv ov orvva- 

It was said (p. 58), that by doing nism is a mechanic, and he who can 

brave actions men become brave, and play the harp is an harper, we say, 

by doing temperate actions, tempe- without any reference to his Tfa. 

rate, and by doing just actions, just. To this objection Aristotle replies, b^ 

But it may be asked ; how can it be showing that they are not parallel 

said that he who desires to become cases : for in the arts we look only to 

just, must do just actions ? In an- the excellence of the thing produced, 

other class of habits, the arts, he who but in virtuous actions, almost entirely 

produces a good piece of mecha- to the disposition of the agent. 

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vious con- 
clusion 
resumed. 



ETHICOUUM LIB. II. 3. 6S 

piOfieircu, ttXtjv avro to elSepai' irpos 8e to tcls 
dpera? to fiev elSepac fiucpbv fj ovSep lor\v€i 9 TO, 
8 9 aXXa ov fiLtcpov aXXa to ttolv SvpaTai, airtp 
ck tov 7roX\aKi9 irpamiv to, blkam kcu (rdxppopa 
57r€piylv€Tou. Ta fi€v oiv wpay/iaTa SUoua /ecu The pre 

/* x / or * ~ t * « */ vious er 

acoeppopa Acycrai, orap y TOtavra ota ap o oikcuos elation 
^f 6 &tD(f)pcQv 7rpa£ei€P' SUouo? 6c kal a(o(f)p(ov 
e<rt\p ov\ o TauTa irpart(op y eJAAa kal 6 ovtg> 

TTpUTTGOV 0)9 oi StKOUOl KOU 01 <TCO(f)pOp€9 irpOT- 

iotov&lv. ed odp Xeyerat ori 4k tov Slkaca irpar- 
Tetp o Sltcouof yiverauL kcu 4k tov fa trwfrpopa 6 
o-co(j)poov' 4k 5e tov p.rj TrparreiP raSra ovSels ap 
ovde fieWrjatie ytpeadai ayaOos. aAA* oi iroXXol 
Tama p.ev ov itpaTTOVoriP^ 4iri Se tov Xoyop 

\5KaTd<f)€vyovT€9 oLoptol (f)iXoo m o(f>€iv Kal ovrto? €<r€O m - 
Oai (rrrov8aloi 9 ofioiop tl iroiovvres tois Kappovcrtp, 
oi t£p laTpcop aKOvovai p£v €7rt/i€A<5y, iroLOvat ft 
ovdev tg>p TrpooTaTTop.ev<ov. axnrep ovp ovS 
€K€ivoi €t5 eijovai to acopa ovtg> Otpairevopjepoi, 

20ovd' ovtol ttjp tyvyrjp OVTG) <l)L\0<r0<f)0VPT€9. 



2. ri p\t f Ainu] ««) y*{ Whixtrtu dam ad virtutem appellator : quod 

fAY&v A*p(l\t «rtj) J^trUt »*>•*» tiiira autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi 

*vvS*7» iTmm. Paraph. perfectio naturae." Acad. i. 5. 

5. tu «Zv \iyireu] Cicero giving a 5. }/*«#« «-(«rruv] Although the 

short analysis of the doctrines of the acts done previous to the acquirement 

old Academy and Peripatetics, (nihil of the habit be not only imperfect, but 

enim inter Peripateticos et illam vete- also spring from unworthy motives, 

rem Academiam differebat,) thus de- they may still lead to a perfect habit, 

scribes their doctrine of moral virtue, and then the habit produces the per- 

" Morum autem putabant studia esse feet act See Butler's Remarks upon 

et quasi consuetudinem (Ife ) : quam the assertion of Lord Shaftesbury, that 

partim ezercitationis assiduitate, partim acts of obedience springing from self- 

ratione formabant ; in quibus erat phi- ishness only generate habits of self- 

losophia ipsa, in qua quod inchoatum ishness. Analogy, i. 5. 



est neque absolutum progressio qua- 



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64 



ARISTOTELIS 



CHAP. IV. 

Virtue is either witn, V—pit. or t£« — it is neither mdw nor Uimfui, 
(for we are not praised according to them, but we are according 
to Virtue,)— and therefore it is $« . 

Jnr?*™* META *c raOra ri eartv tf apery aicewreovA 
"ate?" * 7r€ * °^ y r< * * y ^ V^XT? ywofieva rpia early ttojOtj 
Virtue, not Swages eijei?, tovt(ov av ri eXrj rj apery. Aeya> 
8e iratiSr) fiev eTTidvfilav, opyrjv, 0o/3ov, dpaaos, 
(pOovov, yapav^ <j>tXiav 9 fuaos, iroOov, $7^ 01, > 5 



tUh. 



After having thus proved that the 
virtues are not implanted in us by 
nature, but are acquired by the repe- 
tition of certain actions, and having 
shown what those actions are, next 
how we may understand when we 
have attained the virtues, and upon 
what object-matter those virtues are 
employed ; Aristotle now proceeds to 
discover the definition of Virtue. This 
order of treating the subject was 
necessary ; for if the opinion of some, 
that virtue is innate, had not been 
refuted in the outset, the definition 
which Aristotle presently gives of vir- 
tue (V&s rgNM{ir<xff) would be vain 
and nugatory. 

We proceed therefore to discover 
first the genui of Moral Virtue. Now 
since the virtues of the soul are in the 
soul, and the Moral Virtues in the 
moral or appetitive part of the soul, 
and since pleasure and pain are the 
object matter upon which they are 
employed, it will be necessary to con- 
sider what those faculties are in the 
moral part of the soul, which are at 
all concerned with pleasure and pain. 
There are three, rain, iwaput, V£us 



Pleasure and pain follow the «*«#n, — 
the ^tnmfiut are the capabilities of be- 
ing affected by the <rain, consequently 
by pleasure and pain, — the tyus are 
those by which we are well or ill 
disposed to them, and consequently 
well or ill disposed in reference to 
pleasure and pain; Virtue is neither 
of the former, consequently it is the 
latter. 

2. ?£<«] Compare Plutarch de 
Virt. Morali. c. 4. (Vol. ix. p. 399. 
Ed. Hutten) : «•{*« ya^ ft rmvra $**i 
trig) rkv "^tf^ift wCu{%ut, 3v?ayu*, 
««S« , fgn>. n /Up wv ifatfius «££« *** 

r»Xm % 0Mtf*X.tirti{. ri 3. *aJo( xtm*U 
rtt ft* rnt }tn»ftttt Ig 14§v$ iyyivopim . 
**»/« fi\* m» <pauX*<, a^iri, )• mt 
xak*s Surl rtu Xiyeu <r*u&*y*ynfy <ri 
xihs. According to Giphanius, Aris- 
totle enumerates only **4o{, Ivutfus, 
and l&f , because as Virtue is a quality 
and these three with form (*;g«p«t), 
which pertains only to material things, 
are the only species of quality, con- 
sequently Virtue must be one or more 
of these. See Categ. c. vi. (Ed. 
Tauch,) 



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ETHICORUM LIB. II. 4. 65 

eXeoPy o\g)9 oh eirerou rjSovrj rj Xv7tt), Swapjeis 
8e Ktxjff as TraBrynKoi tovtoov Xeyo/xeOa, dlov Kajff 
as Svvarol opyio-Orjvai r) XwrrjOrjpai r) tXerjcrai, 
€%€i9 8e Kajff as irpos ra rrajOr) ZyppAP e3 rj 
5jeaica>?, olop rrpos to opyio-Orjpai, *l /jl€p o-(f>o8pG>9 

7) aP€lfJL€P(09y KdKCO? €XOfl€P, €t 8l /LieOYO?, €?. 

6/XOLC09 8e Kal rrpos raXAa. irdOr) /xep ofip ovk 
uaiv ovu at aperai ova cu KOKtai, on ov Aeyo- 
fieOa Kara ra rrdOr) airovSatot rj <f>avXoi, Kara 8$ 

lord? dpera? i) ray KaKias XeyofieOa, Kal ore Kara 
fiev ra Trddr/ ovr erraiPOv/ieOa ovre tyeyoficda (ov 
yap irramptirai 6 (f>ofiovfi€P09 ovSe 6 6pyi£6fi€P09, 
ovSe yjreyerai 6 a7rAa>y 6pyi£6fi€P09 dXX 9 6 7ra>y), 
Kara 8e ra? dperds Kal ra? icaic/a? IrraiPovfLtOa 

15 ?? yj/€y6fi€0a. eri opyiffifieOa /xep Kal (fwfiov- 
fieOa a7rpoatpeT(09 9 aX 8 aperai Trpoaipeo-eis ripe? 
r) ovk avev rrpoaipicrtcos. rrpos 8e rovrois Kara jjlcp 
ra Trddr] KipeiaOai Xcyofieda, Kara 8e ras aperd? 
kou ras Kcudas ov KiPtiaOai dXXa 8iaK€i<r6ai 7tg>9. 

20 Ata ravra 8e ov8e Svvdfieis elaip' ovre yap virtue not 
dyadol XeyofieOa rep 8vvaa0ai rrda\eip dwXw '""'"' 
ovre kqlkol, ovr krraipovp&da ovre \jr€yo/JL€0a. Kal 



19. 3i«*«~*fci «•*>*] Virtue is an af- **) Jw*iMJr*». hatieus ft Xtyorrxi 

fection by which we are disposed or & \*m tvzhtira tut) r*%u furafidx- 

conformed {^MxtleOeu) in a certain Xotra* a7d* tt^fMrns **) ^ux^ rfls * *** 

manner. Virtue is not however a dis- vi<rof xa) vyu/a, xa.) %v* &Xka tomvth. 

position (J**^i«*) f but a habit (¥frf). Iidzurai fih y&£ *•>{ zara, retvrag i 

In what way hattris differs from ¥&; Mauris, rax* 1 ft f**r*(ldXXu, i* fy- 

Aristotle thus explains in his Cate- ped ^vxfot yttoptns, *** lz rev vytcu- 

gories, cap. vi. (p. 48. ed. Tauchn.) n» %U t» »«rsT». 

timfi£u ft ifys hedirtuf rSf xw i » rl W % 20. hnapiti'] Capacities of feeling, 

that xeii putiftHTtfot' roiecurat ft etl rt or being acted upon. In which the 

itr/frS/MM %al at u^rar %rt yȣ ir<- present use of the term differs from 

*Tnf*n i**ti tZ* **£f*»tifmri{*9 thtu that of p. 6, and elsewhere. 



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ARISTOTELIS 



Virtue it 
IS*. 



ert dwarol fiev eapuev <f>vcrei 9 ayaBol 8e r) kcucol 
ov yivofieda <f>v<rei' eXirofiev 8e irepi toutov irpore- 
pov. Ei oil/ fiyre irdOr) eialv <u apercu p.r\re 

Svvafieis, Xehrerou eget? auras elwu. o re pkv olv 
earl t$ yevei rj apery, etpr/rai. * 



The Diffe- 
rentia of 
Virtue in- 
vestigated. 



CHAP. V. 

That Virtue is a habit in a mean (i» furJrtw) relative to ourselves. 

AEI 8e firj pjovov ovt&s elirelv, on €&?', aAAa5 
Kal Troia Tt?. fareov odv ort iraaa apery, ov av 
r\ apery, avro re ed e\ov diroreXel Kal to epyov 
avrov ei anro8i8G><nv, olov rj tov o^daX/xov apery 
top re 6(f)0a\fjLoi> (rrrovSalou irotel Kal to epyovio 
avrov' rrj yap tov 6*f)0aXfiov apery ed bpa>p.ev. 
ofjLolco? r) tov imrov apery Imrov re airov8alov 
iroiel Kal ayaOov Spaficiv Kal eveyKelv rov eiri- 
fidryu Kal fieivat tov? 7ro\efJilovf. el 8rj rovr eirl 
irdvr(ov ovtoos *X €L > K( * L V T0 ^ o,uOpay!rov apery 15 



Having thus discovered the Genu* 
of Virtue, it remains to investigate the 
Differentia, Now considering «; »rn in 
its widest sense, we say, it is that which 
must produce good l^y* ; but good 
l^ya, as we have said before (p. 57), 
are those which avoid excess and de- 
fect ; therefore virtue, since every V&t 
reproduces the same l?y* by which it 
was produced, (p. 58), must be a 
habit avoiding excess and defect, or 
tfys i» fiiffirnrt. 

II. Virtue is of the more difficult, 
the mean is the more difficult ; there- 
fore Virtue is of the mean. 



But the mean is of two kinds, &e 
absolute and relative which is the mean 
to us ; and this is the mean which 
Moral Virtue aims at. Therefore Vir- 
tue is tfys If (Mernrt rjf *fis h/*ag. 

12. «gir«] The reader must again 
be cautioned not to apply the restricted 
signification of moral Virtue to this 
term. The meaning of the word is 
well expressed by Cicero, de Legibus 
i. 8. " Est autem virtus nihil alhid, 
quam in se perfect* et ad summum 
perducta natura." This is a literal 
translation of Aristotle. See n. 
p. 26, 3. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. II. 5. 67 

etij av e^t9 d(f> ?j9 dya0o? avOpcawos ylverai *ai 
d(f> f/9 ei to iairrov epyov diroSfoa-u. ir&9 81 tout 
eoTai, TfSrj fiw elpr/Ka/itv, ert 8e kcu coS tcrrai 
fyavtpov, iav Otc&prjo-copev iroia ris icrrtv tj (f)v<ri9 
bavrrjy. *Ej> iravri Srj <tvv€\€L kcu Stcupercp iori The mem of 

Xafietv to fuv irXeiov to # eXarrop to 8' taop, absolute *' 

v ~ * »»\\ « * \ t rs and icla- 

Kai tolvtcl tj kclt avro to irpaypa rj irpos rjpa? tlve> 
to $ taov picrov tl trTrep/HoXr)? koll eAAc/i/few. 
Xeyco 8e tov pep irpdypjiTos p,i<rop to lcop dftr4\op 

10 d(f) €KOT€p0V TCOP OLKpCOP, 07T€p €OTlP €P KCU TOLVTOV 

iracrtp, 7rp09 77/ifi? Se b fir]T€ irXeopdfiet pr/T€ 
iXXefaret. tovto # ov% ev, ovSe tolvtov 7rdcrcp 9 
oloi/ el tol SeKa 7roXXa to. 8c Svo oXtya, to, e£ 
pecra Xafifidvov<ri /card to irpdypja" icrtp yap 

IbVTTCpeX^t T€ KCU VTT€pe)(€ Ta h TOVTO S\ p€CTOP COTl 

Kara trjv dptOfir/TUcr/p dvaXoyiav. to 8e irpos 
7)fids ovx ovtg) Xt)ttt€0v' ov yap €i tco SeKa jxval 
<f)ay€iv 7roXv Svo Se 6Xlyov> 6 oXenm]? e£ pvas 
irpocrra^eC Zvtl yap to-<09 koli tovto 7roXv tco 
ItiXrjtyopApxp i) oXiyop* MlXcopc pep yap oXiyop, tc$ 
8e dpxo/jtevcp tcop yvppaxruop iroXv. opotco? cVt 
Spofiov kcu irdXrjs. ovtg* 8rf fray kincrrqpjtov ttjp 
virtpfioXrjv pep koli tt/p eX\€i\jnv favyet, to 5e 

pAcTOV {flT€l KCU TOvff alp€lTCU, fit (TOV Se OV TO 

26 TOV TTpdyptJLTOS dXXd TO irpOS 17/Xay. Et St/ Virtue aims 

~» / <t \v ?> N ~\ at th « rela- 

iraCTa €7TtaTrjp7f OVTCO TO €pyOV €V €7TIT€A€L, TTpOS live mean. 



5. rvri%€7 km) heuftr^] Discrete or nor to virtue, aims at the mean, and 

continuous. Of the former are num- performs its tyy* well by looking to 

bers ; of the latter are lines, surfaces that mean, much more will virtue, 

and solids. which is superior to every art, do the 

26. Yrsmfeii] This is an argument same ; as also does nature. Nature is 

a minori. If every art, which is infe- superior to art, for art imitates nature ; 

F 2 



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68 ARISTOTELIS 

to fieaov fiXerrovaa kou el? tovto ayovaa to. epya 
(oOev eiddaaiv eiriXeyeiv rol? eft e\ovaiv epyois 
on ovr d^eXetv eartv ovre irpoa6elvai 9 a>s rij? 
fiev wreppoXr/s Kal tt}? eXXefyeoi)? (ftdeipovarj? to 
€$> ttjs 8e fieaorryros aoatflvarfs) , ol It dyaOoih 
T€\vitou 9 d>9 Xeyofiev 9 7r/>oy tovto fiXeirovTe? epya- 
£ovtcu, 77 5^ apenr) irdarfs Teyyrfs aKpifieaTepa 
kou dfieivoov eariv 9 oaairep Kal tj <f)vai$ 9 tov fieaov 
av etrj oro^aaTiKfj. XeyoD 8e ttjv r/diKrjv' avrr) 
yap eari irepl irdO-q kou 7rpd£ei? 9 ev 8e tovtoisio 
early wrepfioXr) kou eXXev^tt^ kcu to fieaov. olov 
KOi (pofiTjOrjvat kou dappfjaat Kal emOvfirfaai Kal 
opyiaOrjvai kcu eXerjaat Kal 0X0*9 rfadrfvai Kal 
XxmrfOr/vat eari Kal fiaXXov Kal tjttov, Kal dfi<j)6- 
Tepa ovk ev to otc oei Kai e<p 019 Kai irpo$\h 
ow Kal ov eveKa Kal w Set, fieaov re Kal apcarov, 
oirep earl ttjs aperr}?. 6/101009 8e Kal 7repl ray 
7rpd£eif eaTtv wrepfioXr) Kal eX\ei\f/is Kal to 
fieaov. t) 8 apeTTj irepl 7rddrj Kal irpd^ei^ eaTiv 9 
ev oh rj fiev inrepfioXr) dfiapTaveTai Kal 77 eXAeiyjnszo 
yjreyeTai, to 8e fieaov eiraiveiTai Kal KaTopOovTaC 
TavTa & afKJxo tt/s dperqs. fieaorrfs tls apa earlv 
Virtue is of?} dpeTt/ 9 aTO\aaTLKr] ye odaa tov fieaov. Etc 

the mean NXe / X v ~ > / /- v v \ 

because it to fiev a/xapravecv TTOfiJsjtyps eartv (to yap KaKOV 

is more dif- „ , , t , __ A , *r y \ «* 

ficuit. tov airetpovy cos ot LLvuayopeioi, eiKaQov 9 to 25 

but virtue is still better, for it is the not the Intellectual. For it is not re- 
perfection of. nature, nature itself ca- quired in Intellectual virtue that we 
pable of obtaining its proper end. should understand but moderately, 

The word Wirrnpn is sometimes used and avoid excess in knowledge. See 

by Aristotle to denote an art as well as p. 58. n. 

a science. 25. JJu^etyo^uu] See the <wrf£i«i 

9. \iytt ft rhf M*«»] Moral of the Pythagoreans, quoted above, 

virtue only aims at the mean, and p. 17, 7. n. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. II. 5. 



69 



ayaOop rov 7reirepcurp.epov) , to 8e KaropOovv 
popa\co^ 810 kcu to pep paSiop to 8e \aXeiroPj 
pa8iop pep to aworvxtip tov o-kottov, \aXe7rop 8e 
to eirtTV\elp. kcu 8td toot odp ttjs pep tca/cla? 17 
bvirepfioXr) kcu r) eXAeiyjn?, ttjs 8 dpeTrj? rj peo-orq? 
" ea6Xo\ pep yap dirXcbs, irapToSairm 8c kclkoL" 

Kotcp apa rj dperff e£i? irpoaipeTiKT]^ ep pecro- Complete 

9 ~ \ t « c />' v definition of 

rrjri ovcra ttj irpos rjpa?) (opto-pepr) Xoy<p kcu virtue. 
coy ap 6 (f)poptpo? opio-etep. peaorrjs 8e 8vo kolkuop, 
IOttJ? p,ep Kaff vwepfioXr/p tt}? 8e kclt eXXeiyf/ip* 

KCU €Tt T<p TOL$ p€P eXA€L7Tet,P T<X9 8 V7Tep/3dXXeCP 
TOV 8eOPT0? €P T€ TOl? 7rd0€<Tl KCU €P TCU9 ITpd^eCTlj 

ttjp 8 dp€TrjP to pecrop kcu evplaKeip kou aipeto-- 

Ocu. 81b icara pep ttjp overlap kcu top Xoyop top 

16 ri t)p eipai XeyoPTa pea-ory? ea-Ttp 77 dperf), KaTa 



2. ;£«A««rfl»] *o*s ya^, Z ttt- 
x^artf, rb Xtyopttot aXnfif, art %a- 
Xura ra xaka. Plato, de Rep. 
p. 435. 

6. irtXoi] Cujus poets versus sit 
nescitur: Zwingero et Giphanio vide- 
tur esse Theognidis. ZELL. 

12. *aJtfft — «-{«girj f ] The object 
matter of some moral virtues are pas- 
sions, of others, actions. See the divi- 
sion in the succeeding chapter. 

14. »«t«— rh obeia.*] Virtue is 
both a mean and an extreme. A 
mean if you look to its essence and 
definition (xara pit rtit oveiat xa) ret 
Xiyot rot ri fa tstat Xtyotra), but an 
extreme if you look to its excellence 
and its quality. 

15. ri fa utat] Quum fixae et 
constantis Aristotelis dicendi formulae 
ri ri fa ttftu s. ri ri fa mentio inci- 
dent, liceat mini occasione oblata ita 
uti, ut, quod in hoc dicendi modo ob- 



scurum videatur, paucis illustrem. 
Quaeritur, quae tandem in hac dictione 
propria sit forma* imperfecti fa ratio 
et conditio 1 Omni linguae usui facile 
aptius putaveris rb ri Urt. Sed disertis 
verbis Aristotelis alterum ab altera 
discernit, Metaphys. vii. 4. Z. p. 134. 
Brand, bti xa) tut \<rt) ri Xtyipttov 
Qattfi* xa) ro ri fa utat opo'ietf uragu 
xptrut ft\t xa) arX&g r jj tuvia %ira 
xa) rote &XXoif St*n xa) ro ri Writ 
ou% arX£( ri fa tJtat, aXXa totaf *j 
«w£ ri fa utcu. (Illius rb ri \<rri ex- 
empla v. Metaph. vii. 9. Z. p. 144. 
xiii. 4. p. 266. Brand.) E loco lau- 
dato intelligitur, ro ri irrtt ab Aris- 
totele severius adstringi ad rationem, 
quale quid sit vel quantum sit, ut rb ri 
fit generalius et totius dicatur. Quod 
discrimen quomodo inest his formis 
inter se diversis (»«■*}— fa)1 Fortasse 
Aristoteles propterea imperfectum rb 
ri fa elegit, quod §Mm, forma, in qua 



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70 



ABISTOTELIS 



Soroeac- $£ T q dplOTOP KCU TO €<5 OKpOTTfS. Ov 7TQ4Ta 

passions g €7ri8cY€T0U lTpa^l9 OvSe ITCLP 7TO0O? TTIP U£Cr6- 
never admit * v , \ , / / 

of a mean. rt/Ta* €VICL yap €V0V9 WOflOOTOl OVP€tXrffJLfl£Pa 

fiera tt)? (fravXorriTOf, olop iirixoupeKaxia apcu- 
fryymla <f>0opos 9 /cat tifi T(op irpa^ecov paiy^'iab 
kXowt) dv8po(f)ovla' irdpra yap ravra kcu to, 
rouwra \jrcyeTai r<p avra (f)avXa €ipqu 9 aAA* oi>x 
cu u7T€pfio\ou avrcop ovS al eXXelyj/eis. ovk €<ttip 

OVP Ov8e7TOTC 7T€pl OVTO. KaTOp0OVP 9 oAA' 0€L 

apuaprapup* ovS tern to eS rj fir) ci5 wepl raio 
TOtauTa ip T(p rjp Set kcu ot€ kcu cop p,ot\ev€iP 9 
aAA' airX£>$ to iroielp otlovp tovtcop apjapTavtip 
iorlp. ofiocop oip to a£tovp kcu ir^pl to dSiKeip 
kcu SeiXalveip kcu aKoXaoTaipeip elpat p.e<roTr)Ta 
kcu xmepfioXriP kcu eXXeiyjnp' earat yap ovrcoXb 
ye wrepfioXTJs kcu iXXefyecos pLeo-orrjs kcu inrep- 
fioXr)? wrepfioXr) kcu eXXeiyfns iXXefyew. cocnrep 
8e aaxfrpocrvpris koi apSpela? ovk tarip v7r€p(3oXr) 



hoc rd ci h positum est, ante mate- 
riam et prior menti informatur. Unde 
c# ri h proprie illud, quod res esset, 
si a materia secretam et per se pone- 
retur abstractum. Etsi hanc explica- 
tionem Platonis ideas quodammodo 
olere judicaveris, egregie tamen pro- 
batur loco Aristotelis Metaph. vii. 7. 
Z. p. 140. Brand. Strt evpfraUu cf«- 
**•» riwit rnv vyiuaf l| ityniat yUitieu 
xet) Tiit olxietf 1% olx/etg, rns &nv vXttt 
rhf %x»ve** 8\tir Si yk(> setrpxti iert 
xa.) »lx0&ofuxh ri fTfof rtis uyitias **) 
Cffc ctxiag. \iye* V ebvia* &nv vXfie ri 
ri fa that. Cf. vii. 7. Z. p. 139. Br. 
Trendelenburg 1. 1. p. 41. 

1. cb rata —*{oi%is] Having ob- 
served that we ought to aim at the 



mean in all our actions, Aristotle sub- 
• joins, in order that men may not con- 
tinue in vice, through pretence of 
aiming at a mean in it, that not all 
actions admit of a mean, but some 
are always extremes, whether followed 
more or less, and consequently always 
culpable. Of this he brings several 
instances. Were it not so, he ob- 
serves, we should be reduced to this 
absurdity, that there would be an ex- 
cess of defect, and a defect of excess. 
For, if there is a mean of excess, there 
is also a defect of excess, and the re- 
verse. And so likewise would there 
be an excess and defect of that which 
has no excess and defect, that is, the 
mean. Which is absurd. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. II. 6. 71 

kou eXXetyjns Sid to to \a£<tov elvat 7ra>? axpov y 
ovtg)9 ovSe €K€lvcdv iieo-OTq? ouSe irnrepfioXr) /cat 
eA\ei\fn9, dXX* ©y dv 7rpaTTqTat apuapTaveraC oXco? 
yap ovff trTrepfioXi}? kou tXXetyews fieo-ory? ioTiv, 
5 ovre fieo-orr/TO? v7T€p/3oXri teal eAAetf/ar. 



CHAP. VI. 

An application of this general principle to particular instances. 

7 AEI 8e tovto fir/ puovov koBoXov Xeyeo-Oat, in ac- 
oAAa Kai tol? Kaff eKaara €(papfioTT€tv ev yap 

T0L9 7T€pl T0L9 7Tpd^€l9 XoyOLS ol fl€P KoBoXov 
K€VCDT€pOl €1<TLV, OL 8 €7r} JJL€pOV9 d\7) OlVtOTtpOl* 

107repl yap to. Kaff eKaora cu 7rpa£ei?, Seov 8 eVi 
tovtcdv avfMfxoveiv. Xt)7TT€0P ohv Tavra 4k ttj? 
8taypa<f)T)?. TLepl ficv odv <f>6f$ov$ Kal Odpprj i. i^m. 

dvSpeia pLearorrj^' tG>v 8 wrepfiaXXoirrcop 6 p&v\\A'uZiJ! t 
rrj dfo/Ula dvan/vfios (jroXXd 8 iarriv dvcovv/JLo), 

15 6 8 ip T<p Oappelv v7repfidXXa)P Opaxrvs, b 8e r£ 

6. xedikou] In the Politics, Aris- particulars, and moral science is in- 

totle thus uses this term : ftfrtv ft tended for practice which turns upon 

tovtc *«} xecra, pipt puiMn l*irxe- particulars. We must therefore de- 

*9vrt xmMx*» y*£ ol Kiydrru \%ttva- scend and apply our definition to each 

*£*i* lavrovf. i. 5. (p. 24. ed. single virtue, that the nature of them 

Goett.) may he more clearly understood, and 

9. Mtpmnpt] Too vague for prac- the definition confirmed by those in- 

tical purposes. Aristotle says it is not stances which appeal directly to the 

sufficient to give a mere abstract defi- senses. 

nkion of virtue, but we must apply 10. Hot— rvpf*vi/V] It is necessary 

the definition to particulars. For in to apply it to particulars, and shew 

moral science particulars have a greater that it agrees with them. 
weight and more influence on the 12. hmy^afHt] A diagram or detine- 

mind than universals ; for universale acton ; such as he gives in the subse- 

appear to derive their certainty from quent books. 

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7* ARISTOTELIS 

tIons. P* v fofcivGiu inrepfiaXXcov r$ 5c Oapptiv c'AAet- 
v.*»fp0Vfn.Tr<ov StiXof. Uepl rjSopas Se kou \xnra$ ov 

ii.Anoo. TTOCraSj TfTTOV 8l KCLL 7T6/CH TOS XvTTOSy fJUeaOTq^ 

pkv (TGXppoo-vwj, inrepfioXr) 8c aKoXcuria. eAAe/- 

TTOVTSS 8\ 7T€pl TCLf TjBoVOS OV ITOLUV yiVOVTOLC 5 
8lQ7T€p OV& QVOpXLTQS TtTVyflKaiTlV OV$ OL TOIOVTOI, 

3.Uh*a- earcoaap 8e dvai<r0r)TOi. Uepl 8e 86<riv XPV~ 

l.ktmrm. jxdrCOP KOU XrfylV fl€O-0T7)9 fl€P iX€V0€pU>TT)9 y U7T6/0- 

Af/«. fioXr} 8e kou eXAenjns daearia kou dveXevOepla. 

ivavrUos 8 eavTou? {nrcpfiaXXovai kou eX\evjrov<riv' 10 
6 p.kv yap SxrcoTOs kv pkv 7rpo€<rei wrepfiaXXei iv 
8\ Xrjy^ei iXXelirci, 6 # dveXev0€po9 ev fiev Xr/ijrei 
V7T€pfiaXXei kv 8e Trpocau iXXelirei. vvv pkv oiv 
rvrrcp kou eVi K€(paXalcp Xeyoficv, dpKOv/xevoi avr<p 
rovr(p' varepov 8e aKptfieoTepov 7repl avrcbvib 
4. w*\: 8Lopi<r0T)<r€TGu. Uepl 8e rd xPVI JiaTa * a * &XXau 

i. £ar«i**'«. 8ui0€<r€is elat, fi€<roT7)9 fJLev iteyaXoirptireia (o yap 
ru». fi€yaXo7rp€7rrj9 oiaipepei eXevaeptov o fiev yap 
irep\ /jLcyaXa, 6 8e 7T€pl puKpa), wrepfioXr} 8e 
dirtLpOKaXia kou fiavavala, eXXeiyfn? 8e pxKponrpi- 20 
7T€La' Siacpepovai 8 avrou tcdv 7re/u ttjv eXcv- 
depiorrjra, 7rrj 8e 8ta(f)€povo'tp 9 varepov prjd^aerau 
%J*u mX§ ~ n^/ol 8e Tipjjv kou driyuav fieaon?? /jl€v /xeya- 
!: *«»~«w. Xoyjrvxia, vwepfioXr/ 8e xavvorr)? ris Xeyo/xem], 
+»&*• eXXeiyjns 8e /JUKpo\j/vx^a 9 'I2y # eXeyo/xev €\€tv^ 

i. &X*rip/a. 7TpOS T7]V /JL€yaXo7rp€7T€iaU T7)V iX€V0€pLOTr)Ta, 7T€pl 

Tip's*. /juKpa oia(pepovarav 9 ovtco? €\€l tis kcu irpo? ttjv 
/jLeyaXoyj/vxlai/, 7T€pl Tifirjv oZvav pLeyaX-qVy avrrj 

4. *mfp*hn] This and its opposite 15. Sfri^n h M^im^i] See iv. 

habit is considered at greater length in 1. 
the Seventh Book. See also hi. 7. 22. Strip* fnH*i*cu] See iv. 2. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. II. 6. 78 

irepl fUKpav oiaa* eari yap w Set opeyeaOat in ac- 

Tl/JLTJS KCU fiaXAoV 7) $€l KOU fjTTOP, XiyCTOU 8 6 
fl€V V7r€pfidX\(Ol> TOLLS 6p€^€(Tl <f>l\OTlfW9 y 6 8 

eXheiircov dxf)i\oTipo9, 6 8e pi<ro$ ap<opvpo$. olp<o- 

bpvpuoi 8e kou al SiatfiaeL?, ttXtjp 17 rod (f)tXorlpx>v 

(j>i\oTifila. o0€V iiriSucdfioprcu 01 atcpoi ttjs pecn]9 

X&pa?. KCU 7}fl€L9 8e €OTl fl€P OT€ TOP fJL€(TOV 

(f>iX6rifiop KaXovpev tori 8 ore atyiXoTipov, koI 
eoTtP ore pep eiraivovpev top <f>iXartfiop *<m 8 
10 ore top a<f>i\oTifWP. 81a tvpol 8 auTiap tovto 
iroiovfiep, ip tols i£r}s p7)0rj<r€TGu' pvp 8e wept 
tS>p Xonrtop Xeycopep koto, top ixprjyrjpepop Tpfmop. 

"EOT* 8e KOU 7T6/CH OpyTjP VTTepf&okr) KOU €XA€tf|w 7. Anon. 

kou fieo-orr/?, oytoop oe ap&pvjuop optodp avTioP\\.i $t y n0 ' m . 

\bTOP fxeaop irpaop Xiyopre? ttjp pLeaorqTa TrpajoTr/ra 
Kakeaofiep* tG>p 8 aKpeop 6 p.ep vTrepfiaXXcop 
opyiXo? eorcoy -q 8e Koucia opyiXoTrj?, 6 8 iXXehr&p 
ouopyrfT09 ns, r) 8 eXA€L\jns aopyrjaia. Eicri ?. k\Mu*. 

8e kou aXXac Tpels p^o-OTr/TCSy expuaou pip Tipa'^^mum. 

20opotoTrjTa irpos dXXrjXa?, 8iaxf)€pov(rou 8 aXXrjX&p' 
iraxrou pep yap elat irepi Xoycop kou irpdi-ecop koi- 
pcopiap, 8ia(j)€pov(rt 8c oti rj flip iaTi irep\ toXtjOc? 
to ep avrois, at oe irept to rjov toutov oe to p&p 
ip wouSia to 8 ip ttSxtl toi? Kara top fiiop. ptyriop 

25 odp Kal 7T€pl tovtcdp, Ipa paXXop kolt 1800 pep oti ip 
Traaip f) pLea-orr/? iiraiperoPy to, 8 oucpa our opOa 
ovr iirouperd dXXa ^eicra. eari pep odp koi tov- 



6. IviliM&Zovreu] Comparatio est a student ita et nomen locuraque medii 

fundis seu possessionibus racantibus bujus nomine vacantis occupare stu- 

sumpta; nam ut in vacuum fundum dent extremi. GIPH. 

viam utrimque invadere et occupare 11. pntinrtu] See iv. 3. 



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74 



ARISTOTELIS 



In AC- 
TIONS. 



9. tvrga- 



X"- 



10. 

i. *{fo 

or 

ii. )*r»«X*i 



In PAS- 
SIONS. 
1. m!U ( . 
i. «•*-«- 
«*.«&;. 
ii. Amu*. 



1. ripifftf. 
i. (plow. 
ii. \«tx*t- 
{txttmiaf, 



tcov ra 7r\euo av<i>wpuoC ireipariov H \ axrrrtp kou 
iwl tS>v aXXo»p 9 airrovs opopmviroiup (ra<f)Tjvela9 

€P€K€P KCU TOV €V7rapOKoAov&rjTOV. 7T€pt fJL€P QVV TO 

aXtfOcs 6 pip fieaos aXrjOr/? ti? kou r/ pjecrorq? 
aXr/Oeia XeyeV0a>, tj fie irpocnrovqats rj pip cVt to 5 
ful^ov d\a{ftV€ia kou 6 €\a>p avrf/v aXatj&Py r) 8 
iirl to cXottop elpcopeia kcu elpcop. He pi fie to 

t/8v to pip kv 7T€u8ca 6 pip pAcro? tvrpanrekos kcu tj 
.8ta0eai$ eur/MHreX/a, rj 8 wrepfioXr/ /3ayu>Xox*a 
kcu 6 e\cov avrrjv /3a>/ioXo;(o?, 6 8 iXXeuiratP ay pot- 10 
K09 tis kcu t) i£is dypoiKia. Uepl fie to Xonrop 

V TO €P T<p pUp O fl€P (OS 0U TJOV? (OP (f>tX09 KCU Tj 

' fieaoTrj? (piXla, 6 8 inrtpfiaXXoop, el pip ovScpos 
eWica, apeaKOS, ei 8 &0eXet'a? ttjs avrov y #coXa£, 6 
8 iXXevjrc&p kcu 4p iraxrtp ar)8r)9 8vcrepis tls *cai!6 
8vctkoXo$. Ewrx fie kou ip toZ? irajBea-t kcu ip 

toI? irepl to, 7ra$r) pLeo-orr/Tes' fj yap <u8w$ apenj 
pip ovk eaTiPy €7tcup€itou fie kcu 6 ou8rjpxop. KOU 
yap ip TOVTO19 6 pip XeyeTCU p.eaos, 6 5* U7re/>/8aX- 
X<dp 9 m 6 icara7rX^, 6 irapra al8ovp,€po?' 6 8 20 
eXXetTT&p i) b p.7/8* oXco? apalayvPTOs" 6 fie /ie'cro? 
oudrjpAOP. Ne/nem? fie fieo-or^y (f>0opov kcu im- 

XaiptKOLKias. eioi fie 7repl Xvttt)p kou t)8optjp tog 
em toZs orvp.fiaipovo'i toi? iriXas yiPop,£pa9 % 6 pip 
yap pepeoyjTiKos XxrirtiTai eVt toIs apa^uos e#25 
7rpaTTOV<riP 9 6 fie <j>6ovepos wrepfiaXXt&p tovtop 
€7rt iraxri XinreiTaiy 6 8 €irt\oup4KaKos tocovtop 
eXXet7r€L tov Xinrelo-Oou eoaTe kou yaiptip. aXXa 



20. ix*ra*Xjfc] ovn »s o x*ra«\r>l 22. tifiiffif] See the Khetoric, 

\t **ir) ««) **»rmt ib\*&ti4n*irM. ii. 9. 
Mag. Mor. i. 30. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. II. 6. 75 

irepl pkp tovt&p koI aXXoOc Kcupbs 2otou' irtpi 
8e SiKaiQavwjf, eirtl ou\ oarXw \iyerou, perd 
ravra SuXopepoc irepl iicaTtpafi epovpep ttcw 
ptaoryfris eiaiv* bpuouos 8k kou irepl tAp Xoyuccop 
baptrwv. 



CHAP. VII. 

That the Virtues and Vices are in mutual opposition. 

8 TPIQN 8k 8iaBe<T€G>P OV<T(OP, 8v0 fl€P KOKUOP, The mean 

TT)S pkv KOjff V7T€pfioXrjP T7/S 8k KGLT cXAttl/ttJ', pia? tremes in 
*> , / ~ / , / , mutual op- 

o aperrjr ttj? p.e<roTr)TO$, iraaou ttoxtoas avruceurrcu position. 
Trow* ax peu yap axpai kou rp pe<ry kou aXXr/Xatt 

10 ipaPTiai eicriv, -q 8k pecrrj reus afcpcuf' axrrrep yap 
to i<rop irpb? pep to eXarrop pel^op irpos 8e to 
pel^ov eAaTTOPy ovTtos at pe&ai eigevs irpo? pip tos 
eXXetytis imtpfiaXkovo'L, 7rpbs 8k tol9 irrrepfioXd? 
iXXetTTovo-ip €P T€ tow irddeat kou tcus Trpd^eaip. 

16 o yap dpSpeios 7rpbs pev top 8ei\op Opaxrvs <f)cu- 
vercu, 7rpb? 8k top Opaavp 8€iXor' bpoim 8k Kal 
6 (raxppcov irpo9 pep top dpaiaOrfrop oKoXaaTos, 
TTpb? 8k top djcoXaoTOP apai<r&riTos 9 6 5* eXevOeptos 
TTpbf pep top dpeXevOepop aacoTOs, irpos 8e top 



2. h»*t«rvtfif] See the Fifth called absolute opposition. White is 
Book. opposed to grey, black, brown, &c. 

3. *»{ fiueornrts] See v. 7. near by another kind of opposition; called 
the end. by the logicians, oppotUia secundum 

4. XrysxZf] In the Sixth Book. quid, according to which the extremes 
10. ifamu] Correctly speaking, one are opposed to the mean. On this 

thing only can be opposed to one subject see the Categories, Chap. vui. 
thing, as white to black, and this is 



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76 ARISTOTELIS 

OXTOYTOV aV€\cU0€pOS. 8lO KOLL OtinoOoVPTCU TOP 
fUO-OV Ot OKpOC €KOLT€p09 ITpOS €KOT€pOP 9 KCU 

KaXovac top dp8p€iop 6 fiev SetXo? Opaxrvp 6 8e 
Opaovs SeiXoPj kcu iwl t£>v SXXcop dpaXoyop. 
TbeoppoM-Ovro) $ avTiK€ifi4v<ov dXXr/Xoi? tovtcop, wXelcop 5 
tweenez- cpaprtOTr/s ioTt tow oKpoi? icpos aXXijXa 7) irpos 

tremes 

greater than r ^ ^aov' 7roppcoT€p€o yap TOLVTa a0€o-n;#c€i> oAX^- 

meao and ^p fy r0 {J fi^CTOV, GXTTTep TO fJLtya TOV fllKpOV KCU 

Some ex- TO flUCpOP TOV fUyaXoV 7) CLfKJXO TOV UTQV. En 

tremes more \ \ \ / > t v * f 

opposed to 7Tp09 flCP TO fie<TOP €PiOl9 CLKpOlS OflOlOTTJS TL9 10 
toe mean ., «**/i / \ \ •» * / \ 

than othert . <pCUP€TCU, (Of TTj upaOTJTTJTl 7Tp09 TT)P OLVOptiaV KOLL 

nature of TJI daWTUL TTpOS T7)P iXevOeplOTT/TO,' ToZf &€ CLKpOL? 

themselves. TTpbs aXXtjXa irX^LOTTf dpOflOlOTT)?. TO. 8e irXetOTOP 

anri\opra dXXrfXcop ipaprta oplfioprcu, ©ore kcu 
fwXXop ipaprta Ta wXetop dir€\0PTa. irpos 8k to 15 
fiecrop clptLkutcu fmXXop £<f) top fiep rj eXXetyjns 
£<f) cop 8e r) virepfioXri olop dpSpeia fUP ov\ 
7) QpaxrvTt}s v7T€pfioXrj o8<ra, dXX' 77 8eiXca eX- 
Xeiyjns odaa, ttj 8c aaxfrpoo-vvr) ov\ tj dpat- 
o-Orjcrta ep8eia o$<ra, dXX' 17 aKoXaata wrcpfioXrizo 
odcra. 8ca 8vo & cutlos tovto avp,f3aipei> fiiap 
fup ttjp ££ avrov tov TrpdypxtTOs" Tto yap iyyv- 

T€pOP €LPCU KCU 6flOlOT€pOP TO €T€pOP OLKpOP Ttp 

/leo-co, ov tovto dXXd tovpclptiop dpTLTiOefxep 

/JLOXXOP, 0I0P €7T€L 6fWLOT€pOP €LPCU 8oK€l Ttj <£*>- 25 

Speia 7) OpaxrvTTjs kcu eyyvTepop, dpopuoiOTepop - 



3. rbt afyuot] " Timid us vocat se Either because they have naturally 

cautum parcum sordidus." Ter. less resemblance and are further frem 

7. *otf*r'nv— &Qi*rfi%iv] Some the nature of the mean j or because 

extremes are further from the mean our appetites are more inclined to 

than others > and this for two reasons, them. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. II. 8. 77 

tf tj SetAta, rauTTjv paXXop aPTiTiOe/jLep' ra yap 
airiypvra irXelov rod fjueaov ipapruorepa 8oK€t 
eivcu. M/a pip oSp curia avrr], ££ avrov rod 2. From the 

/ « / a\ »y e ~ 1 « . \ A disposition 

TTpay/iaTO?, €T€pa 0€ e£ rjpxop avrcov irpos aofmTato- 
byap avroL fiaAXop 7re(pVKap€P 7tgv, raura ptaXXop 
kvavrla rep fxecrcp (paiverai. olop avrol ptSXXop 
7T€(f>vKafJL€j/ rrpbs tol9 rjSopas, 810 €VKard(f>opoi 
€<rfi€i/ fiaXXop irpos ajcoXourtap rj irpbs koc/mo- 
Trjra. ravr odp fiaXXop ipaprla Xeyo/xep, wpos 
10 a r) i7ri8o<ri9 paXAop yiveraC teal 8ca tovto r) 
aicoXaaia inrepfioXr) odaa evavruorepa earl rg 
(TGxfipoavvri. 



CHAP. VIII. 

Recapitulation of the whole Book. 

9 OTI p}v o5p ia-rlu rj aperrj rj r)0ucrj peaorr)?, Recapituia- 

KOU 7TG>9, KCU OTI fl€(TOTrj^ 8vO KdKlCOl>> TTjS fl€P KCfjff 

\h\mzp$oAr)p rrj? 8e tear eXXecyf/tp, Kal utl roiavrrj 
earl 8ca to OTO\a(TTLK7] rod peaov elpou rov ip 
row iraOecri kou tols 7rpa£€<rip, licapcb? etpqrai. 8tb 
Kal epyop earl <nrov8aZop elpou* 4p eicdoTCp yap 
to fiecrop Xafieip epyop, olop kvkXov to fieaop ov 

Vtoiraprbs aXXd tov tlSoro?. ovtod 8e Kal to flip opyi- 
<r0r)pcu 7raPT09 kou paStop, Kal to Sovpou apyvptop • 
kou 8airairrj<rai m to 8 <p 9 Kal oaop, kou ot€, Kal 08 
ev€Ka 9 Kal a>s, ovk€ti Trapros ov8e paStop' Sioirep 



10. iffihrtf ] Our inclination is late this term by the word incrementum, 
greater. Some writers, however, trans- progression See. Plato de Leg. p. 676. 



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78 ARISTOTELIS 

to €$ teal cnravtov kcu hraiverov teal kclAop. 8to 
fei top aroyaQfLsvov tov [i€<rov ntpSrrop ficp 
wtvoywptip tov /jlSWop ipaprioW KOffairep koI fj 
KaXi^fi) irapatvel " tovtov fiep Kairvov kolI kvjjul* 
tos t €kto9 €€pye prja*" t&p yap axptop to flip 5 

€OTlP &fUZpTG>\0T€p0V, TO 5* fjTTOP. €7T€2 oSp TOV 

fUaov tv\€Iv a*pw xaXeirov, Kara top Stvrepop 
(fxt(ti ttXovp to, iKaxtora \tjitt4op t&p k^kcop' 

TOVTO & €<rtai fJLOLklO-Ta TOVTOP TOP TpOTTOP hp 

General \cyoil€P. ^KOfTtlP 5c Su ITDO? a KOU OVTo\ €VKaTa- 10 

rales for at- , v y y 

Uiningthe (f>opoi €0-fl€P m OtWot yap ITpOf CiXXa 7T€(fyVKafl€P.' 

tovto # eorai yp&pifiop 4k ttjs r/Sopfjf kcu tt}? 

\V7T7J9 T7J9 yiPOtl€P7}$ 7T€pl 77/Zay. €19 TOVPOPTIOP 

8 iavTOV? a(f)€\K€iP Set* 7ro\v yap anrayayoprts 
tov apapTapeiP eh to fie<rop rjljofiep, o7rep oi ra 15 
SiecTpa/xfiepa t<op £v\<op opOovpre? irotovcrip. ip 
irapri 8e fiaXiora <f)v\aKT€OP to r/8v kcu ttjp 
ySoptjp' ov yap aSeicao-TOi Kpipoficp avTr/p. o7rep 
odp oi 8rjpLoyepopT€9 htaOop irpos ttjp f EAeV?jj/, 

3. rut (iaXXn b«»W#v] From the corfumpere qui conabantur ii decuriis 
further extreme. judicum aliquid polliceri atque largiri 

4. KaXtr^*] Supposed to be an solebant ; quae erat decuratio quaedam, 
oversight for Circe. See Horn. Od. xii. id est, distinctio judicum arut tribuum 
108, and 219. ad dandam pecuniam emendaque suf- 

7. rli hvrtpt <rx«w>] Plato like- fragia. CAM. 

wise uses this proverb in the Philebus, 19. *EXm»r] Horn. 11. i«. 156. 

p. 19. See Stallb. ibid, ?ivri£0f T tttcu *6» vipxtit T^Sag x«i luxtttfulag 

9kavf hxit f*h X*ff*9tif aurcf etvre*. *A;g«/sdf 

The Scholiast upon the Pha3don(Bekk. runt i^fi ymmm r#Av> x(iw 

p. 381.) thus explains it: cr*f«*pj« akyut **r%M' 

2t0Ti^( *\ovt \<r) rm &*jm\£g rt xyxr- ulwg aJttfdrnn 6%nt tig thea #•/- 

rhr*f, **( 1'ot ti httfu^rivrtf xara xir 

rit rfcTipf *\ov9 kftyaXXtt rtt^m &XXm xai mi rein rig UZ* U vnvw) 

0xwa^oirxt r«v hvrt^n. niafa 

T8. Minarrci] Translatum est ver- f*t& hfiuf ««(■*/ r btfrtm Tn/t* 



bum a fbrentdbus judiciis. Nam hec xUrotro. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. II. 8. 



79 



tovto Set iradelp koll rjpuis irpos ttjp tjSoptjp, 
kou ip iraxri ttjp iicelvcov iirtXiyup (fxoprjp* ovrco 
yap avrrjp d7ro7T€/nrofi€POt t)ttop ajxaprrjaop^Oa. 
ravr oip trotovpres, m ip K€<f>a\aup elirctp, 
bfjuaXiara SvprjcropueOa rod /xecrov rvyyavtw. Xa-Togi?e 
Xerrop o taw tovto, kqli /juzXiot ep tols kolu not po«- 
Zkoxttop' ov yap paScop Siopiaou 7T(3y Kal Ttcri 
koll iirl TT0L0L9 kou irocrop yjpopop bpyioriov* kcu 

yap TJ/JL€L9 OT€ /JL€P TOVf iXXtLTTOPTaS €7TGUVOVfl€l> 

lOjceu irpdovs (f)afi€i/, otc 8e tov? \aXc7raivopra9 
dpSpcoSeL? a7roKaXovfi€P. aAA' 6 /jl€p puKpoP tov 
ed irapeKfiaiPcop ov yf/eyeTai, ovr iiri to puxXXop 
ovt cVi to 7)ttop, 6 8e 7tX4op % ovto9 yap ov 
XapOdpet. 6 8e p-€XP l rivo $ Ka * €7r * iroaop yfrtKTos 

15 ov paStop Tip \6y<p d(j)opl<rai m ovSe yap aXXo 
ovSep Tap alcOrfTCop' tol 8e TOiavra ip tol? Kajff 
eKoora, Kal ip rrj alo-Orjo-eL t) Kpiais. to fiep apa 
ToaovTO SrjXop otl tj fiiov} e£i$ ip iraxrip i7rdiP€Tr/ 9 
airoKAiPtiP oe oei ore pep eiri ttjp xnreppoXTjp otc 

20 & €7r2 ttjp eXXetyjnp' ovtod yap paora tov fieaov 

KOLL TOV c5 T€v£6fJL€&a. 



6. It <ro7f »mf %*m*rn ] In parti- unvarying rule, they will not admit of 

cular cases. The senses only take the certainty of Science, 
cognizance of individual acts, and as l\. rov iZ **p»(btt9*p] Compare 

these cannot be reduced under one iv. 5, near the end. 



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INTRODUCTION TO BOOK III. 



Having thus far considered the nature of moral virtue, 
Aristotle now proceeds to the investigation of a question 
wjuch had occupied the attention not only of the poet 
and philosophers • in the early periods of Greek litera- 
ture, but had also lately been revived with fresh energy, 
and occupied a prominent part in the discourses of 
Socrates, and the dialogues of Plato. Socrates had 
asserted that Vice is the mere result of ignorance, and 
that no one acts viciously, except against his will and 
from want of knowledge. A doctrine which might have 
been expected from one who asserted that the Virtues are 
sciences, that pure reason is the type of all that is excel- 
lent, that nothing done without reason is good, nothing 
with it is bad. Thus he argues : iravra$ yag ol/xai irgoaigov- 
H&ov$ ex tqqv hdexpftivoov, a av olcovrai arvpfogoorara avrolg 
elvai, Tourot irgarrew. vojx/£o> ovv rovg jxij opQwf irgarrovrag o5rs 
(rofoug oure arwQgovag elvat. ?<prj $e xa) rrjv foxaio<ruwiv xa) Trjv 
ikkriv vaxrav aperyv <ro<plav elvoci. ra re yoig hixcuct xa) nravra o<ra 
ogerjjf vgarrerai, xaXa re xa) ayaia elvar xa) ovr av rov$ raura 
siWra$ «AAo avr) rovroov ou&ev irgoeX&triou, otrre rov$ [ayj emara- 
pevov$ Buvacrdai irgarrsiv, aXhoL xa) eav hyxjeigaavw afXAtgraveiv. 
o&ra xa) ra xaXa re xa) ayaioi rov$ jxev <rofov$ vgarrsiv, tov$ 
tie m <ro<pov$ 06 tiuveuriai, aXKx xa) eav ly^gigoo<riv dpagraveiv. 
eve) duv ri re llxaia xa) roL aXAa xaXa re xa) ayaioL it avr a 
agenj irgarrera^ SijAov elvai fn xa) ij foxawevwi xa) r\ iWy 
*wra apery <ro$la !<rn b . And again, in the Gorgias, 
he endeavours to show that the wicked man does not 
act as he will, but as he thinks to be best c , that the 



* See a discussion upon this subject Arist. Eth. vi. 10. near the end. 
in the Pythagorean fragments in Gale's c ovih yk{ voiiit St favkovrw, l>t 

Opuscula Mythol. p. 47. i**s %l*ur *um fiitrai Srt av avvetf 

b Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 4. Compare 3«g* &iXnmt fit*. Gorg, 466. E, 



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82 INTRODUCTION. 

will is universally directed towards good; that the 
exercise of virtuous habits is voluntary, since the reason 
is unimpeded and the principles of action free ; but that 
vice is altogether involuntary; as much as the actions 
of the body which are influenced by a disease which 
impedes and clogs its natural energies d . 

That the will in its natural, that is, its perfect state, is 
invariably towards good, Aristotle appears to concede , 
but it by no means follows that every wicked action 
must necessarily be involuntary, or that the deteriora- 
tion of the will is not self-caused. Men do on their 
own confession act contrary to conviction ; they do 
submit to have their reason mastered by their desires, 
and submit themselves deliberately to such subjection. 
And they do all this knowing the effects which must 
be consequently brought upon themselves by such ac- 
tions, that every evil act places them in a less advan- 
tageous position for the resisting of evil, and of dis- 
tinguishing between virtue and vice, depraves the will, 
and eventually renders it incapable of exertion towards 
good. But then such persons have voluntarily submitted 
to lose this freedom, and having been perfect masters 
of all the single steps which led to this state must be 
considered voluntary agents. And even granting the 
assumption made by Socrates, that he who pursues vice 
or performs a vicious act does so from want of know- 
ledge, from not being able to tee how much more Virtue 
is his real interest and eventually a greater good, it 
still remains to be enquired how far he has been and is 
the author of his own ignorance. For if from careless- 
ness or from any other cause he has brought upon 

* De Legib. ix. The principal « i^m p» r in iwXSt &t *•) nmr* 

sources of information upon this sub- itf$u* f frvXnrh Jmu rkymSit, lUrr? 

ject are, Xenophon's Memorab. i. 2, ft r j ^ U9 df U99t% r j ^ # 5, **••«*«> 

49. iii. 95. iv. 2, 22. and 31. Plato's ^ w AxMumf ttms. rj ft <p»ix r ri 

Protagor. p. 352. sq. Gorg. p. 468. ry% b % fa, H „) m t £ 9 ,*?£„» r«t 

B. 509. E. Hipp. Min. 374. Ph»d. ^, ,j Iwm^Umw h*»>* **« «* *«*" 

p. 68. The entire dialogue of the tx^umt rvmSr* Srrm, r», J' itr,*W«« 

Menon and De Legibus, p. 860. sq. *«»«. iii. 4. 



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INTRODUCTION. 83 

himself a degree of blindness so as not to be able fairly 
to weigh and appreciate the difference of good and evil, 
and so consequently pursues evil as a greater good, he is 
nevertheless a voluntary agent*. For most if not all 
men are by nature endowed with capacities sufficient for 
such discrimination, and with a natural bias towards 
good*; nor are these lost except from our own fault. 
That men, under the influence of temptation, suffer a 
temporary dereliction of knowledge, may be the case, 
but then it is their own fault to be so influenced by 
temptation ; for nothing from without can tempt a man, 
unless there be something from within to correspond to 
that temptation to render him susceptible of impressions 
from it h . And over these inward feelings he has almost 
unlimited control, otherwise he must ever be tempted 
alike by the same objects ; which self-denial, if he has 
omitted to acquire, he has himself to blame if, having 
let slip the opportunities of acquiring it, when the time of 
temptation arrives he sinks under its influence. And this 
is evident from the general sense and conduct of mankind, 
who punish those who break the laws without stopping 
to consider whether they have had the means of knowing 
or capacity of obeying those laws, as taking it for granted 
that they ought to have had and consequently could have 
acquired them f . 

This book then is divided into the following parts. 
In the 1st chapter Aristotle considers the nature of the 
Voluntary and Involuntary generally. In the 2d, the 
principle of Moral Action, or 9rgoa/g«n$. In the 3d, of 
Deliberation, which is antecedent to wpoctigwig, and which 
is employed upon the means. In the 4th, of Will, 

f i j ft fui aypHtp rig *£dr*u i$ J» the same as the opinions of Socrates, 

1*rm£}tx$g t \x6tt &i»f tip fin, •» ph* U» and probably were derived from him. 
y\ (hvXnreu, k%*t »y *afctr*i. iii. 5. h See Butler's Analogy i. 4. Com- 

S *m*i ykt hxu Ixmrr* t£p niSf pare also p. 89, 2. ytXsTtf ft «•& 

&r«£gUF $vru **g. vi. 10. Compare *\riWw rot Ixrif, £xx£ pk mbrit 

also z. 2. *«] U r§7t $»vKus Uri n iMfymrtv Strtt vwi rZt rtftfawt. 
Qtm*h kymdh x^urrtt ft xtJ mbrm, * See this point fully discussed in 

i lfUr*4 r$v tixutv ayahv. These are vii. 3. 

g2 

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84 INTRODUCTION. 

which is antecedent to deliberation, and is directed to 
ends. In the 5th, how far man is a voluntary agent in 
the formation of his good and evil habits. And in the 
remainder of the book, how far his general definition is 
applicable to particular instances. 



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ARISTOTELIS 
ETHICA NICOMACHEA. 

LIB. III. 



CHAP. I. 

Of Voluntary and Involuntary Actions. 



TH2 aperr}? St) irep\ iraOrj re koll 7rpdi-et9 involuntary 

v \ y \ \ t / > / v actions pro* 

overt)?, rcou eiri fiev tois eicovcriot? eiraivcov icai ce ed either 

i / / » \ »\ ~ » / from com- 

Yoya>v ytvofievaypy eiri be tois glkovctlols oiryr ?VL \ s \ on or 

/ »/ * * * >\ > % « / \ ignorance. 

yvtofi7]9 9 eviore be icai eAeov 9 to ercovo-tov kcu * 



In the second Book Aristotle after 
explaining the Genus of Virtue, (Chap. 
4.) by investigating its origin and its 
efficient cause, (Chaps* 1. 2.) com- 
pleted his definition, (Chap. 5.) and 
explained several other questions ne- 
cessary for a clearer understanding of 
its nature. In this third Book he pro- 
ceeds to the discussion of each of the 
virtues singly; more fully describing 
those parts he had briefly touched 
before, in order that our knowledge 
of virtue and of the nature of the 
Chief Good, which is the end and 
aim of his treatise, may be perfect 
and complete. But before he can 
proceed to this part of his inquiry, it 
is necessary to resolve certain doubts 
and to meet certain objections which 
would be immediately raised against 
his definition of Virtue. For it may 



be asked, how far he is correct in stat- 
ing that Virtue is in our power, that it 
depends upon our actions, that it is Vfrs 
*pouprix4. p. 69. To answer these 
objections he branches out into a 
somewhat wider field of investigation 
in order to grapple with that much 
disputed question, so prominent in the 
mythology, poetry, history and philo- 
sophy of his nation, the necessity or 
spontaneity of human actions; accu- 
rately describing and defining the na- 
ture of the Voluntary and Involun- 
tary, before he speaks directly of 

'Ewu §Zf Qmlnreu lip' fjfjtir ct to vrou- 
2*r«» that, Awyxmin ro fttra, retvra 
tlriiv U9r\{ Ixouriou, ri \<rrt ro \xov9ior 
rovro ya.£ i*rt r) xvyetrurof *ara 
rti* «(irfff, to itctvftot. Mag. Mor. 
p. 19. 



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86 ARISTOTELIS 

aKOvaiov avayKouov taw Siopicrou roTy 7repl apery? 
eiruTKOTrovcriy yjpyaripjov 8e Kal toZs vo/xodcTovai 

7Tp09 T€ T0L9 TtflOLS KOU ' T0L9 KoA(XXT€L?. 8oK€t 8e 

ajcovaca elvou tol fiia rj 8t ayvotav yivo/xeva. 
The com- Blatov 8* ov r) ap\r) efjtoOev, TOtavTTj ov a a ev #5 
fined. /JLijoey avppaXXerat o irparrtov rj o iraxrx&Vy ocov 

ei 7TP€v/xa KOfiiaax rroi rj avOpomrot Kvptot ovre?. 

Thediffi- "Ocra 5* SlOL (f>6f3oV fl€ltoVO)V KdKCQV 7TpaTT€Tat Tf 
cultiesre- , > « , _/ / , 

specting 8ia KOLAOV Tl, OLOV €L TVpOVVOS TTpOGTOLTTOl OMjyjpOV 
muedac- „ , * , v , 

tions(partly Tl 7T/>a£Ol KVpiOS (OV yOV€6)V KClt T6KV(DV, KOLL 10 
voluntary ,. y , y x , ^ ^ , 

partly in- 7TpagaVT09 fl€V <TG>QoiVTO y fir) TTpO^aVTOS aiTO- 
voluntary) , , , v , , , , 

explained. 0VifCTKOl€V 9 afJL(pLO'p7)T7)0'LV €\€t 7TOT€pOV CLKOVCTUL 

ioriv r) €KOV(na. TotovTov 8e Tt <rvft(3alv€i Kal 

7T€pl T0L9 €V TOL9 \(ELfJuS>atV itc/SoXo,?' a7r\&9 /JL€V 

yap ovSel? a7rofiaW€rai £kcov 9 €7rl croyrqpla S*i6 
avrov Kal t£>v Xonr&v arravres oi vovv cxozrer. 
fjLLKral fiev ofiv elcrlv at roiavrai 7rpd^€t9 9 ioUourt 
8e /jlSXXov €kovctioi9' aiperal yap tla rore ore 
7rpaTT0vrai, to 8c TtXos T7j9 irpai-e&s Kara top 

KCUpOV ioTlV. KOU TO GKOVtTtOV 8r) KOU TO OKOVCCOVy^O 

1. Um] There is some difficulty in those points where his reasoning is 

in this term. The Greek Scholiast most conclusive. See x. 1. 

thinks that Aristotle does not question 7. ni#» krtg] Stronger than our- 

whether it is necessary or not to define selve$. 

the nature of the voluntary or involun- 19. ri ft vix*] At the time when 
tary ; but whether it is necessary at the action was done, the agents were 
this point of the investigation. He voluntary, they could either throw 
therefore understands «•{«*••>, with this their goods overboard, or they could 
sense : perhaps it is necessary before forbear. And the nature of the action 
we proceed further, before we com- is to be determined, according to what 
plete our definition of Virtue, and it was at the time it was doing; the 
what we have to say about it. Pro- end of every action is at that time. It 
bably the word is here used merely to is then done and finished, nothing sub- 
avoid an appearance of dogmatism, of sequent can alter its nature, or make 
which Aristotle is very cautious,- even it spontaneous or otherwise. 

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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 1. 



87 



ore irpdrrei, Ae/creop. irpdrret de €K<op' kcu yap 
V vfiXV T0 " KMiv ra opyavLKa peprj iv reus 
TOtauTous 7rpdi~e(riv iv ai>r<p iariu* a>v 8 iv curry 
tj dpxv> €7r * airr<p kcu to Trpdrretp kcu fitj. ixovena 

6 8*1 TO. TQUWTCLj OtrXw 8 UTODS OKOXXTUOC Ovdtlf 

yap av eXotro' Ka£t avrb t5>v toiovtgh/ ovbev. 

*Eir\ raus 7rpd^€<ri Si tcus rotavrais kviort Kaij.Suchec. 

* ~ & 1/ * v \ e tionsare 

£iraivowrai, orav €uayj>ov rt rj Xvmjpov inro- sometimes 
jjuevGHTip dvri pjeydXmv kcu koXcop' av 8 dvaTraXiv, ITsm** 

1A i / \ * * /* e ~ > v ^ \ timet 

10 Y^yovrai ra yap aurxtcra mofietvai €7ri firjoevtbiammL 
*uxX<p rj f&rpup (pavXov. 'En kvlovs 8 eiraivos p.kv$. Some- 

» / / # or * \ ~ /* tiroes pur- 

ov yiv€TOL 9 ovyyvwfLT) o, orav oia rotavra Trpagy doned. 
T19 a p.rj Set, a ttjv avOpanriwjv (pvacu inreprelvu 
kcu fiijSeh au inropelvcu. Eput 8 ura>? ovk tariv 4. Some- 
l&djHiyKaa-drjvai, aXXa paXXop dirodavereov iraBbvri * 
ra SeivoTara' kcu yap top Evpnrldov 'AAxfiaLcova 



7. M rmt flr{«gi*i] It sometimes 
happens that the authors of those ac- 
tions which are called mixed are praited 
for their conduct ; when, for instance, 
they suffer some great indignity or pain 
for the attainment of a great and noble 
object. On the contrary they are blamed 
H rather than incur pain they endure 
disgrace. Thirdly, if after having en- 
dured pain men give way at last 
through the excess of torment as sur- 
passing what human nature can bear, 
they are pitied or pardoned, if they do 
not thereby incur very great disgrace. 
And with reference to the first class 
of actions, some things, says Aristotle, 
bring such infamy upon us,' (such as 
would Isabella's acceding to Angelo's 
proposal in " Measure for Measure,") 
that we ought not to submit to them, 
whatever may be the benefit resulting 
from *uoh submission. As Cicero ob- 
i in his De Officii*, i. 45. " Sunt 



enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim 
ka flagitiosa, ut ea, ne conservandss 
quidem patriae causa sapiens facturus 
sit." But how to direct our conduct 
and form our choice in many cases is 
very difficult, especially when the dis- 
grace and labour to be undergone is 
about equal to the glory to be ob- 
tained. And still more difficult is it 
to adhere to our purpose in such in- 
stances, where our resolution has been 
formed ; for although we perceive that 
those things are disgraceful to which 
we are compelled* yet from the dread 
of coming pain we are too frequently 
induced to change our purposes. And 
hence it is that they who, without 
compulsion, endure pain for a good 
purpose, are praised ; and they blamed, 
who suffer themselves to be overcome 
by pain and do what is disgraceful. 

16. ESpe-flse] Euripides p. 349. (Ed. 
Oxon. 1833.) 



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90 



ABISTOTELIS 



Involon- To & 8l ayVOUUt OV\ CKOVCIOV fUV COTOP iaTlV 9 2 

froi^oo- ixowriov 8i to arlXwrov kcu iv fxerafieXeia' o 
?B(^iihed yap 81 ayvoiav irpd£a$ 6tu>vv 9 f0)8a> 8e 8vox*pal- 

ajx? defined, t \ //- e \ \ » / * 

veov art rg irpa&i, cicaw p£v ov ireirpaxw, o y€ 
t*q V&ci> ov& ad axcov, jjuj Xwovfuvos ye. rovb 
Sr/ 81 ayvoiav 6 piv iv fJUtra+uXziq. axcov 8oK£i 9 
6 8c /jLTj fi€TafieX6fi€V09 9 iwel mpos ecrrco, ov\ 
ctccZv* cirel yap SuMptpei, fidXrtov ovopu iy*w 
t8tov. erepop & tout* kcu to 81 ayvoiav nrparreiv 
tov ayvoovvra iroitiv* 6 yap fxeOvwv y 6pyi(pfi€V09 10 
ov 8ok€i 8i ayvoiav 7rparr€iv 9 dXXa 8ia n rcbv 
uprqpAvm> 9 owe eiS&v 84 9 aXX 9 ayvoebv. ayvoel 
ficv oiv tray 6 px>x0rjpo9 a dti irparreiv kq\ wv 
atf)€KT€ov, Koi 8ia ttjv Tocavrrjv apxipriav a8ucoi 



9. !«' I?mm» *t*mn\ To act 
through ignorance. That is, an igno- 
rance of particulars ; which, as they 
are eitraneous to ourselves, if we are 
ignorant of them, we are not blame- 
worthy. Such an ignorance as this 
is an external cause (Jex**), a Kind of 
external instrument although within 
ourselves. Hence these actions are 
said to be done, V kytmtf, as though 
ignorance, and not we ourselves, were 
the agent. But to act in a state of 
ignorance (A^wiivri r«i?»), an igno- 



rance of principles, is an ignorance 
of which we ourselves are the authors, 
and for which we are culpable. Thus 
to drink a glass of brandy instead of 
wine, not knowing that it was brandy, 
and so to cause drunkenness, is to act 
)/ &yvi*f, and is excusable if it be 
followed by repentance ; but to get 
drunk, not knowing that drunkenness 
is a vice, is to act kynSi, and is not 
excusable. The following table will 
make the division of these actions 
more clear. 



Actions. 



t 

Voluntary. 
AyMwv, or 
Ignorance of the prin- 
ciple. 
Ignorantia juris, 
Blameable. 


Involuntary. 

Ignorance of some cir- 

cumstantia of the fact 

Ignoruntiafaeti, 

Attended with repent- 
ance is not blameable. 


Non Voluntary. 

Ignorantia f act i. 
Being not followed with 
repentance is blame- 
able. 



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ETHICORUM LIB- III. 1. 91 

KCU oA<»? KOKOl ytVOVTOU. TO & OKOVfTlBP fiovAeTCU 

XeyeaOat ovk el tls dyvoel to ov/juf>epov' ov yap 
7) ip ttj irpoaxpeareL ayvoia curia tov ajcovcriov 
dXXa tt)9 f&oyfhipiasy ov& tj koBoXov (yfteyovrat 
5 yap 8id ye Tavrqv) aAA* rj Kaff JxaoTa, iv olp 
K*xi icepl a t) TTpaijts* ev tovtois yap kou eXeof 
Kal ovyyvw/irj' 6 yap tovtodv ti dyvoAv okovo-uo? 
irpaTTei. law? ohv ov yelpov Stopio-cu avrd, Tiva in what »- 
Kat 7rocra eori, tis Te 017 #cat to kou irepi ti rf ev the fact can 

10 tivi ir parrei, evioTe Se kou tuh, olov opydwp, kou 
evena t'lvos, olov crayrrfpias, Kal irw 9 cliov rjpe/jja 
t) cr(f>68pa. dwavra fiev odv Tavra ovdeh av 
ayvorjcreie /jlt/ ftaivo/xevo?, SrjXov 8 w? ovSe tov 
TrpaTTOvra' irw yap eavrov ye ; o 8e irpdrrety 

l&ayvorjcreiev av to?, olov Xeyovres fyaxriv e/areo-eiv 
avrovs, rj ovk elSeveu ore aitoppiyra fjv, coowep 
AioyyXos to. fWcrriKa, rj 8el£at fZovAo/Juevo? d<f>ei- 
vol, ©? 6 tov KaTa7reXT7jv. oiyj$eitj 8 av to? kou 



2. myuu ri siytfigu] h ignorant of perate UjmAjmwi ), who knows not that 
his own good. intemperance is a vice ; the second is 

3. $ U rjf *pmp*u tLy9i*—»Vf * the ignorance or rather error of the 
xati\9v] There is a difference between incontinent (£*{*nk), who knows that 
one and the other. The ignorance of the lust should be avoided and continence 
Universal (h *m$ix*») is when a person observed, but who being overcome by 
has lived so long in a state of vice as his passions prefers their gratification, 
not to be able to distinguish good from and moves out of the line which leads 
bad, virtue from vice. (See vii. 2. n. to the end he ought to pursue See 
ad fin.) He knows not what end he Mag. Mor. p. 19. 

ought to pursue. The ignorance it The first then is a general ignorance, 

wp*tp*u is not yet arrived to such a as when a man is ignorant that adul- 

desperate state as this j it distinguishes tery is a crime ; the second a particu- 

between good and bad, it knows what lar, as when he is ignorant (overborne 

end it should pursue, but does not se- by his passions) that this particular 

lect the proper means to that end. instance of adultery is a crime. 
The first is the ignorance of the intern- 



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9* ARISTOTELIS 

rov vtov iroXepuop elvou axrrrep tj MepoTrr), kou 
iaxf>atpwr0ou to Xekoyxcofxevov Sopv, rj top Xidou 
KiaoTjpcv etpou* kou iiri ax&rrjpia Trauras airoKreivou 
av % kou Seti-cu /3ov\ofi€vos, axnrep ot oKpox^tpt- 
{fifuvoi, 7raTa^€i€P av. wepl iravra Srj Tavra ttj95 
ayvotas ovar/v, iv 0I9 r\ 7rpa£i$, 6 tovtcov tl 
ayvorjaas okcov 8ok€L ireirpaxivou, kou puaXtara 
iv Toh KvpiayraTois' Kvptcorara & elvat SoK€t, iv 
oh rj irpa£i9 kou oS cvckgl. tov Stj koto, rrjv 
. TOtavrrjv ayvouav ducovatov Xeyofiivov eri Set tt/vio 
irpaj~tv Xvmjpav elvat Kai iv pLerafxeXela. 

Thevolun- *OvTOS 8* OLKOVCTtOV TOV fita KOU St ayvOULV, TO 3 
Uryde- c/ ~/«. * 9 T t , v , ,^ 

fined. €KOV<riOV OOgeteV (XV etVOU OV Tj OLpyf) ev dVTCp 

Actions etSoTt TOL KOjff €KOUJTa iv oh Tj 7Tpfii£t9. *1<TW 

done from v , ^ , , , s , v v 

passion or yap OV KOACQ? A€y€TOU CLKOVCTia etVOU TOL Ota UVp.OV\b 

voluntary, n St iirtOviAtav. Ylp&TOV U€V yap OvSev €Tl 

andwhy. ' m ** , f £ \ H , 

T<ov aXXwv Qpcw eKOvai(D$ 7rpaget 9 ovo ot iratoes. 

a.Etra itorepov ovSev eKOVcrlco? TrparropLev t£>v St 
iirtOvplav kou Ovptov, rj to. kolXol p.ev eKOvaixos 
Ta & alcrxpa axovatcos ; r) yeXotov evos ye aiTtov 20 
ovros ; Stottov Se tcrcoy to aKOVcrta <f)dvat oov Set 

3.6peyeadou. Aet Se kou opyifiecrdou iirt Ttart 

14. hut yk() Excludit quemdam passiones appetitus sensitivi excitantur 

errorem : et prirao ponit ipsum. Qui- a rebus exterioribus apprehensis per 

dam enim putabant non omne id esse sensum, hie error ejusdem rationis esse 

vol untarium cuj us principium est intra, videtur cum eo quern supra removit, 

cum scientia circumstantiarum. Potest secundum quern dicebatur quod res 

enim contingere quod illud principium, exteriores inferunt violentiam. Sed 

quod est intra, non sit appetitus ra- illud fuit ibi dicenduro, ubi agebatur 

tionalis qui dicitur voluntas, a qua de- de violento cujus principium est extra, 

nominatur voluntarium,sed aliqua pas- Hoc autem est hie agendum ubi agitur 

sio appetitus sensitivi, puta ira vel de voluntario cujus principium est 

concupiscentia vel aliquid aliud hujus- intra, nam passiones intra nos sunt, 

modi, quod Philosophus dicit non esse — Thos. Aquin. 



bene dictum. Et notandum quod quia 



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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 2. 93 

kou eriOvfulv twS>v> oiov vyteias kou /AajOrjo'e&e. 4. 
Aofcel 8e ra piv aKovaia Xxnrqpd elvcu, ra Se 
scar liriOvphav TjSea. Kri 8e ri Scaxfrepei r©5. 

OKOvcia etvou ra Kara Xoyiapov rj Ovpuov dpaprr}- 
5 Oivra ; (f>€VKTa fiev yap apxfxo, Sotcei 8e ov\ ^ttov 
dvOpamiKa ttvou • ra aXoya ttojBt). ax 5e 7rpa£w 
rou avOpdmov otto Ovfiov kou hnOvpLias. Stottov 
8tj to TiOevau aKovaia ravra. 



CHAP. II. 

Of Choice or vcpmipttt. 

4 AIQPI2MENQN 8e tov re eicovcrlov kou tov **"*"" 

closely 

10 aKOvcrlov, irep\ irpooupeaetos errercu SceXOelu* oIk€io- •?>■•* to 

rarov yap eluou SokcT rfj dperrj kou pJaXXov ra 

7j07j KpLveiv t£>v 7rpdlJ€(Dv. *H irpoaiptcns 8rj i. «-(««;- 

zkovotlov fJLtv (paiverou, ov tovtov 0€, aXX eiri the voiun- 
x / \c/ % \« / \t**y 

7TA€0U TO €K0V(T10V TOV fl€V yap €K0VCT10V icat merely, 

157rat5cy icat raXXa £Jpa KOivcovtl, irpoaxpecrecos 8 
ov, kou tol e£ai<f>vr)9 eKOvcria jxev Xeyo/xev, Kara 
irpoaipzariv & ov. Ol 8e Xiyovrts avrr/u eVt- 2. npmi- 

1%*H is not 

desire. 

6. r« &\*ym *Mn\ The irrational choice. This word is generally trans- 
passions and appetites appear to be a lated deliberate choice. But all choice 
part of man as man, (M^tHn*d), in- implies deliberation. It is evident from 
asmuch as they can be made obedient the nominal definition given of it at 
to reason. Therefore the acts which the end of this chapter, («•$• Iripn 
spring from them must be considered al^trii) that choice is the proper and 
the actions of man as such, and con- primary meaning of the word. But 
sequently voluntary, since no involun- unless we also give a secondary sense 
tary action (involving neither praise to these words, neither choice nor deli- 
nor blame, and having nothing to do berate choice will convey the full mean- 
with his moral nature) is attributed to ing of the term as technically em- 
man, ployed by Aristotle. 

10. *i{* xpwfawi] Concerning 



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94 ARISTOTELIS 

Ovfiiop rf Ovf&v rf fiovXrjaip rj npa Soijap ovk eoi- 
i. Kaanv opOw \cyci*. Ov yap koipop r) Trpooupeais 
2. kcu tAp a\oya>p, miBvpia 8e kcu Ovfws. Kat o 

aKparrp emOvp&p ptip irparrei, Trpoaipovp&pos 8 

ov' 6 eyKparr/s 9 opaTraXcp wpocupovpevos p£p y h 
z.iiriOvfriip & ov. Kcu Trpoaipivti pkp ariBvpia 
i.iwurriQVT€U 9 eiriOvpuq* & ktnAvpba ov. Kcu rj pep 

eircOvfiia r/Seos kcu €7n\v7rov> r) irpoalpeais 8 ovre 

3. Nor Xum/pov ovff r)84o$. Qvfibs 8 ert rfrrop' fjnurra 

yap to, 8ia dvpjbp Kara irpoaipearw etpcu 8ok€i. io 

4. Nor 'AAAa pr)p ovSe fiovXrjo'is' ye> Kcuirep avveyyvs 

{fxuuopepop' 7rpocup€cri9 pip yap ovk Zoti t<op 
aSvpar&p, kcu ei rts (paly TrpoaipucrOac, SoKoir) op 
rjXiduos elpcu' fiovXrjais 8 earl rebp aSvpar&p, olop 

2. iOapcucrias. Kcu r) pep fiovXrjcrl? ecrrt kcu irep\ 15 
ra prjSapxo? 8t aurov irpaydevTa op, olop vwoKpi- 
rrjp rtva pikclp r) aJdXr)ri)P. irpooupurcu 8e ra 
rotavra ovSeh, aXX* oara otercu yepeaOou av 8C 

3. aurov. v Ert 8* r) pep fiovXrjaL? rod rcAow cari 
paXXov, r) 8e irpoalpeais twp irpos to reXos, olop 20 
vyiaipeip {JovXopeda, 7rpocupovpe0a 8k 8c cop 

VyULPOVp£P, KOU €v8cupX)P€LP (3ovXop€0a p*P KCU 

(f>apev> 7rpoaipovfie0a 8e Xeyeip ov\ appose' oXco? 
yap coucep r) Trpoaipeais irep\ ra i(f) r)pup cipcu. 
Noropi- OvSe 8r) 8o£a ap etrj* r) pip yap 86{;a Sokcl 7T6/H25 

6. «{««{(#* pb \ * t0f» U ] Do- be the opposite (ImwrUt) of desire; 

are is opposed to it^m^wtt as in but bed desires and *pmJpwit, which is 

the incontinent person ; the evil that a pare and perfect principle, inducing 

he would not that he does. Two men to feel and act virtuously, cannot 

op po site s cannot exist together at the exist in the same mind simultaneously, 

same time in the same subject, but and consequently are hmwrm. See 

two desires may possess a man at the the Categories chap. viii. 
same time, consequently desire cannot 



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EfTHICORUM LIB. HI. 3. 



9* 



7rdvra that, kou ovdev fyrrov irepi re diSta kcu 
ra ddvvara rj ra €<f> r)fup' kou r<p ^evSet kou 
akrjdtl SuupeiTcu, ov r<p xaiup kou aya&ip, 17 
7rpoaip€<ri? 8e tovtois /iSXXop. o\a>? fup oiv 8o£y 
bravrbp ura* ovSc Xeytt ovSel?. 'AAA' ov&'Norany 

\ ~ /\ » /\\ + \ \ Particular 

tlpl red yap 7rpoaip€i(rVai rayaffa rj ra *a«a opinion. 
irotoi TiP€9 €<rfi€P 9 ry 8i 8o£dfap ov. Kou irpocu-2. 
povfie0a flip Aafitcp rj (puyetp rj rt riop towvtcop, 
8o£d£ofX€i> 8* rl iartp t) tlpi ovpjfyipei 17 tt£? 

10 Xaficip 8 rj (j>vy€ip ov 7rdpv 8o£a{fifi€P. Kou 173. 
fiep irpoaip€trt9 ivoupeirou rep etpou ov Set jiaXXou 
r/ tq> 6p0m, rj 8* 86£a r<p w dXajOcbs* Kou rrpocu- 4. 
povfieOa pep a fmXicrra ta/xeu dyadd optcl, 8o£d- 
(flftep 8c a ov irdpv tapicp. Aokovctl r« ov\ 01 &. 

isairrol wpocupeiodat re aptara kcu 8o£d$EiP, aAA* 
tvioi 8oi-d£eip pep a/ieipop, Std kolkiclp ff aipeicrffai 



5. «6X m] Aristotle says, that 
*{§*i{t*s( is not opinion generally ; nor 
is it any particular opinion ; that is to 
say, it is not merely a correct opinion 
respecting morals, concerning what is 
good or bad, virtuous or vicious. For 
*pmip*if is a vital active principle, 
mere opinion is not 

Hujus differentia* autem ratio est, 
quia bonus vel malusdkituraliquis non 
secundum potenuam, sed secundum 
actum, ut habetur in nono Metaphy- 
sics? ; id est nou es hoc quod est po- 
tent bene operari, sed ex hoc quod 
bene operator: ex hoc autem, quod 
homo est perfectus secundum intellec- 
tum fit homo potens bene operari, non 
autem bene operator; sicut ille qui 
habet habitum grammatics ex hoc 
ipso est potens bene loqui eongrue. 
Sed ad hoc, quod eongrue loquatur, 
requiritur quod hoc velit, quia habitus 



est quo quia agk cum voluerit, ut dicit 
Com. in 3. de Anima. Unde patet 
quod bona voluntas fecit hominem 
bene operari secundum quamcumque 
potentiam vel habitum rationi obe- 
dientem. Et ideo aliquis dicitur sim- 
pliciter bonus homo ex hoc, quod ha- 
bet bonam voluntatem. Ex hoc autem 
quod habet bonum - intellectual nou 
dicitur . bonus homo simphciter sed 
secundum quid, puta bonus gramma- 
ticus. Et ideo quia electio pertinet ad 
voluntatem, opinio autem ad intellec- 
tual, ex electione dicimur boni vel 
mali non autem ex opioione^— Thos. 
Aquinas. 

12. 4 ft l&] Compare the Philebus, 
p. 40. SO. vi «; *§*& Kg« mmi 
Xfmrkt AXXm$ 4 ?r< kX*$ut mmi ifa&hte 
ytyufAm§ fx<pt» •Arawi IIPA* *im 



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96 ARISTOTELIS 

ov\ a Set. ei 8e irpoyiperat 8o£a rrjs 7rpoatpeaea)9 
rj 7rapaKo\ov$€L, ovSep Stax^epet' ov tovto yap 

Nominal <rK07TOVfl€V, oXA* €t TCLVTOV €OTt So^Tf TtPt. Tt 

definition of -+„,,, > *v ~ , / 'yj/ 

wpmttwti. OVU 7) 7TOIOP Tl €OTlP> eireiOTj T(OP eipr)/JL6P<DP OVUeP ; 

tKOvaiov fiep St) (palperai, to 8* eKovatop ov irap& 
irpoaiperop. aXX* apd ye to wpofiefiovXevfiepop ; 
r) yap 7rpoalp€cn? fiera Xoyov teal Stavolas. inro- 
<rq\xaiveiv 8 eoiKe teal tovpo/jui a>9 op wpo erept&p 
alperop. 

CHAP. III. 

Of Deliberation, or (bfaurtf. 

what i. the BOYAEYONTAI 5c itorepa vepl Trdprcop kou5 

dSibe° f ir " y fiov\€VTOP eOTtP, 7) 7T€pl ePUOP OVK eOTt 

ration. fiovArj ; Xescreop & lam fiovXevrop ov\ inrep ov 
(3ovXev<rair ap tls rjXlOto? t) /uupofiepos, aXX* 
vwep top 6 povp ey&p. wept 8e tg>p aiSUop ovSei? 
fiovXevercu, olop irep\ rov koc/jlov tj rrj? Stafxerpov 15 

l.uhrpyiurMi] Sciendum tamen shown that the circumference and 

quod opinio cum pertineat ad vim diameter of a circle are incommen- 

cognoscitivam, perse loquendo, pre- surable. See Trendelenburg in Aristot. 

cedit electionem, que pemnet ad vim de Anima, p. 500. Quadrat am proxi- 

appetivam quae movetur a cognoscitiva. mum est, ad quod exemplum per- 

Per accidens tamen contingit quando- tineat. Hujus enim latent cum linea- 

que quod opinio sequitur electionem. diagonali communem mensuram non 

Puta, cum aliquis ex affectu eorum habent. Quod e Pythagoreo, quod 

quae diligit, mutat opinionem quam vocatur, theoremate facile intelliges. 

prius habebat.— Thos. Aquinas. Redit enim linea diagonalis ad ra- 

7. fjttrit xiyou] See vi. 1. dicem e duobus inveniendam. 

15. rvi h*fiirfv] The side of the 1 2 + 1 2 =* 2 

square is incommensurable with its 2 =i 2 

diagonal. It is somewhat remarkable J2 ==x 

that some should have thought that Est autem */2 numerus irrationalis 

Aristotle alludes here to the quadra- i. e. numerus cujus ratio cum uno 

"ture of the circle, since it was not till comparata in infinitum abit. Unde 

the time of Archimedes that it was facile sequitur h Imptrpi tovpfurpr. 

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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 3. 97 

KCU TTj$ TrXevpas, on dovfifieTpoi. aAA* ovSe 7repl 
r&v iv KLPr/aeiy del 8e Kara ravra yivofievcov, etr 
i£ avayKTfs etre Kai (f>v<r€t r/ 8td nva alnav 
aXXrjv, oiov Tpcmcov kcu dvaToXcov. ovSe irepl 
&.T&V aXXore aXAcoy, oiov avyju&v kcu o/xfipcov. 
ovSe irepl t£>v diro rv\V^9 °* ov drfcravpov evpecreco?. 

dX\ 9 OvSe 7T€pl TCOV avOpCOTTLKCOV TTOLVTCOV) olou TTCO? 

dv ^Kvdat dpiara 7ToXit€voivto ovdeh AajceScu- 
fiovuov fiovXeverat. ov yap yivoir av tovtcov 
lOovdev 81 rjiixov. BovXevo/xeda 8e irepl tcov We deiibe- 

*/> < ~ ~ . v N v , y rate merely 

€(f) 7]fllV 7TpaKT(OV TOVTa 0€ Kat €OTl XOLTTa. aiTia concerning 
n * ? i / n » / v r J hal which 

yap OOKOvariv eivat cpvcns Kat avay/crj Kai TV\rf 9 \%mo\a 

v " *\ ^ \ ' \ * 9 > /\ / ~ *> power. 

en oe vovs Kai nrav to oi avupamov. tcov o 
dvOpamcov eKoxrToi fiovXevovrai irepi tcov 8t avTcov 

15 7rpaKTG)v. Kai wepl piev ras aKpifiei? Kai avrdpKet? 
tcov i7TLorrf/jLciv ovk ecrn fiovXrj, oiov irepl ypapr 
fidrcov (ov yap Siord^ofiev nebs ypairreov)' dX)C 
oora ylverai 8i rj/Jtobvy fir) axravTm 8 del, wepl 
tovtcov f3ovXevofjL€0a, oiov irepl TG>V KaTOL laTpiKTfV 

20 Kai xprj/jLaTco-TiKT/v, Kai irepl KvfiepvrjnKr/v fiSXXov 
7] yvfiva<TTiK7)v 9 ocrcp tjttov 8ir}Kpif}corai, Kai en 
Trepl t&v Xonrtov 6/jlouo?, fjuiXXov 8e Kai wepl ray 
Teyyas rj tol9 emorr/fias' jjlSXXov yap Trepl avTas 



13. «£f r} V *^4Mr«y] That is Of the first are Geometry, in the gene- 
anger, desire, or whatever else may ral use of those terms, Physics, Gram- 
be included under the term appetite, mar, &c. ; among the second are 
(•{•$**)• Politics, Medicine, Rhetoric, Dia- 

22. *i{) vets ri%9as~\ For the arts lectics; &c. The latter, being acquired 

are in contingent, the sciences, pro- by care and experience, are more the 

perly so called, in necessary matter, subject of deliberation than the former, 

See vi. c. 2. 3. But the Greeks because they proceed not upon unvary- 

generally divided the sciences into two ing rules, and their results are uncer- 

classes ; the exact (Zxpfiuf , xurec^xut) tain, 
and the conjectural {r*o%arrix*i.) 



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98 ARISTOTELIS 

8ioTa£o/i€P m to fiovXeveaOcu 8e iu roh a>9 siri to 
iroXv, aSr/Xoi? fie ttgJs 1 aTto^areraXy kcu 4p oh 
aSiopioTov. ov/ifiovXovf 8e irapakap$avo\uv eh 
to. fji€ya\a, enrurrovvre? r\plv avroh w ov\ IkolvoZs 
j^boT*" 8uLyv<bvcu. BovXevo/ieda & ov irep\ tG>v r€Aa>j>,5 
c °d« e b liDg <*^* *"*/>* r ** p irpbs to, TeXtf. ovre yap Uvrpo? 

meant. fiovX€V€TCU 61 VyiOXT^ OVT€ prjTCDp el 7T€MT€t, OVT€ 

7ToXitikos el evvopiav 7roirj<rei, ovSe tg>v Xoarcov 

ovSeh irepX tov tcXow' aXXa Oepuevoi tcXos tl 9 

ir£>? kcu 8ia tiuodu earai crKoirovcn, kcu 8ia 7rAe«)-io 

iwv fjLtv (fxuvofjulvov yiveaOcu 8ia twos paora 

koL koXXiotol eiruTKonrovari, 81 evo? & iiriTeXov- 

fievov 7T(Sy 8ia tovtov earai KaKelvo 8ia twos, 

€<&>? av eXOaxnv eni to itpSyrov avriov 9 o ev rg 

evpeaei eoyaxov eoriv' 6 yap fiovXevofievo^ eoiKeib 

£qT€iv kcu avaXveiv tov elprjfiivov Tponrov axnrep 

BcoXturie not $ cay pa fJLfia. <t>aiv€Tai 8 17 fiev ^qTrfais ov 

the same as ^ « t _ e 

&rnris. iraxra eivat fiovXev(rc9 9 oiov al fiadrjfiaTiKat, 7] 8e 
fiovXevais iraaa {jf/Tr)o'i9> kcu to ZoyaTOv ev r# 

5. cv <ri{) rSn Ttkm] Since deli- 19. xm) to 1r%*rov it rj xtmXvtu] 
beration is only of things in oar own This is familiarly and easily explained 
power, it cannot be of ends but of by Simplicius in his Introduction to 
means to ends, for the first are not the Categories, and also by Ammonius 
in our power, upon them fiovXnrif on the same. x*4ix»v y«g vtis /dt 
energizes. Compare the Rhetoric, 1. 1. foveas ro rix&s yinrou &£%h rns *£*• 
ivi ph §vt tux font curt Wet Ttt* yitovt %*»f tfi>**Xit 2i, rns <Tf«|i^ ri riXsf 
*<p»p<rp.ifou n fnro^xn, ■ . Qanpt. xa) mfxh W ft*£t*f. •let, o •Ixdiftts l*' 
trt oh rb «ura.t i^yt ahrnt , iXX* ri rayiif uxet Xiyu x*t ittvrif, Wtrxyni 
fiui rk b«*tx** v * **4**b **& '««•*•». *f* n ******** Z**e l"' **\xu*pM xmXu- 
xaluvriz xa) U rmg uXXeuf ri^Mf «•/»•» Sp&ptw xec) xxupuvti, r*vr§ % 
xr»ffouf evSi yct^ mr^txns ro vyia, *c*n- •«» ** yiwrt f*h yMpivnt i^tjf. it- 
em. ak\a pbxV '" idixirat, fii%(i rtuht evf a^ireu rnt tuttfat, Vf&x't- 
rturov *£cay*yM' irn yag xxt reus f#v J» Qnvif etXXa rtvvt ovx At yiwr» 
iitncircvg fttvetXa&ut vynixf tputf fagx- fin yinfiiw* T»i%*9, «Jtw Vi »vx if 
no*** xttXSs* yifonrt p,n v**$Xn6**r»* fopuXun, ci 

17. {fowi] Sec vi. 7. %\ hpixtotoux «» (ZXnhtn ^n quotums 

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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 3. 



99 



avaXvcret irp&rou eivai ev tjj yevevei. kolv pkv 
aSvvarcp evrvyeoaiVy autyioTavrai, olov el yjvqpmrtQV 
Set, raura 8e p,rj oiov re 7ropur0f}pcu' edv 8e 
8vvarov <f>aivrjT(u 9 ey\etpovai rrpdrreiv. Sward Se 
5 a 8t rjpxbv yevoir av' rd yap Sid r&v (f)iX(ou Si 
tj/judp 7TCDS 1 eariv' Tj yap dpxv *v rip.lv . fyreiTou 
& ore ficp rd opyava, ore 8 tj ypeia avr&v' 

OfMOLCOS Se KCU €V T019 Xot7TOl9 OT€ fl€V 8l OV 9 

ore Se irm tf Sid twos, eonce 8r/, KCtBdirep eipijrcu, 
\odv0payiros eiuai dpyyj r&v irpd^etov' y Se fiovXrj 
rrepl r£>v avr<p 7rpoKrobu 9 al 8* wpdljcis aXXow 
eW/ca. ovk <w olv eirj fiovXevrov to tc'Ao? dXXa 
rd 7rpo9 rd reXrj. ouSe 8r/ rd Kajff Stacrra, olov 
el apros rovro tj nreireTrrai a>s Set' al<r0r/o-ea>s yap 
15 ravra. el Se del f$ovXevaerai 9 eh diretpov rjijei. 



rnf ynf Itrmvtm **tiA»j£i> h 4ut{ia, 
imvttf cvt ei^irai n «*{«&;. «£A*f(«f 
y*£ ifvrru riif yii*, fif iSrst fldXXu 
tw 4tpi\Mf, i7r« lyi/{i/ roi^evf, x«J 
urrigu i+trsJntn r%t ip<pnf, Krif Irri 
riXat *ns writs' h $' fyxh rns ir^d- 

10. tttiptvtt fiuu A?%4] From what 
has been said, it is evident that man is 
the principle of his own actions, and 
that all things do not happen by fate 
or necessity. For if man deliberates 
merely upon actions which are in his 
own power, it is plain that there must 
be such actions, or otherwise there 
would be no such thing as delibera- 
tion. Since actions also are for some- 
thing ulterior, it follows that delibera- 
tion is not of ends but of means : that 
is to say, not of ends as ends. For in 
our progress to some final end, each 
end becomes a mean to the final end, 
and all the ends are therefore means 



and the subject of deliberation, except 
the last. As, for instance, A deli- 
berates whether he shall go to Town. 
In this case it might appear that the 
going to Town was in itself an end, 
and consequently that ends are the 
subject of deliberation. But in reality 
it is not. For the end which the mind 
bears in view is the welfare of A, and 
the deliberation is in reality, whether 
his going to Town will be the means of 
promoting a certain end, his welfare, 
&c. This point then being determined, 
that which was before a mean, the 
going to Town, becomes an end, and 
he now deliberates concerning the 
means to this end, the conveyance or 
such like, which in its turn becomes 
an end, until he arrives at the last 
point in this analysis, so that each end 
in its turn becomes a mean and the 
subject of deliberation. 



h2 



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100 ARISTOTELIS 

Difference hovXeVTW $€ KCU 7TpOCUp€TOl> TO aVTO, 7tXtJV atfxo- 
and «■{*»/- piCfieVOV tJStJ TO TTpOCUptTQV' TO yap €K TTf9 

fiovXrj? irpoKpidcv irpoatperov iariv. iravercu yap 
CKOOT09 (jr/rav irw irpa^ei 9 orrav ciy avrov avd- 
yayrj tt)v apytjv, kcu avrov ei? to rjyovfjieuou* & 
tovto yap to Trpoaxpovp&vov. SfjXop 8e tovto teal 
etc twv apyamv 7ro\iT€i<ov, a? Op.rjpo? ipufieiTO' 
oi yap fiacriXei? a irpotXoivro avfjyyeKXov r^> 
Srjpq). ovto9 Se tov irpocupeTOv fiovXevrov opetcrov 
t&v i(f> rjp2v, kcu r) 7rpoalp€<ri9 av etr) fiovXevrucrflO 
opeijts t&v i(f> r)puv' 4k tov fiovXevacurOcu yap 
KplvavT€9 opeyofieOa /caret rt\v fiovXevaiv. 17 pJev 
o$v 7rpoalp€<ri9 Tirrrtp eiprfaOa), kcu irepl irola iarty 

KCU OTl TtoV 7TpO$ TO. tIXtj. 



CHAP. IV. 

Of the Will, or /Wx«#*. 

Whether *H 8k BovXnO-19 OTl LL€V TOV TeXoVf €OTlP 9 6 

the Will it * ~ J\ ~ \ , * ' 

invariably GiprjTai, OOK€l 0€ TOlf fJL€l> ayadov €LV0U, TOlf fie 

Good or tov (f)atPOfji€Pov ayajQov. avfifiaivei 8e tois fieu 
to povXrjTOP TayaBov Xeyovo-i fiij €ivai fiovXrjTW 



5. kytv(ni«i\ That is, to the mS* 10. wpmprtf] This consideration 

wptnnxhs within himself. This phrase- is resumed in vi. 1. For Aristotle is 

ology was probably suggested by the compelled to defer the further explana- 

reasoning of Plato in the Philebus, tion of it until he treats of the Intel- 

p. 28, sq. who compares the one lectual Virtues; «£t«Sgi#ff consisting 

supreme Intelligence (uvt /WtXiw) partly of our Intellectual (mw), and 

which rules and orders the universe, partly of our moral nature («£•&*). 

to the lesser intelligence directing the 18. ro 0«vXf»r}» <rky*K*\ Compare 

little world, which man calls himself. Plato, Philebus p. 22. Ej ){ m &XX* 

7. Ofine«] See the Iliad ii. 53, sq. fiptf npZ*, *«£« Qvrn At «•** rw iXsi- 

and 83, sq. i»t alftrov Ixdpfhtrtf &**t, !$ kynU< 



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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 4. 



101 



o fiovXercu 6 firj opdm cupov/iepo? (cl yap €<rrou 
fiovXrjTOP, real ayaOop' fjp &, ei ovrco? €tvx*> 
kokop), roh 8 ad to (paivofxevov aya&op to 
fiovXr/TOP Xcyovo't fir) eipat (f)vcr€t fiovXrjTOP 9 oAA* 
b€Kaorq> to Sokovp' aXXo & aXXcp <f>aip€Tai, kcu 
el ovtg)9 tTV\€ 9 Tapapria. €i 8k 8r/ Tavra firj 
ape<TK€L, apa (fwreop awXco? /xkp koi /caT dXrj- 
0€lop PovXtjtop elpou Tayadop, i/caoT<p 8k to 
(fraipo/jucpop ; r<p pep o$p cnrovSaicp to kot dXrj- 
lO0eiap elvat j ry 8k <f>avX(p to tv\6p 9 aowcp kcu 

€7Tt TOW C(OfWT(OP Tols fl€P €$ 8uiK€LfJL€POl9 Vyt€LPa 

iori tol KaT dXrjOeiap TOiavra opra, toi? & €7ri- 
pocois €T€pa. ofjLOico? 8k kcu iriKpa teal yXv/cea 
kcu Oep/xa kcu fiapea kcu t&p aXXcop eKacrra' 6 
IbairovScuo? yap eKoara KptP€i 6pdw 9 Kal ip €#ea- 
crrois TaXrjOes avTip (f>aiP€Tai. Kaff eKaorrjp yap 
€^lp i8id ion koXcl kcu r]8ia 9 Kal 8ia(f)ep€i irXei- 



9 rn$g /ttayxfit m tShUjut h See also 
this question discussed in Plato's dia- 
logue, Gorgias, p. 466. and in Cud- 
worth's Im. Moral, p. 38. sq. 

4. k\X % Ufrrif «■* hxcvt] This 
was, in effect, the doctrine of the cele- 
brated Sophist Protagoras. mm) yk( 
IntTtf %fn ****** iTmm ££npiEr»f pi- 
T(#» ro MpHto' tvftr frt£#v Xiymt, *f 
ri fcnMVf t»«r«*y tooto mmi iTmu wayU*. 
r*4r»v ft yttepitov, t> mvri fuufimitu 
urn) that xmi /»n iThu. *a) xaxit x*l 
iymiit iftmt.— piT^i T tltat re Qmti- 
f»»*. (Arist. Metaph. X. 6. p. 221.) 
Of this sentiment, however, he was not 
the author, but probably derived it from 
Heraclitus. (See Arist. Metaph. iii. 3. 
p. 66. ed. Tauch.) At all events, 
Auaxagoras and Democritus held it 



before him, using the same arguments 
as Protagoras, for the supposed proof 
of it Of the former Aristotle says ; 
'AM^eyi^iif ft *«) **i$4tyfi» /itn/t*- 
nvtvm W(*( rSt Irmipt rttdg. In 
rtmvrm eturoif rk Stva •!* it ir§Xm- 
/Wi. Met. iii. 5. The whole chapter 
should be consulted for the history and 
refutation of this celebrated dogma. 
See also Geel's Hist. Sophistarum, 
p. 87. Plato's Theastetus, p. 152. See 
Introduction to Book ii. p. 49. 

8. <r* fmtrifttw] Compare Arist. 
Met. xi. 7. p. 248. Ed. Tauch. 
Wriuptirbf pit t1 ftuvifttm xaX.it, 
fitvXnrht ft *b *£*rof r)> it x*X$t. 
qtyifiitit ft ort hxtt, fAuXXtt n 1oxt7 



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102 



ARISTOTELIS 



otov ura>f 6 cnrovScuos rqi raXrjOes kv cjcaaroi? 
bpavy axnrep kolvcov kou fierpou avr&v a>v. tois 
7roWoi9 8e rj oararq Sea ttjv qSovrjv eoi/ce ylvtaOoL' 
ov yap ovcra ayaffou (fyalvercu. alpovmat ovv to 
r/Sv coy ayaOoPy ttjv &€ \v7r>)v w kolkov <j>€v-& 
yovaiv. 



CHAP. V. 
That Vice, as well as Virtue, is voluutary and in our own power. 

Virtue and ONT02 8rj fiovXfJTOV fl€U TOV T€\0VS, fiov- 7 

Vice are N ~ «, \ >, ~ \\/ N 

voluntary. A€VT<DV 0€ KCU It poaip€TG>V T(OV 7T/0O9 TO T€A09 r 



2. /»•«-£•?] Aristotle seems to have 
derived the particular use of this 
phraseology from Protagoras and the 
Sophists, as also did Plato. Compare 
the expressions: fUrpt~r&9 Mpntn, 
and pirpf ri QaitlpuMf. See the note, 
p. 101, 4. The sum of the reasoning 
is this; the good man only, and not 
every one, as Protagoras thought, is 
the rule and measure (jmevaw xmi pirpw) 
of what is good and true. 



Chap. V. 

Having thus determined the nature 
of the voluntary, of *p*i{Wis, of de- 
liberation, and will, which are the 
principles of human action, Aristotle 
now applies what has been said to 
Virtue and Vice. 

His object in the following Chap- 
ter is to show, that Vice is as vo- 
luntary as Virtue. Virtue was gene- 
rally acknowledged to be voluntary 
in his time : this indeed could not 
consistently be denied by men, who 
praised others and required praise in 



return for their good actions. The 
reasoning in this chapter appears, 
however, to be chiefly directed against 
Socrates, whose opinions on this sub- 
ject are thus briefly stated in the Mag. 
Mor. i. 9. (p. 16. Ed. Tauch.) 
Ittxfecrnt fyff, olx ty' nfut yivivteu re 
**optalov( tTvtu n <p*v\9t>t. 1/ yd( rtg, 
Qtiffit, lf*W/» 09<ri9*iv* t «*«tt£«» at 
fiouXur* Yixetitf uteu n c&ixof, *M t 
£9 Xfy«4*« rn* iiix/av. hfnims V I* 
etf\ii*s xxi luXtxs xm) rSt cLXXah i^t- 
tZ* iti) «r«vr«f, EiX«f As tt QxvXu 
wis tiftf, ovx £» Wotrif tltiemv QavXm. 
[Ztrn tiiXef, in oliil <rT4tda4oi.] See 
Plato de Legibus v. 731. ix. 860. And 
Butler's Analogy i. 5. and 6. 

7. £W ^ favknvv] If (IwXnftf is 
of the ends, and /Waiwi; of the means, 
and fiovXtwif is only of actions in our 
. own power, moral actions as being the 
objects of fieoXtmris must also be in. 
our power. And if the actions are, 
so must the habits which spring from 
them; and these habits are virtues 
or vices. Consequently Virtue and 
Vice is in our own power. 



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ETHICOBUM LIB. III. 5. 103 

cu irepl ravra irpaijeis koto, irpoaipeaiv av eUp 
kcu i/covaioi, at Se t&p apeTtov epepyeuu irepl 
Tavra, e<p rjpup be kcu rj aperrj, ofiouos oe kcu 
Tj KOKta. ep 0I9 yap e(f> rjplv to irpaTTevp 9 kcu 
5 to firf irparreiPy kcu ep oh to firj, kcu to pal' 
toor el to wpaTreip koXop op e(f> -qp.lv earl, kcu 
to /jltj irparreip e(f> rjpXv eorou cuaxpop op 9 kcu 
el to fir/ 7rpaTT€tu koXop op e(j> rjp.lv, kcu to 
irpaTreip alo~xpop op e<f> -qp.lv. el 8 e(j> rjplv to. 
XOKaXa TrpaTTCLP kcu to. aloypd, 6p.ouo9 8e kcu to 
fir/ 7rpaTT€iP 9 tovto 8 tjp to ayaBols kcu kclkoIs 
eivou 9 e(f) Tjpuv apa to eirteuceai kcu <f>av\oi9 elpcu. 
To 8e Xeyetv a>y ov8eis €kcov 7rovr)pb? ov& clkcop if man is 
poucap, eoiKe to pev yevoei to o oAr/vei pxiKapios his own ac- 

mm \ \ »* \ v « a^ a ' « ' lions, hit 

lb pep yap ovoei? aK<op 9 rj oe poyVripia eKOvaiop. actions are 

*- ~, / *jl'/o / v n voluntary. 

rj tois ye pvv eiprjpevois apxpivpyyn)Teop 9 Kai top 
avQpcyrrov ov (f>aTeov apyr/v eipou ouSe yepprjTrjp 
tS>v irpai^ecov coorrep kou tckpcop. el 8e Tama 
(f>aip€Tai Kal px) eyop.ev els aAAay ap\a9 avayayelv 
ZOirapa ray €0* r)P>lp 9 &p kcu al apypu ep rjplv, kcu 

I. rif) rmvra T£a%uf] Actions which *X&^ Tt * mi *«** l*/»r« l{yl?srAu, 
have reference to the end. aJ & rSf AXX* tv Ivmtn In w&mt ol rat etiv%{k 
m^trm x. r. X. but ilie energies of %x) nrnxm +§i§vtvif &x»trtg *«t!vrt. 
Virtue are upon acts done with a view Where see Stallbaum's note for further 
to a certain end : that is, with a view authorities. 

of becoming virtuous and happy. Tla^t/At* yk^ revro y J *«) '£*<- 

II. reiuTt 3* nt] See p. 63. X^f^f • 2sfmm*v*M$ xix^nrai. It «7s 
13. Imm t] Compare Plato's Protag. $fifir *\X« fih lyln k*my%tut ruSrtt 

p. 345. D. ov ymf •urmt irttfituref *a'tT» *$tist. ctoftut e\ in ivtiif i*«> 

h lifutftins »*r% rovTtuf <pxttu Wm- *»npt •vh* irat 1%**. 'Ev 'HoaxXtj 

>*?*, U *» \%in ptiSt* Kttxtf Toiti, it % raurm rtf Tltt^a<po^ xtTren. Schol. 

otrttt rttZt «7 \xotnt xtczct *u»uen in loco. 

iy» yckf 9-%(&i* ri xtf**i rtvro, Irt 20. Zf **i ml *^«/] This is other- 

«»ot)s tm9 retpHf **}(** lyureu tfoita wise expressed and at more length 
£»#{»*«» ixtir* ilafu^rdtuf, »vll mi- . by the author of the Mag. Mor. 

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104 



ARISTOTELIS 



The fact of 
reward 
being at* 
tached to 
good, and 
punish- 
ment to 
bad actions, 
proves they 
are volun- 
tary. 



For even 
for bad ac- 
tions done 
through ig- 
norance, if 



aura 4<f> rffilv kol €tcov<rta. Tovroi? 5* eottce 

fiaprvpeurffat teal 181a v(f> €koxttg>v kcu xnf avr£>v 
r&v vofioOercbv' Ko\aifiv<rt yap kcu rtpxopovprou 
row Spjovra? fuoyOrfpa, ocrot firj fila rf Si ayvoiav 

ffi fJLTf aVTOL OUTIOL, TOW $€ TO. K(xXa TTpaTTOVTOSh 

Tifi&<riv 9 a>9 tovs uev irporpfyovreS} tovs Se 
KcoXvaovres. Kairoc o<ra urfr €<f)' rffiiv iarl puffff 
eKovcrta, ovSeh irporperrerax 7rpdrr€ip 9 d>s ovStv 
irpo epyov ov to weurOrji/cu fir/ 0€puaive<rOcu tj 
aXyeiu rf Trcivqv rf aXX* brtovv t&v toioutcov' 10 
ovOkv yap fjrrou ireuroaeOa aura. Kcu yap 

cV avr<p ra> ayvoelv Ko\d£ov<riv, £av aXrio? eivai 
Sokji riff ayvoiasy dlov tol? fi€0vov<rt SnrXa ra 



p. 17, 18. That argument may be 
thus represented. Every principle is 
productive of something similar to 
itself, a dog of a dog, a tree of a tree, 
and so on. And as are the principles 
such are their results. If then the 
actions of men are constantly varying 
and he has power to change them, as 
we see he has, so also he has power 
to change his principles, and of form 
good to bad, and vice versa, and con- 
sequently he is master of his own prin- 
ciples and accordingly of his moral 
conduct. 

3. *4k*i/»v*i\ Not only from the way 
we punish, but also resent injuries. 

4. V 2y»««»] See p. 90. 

12. xtXetZetwif] The difference ob- 
servable in our treatment of bad ac- 
tions done from ignorance is a proof, 
that we punish men only for their 
voluntary actions. For we pardon 
them when they are not the cause of 
their own ignorance, we punish them 
when they are. 

•— mlrtot — rnt otyiMf] A man is 



the cause of his ignorance in two ways, 
either directly or indirectly. Directly, 
as in the case of the drunkard who 
inebriates himself, and places himself 
in a state of ignorance : and who con- 
sequently deserves a double punish- 
ment. One for intoxication, and 
another for doing what he ought cot 
in that state. For both are voluntary. 
Drunkenness is the cause of his igno- 
rance, and he himself is the cause of 
his drunkenness. 

Indirectly a man is the cause of his 
own ignorance, when he neglects to do 
that which he ought to do. When he 
neglects to make himself acquainted 
with the plain laws of his country. 
Or when in youth he neglects to cul- 
tivate those habits and capacities which 
are to fit him for the state of manhood. 
That such ignorance is culpable and 
consequently voluntary is clear, from 
men being punished for it. 

13. InrxSJ Such was the law of 
Pittacus. Of which see Pol. ii. 12. 
Rhet. ii. 25. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 5. 



105 



en-iTifiia' tj yap apyr) 4v avrcp' tcvpios yap tov the igno- 

y a a* ~ a* v ** » / \ ranee be 

fir/ pLevva-V-qvai) tovto o avriov tt\$ ayvoias. /catseif-caused, 
T0V9 ayvoovvras ri ra>u cv rots vofioi?, a ocipaobhed. 
kiriaraa'daL Kal prj ^aXeira eon, KoXafyvaiv. 
bbfiouDs 8e kcu iv tow aXXois, oca St afieXetav 
aypoeiv So/covcrtf, ©y enr avrois ov to /jltj ayvotiv* 

TOV yap €7n/JL€\7}0rjvai KVpiOl. 'AAA' lam And even 

~ / » * \ » \ /i~ »\x* ~iffromna- 

TOIOVT09 eOTIV CDOT6 pXf €7ri/J.€Ar)V7]Pai. OAAa TOU tural cere- 

/ f /% > \ y >»~ » / lessneesaod 

toiovtovs yeueaucu avroi atnot Qmrr€$ aj/cifteiw?, neglect 
10 Kal tov olSikov? r) OKoXaerrovs elvcu, oi /icvqmnbld 

« 5,\ » / \« / habits, 

KOKOVpyOVPT€9, 01 0€ €V 7TOTOL9 Kai TOlf TOlOVTOlf those ha- 

Sidyovres' cu yap 7T€/h e/caora evepyeuu toiovto w luntary. ? ° 
iroiovaiv. tovto 8e SrjXov 4k t&v p.eXeT<ovTG>p wpbs 
tjvtlvovv dycoviav r/ itpa^iv' StaTeXovo-i yap evep- 
Ibyovvres. to p&v odv dyvoelv oti 4k tov ivepyeiv 
irepl eKourra al €$;€L9 yivovrai^ KOfuSrj dpacaOr/TOV. 
En & aXoyov tov aSucovvra fnj fiovXecrOou ct&icoj' Nay more, 

if men have 



7. £xx'fr«;] Aristotle now examines 
into the origin of the objections against 
the spontaneity of evil, dividing them 
into two heads. Those which are 
drawn from a consideration of the dis- 
position of the agent, by which he is 
inclined to evil contrary to his will, 
and those from a consideration of a 
defective apprehension ($arr*tt*.) 

8. ph WipiXninuu] One objects, 
and says that some men are naturally 
careless, that their vices are to be 
ascribed to nature rather than them- 
selves, and that having unwillingly 
acquired a confirmed bad habit, they 
can no longer help acting in con- 
formity to that habit. To which Aris- 
totle replies ; they are themselves the 
authors of- that habit, willingly per- 



forming the single acts which led to it, 
and are therefore voluntary agents, 
even although their conduct may now 
occasion them pain. 

If a person should further object, 
that he did not know that performing 
the single acts would lead to a habit, 
Aristotle says this is incredible. For 
all men are born with a certain degree 
both of virtue and prudence. (See 
Introduction, p. 83.) 

17. In J* Axeyr] Aristotle meets a 
second objection. If it be in our 
power, says the objector, to become 
vicious, it would also be in our power, 
when we pleased to cease being 
vicious : but this is by no means the 
case ; for many after living in a state 
of vice, have become so habituated to 



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106 



ARISTOTELIS 



acquired a 
confirmed 
bad habit 
for which 
they are 
sorry, that 
habit it 
voluntary. 



So also for 
bodily 



eipai 7) top aKoXaoTcupovra axoXaorrov. el 8e pjj 
aypo&p Tis irpdrrei i£ <op tarai aSctco?, £kg>v 
aSucos ap €irf 9 ov ftr/p tap ye fiov\r/T0U 9 aSucos &p 
iravaercu koi earou Sikcuos' ovSe yap 6 pocrcbv 
vytrjs. kcu el ovtq>9 erv\ep 9 £ko>p iotci, (heparan & 
fiioTtvow kou aireiO&p toi? larpols. rore pkp ohv 
iljrjp avrcp /jlt) po<T€lp 9 ?rpo€fi€P(p & ovk€tl, axrTrzp 
ovS a(f>€Prt Xidop er avrop Svparop apaXafietp' 
aAA* ofJLCOf eV avr<p rb fiaXelp kcu pfyat rj yap 
ap\7] hf avrcp. ovtod 8e kcu tg> dSUcp kou railO 
aKoXdorrcp £{• dpxv? P** *%*l v toiovtois p.rj yepe- 
aOoUy &o €kopt€S eiaip' yepo/iepois & ovKen ei^eori 
fxrj elpai. Ov fiopop & at rrjs tyvyrjs kokUu 



it, that they can no longer desist from 
it; many have lived so long in a 
course of intemperance, that intem- 
perance has become necessary to their 
very existence ; and though they fer- 
vently desire it, they cannot return to 
temperance. Aristotle says, such men 
performed the single acts, which led to 
this confirmed bad habit, spontane- 
ously, and they know that these single 
acts would lead to such a habit ; it is 
absurd therefore to suppose, that a 
man who has done every thing volun* 
tarily and knew that such effects must 
follow from such a cause, to say that 
wishing for the cause he did not wish 
for the effect. For though it may be 
that he did not wish the effect of his ill 
actions to follow, absolutely and in it- 
self, yet he wished that the effect should 
be, rather than that the cause should 
not be. But that this man cannot 
correct the vicious habits he has con- 
tracted, that is, cannot make undone the 
single acts which led to these habits, 
though he is desirous of so doing, 



proves not he is an involuntary agent. 
As when a man has it in his power to 
fling or forbear flinging a stone, if he 
flings it, he acts voluntarily, however 
anxious he may be when it is out of 
his hand to have recalled the act. So 
though the recalling of it is no longer 
in his own power, the act is volun- 
tary, and was so at the time of his 
doing it. See p. 35, 15. 

13. ov fUf*f] This is a tacit reply 
to Socrates, who, wishing to show 
that a man's moral deformities were 
contrary to his inclination, instanced, 
as a parallel, bodily diseases and 
deformities. " Now no one," said 
Socrates, " blames a man for these, 
thereby acknowledging that they are 
involuntary." Be it so, says Aris- 
totle, but then we do blame men 
even for bodily deformities, where they 
have themselves been the causes of them. 
And our making this distinction, and 
blaming them only for those of which 
they themselves are the cause, is a 
proof that these actions, for which we 



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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 5. 



107 



€KOvaiol eiatUy aXX' eviot? kou at rov (Tco/jlclto?, deformities, 

* v> ~. ~ ' \ ^ * ^ jl ' where they 

Otff KOU e7TLTlfta>ft€V TOl? fJL€V yap Ola (pVO-lV are self-in- 

» ~ »* \ > ~ ~ *\ *» * / dieted, we 

ai(TXpOl9 0V0€L9 €7TLTl/ia, TOIS 0€ 01 ayv flVOUT tap blame men. 

/cat afieXeiav. bfiolxos 8e kou irepl axrdeveiav kou 
bTrr/pGHTip' ov0€i9 yap av 6v€i8l<t€L€ rv(j)\<p (j>v<r€t 
7) €K voaov 7] c#c ir\rjyrj9 y aAAa fidXXov eXerjaou' 
rip & e£ oivocfrXvyia? f) aXXrjs aKoXaaias was 
av i7nn/irjaou. t£>v Stj irepl to arG>pja KOKitov cu 

€<f> TjfUV emTipXOVTOU, CU &€ flT/ 4(f) TjfJUU OV. €L 

10 5* ovtg), kou eirl twv aXXcov at imTL/juofMevcu t&v 

KaKuov i(f> 9 rjfilv av dev. E* 8e tis Xeyot OTl And even 

if men are 



blame mankind, are voluntary ; since, 
therefore, we blame them for vicious 
habits, such habits are voluntary. A 
similar argument on the same subject 
is urged by the sophist Protagoras. 
%9* yk{> hyevvreu aXkfatvs ttaxa ^X ut 
MfMWt <po*u fj rv%y *fo**t iufuuras 
o&l tcviiru 9$i\ J#J«#»w »v%\ jwX«£i/ 
whs rtcura t%9fT#s, %* jtth ruwrm 
Jfntt &X)C \Xi9V0tr §7§* T6vs *te%{*vs n 
ffUKftot 3 kdvnit rU ovrtt uvinros 
Sevt rt wvratt Wt%uptt vrtiu* ; ?r« ft 
V£ \*t(A*>.u*t x«) mr*fou*s *«) 2')«;g«f 
*"nrm yiytirimt mymim iai^»Mtt$ t lit 
rtg raura ph l%n, aXkot raictvria rev- 
ran **»«, W) Ttvrotf *ov el rs 4vpu>) 
yiyt§fvm x«A ml tuXfout »«) tu fut$- 
<rn*us. Plato's Protag. p. 323. 

11. u Y% r«] This was the principal 
objection of the day, which Aristotle 
now proceeds to refute. The objection 
may be thus stated : 

To pursue Good, we must first de- 
sire it, but to desire it we must first 
apprehend it But that apprehension 
is not in our own power, but is a 
natural faculty, a species of mental 
vision, over which we have no control, 
and which we receive from nature as 



any other sense or outward faculty. 
Since every one therefore follows what 
he apprehends to be good, and cannot 
alter his apprehension, he who mis- 
takes good for evil, as does the wicked 
man, and acts according to that ap- 
prehension, is not blameable, but his 
errors are to be referred to nature or 
necessity. Consequently Vice is in- 
voluntary. 

1. To this objection AriBtotle re* 
plies, that we have power to regulate 
this apprehension. For since our ap- 
prehension of good and evil is regu- 
lated by our habits, and our habits 
are in our own power, consequently so 
is our apprehension (p«»«w<«.) See 
p. 101, 15. 

2. But if it be not so, if we have 
no power over our apprehension of the 
end, but it is fixed by nature un- 
changeably in every one, if it be the 
case with the bad man it is also the 
case with the good man ; and then 
Virtue is in no respect more voluntary 
than Vice, which is contrary to the 
objector's own acknowledgment. 

Or if, notwithstanding such a theory, 
good men are voluntary agents because 



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108 



ARISTOTELIS 



D * m ? l * m irdvres €<f>Uvrou rod (fxuvofiwov ayaOov, rrJ9 8c 
gtoation, (fxiirracriar ov Kvpioi, aXX 9 orroto? itoff 6JCO0TO? 

■till Tolon- £oTl, TOIOVTO KOU TO T*Xo$ (f>aiU€T0U OUT$' €1 fX€V 

ohv cicooros 1 £avrq> rrjs i£ew iari way? curios, 
kou rrj9 <f>aPTCuria9 eorou 7ra>9 avrb? curios, el 8e& 
firjy ov0€t9 awry curios tov kokol iroieiv, dXXa 81 
ayvoiav tov TiXovs raOra 7rpaTT€i 9 8ia tovtcdv 
oio/xevor ai)Tcp to apiarov ea€cr0ou 9 17 8e tov 
tcXovs fytcri? ovk avOaipeTW, aXXa (pvvcu Sec 
axnrep o\jnu €\oirra, j) Kpiuei koXco? kou to /car 10 
akrjOeiav ayaffbv alprjo-tTCU, kou tariv ev(f)VT}?, a> 

TOVTO KClXcOf 7T€(f)VK€V' (jO yap fJL€yiOTOV KCU 

koXAiotov, kou Trap frepov firj olou T€ \af3ecv 

fJL7)8e fJLO0€lV 9 aXX' OlOV €<f>V, TOIOVTOV €^€l 9 KOI 
TO ed KOI TO KOtXcDS TOVTO 7T€(f>VK€V0U 7j TeXeiOLlb 



they put in practice the means, that is, 
the single acts leading to this natural 
end, ($*rt*h rl\f), so also, notwith- 
standing such a theory, vicious men 
are voluntary agents. So that whe- 
ther we have power over this appre- 
hension, or whether we have not, we 
are nevertheless voluntary agents. 
Virtue and Vice is voluntary and in 
our own power. 

Such is the reasoning of this some- 
what intricate passage, in which Aris- 
totle has not at all entered into an exa- 
mination of the nature of f «»r«W«, as 
he has done in his Treatise de Anima 
iii. 3. And this is somewhat remark- 
able, for, as Aquinas observes, there 
may be two kinds of apprehension 
(f«fr«#**)> One which is purely 
speculative, which does not depend 
upon any particular disposition, which 
neither regulates nor is regulated by 
the conduct ; and one which is prac- 



tical, of which Aristotle here speaks, 
depending upon the habits or the tem- 
per of the moment; bo that this also 
is of two kinds. For an object may. 
appear good not absolutely, but at this 
or that particular time, or in this and 
that frame of mind, since the desire is 
influenced as well by the accidental 
temper of mind as by the habit Ac- 
cording to the former is the appre- 
hension of an object being good which 
is only accidentally good ; as to men 
who are in fear of shipwreck, the 
casting of their goods overboard ap- 
pears to be good. But the appre- 
hension of that which is really and 
absolutely good, is to be derived only 
from the cultivation of virtuous habits. 
5. t# ft f*n •Mi) But if not, and 
if no one, fitc. * ft roS cix*i* tyiw* 
and if the aiming at the end, &c. The 
apodosis is at il \n rrnvr W<n» «. r. A. 
p. 109, 1. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 5. 109 

kou aXrfdLvrj dv eirj ctxfrvta'^) el 8r/ ravr eorlp 
aXr/Or}, ri fiaXXop rj dperr) tt}s Kaxias earou €/coi/- 
aiop ; dpxf>olp yap 6/xotW, rtp ayadcp kou rep 

KOKtp, TO TeXo? <f)V<T€t T) OTraHrfil/TTOTC <f>aiP€TOU KOU 

&k€ltcu, ra he Xonrd wpos tout 9 dpcufrepopre? irpdr- 

TOVO-IV 07TGHr8^7rOT€. €*T€ 8t) TO TeXof fir) <f)V<T€l 

cVcaoTG) (fxtLverai olop8fj7rore f dXXa n kou Trap* 
aurop icrrtp, elre to fiep TeXos (frvaucov, ry 8e 
tcl Xotwd wpdrrecp €kov<tioo? top crrrovSatop i) 
lOapeTT) €KOV<nou ecrnp, ouOep fyrrop kou rj Kaxia 
€KOvaiop ap ehf' o/jlouo? yap zeal r£ jca*^> vnapyei 
to 8t avrbp ip tolls Trpdijeai kou el firj ep t^> TeXei. 
el odp, coowep XeyeTou, eKOvcnoi elcrtp aX dperai 
(jcou yap t£>p e(~e(op ovpatTioi 7ra>? auroi e<rfiep 9 

I5icat r<p TToioi Tipes elpau TOTeXos toiopSc Ti0efie0a) 9 
kou at KaKiai £kov<tlol dp elep' bfiolxo? yap. 

8 Kotprj ftep oSp irepl t£>p dpercop eipryrai rjfup Brief reci- 

/ f / ff t / , \ « pitulttioo 

TO T€ y€P09 TV7T<p, OTl ft€O-0TrjT€S €L<TLV, Kat OTl of the tub- 

egeis, vq> odp t€ yvpoprai, Kat art tovtodp irpax- 

2QTIKCU KO0 OUTaS, KOU OTL €(j> fJ/UP KOU iKOVCTLOl, 

Kat ovto>9 a>? ap 6 opOos Xoyo? irpoord^Tj. OiJxThatactioni 
oftoUo? 8e at Trpd^ets eKOvcnoi eicri Kat at e£eis 



are more in 
our own 



14.#vMwr/«] Joint author t. By which not as vice, ««/ mvrnt. 

expression he seems to acknowledge 21. ol>x if**'*< ml *£<t*Sif] Actions 

that nature and chance (for instance, which result from habit are no longer 

being born of good parents) may ha?e equally in our power, as they were 

some influence in forming our habits. previous to the formation of the habit, 

20. *«/ etvrae] Per se: by reason but approach rather to the nature of 

of their essence, not accidentally. For the involuntary and natural, for cus- 

not only may a good habit be acci- torn is second nature. The habit from 

dentally the cause of good actions which they spring is beyond our con- 

which do not spring from itself as trol, nor however desirous, can we be 

such, but vice also may accidentally rid of it otherwise than indirectly : as 

be the cause of good actions though it was formed by degrees so must it be 



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no 



ARISTOTELIS 



power than T&V pkv yap TTpO^€<OV WIT OpX?}* ^XP 1 ro *> T&OVS 
the habits. / t » • » / \ j* <t ~ * s. 

KVpiOt CO-fUVy €lOOT€9 TO. KOff €KCUTTa 9 T<0V € £;€<*) V 

&€ rfjs <*PXV?i Ka & €Kacrra fie r) irpoaOeats ov 
ywoptfiofy G)<r7rcp eirl t<ov appaxmxbv' oAA* ori 

4<f> Tjplv 7)V OVTW V fJLTj OVTQ} Xprjo m OO'0QU 9 8ia TOVTOb 
€KOV<riOl. 



CHAP. VI. 

Application of the definition to several particulars. 

FEAR— COURAGE— FOOLHARDINES8. 

pain. ANAAABONTE2 &) wtpl cxocrnp, €*W/4€*9 

defined. riv€S eiai KOU 7T€pl TTola KOU TT&S' OL/ia 8 9 €OTGU 

SrjXop teal Troaai elo-lv. kou irptorov irep\ av8peia$. 
on ft€v o$v fiecroTrjs earl 7rep\ (j)of3ov? koI Oappr), 10 



corrected. And thus it is that the 
4{;pt only of habits, that is the single 
acts which lead to their formation and 
not the entire habits themselves, are in 
our power. This argument appears to 
have been intended against the Plato- 
nists, though I do not remember to 
' have seen it explicitly stated in any 
of Plato's dialogues. Plotinus how- 
ever has endeavoured to show that, 
while the habits of bad men are invo- 
luntary, single acts are however volun- 
tary. De Providentia, ii. 10. 

Chap. VI. 
Upon the first perusal of the 
Ethics the reader should omit what 
follows of this Book, together with the 
fourth and fifth, proceeding imme- 
diately to the sixth. Afterwards read- 
ing the omitted books in connexion, 
having first read the sixth chapter of 



the second Book. Generally upon 
this and the succeeding chapters the 
reader will do well to consult the 
second Book of Aristotle's Rhetoric, 
and the Characters of Theophrastus. 

9. ff'gftw* *tf} kvhpmt'] Non ut 
vult Eustratius, ideo a fortitudine in- 
cipit, quod sit longe difficillima et 
praestantissima omnium virtutum sed 
quia mirabili judicio Aristoteles virtutes, 
quippe cum sint appetites ad rationem 
directi, eo ordine persequitur quo in 
hominis natura a vitioribus ad excel- 
lentiora progrediente appetitus unus ex 
altera pendet ; ita ut potius a virtuti- 
bus, minus praestantibus, t. e. for- 
titudine et temperantia circa dolores 
et voluptates versantibus, profectus, 
postremo ad prestantissimam nempe 
sapientiam libra vi. perveniat quae in 
summo cognoscendi appetitu posita est. 
MICH. 



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fcTHICORUM LIB. III. 6. Ill 

rfStf koI wporepou upqrcu, (f>opovfi€0a 5e SrjXovori pain. 
tol (pofiepd, ravra & iarlv ' <w anrXw threw 
KaKcC 8th Kal top (f)6$ov opi^ovrcu TrpoahoKiav 
kokov. QopovficOa pkv odv irdvra ra /ca/ca, ju object- 

holov d8o£lav irtviav voaov dijxXiav davarov, aAA* a^ished" 

> \ ' ft ~ « » ft ~ * . v \ *na defined. 

ov 7T€pi iravra dotcei o avopeios ewcu euia yap), what 

KCU Set (ftofieiO-OoU Kal KoXoU, TO 8e /XTf alayjpOV^ properly its 
* ** /•' • « x x jl o ' » * obiecUmtt- 

otoi/ aoo£taj/ o ft€i> ya/> (popovfievos einuicqsu}. 
kcu aiSrjfJucop, 6 8e prf <f>o/3ovpL€vo? avaiayvvros. 

10 Xiyerai & wro rtwov dvSpetos Kara p.€Ta(f)opdv' 
exec yap rt opuoiov rip av8pelxp' axj>o{So$ yap ns 
kcu 6 dvSpeios. 7T€viav 8 laws ov Set (ftofielaOcu 
ov8e voaoV) ovS 0X009 oca firj diro Kcudas fiTjSe 
81 avrov. aXX' ovS 6 irepl ravra a(f>of3o? dvSpelo?. 

XbXeyop&v 81 kcu rovrov Kajff ofjLOioTr/ra' evtot yap 

kv TOL9 7T0X€/JLLK0t9 Ktv8vV0t$ SeiXol OVT€? cAct/- 

depiOL curt Kal 7rpos yjn)pjdr<ov dirofioXriv evOap- 

a<os txovcriv. ovSe 8r/ et ns vfipiv irepl iral8a$ 

kcu yvvcuKa (pofielrai 7 (j)6ovov rf tl rS>v roiovrcw, 

20 8eiXo9 kanv* ov8 % ct dappei /leXXcou fiaariyovaOat, 

avSpelo?. Ylepl irova oiv rS>v <f>ofiep(ov 6 dvSpelo? ; 2. What 
rj wept ra fitycara; ovueis yap viropLtveriK&rtpos 
t&v 8eiva>v. (fropepatrarov 8* 6 ddvaros* irepas 
yap, Kal ovSev eri rip re0P€&ri 8ok€i ovt dyadov 



1. cfjfigw] See ii. 6. quoddara circa quod versatur. Pro- 

3. «gi£«frai] Plato in Protagora, cediraus enim in cognitione nostra ex 
p. 358. *£cff&oxt*f ma Xty» x*x«Z objectis ad actri9, et ab actibus ad 
rwr», tin (p'o^tt tfn 1i»e zetXtTn potentias, et a potentiis ad essentias; 
Laches, p. 198. MICH. a notioribus ad ea qua nobis sunt 

4. rtttra rb xttxd] See the Rhet. minus nota. Acciaj. 

ii. 5. Tractat autem in prima de ob- 23. li^mt yi(\ «• Mors ultima linea 

jecto fortitudinis materiaque ejusdem. «• rerum." Hor. 
Omnia enim habitus habet objectum 



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lit 



ARISTOTELIS 



PAIN. OVT€ KOKOV €lVOl. 86^€l€ 8 <W 0\)8\ 7T6/M OdvOTOV 

tov kv wavri 6 dvSpeio? etvcu, olov ei kv OaXdrrri 
rj kv vo<roi9. kv tio'iv oiv ; rj kv rot9 KaXkloTots ; 
toiovtoi 8c oi kv iroXkfup' kv fteyiortp yap koll 
koXXlotco KivSvixp. 6/wXoyoi 8c tovtois cicrl /cat 6 
at Tifuu at kv Tais woXeai koll irapa toIs fiovdp- 
X<w. tcvplcos 8ij XkyoiT av avSpeio? 6 wept tov 
koXov Odvarov obeys, kcu oca Odvarov km^kpet 
wroyvta ovra* roiadra 8e fuxXiara to Kara 7roX6- 
fwv. ov ixrjv dXXa kcu kv OaXdrrri /cat kv voaoisio 
aSerj? 6 avSpeio?, ov\ ovtg> 8* ©y oi OaXdmoi* 
oi fiev yap aTT*yv<OKaxri rqv o'omjpiav /cat tov 
Odvarov tov toiovtov Svaxepalvovo-iv, oi 8e evkX- 
Tn&ks elai irapa rrjv k/iiretpiav. a/ia fie /cat dvSpl- 
{fivrat kv oly kariv oXkt) rj koXov to diroOavetv' 15 
kv reus roiavrcu? 8e <f)0opous ovOercpov indpyti. 

To 8* (pofiepov ov iraxn p&v to avro, Xkyo/icvlO 

$€ Tl KOU V7T€p avOpODTTOV. TOVTO fl€V odv TTaVTL 

<f)o(3€pbv Tip y€ vovv e\ovTty to 8e /car avOpamov 
8ia(f)kp€i fieykOei koi T(p fiaXXov kcu r)rrov' o/aoudszo 
8e #eat to OappaXea. 6 8e dvSpelos oW/cttA^/ctw 



Courage 
and its 
extremes 
compared. 



9. Myvtm. ftr«] <rX«rM» ci Qeuu- 
fiitm **} fin «*«(£*. Eud. Eth. iii. 1. 
Compare the Rhet. ii. 5. *h ykf *&.*** 
rk *«zk Q»(Z*vtT*i, •*•» i) term k%*t % 
fy*)v(, AXX 9 7r« kum-Mt pty&kmt ft 
Qh{k{ ivrmrm, xm) rmW U> pk witf* 
kXXu rvttyyvf Qminreu Zrrt ftiXXut. 
rk yk{ W{{* rf d{« §b f •/bwvw. 

16. *v4irtf0f] A most unusual ortho- 
graphy, in which Bekker is by no 
means consistent, sometimes writing 
Mi and tUif, sometimes (into or 
pnlii. Goettling thinks that this form 
was not introduced till after the battle of 



Leuctra. See his note on Arist. Polit 
i. 1. p. 278. The same writer has ap- 
pended the following note upon this 
subject to Trendelenburg's edition of 
Arist. de Anima, p. 202. } in 4 mu- 
tatum esse in $vAt et •liiripf non . 
videtur ; potius a Boeotis ^olensibus, 
quorum Mf fuisse proprium dicitur 
(V. Eustat. p. 1814.) pro spiritu 
aspero 4 ascitum esse ut in 4*fi* et 
if**, in 4*X**nt et £x< atque hoc 
post pugnam Leuctricam ad reliquos 
etiam transiisse Graecos, ut multa alia, 
ad fidem propius esse videtur. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 6. US 

w avBpanros. (frofir/creTcu pev oiv kou tol roiavra, pain. 

« ^ » ^^ \ce N / t ~ ~ x ^Courage. 

o>r oei Se teat av o Aoyos viropuevet, rov kolaov 
eveKa' rovro yap reXos ttjs apeTTjs. eart Se 
fjLaXXov kou fjrrov TavTa (fofieicrOai, teal en tol 
5 /lit) <f>ofiepa o>9 TOtavra <f>o/3eio'0cu. yiverou Se raw 
afjuoLpTtxov 77 piv art ov Set, 17 Se oti ov\ w Set, 
7j Se on ovx Sr^, rj n raw toiovtodv* bpjouos Se 
teal rrep\ tol OappaXea. 6 pJev oiv a Set kou ov 

€1>€K(L V7TOp.€V(OV KOU <f)0/3ovp€V09, KOU ©? 8*1 KOU 

10 are, ofiolcos Se kou 0app&v, avSpelo? /car d£tav 
yap, kou a>9 av 6 \oyos 9 iraxryei kou irparret 6 
dvSpeio?. t£\os Se iroLarqs evepyeta? earl to Kara 
rr)v *(*iv* kou Tcp avSpeico Se if avSpeia kolKov. 
toiovtov St/ kou to tcXos' 6pi(erai yap eKaarov 

]5ra> Tekei. koXov St/ eveKa 6 avSpeto? xnropAvei 
Kol irpaTret tol Kara ttjv avSpeiav. T(3v 5* irrrep- The ex- 

/ «\ *• » i rkt » / f * tremescon- 

paXXovrcov o p.ev tq acpopta awovvpios (^i/wyraisidered. 

ft Tjplv ev tois irpmepov ort 7roAAa eariv olvg^ 

wpxi), eirj 5* av ny pjawvpuevos r/ avaXyrjTOS, 
20 el ptjOev <f>ofioLTO, p.r)Te aeiapjov prjTe tol Kvpara, 

KaBairep (pcuri tovs KcAroifc. 'O Se T<p Oappeivx. The Fool. 

v7repfiaXX(ov wept to, <f>ofSepa Opaavs. SoKel Se 
* kou aXatjcov etvou 6 Opacrvs kou wpoarroiriTiKos 

avSpeia?. a>s odv eKeivo? irep\ tol <f>o{Jepa e\eh 
2&0VTCDS oSros fiovXeTcu fyaivecrOaC ev oh odv 



12. riXit V*] If the habit be action also appears from ihe end to be 

honourable the end must also be either honourable or disgraceful. But 

honourable. For every energy pro- courage is honourable, therefore the 

duced by a virtuous habit is for the end of courage, for which sake courage 

sake of virtue. The brave man will is exercised, is also honourable, 
therefore do and endure, as a brave 18. «•{*«{•»] See p. 71, 14. 

man, and for the sake of virtue. Each 



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114 ARISTOTELIS 

pain. SvuarcUy fiifieiTCu. 8 to Kal €tcrlv oi woXXol aVTtoV 
OpaovSttXoC iv tovtois yap Opcurwofievot to. 

2. The fear. 0O#€/)a OV\ V7TOfl€VOV<rtV. 'O $€ T^ (fro/BclcrOcU 

V7T€pf5a\AcDi> SciXos* kcu yap a fir) Set Kal w ov 
Set, teat iravra tol rotavra oucoXovOeZ avr<p. £X\€t-6 
TT€t 8* teal Tip Oappuv* aAA* iv tcu? Xuircu? virtp- 
fiaXXcov fxaXXov Kara<f>ainj? eortv. 8v<r€\7Ti? 8rj 
rts 6 Seiko? iravra yap <f>ofi€tTai. 6 & avSpeios 
And com- kvavricos* to yap Qapptiv €V€\7ri8o?. He pi Tavra 

pared with ^ i * \ * * x \ \ « /i * * e , A 

the mean. flW OVV €OTtV O T€ 0€tA09 Kat O VpOXTVS KCU 10 

avSpelos, 8ta<f>6pG)? & e^ovat irpo? avrd' oi fiev 
yap wrepfiaXXovo't Kal iKXehrova-tPy 6 8c fJL€<rcos 
€\€t Kal cos Set' Kal oi fiev Opaaeis 7r/)07T6re?r, 
Kal /3ov\o/jl€vol irpo t£>v klvSvvgdv ev avroi? tf 
a<j>ioTavrcu, oi & avSpeiot h> toIs epyot? o^efr, 15 
irpoTepov 8 rjav\tot. 
Recapitu- . Ka0a7T€p o$v eipryrat^ tj avSpela fieforrfs earl 1 1 

lationofthe s n , \ «/>/»* y v 

subject, and 7T6pi VappaAea Kat (pope pa, ev oir eipr/Tai, Kat 

the distinc- „ x ,„ x , , Aflf v 

tion of cou- ort KoAov atpevrat Kat V7rofi€V€t, 7) oTt attrypov 
five impro- to fir), to o diroOirqcrKetv (bevyoPTa ireviav w20 

per kinds v * N \ 9 , ~ , , % 

of it. eparra rj Tt Avrrrjpov ovk avopuov, aXXa /jlSXXop 
SetXov' /xaXaKia yap to <f>€vyetp to. hrhrova, kcu 

OU\ OTt KOXOP V7TOfl€P€t 9 dXXd <p€Vy(Dl> KOKOP. 
1. Political. tCTTt fl€P olp 7] dv8p€ta TOtOVTOP Tt. Aeyovrcu 



10. iuKit] Cf. Theophrasti Cha- MICH, 

racteres, xxv. «^2 |„x/« f . Descri' 16. r^rtpt * Mxm] Compare 

buntar enim ab Aristotelis discipulo, Polonius' advice to Laertes, 

hoc ipsum magistri optis nimirum re- Beware 

spiciente, singuli naturales appetitus, Of entrance to a quarrel: but, 

quemadmodum toto animo potiti et ad being in, 

extremum provecti vitiosam singu- Bear it, that the opposer may beware 

lorum hommum mdolem perficiunt. of thee. Hamlet, i. 3. 

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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 6. 115 

$€ KCU €T€OOU KOTO. 7T€VT€ TDOTTOVS* 7T0&rOV- tllv 7) PAIN. 
^ '. '* * v . * ~ x c 'Couragt. 

TroAiriKi) fJuxAioTa yap eouccv ookovctl yap V7ro- 

1±€V€IV TOVS Ktv8vVOV$ OL IToXlTai 8lOL TO 6IC 7W 
VOfJU&V €7TLTLfUa Kal TO. QV€l8t) Kal Sta TCL9 TlfJUOLS. 

hKcu 8ia tovto avSpeioraToi Sokovcip tlvou Trap 
ots ol SeiXoi arifwt teal ol avSpcioi tvripjoi. toiov- 
rov9 8e Kal "Qpuqpos ttoicl, olov top Ato/"7&7" 

KOI TOP EtKTOpa. 

IIouAuoa/uwtf /Etoi 7rgwT0$ iXsy^sltjv avatfia-tr 

10 kcu AiOfirjST)?, 

*ExTcog yag vore $ipu M TpeJsoV ayogevaw, 

atfiouarat tf avrq paXiara rrj irporepov eipr)p.€vr), 
on 81' aperrjv yiverat* 8c aiSco yap Kal 8ta 

IS koXov ope^tv (rifirjf yap) kcu (fairyr/v ovclSovv, 
alarypov ovtos. t<l£cu tf av rt? kcu tow viro 
twv ap\oura)v apayKaffifievovs el? rauro' yeipovs 
8 j o<ra> ov 8i aiSai aXXa Sea (j)ofiov avro Spcocrtj 
Kal <j>cvyovT€s ov to cuaypov aXXa to Xvirrjpov' 

20 avayKafyvai yap ol Kvpioi, coenrep 6 Ejctg>/) 

ov 8e x' eydv airiveuti \L&.yy$ TFTaxrcovra vo^<ra>, 
ou ol igxiov eco-elrsu Qvy&ew xvmg* 

Kal ol 7rpoaTaTTOVT€9 9 Kav avaycopSHTi Tirrrrovre? 

2. *§Xtrt*t] Such particularly was Polit, iii. 14. Hector tamea simillima 

the courage of the Romans. profert Iliad, xv. 348 — 351. Nee 

7.*Op*{«r] See Iliad xirii. 100. and mirum, quod in utroque loco Aristo- 

viit. 148. sq. telis hi versus paulo aliter scribantur, 

W."E*r*{] Agamemnon hos versus quam nunc apud Homerum legimus, 

(Iliad, ii. 391 et 393.) pronuntiat, ut com memoriter eos philosophus audi- 

est etiam apud ipsum Aristotelem, toribus haud dubie recitaverit. MICH. 



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116 ARISTOTELIS 

PAIN. TO aVTO SpGHTL, KOI ol 7TpO T&V TOifrfKOV KOU T&V 

Courage. , , / \ » / 

toiovt&v irapararrovr^s iravrts yap avayica- 
{ftvcriv. Set & ov St avayKqv avSptiov *tvax y 

^^P** oXX* OTl KoXoU. A0K€l St KOU If €fJL7T€tpla 1) 

wept ckootol avSpeia rt9 elvat* oOev teal 65 
^coKparr/s cpr/07f iirtoTTjfiTjv elvat tt\v avSpstav. 
Totovroi Se aXXot p&v kv aXXot?, Iv rots ttoAc/u- 
koZs & ol OTpaTt&rai* Sotcet yap ttvai 7roXAcL 
Keva tov iroX4fiov 3 a fmXiora ovvtcopaKaaiv oSrot' 
(fxitvoirrcu Sij dvSpelot, on ovk taaxrtv ol aAAotto 
ota ioriv. etra irovq<rat Kal fir/ ira&siv fiaXtara 
Svvavrai i§c tt}$ ipnr*tpia$ y Svvap&vot xprja-Oai 
rots ottXois kou TOtavra expires bnrola av €t7j Kal 
wpos to irotrjo'ou Kal 7rpos to firj iraBeiv KpaTtcrra* 
axrirep oiv avoirXots amXto-filvoi fJLa\ovrat koI\^ 
aOXrjTat IStcoTOus* Kal yap Iv TOt? TOiovTOt? ay£>- 
crw ov\ oi avSpetoraTOt pjaytpjdyraToi eicrtVy aAA' 
oi pjaXiOTa ioyyovTes Kal to. aayfjuara aptcrra 
e^oine?. ol crTpaTt&Tat Se SetXol yivovTat, otom 
xmepTeivQ 6 kivSvvos kolL XecircovTat tois irX-j/jdea-t^Q 
Kal Tats irapaaKevcus* irp£>TOt yap (j>€vyovo-i, ra 
fie iroXiTtKa p.evovra a7rodin/(TK€t, owep Kawl r^ 
'Ep/xa/o) avvefirj. tois p*v yap atoypov to (f>€vyetv 



6. £«*£<Sr«r] See the Laches, t«vry 'OtipM^xt i <t»«»svr wpldutat 

p. 195, and the Protagoras, p. 360. «vr«, avro) pir fititnms «a > tS«»«f vW 

22. raf 'E{f*,at»] *E{fuu*t It K#{«- rSt apty) rbt 'On'ftet{%et, ««*«xXiira?rif 

niet vnt Botvrictf rowot 0vr*f Xtyi- r*t wvXmt lim. avrttf /*&% (ZeoXtftitMf 

putt »'*! wilivbt It awry r£t &\X*n l%iiy Qoyitt xa* x*raXt*ttt v^t varfil*. 

awfta>Mf Strut. It $ wa^nrirotyfiivat ol St rSt B«wr£v fanMrmtrtf avr*7$ 

wor\ K»{»tt7s avt reTs fantfoa&it avroTg fr^etriSrat Ix rev fctrk r«4%ou tyvy§t 

*T{*TU*TMSt tX TCU /KIT* T0l^0l/ ftirk llivf IV &{XV T ** P^X** * tUffipltU 

rSt Btu*Ta{%£t, »r% rht vfait xar- tta rthatett r£t Bcmrtt^^St Xmptm. 

i\*fiov, xai <rttt ax{6wXjv iJ%n vtf Schol. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 6. 117 

kcll 6 Oavaros rrjs roiavrqs crarnqplm alptTcortpo?' pain. 

«js\ \*>* **»»>/ * / v Courage. 

01 0€ KOLL 6£ apxrjS €KlVOVV€VOV GV Kp€lTT0V9 OPT€S, 

yvovres S* <f>€iryovcri, tov OdvaTOv pJaKkov tov 
aiaxpov <f>o/3ovfi€voi' 6 & avSpelos ov rotovrof. 

6 Kal TOV OvfJLOV 8 €7r2 TTfV dvSpelaV €7Tl<l>€pOV(nv' 3. Aoger. 

dvSpetot yap etvat Sokovcti Kal ol Sta Ovfibv axnrcp 
ra (h)pla erri tov? TpaKravra? <f>epopuevot 9 on teat 
ol dvSpetot OvfioetSet? IrrjTtKcoTaTov yap 6 0v/jlos 

7Tp09 TOW KtvSvVOVSy O0€V KCU O/JL7]p0? " <jQ£vO$ 

10 efiQaXe 0vfJL$" kcu " fievo? kcu dvfwv eyetpe" Kal 

opi/JLV ava ptva? jievos kcu eQecrev at/ia 

Travra yap ra roiavra eotKe arrjfjutivetv ttjv tov 

Ov/jlov eyepatv Kal opfir/v. ol fiev ovv dvSpetot 

Sta to koXov irpaTTOva-LVj 6 Se dvphs avvepyet 

lbavrots' to. Orjpla Se Sta XvTrrjv' Sta yap to 
TrXrjyijvat rj (j>of5el<r6cu, ewel lav ye ev v\rf 77 
ev e\et y, ov irpoaep\ovrat. Ov Srj eortv*. insen- 

dvSpeta Sea to inf akyqSovos kcu Ovfiav e£e\av- 
vo/ieva irpos tov klvSvvov bpfmv 9 ovOev t£>v Setvoiv 

SOirpoopcovra, iirel ovtco ye Kav ol ovot dvSpetot 
elev TreivcbvTes' TVTTTOfievoi yap OVK d<f)lOTaVTaL 

T7J9 VOfirjS* KCU ol flOt\ol Se Std T7)V tTTtOvfAiaV 

ToXpLrjpa 7roAAa Spcoatv. ov Srj eartv dvSpeta tcl 
Si dXyrjSovos rj Ovjiov eljeXavvo/ieva irpbs tov 

$&Ktv8wOV. (f>V<riKa>TaTTl 8 €OlK€V rj Sta tov dvfiov 

elvat, Kal irpoaXafiovaa irpoatpeatv kcu to oh 
ev€Ka dvSpeia etvat. Kal ol avOpamot Srj opyt- 

5. tU4i/{mv] Aristotle probably al- 14. ^krizaXav] See note, p. 113,12. 

hides to Plato's Repub. p. 442. 20. •»#/] Respicere videtur notum 

9. "Optics] See Iliad n. 529. E. locum de Ajacis fortitudine apud 

510. Odyss. 11.317, 318. Homer. Iliad. A. 558. adnotanti 

11. JJirit] Theocritus xx. 15. CamerarioquoqueetGiphanio. ZELL, 

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118 ARIST0TEL1S 

pain. (pfLtvot pip dXyovat, Ttpxopovpcpot tf rfSovrcu' 

Courage. e ft \ * \ ~ / / » 

ot oc ota ravra pa\op€Pot pja\tpx>t p*p 9 ovk 
dpSpttoi $€' ov yap Sid to koXop ovtf coy 6 Aoyoy, 
aAAa &a to wado?' iroLpaTrXr/a-top 8 €\oviri tu 

4. saojuroe Oufic 8r/ ol evtXirtScs ovt€9 dpSpetoi* 8td yap to& 

rroXXaKt? kou ttoAAow veviKrjKtvcu Oappovatp iv 
Tots kipSvpois. irapopotot fie, oti ap(fxo GappaXcot' 
dXX* ot pkv dpSpetot Sid tol 7rpoupT}fieva Oap- 
paXeoty ot fie Sia to oU<r0ai Kpeirrovs eivai teal 
prjOcp aPTiicaOeip. toiovtop fie Troiov&i kou oi 10 
pjeOwKop&Pot' eue'A7rifiey yap yipoprai. map fie 
avTots fJLij crvpifSfi rotavTa, (frevyovatp' dpSpeiov 
8 rjv Ta (frofepa dpdpcoTTCo opra teal <f>atp6ji€Pa 

V7TOfl€P€lPj OTI KaXoP KOI ai(T\pOP TO pLTf. fito 
KOU <Xv8p€lOT€pOV 8oK€l €lPOt TO €V T019 OLl(f>Pt8ioi$ 15 

<f)6fioL? a<j>o/3op teal ardpa^op tlpcu 77 4p tois 
irpoSrjXot? 9 diro e£eG>y yap /laAAop, rj teal oti 
ffTTOP €K 7rapao m K€w}s' Ta irpo<f>apfj p&p yap kop 
4k Xoyur/wv kou Xoyov ti? TrpoeXotTO, Ta 8 

5. igno- ejjatyprjs Kara ttjp ei~ip. *Av8p€tot 8c <f)aipopTai¥0 

ranceoflhe vc , „ ,, ,, , ^ , 

danger. Kat Ol ayPOOVPTCf, Kat CKTIP OV TTOppCO TG>P €V€A- 

7Tt8ayp, \elpovs 8 txrip d^uopxz ouSep e^owM', 
£k€ipoi fie'. 810 kou pepovai Tipa ypopop' ot 8 
rprarripiepoi) 4dp yp&atp oti eTtpop rj v7ro7TT€v- 
<TG><rt) <f>cvyov<rip' wrep ol 'Apyeiot hraQop wepi-*b 
TT€<roPT€9 TOts AaK<&&ip ©y *2iKVG>Piot9. 01 re 8f/ 
dpSpeeot eiprjprai irmoi tipcs, Kal ol Sokovptbs 
dpSpeioi. 
Courage Tlepl Oapprj fie Kat <pof3ov? T) dvSpela odaa ov\ 1 2 

versant 
with i«0ig£ 

than 4*u*- 25, Ot 'A^yuot] See Xenophon's Hellenics iv. 10. 

Xta. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 6. 119 

OfiOtOO? 7T€pl dfX(fX0 tCTTlVy aXKoL fJUOtXXoV 7T€/H TO PAIN. 

(popepa o yap tv tovtois aTapa\09 Kai 7T€pt ravu 
d& 8el e\(OP dvSpeto? /mSXXov 7) 6 7rcpl to Qap- 
paXea. Tip drf to Xxnrrjpd v7to/jl€P€iv 9 w etpr/ToUy 
bavSpeioi Xeyovrcu. dib teal eiriXwrov rj avbpeia, kcu 
ducaio)? hrcuveiraC \aXeir(aT^pop yap ra Xvirqpd 
wrofievew ^ tcov rjSe&v dirv^a-Qai. Ov firjv aAAaTheend 
Sofetev av elvcu to Kara vnv av8pelav reXos v8v 9 tut the 

^ means pain- 

inro tcov kvk\<p 5' dfyavL&crOaij olov kolp Toh^> 

\OyvfipiKols dy£>cri yiveraC tols yap ttvktou? to fiev 
reAoy 7]8v 9 ov eveKa, 6 CT€(j)avo$ kcu al Ti/ial, to 
8e TvirTeaOaL aXyewov, efarep adpKivoi 9 kcu Xv7nj- 
pov 9 kcu iras 6 wovos* Sia 8e to 7roXXa tout 
€ipcu 9 fiiKpbv ov to ov evetca ovSep r/8v (palvercu 

lhe\eiv. el 8r) toiovtov 4oti kcu to irep\ r^v dv- 
Spelav, 6 pep Odvaros kcu to Tpav/iaTa Xv7njpa 
T<p avSpeitp #eai clkopti eoTcu, vTropAvsi fie avTa, 
ore kglXov rf otl cuoypbv to firj. kcu ocr<f av 
ftaXXov T7)v apeTTfv tyrf iraxrav kcu ev8cupuove- 

ZOorepo? #, jjlSXXov eni Ttp tiavarcp XvirrjO^o-eTat' 
r<p TOiovTcp yap frnXiora £f}v d^cov 9 kcu ovtos 
fityiOTcov ayaB&v dwooTepelTai €i8&?' Xv7njpbp 
8e tovto. aXA* ovdev tjttov dvSpetos, mtco? 8e 
kcu fiaXXov 9 oti to £v Tip iroXepjcp KaXov dvr 

26£K€Li>(tii> aipeiTCu. ov 8r/ iv cardcrcus tous aptTals 
to i/SeW ivepyelv inrdp\ei 9 ttXtjv i(f> oaov rov 
rcAouf 4(f)dirT6Tai. CTpaTUDTas 5* ovSev laox 
KCoXvet p,rj tov? tolovtovs KpaTicTTovs Hvoi 9 dXXa 



9. zfokf I Things which stand tween us and the end. 
around it ; things which intervene be- 



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120 ARISTOTELIS 

PAIN. TOV9 f/TTOP fl€P OP8p€LOV9 9 aXXo S OTfoBoP flfjSeP 

eXpvras' erocfxot yap ohrot wpos row kipSvpovs, 
kcu top filov irpos fUKpa KepSrj KaraXXdrroirrcu. 
7T€pl flip ovv apipuas en\ roaovrop dpr/ada)' ti 
2? iorip, ov xa\€7rbp TVTrtp ye irepiXafielp 4k 7w5 

UpT)fl€PG>P. 



CHAP. VII. 

INTEMPERANCE— TEMPERANCE— ANON. 

plea- MET A 5e ravrr/p wept aaxfrpoovprj? Xeycofiep' 13 

SURE - * % - ». / * 9 

The object- OOKOVCL yap TG>P aXoytOP /JL€p(OP aVTCU €LPOl CU 
matter of* r *t \« / > v \ e » \ * 

Temperance a />^rai. OTt fl€P OVP pueCTOTqS €OTl 7T6/01 rjOOVCLS 7} 

and Intern- » t * e ~ . ? * v » -~ 

perance. C(0(ppO(TVPrj y etprfTOL rj/JUP rjTTOP yap KCU OV\\0 

ofiotcos ioTt irepl tcls Xvira? ip rots avrols Be 
kcu rj djcoXaala (f>aiP€Tcu. wepl iroias oSp tG>p 

Pleasures J)hopS>P 7 PVP d(pOpi(T(DfjL€l>. AtT]pr)(TO(DaaV 8e al 

^Mental. ^VX^OL icol al C&fUlTlKai, OlOP (frtXoTtfJUO, <f)tXo- 

fidOeia' tKarepos yap tovtcop \cupei y oh faXrjTiKOf 15 
icrriPy ov0€P iraxr^pPTOs rov cho/wtos, dXXa fiaX- 
Xop tt}s Siapouts* ol 8k tt€/h ras rotavras tjSopol? 

OVT€ <TCO(f)pOl>€$ OVT€ OKoXoOTOl XtyOPTCU. OfJLOLCO? 
# OV& 01 7T€pl T0L? aXXoS OCCU flTj (TOO/JUlTtKai 

elaip* tow yap <f)iXofiv0ov9 teal dirjyrjTucow kcu 20 

7T6/H T&P TV\OPT(OP KOTaTpifioPTaS TOL? 7}fJL€pa$ 

aSoXcaxas, aKoXdenrov? S ov Xeyo/i€p 9 ovSe tow 



These habits are more clearly de- 22. tioX.i*x*f] See Theophrast. 

fined in the Seventh book, to which Charact. iii. «•>{« 43«Xir;g<«f. vii. rif) 

the reader is referred for further in- x«;u«f . viii. «n^) X§y$*«Uf. 
formation. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 7. 181 

Xvirovfievov? iwl yfi-qpuactv ij (ptXot?. Hepl Sc ray plea- 
acofiariKas cirj av r) caxppoavmfjy ov ircuras oe ovoe 2 
rat/ray* ol yap yaipovrzs rois Sta Tr}f o^eco?, dtov*^ B * %c *. 
Xpcofiaat kou (ryrjpjxai kou ypctfprj, ovre <r©0/>oj/€y t ^ rlh6 

bOVT€ OKoXcUTTOt XeyOVTOU* KOUTOl 86j;€l€V €LV clvOU*** 1 ' 
KOU CD9 Set \alp€LV KOU TOVTOlSj KOU KO0 UTT€pfioXrfV 

kou eXXei^LU. '0/iota>? Se kou 4v tois wepl r^PiLNor 
okotjv* tow yap t/Trt/o/Se/SA^/iciw? \aipovras ftcXc- 

aiV 7J V7T0Kpt<T€t OV0€19 OKOXaOTOVS Xty€l 9 OvSt TOV9 

10 ©y Set o-(0(f)popa?. OvSe row ircpl ttjv 6<rp.r)i> y iu. Nor 
irXr/v Kara cru/ijSt/fyjcoy* tow yap \oupovTa$ /ii;- 
Xcov T) poSa>p rj dv/xta/xdrcov ocr/ioty ov Xeyopuev 
aKoXdoTOW, dXXa fiaXAov rovs puupcov kou oyfscov' 
yaipovat yap tovtois ol okoXglotoi, oti Sta tovto&v 

\bavafivrjat9 yivercu at/roty raw eiriBvpnyrSiv. tSot & 
Sv tis Kai tow aXXow, orav iretwoo't, \aipovra9 

TOLLS TCOV f3p<OfiaTG)V 6 C fiat?. TO St TOtOVTOt? \CU- 

petv oKoXdorov' rovrtp yap iirtOvpyra raSra. ovk 
€ori Se ovSe roiy aXAot? foot? Kara Taura? ray 

20 ouo'Orjo'eis riSovri ttXtjv Kara avfifiefiijKO?' ovSe yap 
raiy ocrfiat? tG>v Xayomv ou kvv€? \aipovatv 3 aXXa 
rrj fipaxret* Tqv 8 ouaOrfatv 17 oa/ir/ eirovqo'ev. ovS 
6 Xecov rrj (fxovy rod /3ooy, dXXa 777 iScoSfj' on 
& kyyvs eort, Sta tt)9 (JhdvtJs yaOero, kou \atpetv 

26^7 TavTTj <palv€Tai. 6/LtotW & ovtf 180DV rj evpoav 

*Xa(f>ov 7/ ayptov ouya, aAX* oti fiopav e^et. Hept iv. But of 

\ / & > « * \ < a / \«» touch, or 

ray TOiavra? or/ r/ooua? rj aaxppoovurj Kai 17 a#co- mora pro- 

perly taste, 
are the 
chief object- 
3. 9t ymf %m{etru] See vii. c. 4. from association. matter of 

11. **rk ,vnWnxi f ] The Intern- 25. tb& fx«^»] Respexisse vid «* ^dmtem- 
perate delight in the smell of viands tur. Iliad, r. 23. ZELL. perance. 

and unguents, but only accidentally, 

Digitized by LjOOQ IC 



12* ARISTOTELIS 

plea. Xouria ioriv a>p kou ra Xotira Z$>a KOtp&pei, oOtv 

Temped- apSptOTO&ifetf KOU OrjpuiSeiS <f}OUPOPT0U m CLVTOU S 

ance* &ar\v a0i) kou yev&is. <J>cupoptou 8r/ kcu rrj yevaei 
iiri /utcpov 7 ovOtv yprjaOou* Tqs yap yevaew 
iartv'Tf Kpicris twp yvpxop, owep ttoiovcip ot row 6 
olvovs 8oKifia{fiVT€9 kcu tcl o\jra apTvovre? ov irdpv 
8\ yalpovai tovtois, rj ov\ 01 ye aucoXaoTOiy dXXd 
Tfj dTTo\au<r€L 9 7) yiverou Ttaxra 81 d<f>r}9 kou 4p 
airiois kou £p iroTOis kou rots d(f>po8icrtoi9 Xeyo/ic- 
voi?. 810 kcu rjvi-aro ns oyjro(f>dyo9 <dp top (f>apvyya 10 
airnp fMKporepov ytpdpov y€P€<r0ou 9 coy r)86p.evo$ 
rp d(fyjj. Kovpordrq 8rf raw ou<r07fo'€(op Kajff r/y 
t) djcoXouria' kou 8o^ettv op 8ikoUo$ ewwci&oToy 
€tpcu, on ov\ rf avOpwKoi kapjev inrdpx* 1 * dXX! 

In which to ^C£>a. To 8r/ TOlOVTOtf \atpUV KOU fld\lOT0Llb 

delightto „ „ v N e , 

excess is ayairav thjpixodcs. kou yap at eAevuepuDrarou row 

brutish- *n~«jl~«*~»jl' * «« 

ness. OWL T7)$ a(p7)9 fJOOPCOP a<pr)p7)VTCU, OtOP Ot €P TQtS 

yvfipcuriois 81a Tpiyfftco? Kal r^y fepfiaalas ylpo- 
fievat" ov yap irepl irdp to <ra>/za -q tov oKoXdorov 

Desires zrtd(f)r/y dXXd 7T6/W TlPa ^pTf. T(OP 5* €7ri0VfJLlCOP al 20 

kinds: ft€P KOLPOU SoKOVCCP €IP0U, OU 8 l8lOl KOU €7ri0€TOl' 

l.Common. ^ , x « jl ~ j / . ^ > /i ~ 

otop x) fiep rrjs Tpo<pr)s (pvo-tKij Tray yap eiriffv/Aei 
6 €p8€t/9 ipjpas rj vypas rptxpr}?, 6t€ $ d/ji<f>oip, 
Kal evpfjs, (fyrfaip O/ii/poy, 6 p€o? kou oKpA^v 
to $e TOtda8e rj roiacrSe, ovKert 7ray, ovSe raw 25 

aVTCOP. 8lO (f>OUP€TOU T/p.€T€p0P €LPGU. OV fl7)P oAA' 



12. xenoT&rn] xoturttrn y^irnvn ance and intemperance, he now ex- 

afi It v&ffeut rats mvinftrtr Wil xa) plains how the temperate, intemperate, 

*$y rnt wirtu *! mleiitrut mMavsTTw. and insensible, use or abuse them. 

Paraph. See also De Part. Animal. ii. 8. How their desires are regulated in 

20. InhfuHv] Having thus ex- reference to pleasure, 

plained the object-matter of temper- 24* "O^ttftt] See Iliad €1. 129. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 7. 1» 

fyu y* rt Koi <f>vatKOP' €T<pa yap irepois wrw plea- 

7/ScO) KOU €Pia TTOKTiP t)8Uo T&P TV\OPTd>P. €P fl€P Temper- 

ovp rats (pvcriKous anffvfjucus oXtyoi afxaprapoviri 

\ * 19 ft t \ \ X ~ • x > ' /I' x 

K<U €^> €?, 67TI TO 7TA€t,0P TO yap €<TUl€tP Ta 

bTvypvra r) irivtiv has dp v?r€p7rXr)cr0rj, inrepfiaXAeiv 
tori to Kara (fwaiv Tip 7rXi}0€i' dpa7rXrjpaHrts 
yap ttj? ivSelas r) if>v<riKr) aridvpua. 8to Xeyovrat 
ohroi ycoarpifjuapyoiy w irapa to Scop TrXrjpovprcs 
avrr)p* toiovtol 8e ylpovrat oi Xiap dvdpairoSdSei?. 
lollepl 8e Ta? 181a? t&p tjSoihdp 7roXXol kcu 7roAAa-2. Parti- 
X»y Ufmprapownp tcov yap (pcAoroiovroyp Xeyop*- 
p&p rj r<£> \alpeip oh fir/ Set, r) Tip p£XXop 9 % w 

01 TToWoi, 7] /JLT) C»y fi€i, KCLTO, TTGLPTa 8 01 flWCO- 

Xacrrot vTrepfidXXovaip' #col yap \aipov(TLP ipiois 
l&ol? ov 8*1 (jwrqTa yap), kcu ct tuti 8ei \aip*iv 
Ttop tolovtwP) fiaXXop rj Set, kcu toy oi 7roX\ol 
\aipouatP. *H fiep odp ir*p\ ray rjSova? wrep- How far, 

fioXr) in aKoXaaia teal tJtcktop, SijXop' 7T€/w 8* tos *ense? pab 

x ' * rt » \ " > £ / ^c / ig the ob- 

Xvwa? ov\ (ooirep mi ttjs avopeta? rep inrofievHP ject-matter 
VOXeyeTai (reoeppcop aicoXaoTOs 8e Tip fir/, dX)C 6^1^ 
pxp vueoXaoro? Tip XvTreicrffai /jlSXXop if 8*i oti 
TJ&p ifi4a>p ov Tvyyavei (icai rr/p Xwrr/p &€ ttol^l 
mrrcp r) yboprf)) o 8e <rol><f)pa>i> T<p fir/ Xwreicdai 
rr} afrovarla teal r$> a*K€yf<jdai tov r/Seov. ■ 'O /i€i/xheex- 

__9j/ n */i ~ ~ e«»/ /" *> ~ tremes con- 

25 OW a/CoXlWTO? e7TWVfJL€l T1&P 7)0€toP TTaPTCHV 7) TCOP sidcred, 

pjaXtirra^ kcu ayerou vtto <rFft emBxy^las (o&re optI 

t&p aXXcop TaSjff alpeicrOai' 810 kcu XwreiTatnte!* 1 **' 

kcu aTTOTvyxdpcop Kal eiriOvpxop* fi€Ta Xv7nj9 yap 

7/ €7Tt&Vflta' drOTTCp & €OlK€ TO $1 r)8oP7jP XVTTU" 

5. KfmwXiipfrif] A ttefinition de- adopted by Plato. See the Phitebus, 
rived from the Pythagoreans, and . p. 35. n. SUllb. and x. 2. 

Digitized by LjOOQIC 



1. The ex- 
cessive or 



1«4 ARISTOTELIS 

PLEA- <T0ai. 9 E\X€l7TOVr€9 8c 7T601 T0L9 wSoPOLS KCU 

SURE. 

Temper- ffTTOP TJ Set \CUpOPT€9 OV ITOPV ytPOPTCU* OV yap 



2 Thede- w^P*** 1 **) iorip T) TOiavTT) apaiadrjala' kcu yap 

which** T< * Ao«ra ^pa SioKplpei ra ftpta/iara, Kal rots fiep 

Minele11, \aipei rois 8' ov* ei 8e Tip firjdep £otlp 7)8v firjSeb 

Staipepei erepou irepov, iroppa* av elrj rov apOpco- 

iros elpai' ov t4tcv\c 8 j 6 toiovtos bpopxvros 8ia 

And com. TO /JLt) ITOPV yiP€<r0ai. 'O 8e <T(0<fip(Ol> pL€(TC09 7T€pl 

pared with ^ • v . v \ #* * * '\ « » ' 

the mean. TaVT €\€l OVT€ yap 7jd€Tai 019 fJLOAlOTa O aKO- 

\ooto9 9 dXXa fiaXXop Svaxepaipei, ov0' o\co? ohio 
/jltj Set ovre <r(f>o8pa TOtovrcp ovSepl, ovt ottoptcop 
\vttutcu ov8 9 en-tdvfiel, rj /xerplco?, ovSe /xdXXop 
rj Set, ovtf otc /jltj 8ei 9 ovtf oAco? tcop tocovtodp 
ovuep oca oe irpos vyiecap cotip rj irpo? evegiap 
r)8ea opra, tovtgop 6pe£eTai fieTplcof Kal a>s 8ei 9 Kal 15 
twp aX\<op r/Setop piTj e/nroStcop tovtols optcdp tj 
irapa to Ka\bp r/ wrep ttjp overlap. 6 yap ovtcos 
€\(op pjSXkop ayaira tcls TOiavTas r/Sopas ttjs 
a£ia9 m 6 8e aaytypcov ov toiovtos, aXX* a>s 6 opdos 
\6yo9. 20 

Intemper- ^KOVaUp 5c fiaXXoP €01K€V 7) OKoXcUTia Tr}sl5 

ance con- * x / « % \ * » « * ' • * * * N ^ ' 

traitedwithO€tAta^. T) /1€P yap 01 TJOOPTJP, rj 0€ Oia AV7T7JPy 

cowardice * \ \ #■ / * ** jl ' \«\ 

in three °>V TO fl€P atp€TOP, TO &€ (p€VKTOP. Kai tj fUP 

pom ' Xv7D7 iijtoTrjai kol (f>0eip€i ttjp tov €\opto9 (f>v<rt,p 9 

7) 81 T)8oPTI OvSeP TOIOVTOP 7TOl€l 9 pSXXoP tf €KOV-25 

<riop* 8to kcu iiropeiStOTOTepop. Kal yap eOixrOfjpai 
paop 7rpo$ avTa* TroXAa yap ip T<p )3/g) Ta TOiavra, 
Kal oi eduTfioi clklpSvpol. em 8e t£>p (frofiepebp 
apairakip. 86£ec€ & av ov\ 6/xotW £kovctiop tj 

3. anudnvl*] See Theophrast. 29. \x«woi\ Vult demonstrare Aris- 
Charact. xiv. «?{) i»«i^nr/a#. toteles singulas actiones ignavas minus 

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ETHICORUM LIB. III. 7. 125 

SeiXta elvai rots Kajff ckootov' avrrj fuv ya/>pLEA- 
aXinro?, ravra 8* 8ta Xvrrrjv tQcrrqo'iv, cSotc *a*Temper- 
to, owXa plirreiv Kai raXAa a<ryj\puov*iv m 8ib kcu** 09 ' 
Sok€l /3lcua curat, r£ 8 aKoXacrrcp avairdXiv ra 
5/ney Kajff €KOOTa €KOV<rta, iwiOv/wvpri yap teal 
opeyo/jLewp, to 8 oXov t)ttov* ov&eh yap kirtOvp&i 
oKoXao-ro? elvai. To 8 ovo/ia ttjs a/coAacr/aroftheip- 

\»\\ **« / a. ' .v plication of 

Kai €7Tl TOL? TTaiOtKOL? apjiprias (pepOfieU ^\OV<rt the term 

yap riva o/JLOiorrrra. irorepov 8 awo iroripov /ta-ance, to 

loAeFra*, ovOev wpbs ra vvv 8caxf)€p€i, SrjXov 8 ort fault*. 

to varepov awo tov wpoTepov. ov kok&s 8 eouce 

fi€T€vr)V€x0at' K€KoXd<r0ai yap Set to t&v alaypcov 

opeyofievov Kai woXXrjv av^qaiv €\ou 9 toiovtov 

5e fidXiora r) iwiOvfiia kol 6 wats* #ear iwtOvylav 

\hyap £S<rt Kai tol waiSla, kol fxaXtora iu tovtois 

r) tov r)8eo$ opefys. ct oiv /irj taTai evweiOes teal 

vwo to apxov 9 iwl ttoXv 7]i;€i % awXrjoros yap tj 

tov rjheos opej^is Kai wavTa\o6ev T<p avorjTCp, Kai 

7) TT/s ewtdv/ila? ivepyeta av^€t to crvyyeves, kuv 

20 fieydXat kcu a(f)o8pal axriy koll tov Xoytcrfibv €#c- 

Kpovovcrw. 8 lo Set fierpla? elvai auras koll oXiyas, 

kol T<p Xoyco firj0€v kvavriovo'Qai. to 8e toiovtov 

€VW€L0€9 XiyOfl€V KCU K€KoXaafL€VOV' GH77TC/D yap 



spontaneas esse habitu ignaviae (}*xu MICH. 

(Ztata iTww). Itaque quod probaturus 11. rau rpiipv] *ct) ««ri rm *w- 

est, forsan non jam initio ut concessum iixSt &f**fn£v i«r) return* rfa kxeX*.- 

asseveravit, Sensus est : •' Ignaviam r*»» ri Sn/t* furt9t%fntau Paraph, 
minus fugimus quam actiones ignavas, 19. ruyyttis] % ri Wiivpiu u fin 

quia non ipsa affert dolores, sed acti- vto rev Xoyov x+kafym, It) w#Xy Sgu* 

ones secundum earn factae ; quod au- *«) vwi rSv **r Wtiv/u** Itt^yuSt 

tern dolore nos afficit est violentum ; aifafpim xa) ifa Xtyiepir Ikx^ovu 

itaque actiones ignavae, violent® vi- <r$XXdxts. Paraph, 
dentur, ignavia vero ipsa spontanea." 



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126 ARIST. ETHIC. LIB. III. 7. 

plea- top iraiSa Set Kara to vpooTceyfia tov 7reu8ayaryov 

Temper- £r)V, OVTto KCU TO €7rt$VflT)TU€0V KOTO. TOV \6y0V. 

Sta Set tov <rdxj>povo? to eirtBvp^TtKov avptfx&vuv 
ng> Aoyy* ckoito? yap dftff>otv to koXov, kcu errir 
0VfJL€t o adxppcov tov Set kou gk Set ical ore" ovt&o 
8* Tarret Kai 6 Aoyoy. raw oiv r/fiiv eiprjadco 
irept croxppoavvT]?. 

\, *p*T»yp* rw *mUy*yw] See by Aristotle on this subject, p. 46, 
e somewhat similar comparison used 31. 



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INTRODUCTION TO BOOK IV. 



In this Book Aristotle continues to apply his general 
definition of virtue to the particular species of it. In the 
•previous Book he had explained two of the eleven vir- 
tues, of which he has given a brief sketch in Book ii. 6, 
namely, Courage and Temperance. In this, he now 
proceeds to the consideration of the remaining eight. 
Of which two, Liberality and Magnificence, have money 
for their object-matter. Two, Magnanimity and Modesty, 
honour. The next, Clemency, anger. The three last 
have regard to the daily intercourse of social life, Sin- 
cerity, Wit, and Politeness. And in the last Chapter, 
he examines whether Modesty is to be classed among the 
virtues or not. 

The latter part o£ the preceding and the whole of the 
present Book is frequently illustrated by Theophrastus, 
the disciple of Aristotle, in his Characters. 



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Digitized by LjOOQIC 



AEISTOTELIS 
ETHICA NICOMACHEA. 

LIB. IV. 



CHAP. I. 

Of the Habits employed on the giving and taking of Money. 
PRODIGALITY— LIBERALITY— ILLIBERALITY. 

AEITfcMEN & egrjs 7T6/H eXevfeptoTTjTo?, Sokci money. 

*> 9 « \ r f . > x Giving and 

6 €LVOU 77 7T6/H XPVf JL<XTa H€<TOTT)$ €7T(UV€tT<U yap taking. 

6 tkevOtpiO? OVK £v TOIS 7ro\€fllKOlf, OV& £1/ oh .Liberality. 

6 (r(o4>p6)v 9 ov& a$ iv reus Kplcrecrcv 9 aXXa 7re/>«The object- 
booaur yjvqpxiT&v /cat Xrf\fnj/ 9 fiaXXov o €P rrj their habits. 



2. « Tttf XW 4 *™] Quwlibet vir- 
tus mediocritas esse videtur circa earn 
materiam et objecta, circa qua) cum 
bene se habet laudator, at liberalitas 
laudator cum bene se habet circa pe- 
cuniae, ergo ipsa est mediocritas circa 
pecuniae tanquam circa suam mate- 
riam, et non circa res bellicas, aut 
circa ea- quae afferent voluptatas. Et 
declarat philosophus quid intelligit per 
pecunias ; sc. non solum nummos, sed 
omnia etiam quae pretio et nummis 
sestimari et mensurari possunt. 

Notandum quod ebjectum sive ma- 
teria* cujuslibet virtotis- est duplex, 
propinquum et remotum. Nam ford- 



tudo versator circa timores et fiducias 
tanquam circa materiam propinquam : 
circa pericula bellica et mortem, tan- 
quam circa remotum. Idem est de 
temperantia, cujus materia propinqua 
sunt voluptates cupiditates et hujus- 
modi : remota vero sunt ilia qu» affe- 
runt cupiditates et efficiunt voluptatem, 
ut cibus potus et res veneres. Libe- 
ralitatis est etiam duplex materia ; pro- 
pinqua est cupiditas pecuniarum, re- 
mota vero sunt ipse pecunis : et hoc 
dicitur quia virtutes non solum circa 
actus versari videntor, sed etiam circa 
aflectos quos moderantur.—- Acciaj. 



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ISO ARISTOTELIS 

money, iocrei. xPVf JUXTa &* Xiyopuev irama oacov 17 d£ia 
taking. vofiur/juxTt fierpeTrcu. tori 8c kcu rj daarria kcu 

Liberality. 7) OvOsjEvOtpUl TTCpl XPVf JLara VTTCp&oXcU KCU fcAAc/- 

yjr€C9' kcu rqv pjev aveXevOeplav irpoachrrofiep del 
rot? fiaXXov t) 8et irepl xpTjfiara airovSafrvai, 5 
tj)V 8 daarriav £irtff>epofiev eviore avfiirXeKovres' 
row yap oKpareis kcu el? aKoXaualav Sairavqpovs 

aCWTOV? KCtXoVfJL€V. 8t0 KCU (fXLvXoTOLTOL 8oKOVaiV 

eivaC 7ToXXa9 yap apa Kcuclaf eyovaiv. ov 8rf 
oiKeUo? irpoaayopevovrauC ftovXercu yap dacorosio 

elvCU 6 €V Tt KOKOV e)(€OV, TO <f>0€ip€lV T7JU OValaV* 

aaarros yap 6 8i avrov airoXXvpAVO?, SoKel 5* 
a7TCoXeia rt9 avrov etvcu kcu 7) rijs ovaias (f)0opd, 
a>9 tov {jjv 8ia rovrcov ovtos. ovtcd 8t) rrjv 
aacDTLcut €K8cxop*0a. tov 8 eari x/Kt'a, earc roJ-15 
rots yjn\aOcu kcu e5 kcu kokg)?' 6 ttXovtos 8 earl 
t&v yjpnqaipxov* eKaarco 8 apiara xpfjrou 6 excov 
rrjv Trtpl tovto dperrjv 9 Kol irXovrcp 8% ypqaerau 
apiara 6 e\eov rqv irepl ra yjrqpxvta apen)i/. 

The actions OVTO? 8 eOTLV 6 iXeV0€piOS. X/JI/OYS' 5* elvCU 20 

liberal. 8oK€i xpqpaTcov 8airdvt) kcu 8bai$' r) 8e Xrrfyis kcu 
7] (frvXaKT/ Krrjais fiaXXov. 8to fiaXXov eari rov 
eXevOepiov to StSovcu oh Set rj Xafifidveiv oOev 
Set koll fir} Xafifiaveu/ oOev ov Set. ttjs yap 
dperrj9 puXXov to ei irotelv rj to efi irdayeiv^^ 
kcu ra kclXol irpdrretv puaXXov rj ra cuaxpa p.rj 
irpdrretv' ovk dSr/Xov 8 ore rfi p.ev Soaet eirercu 
to ei iroielv kcu to kclXol irpdrreiVy rg 8e Xrpfrei 



1. £&'«] Seev. c.7. »i'utt *p**yqtv»9riu U) infmn fum» 

10. t\*u*t * , (f»'y(tv*iireti~\ «t»Ji •<- xmm'm* inKtvtrt. Paraph. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IV. 1. 181 

to ci 7racr)(€LP r) fir) alaypoirpaycip. kcu r) \dpt9 money. 

~ * * ' » ~ v x a ' \cv Giving and 

TCO OlOOPTt, OV TG> fir) XafipaPOPTl, KOLL O CTTOIPOS taking. 

8c fiaXAop. kcu paop 8c to fir/ Xafielp tov Sovpcu' Liberality. 

to yap oIkciop rfrrov wpotcprcu fiaXXop rj ov 

bXafifidpovo'i to dXXoTpiop. teal cXcvOcpioi 8c 

Xeyoprax ol SiSoptc?' ol 8c fir) Xafif&dpoprcs ovk 

eis cXcvdcptoTrjTa c7raiP0vprai 9 oAX' ov\ j)ttop 

cis SiKouoovprjp' ol 8c Xa/ifidpoPTcs ovS cttoipovp- 

tcu irdpv. <f>iXovprcu 8c oycSop fiaXurra ol cXcv- 

lOOcpcoc tS>p air dpcTrjs' axf>cXtfiot yap, tovto 

28 4p tjj fioo*€i. Al 8c kclt apcrr/p irpd^cis AcaAcu A ndthe 

v « N ~ <r * * »x /l ' 3 * ' mode* and 

KXU TOV KOXOV CPCKOL. KOLl O cXcVUCpiOS OVP OCO<rCl condition! 

~ x ~ <y \ * /%~ . 9 \ * ~ v tf he will ob« 

TOV KCLAOV €P€KCL KCLL OpU(D$ 019 yap OCC KOI OCa^^e in 

\ & ^ 9 \ \ <* *" **»/!**»' them. 

kcu ot€j kcu TaAXa o<ra cttctcu rg opurj Ooaet. 

15 teal Tavra r)8ca>s rj aXv7ra>s m to yap /car apcrfjp 
r)8v r) aXvwoPy fj/ciaTa 8c Xvrrrfpop. 6 8c 8180V9 
oh fir) 8cl 9 r) fir) tov kclXov cPCKa dXXa Sid tip 9 
aXXr/p cut lav, ovk cXcv0cpu)s oAA' aXAos Ti9 
pr/Or/acTou. ov8 6 Xvmjpw' fiaXXop yap cXoct 

20 dp to. yjpyffutTa Trjs KaXrjs Trpajjeco?, tovto 8 ovk 
cXcvOcpiov. ov8c XrjyjrcTot 8c odcp fir) 8cl m ov8c 
yap cart tov fir) ti/jlcdptos to. yprffwra r) TOtavTrj 
XrpJHs. ovk op clrf 8c ov& cuTrjTiKos' ov yap 
cart tov cd rroiovPTos cv\cpS>s cvcpycTcladcu. oQcp 

W,8e 8ci, XrtyeTCU, olop diro tcop \8Ixop KTrffWTGyp, 
ovx <»* kclXop aAA* g>9 dpayKaiop, farm cxy 
8l8qpcu. ov8 dficXrjo-a tS>p 18ig>p> fiovXoficpo? yc 
8ia tovtcqp Tialp irrapKclp. ovSe Toh Tvyovo-t 
Scocreiy ?pa exo SlSopou oh 8ei kolI otc kcu o5 

10. *£w it* ^irnr] Sc. w rr«- 11. W iprh*] See p. 113, U5. 

)«/«». See the Rhetoric, i. 9. 

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13* AHISTOTELIS 

money. koXqp. iXevtiepiov & iarl <r<f>o8pa kcu to imep- 
taking. ISaXXeiv iv rg Soaei, ncrr* KaraXehreiv eavrcp 

Iibemiitj. eXarra>* to yap prj eirif&Xeireiv 4<f> iavrov eXevOe- 
piov. Kara Ttfp overlay & rf eXevOepiorrj? XeyeTai* 
ou yap iv t$ irXrjBet tS>v 8i8ofi€pa>v to eXevOepiov, 6 
aAA* 4v Tg tov 8c86pto9 t{;€i 9 avrq 5c Kara tt/v 

Certain pe- OViTiXW 8I80HTIV. OvOiv 8rj KG>Xv€L eXtvfepu&repOV 

cnliarittes , N ^ , , 9S t , / 

respecting ttvai top ra eXam* otoovra, tav air eXaTTOVcov 
dXtvfepuorepoi 8e elvcu Sokovo-cv ol firf 



KTifaapjevoi dXXa TrapaXaftoprcs ttjv ovaiav' are*- 10 
poi T€ yap Trjs evSetas, koi irawes ayairioai 
pJaXXov to. at/raw cpya, annrep ol yovtls kcu oi 
TTOirjTal. irXovrtlv 8 ov paSiov tov iXcvOcptov, 

ftT/T€ Xrj7TTUCOV OVTa fl7JT€ <f>vXoKTlKOV) 7TpO€TLKOV 

8e teal fir} Tipxbvra hi aura to. yp-qpaxa aAA* 15 
epeKa tt}9 5oo-€o>ff. 8io kolI iyKaXetrou TTJ TVX8 
OTi ol fidXtcrra a£wi owes fjniora TrXovroikrur. 
ovpfiaivti S ovk aXoy&s tovto* ov yap ovov t€ 
yfiqpar *X €LV P* ^irtfieXovp^vop cwrav «xp, (oovrep 
ov& eirl t&v aXXcov. ov firjp Swrct ye ols ov 8*1 2a 
ovo ore p.7) oei, ovb oara aXXa Totavra ov yap 
op en irpaTTOt Kara Trjv eA€i/0€/>ionyra, koi cfc 
Tavra avaXaxras ovk av typt &s a 8ei ava\urK€tv* 
axnrep yap Apirjraiy kXsvQlpios koriv 6 Kara Tr/v 
ovcriav 8anravS>v kcu el? a 8et' 6 & ifirepf$dXX(dv1& 
acraros 1 . 8io tov? Tvpavvovs ov Aeyo/zej/ ochotovs' 
to yap irXrjQo? tt]9 KTrjaea)? ov Sok€l paSiov elvai 
RecapituU-raty 86 aeon Kai tcus Sairavais v7repl3aX\€iv. Tr}? 



Lion. 



4. ttmrk ri» •Iwiaw] Liberality has of the individual. See p. 40. n. 
no 6xed or definite measure, but must 1L *4*th *y**£flt] See, Plato's 

depend upon the fortunes and station Re pub. p. 330. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ETHICORUM LIB. IV. 1. 188 

eXevOeptorrjTO? Stf fieaoTijTOf own;? wept xprjfid- money, 
toj/ Soatv kou Xifytv, 6 eXevOeptos /cat Swret taking. 
kou Sawavrffret els a Set teal oca 8et 9 bfiovtos ev Liberality. 
fUKpols kou fieyaXots, Kal ravra r/8e<o9' Kal A^€- 
6 rot & oOev Set kou oca Set. rfj9 aperr}? yap 

7T6/H aftifXD OVCTJf fieCOTr)T09 9 7TOt^CT€^ CLfl<f>OTepa 

m? ScI* errcrat yap rr} errtetKet Socet rj rotavnj 
Xijyjrt?, r) 8c firj rotavrr) evavria ecriv. at fiev 
ofiv errofievat yiyvovrat a/ia ev Ttp avr<p 9 at If 

10 evavriat SrjXov a? ov. eav Se irapa to Seov kou 
to kclXco? expv cvfifiaivy avrco avaXtCKetv, Xxmrf^ 
cerou, fJLerpico? 8c kou w Set' Trj? apeTrj? yap 
Kal rjSeadat Kal XwetcrBat e<f> oh Set Kat w 
Set. kou evKotv&vrjTos & ecriv 6 eXevdeptos eis 

15XPVf JUXTa ' SvuaTou yap aStKetcdcu, fir\ Tipuwv ye 
ra xprjiMLTa, Kal fiaXXov axOofievos et Tt Slop 
fir/ dvaXaxtev r) Xwrovfievos el fir/ Seov Tt avdhanre, 

KOU Tip jLtfJUGdvlSy OVK OpeCKOfieVOf. 6 ff aC&TOS 

3 Kal ev TOVTOt? StapuaprdveC ovre yap rfScTeu e<f> 
20 ot? Set ovSe &s Set ovre Xvwevrat' ecrat Se 
irpo'iovct (fravepwTepov* Etpr/Tou 8* r/puv OTt The ex- 

e s% \ y. v »x n / i >n « * / n« tremes, 

inreppoXou Kat eXXetyet? etctv rj ourcorta Kat rj prodigality 
aveXevOepta, kou ev Svciv, iv So&et Kal Xrpjset' ra lity, com- 
kou ttjv Sanrdvr/v yap ei? ttjv Soctv TtOefiev. ij5efincd. n 
Vkfvev ovv acarria rip StSovou kou fir/ Xafifidveiv 
inrepfidXXet, T<p Se Xafifidvetv eXXeuiret, r/ 8 
aveXevOepta Tip StSovou fiev eXXeiiret, T<p Xafifidvetv 
fi* irrrepfiaXXet, irXr/v em fiiKpoi?. to, fiev o5v 



18. Ittfunihf] See the Rhet. iii. 2. gtettrr tit debet nbn alfter in parvis 
28. vXhM punptt^ Liberate lar- qiram in magrtts ; avarus eotn^n superat 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



1S4 ARISTOTELIS 

money. Ttjs wrmuLS ov iram ovp8va£erou 9 ov yap paSiop 
taking. l^fiofwOw Xapfiapoira ttoxtl 8t86pou m raxcW yap 

Liberality. ^nAcwrCl 7} OVCia TOV9 l8uBTa$ SlSoPTOS, Ot7T€p 

kou SoKOvaip ouroorot eipcu, cVel o ye toiovtos 
86{;€i€v clp ov /lucptp fieXruov elpou tov apeXev-5 
Oipov. €viar09 re yap earn kou vtto tt}? r/Xucia? 
kou v7ro rfj9 cciropias, kou iirl to peaop Svparou 
iXOeiP. €)(€i yap tol rov eXevffepiov' kou yap 
StSaxri kou ov Xapfiavei, ovSerepop & w 8eT ov& 
€<5. el 8rj tovto iOia-Oeirf rf tt®9 aXAew pjerafiaXoi, 10 
€tTf av eXevOe'pco?' S&aet yap oh 8ei 9 kou ov 
Xrftyerou o0€v ov Set. 816 kou 8ok€i ovk elvou 
<f>avXo9 to %0O9" ov yap pjox&qpov ovS ayepvovs 
to vwep/HaXXeip SiSopra kou prf Xapfiapopra, 
rjXiOLov 8e. 6 8e tovtop top Tpoirop aa-coro? ttoAi;15 
8ok€l fitXruop tov dpeXevOepov etvou 8ia re tol 

€lp7]fJL€Pa, KOU. OTL 6 p.€P GXf)cX€l 7ToXXoV$ 9 6 8e 

Peculiari- OV0€Va y oAA* OvS 'OVTOP. 'AAA' ol WoXXol 

ties of pro- « , / * * t 

digality. T&P CUTCDTCDVy Ko0a7T€p €LpTJTCU, Kal XaflfiaPOVCTlV 

oOep prj 8€i 9 Kal elal KaTa tovto opeXevffepoi.zo 
XrpmKol 8* yiPOPTou 8ia to fiovXeaOai pep dpa- 
Xi<rK€ip, €V\epS>9 8e tovto iroielp pj) 8vvaar6aC 
Tayy yap imXeiTrei avrov? tol vjrap\opra. dpay- 
Kafyprai o5p €Tepo*0€P Tropifietp. apa 8e kou 8ia 
to pyjOep tov kolXov (f>popri^eiP oXtyap&s /cat 25 



accipiendi modum in par vis tantum, fttpof ol yet^ If rSf ret, fityaXa Xop- 
quippe cum in magnis esset spoliator, &*utt vT^fiaXksme mm uV* suA « 
non avarus. Lambinus male vertit rvgavw &*Xt,rr» ««} rXetixrtu *m) 
*Xh pr*terqnam t quasi sensus esset £}<«« net) «si0s7f, «v» knXtMtpt ma- 
in parvis. Eustratius aperte pro nobis \w**m. MICH, 
facit: rXrip U) fuxpTf •vr«W»nSttmi 1. rud»££irm] Michelet and 
i far, J«t ««) #i funp*\i*rmi mmX§v- others read *vHc&itr*t. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ETHICORUM LIB. IV. 1. 185 

. iravToOiev XafifiapovaiP* dtSopou yap eiriOvpovaiy money. 

TO &€ TTCO? f) 7TO0€P OV0€P CLVTOIS 8ia(f)€p€l. SlOTTCp taking. 

ov& eXevdeptoi al Soacis avr&p eiaip' ov yap Liberality. 
KotXai, ov8e tovtov avrov tve/ca, ov8e coy Set* 
6aAA' eploTe ow 8ei irepeaOou, tovtov? irXovq-iovs 
TTOiovcri, kou T019 pep peT plots tcl rjdr) ovSep av 
8olep, toZs 8e KoXajjip rj tip aXXrjp rjSopr/p iropl- 
(pv<ri iroXXa. 8tb kou okoXootoi ovtcop eicrlp ol 
ttoXXoi* ev\€pw? yap dpaXicrKOvres kcu els tols 
10 oucoXourlas Sairaprjpol elcrt, kou 8id to p.r) irpos 
to kolXop £qp irpos tols r)8opds airoKXipovcLP* 6 
pep odp aortoros aircuBayayrjTOs yepop,epos els 
Tavra fieTafiaipei, Tvy&p 8 eiripeXeias els to 
peaop kcu to Seop d(f>iKoiT dp. *H 8 apeXev- of niibe- 

/!/»/'» . * ~ * v ~ \rality. 

IbOepuL aviaros eorip 8oK€t yap to yr/pas Kai 
TTGura dSvpapla dpeXevOepovs iroielp. kcu ov/jl- 
<f>vearepop rots apOpdnrois ttjs dacoTtas 9 ol yap 
7roXXol (friXoxpr/ parol paXXop r) SotikoL koi 

8iaT€LP€l 8 €7Tt 7T0Xv, KOL WoXveiSeS €OTlP* TToXXol 
20 yap TpOTTOl SoKOVO-L TTJS dpeXevdeptaS eiPCU. €P 

Svcrl yap odcra, rrj t iXAefyet ttjs Soaecos kou 
rrj vTrepfioXr} ttjs Xrpfrews, ov ttoxtlp oXoKXrjpos 
7rapaylperat, aAA* epiore xcoplfierai, koi ol pep 
Trj Xrjtyei vrrepfSaXXovariP, ol Se tt} 8oaet eXAei- 
2b7rovacp. ol pip yap ep Tats toukvtous Trpoa"r\yoplais 
olop <f>ei8a>Xol, yXicrxpot, KipfiiKes, irdpres tq Soaei 
eXXeforovo'ty t&p 8 dXXoTpiwp ovk tyUprcu ov8e 
jHovXoprou Xapfidpeip, ol pep 8td rtva eineiKeiap 



14. «vsAivA{j'«] See the Charact 26. Qui*ui\ Compare Arislopb. 
of Theophrast. xxii. «ri$) ktiXtvii^Uf. Plutus, 236. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



186 A&ISTOTEL1S 

money, kcu tvXaf&uap tAp aUrvp&p. Sokovci yap Zpuh 

Ciriy and * 7^\ % ~ ~T\ / * , 

uku*. jy 0curt yc oca rovro tyvXarreiPy iva fir/ ttot 
Libtniity. uvayKaaOwriP alcryjpop n 7rpa£cu. tovtcop 8c kcu 
6 KVfwoirpum)$ kcu ttos o toiovtos* aypopxurrai 
$ ceiro ttJ9 inrcpfioXrp rov fir/Oevl ay Sovpoi. ols 
9 ad 8ia tftofiop ajr€\oprai t&p aXXorpuop a? 
ov pq&tov to avrov pep ra trepcop Xapfidpeip, ra 
$ avrov trepov? puf apeo-Kti oiv avrots to puqTt 
XapfidpeiP prp-€ SiSovcu. ol X av Kara tt)p Xrjyjnp 
wrepfiaXXovai r<p itoptoOcp Xapfidpttp kcu Trap, \o 
olop ol tol9 aveXevOepovs ipyaaias epya£opuepoi> 
iroppofioaKoi koi iraprts o\ toiovtoi, koi tokiotoi 
Kara pujcpop iiri 7roXX<p. irapres yap ovroi odev 
ov Set Xapfiapovai, kcu ottocop ov Set. kolpop X 
hr auTois i) alaxpoKepScia (pcuperat' irdpres yap\$ 

€P€Ka K€p8oV9, KCU TOVTOV pUKpOVy OP€L8rj VTTOflt- 

povaip. TOV9 yap ra pueyaXa fir) oOep 8e Set Xapr 
fZapopras, pj/Sk a del, ov Xeyopep apeXevdepovs, 

oloP TOV9 TVpaPPOVS TToActff TTOp0oVPTa$ KOI Up a 

ovXtbpras, dXXa noprjpovs paXXop koi acre/Bets %q 
koi olSlkov?. 6 pePTOt Kvfievrrjs Koi 6 XamodvTTjs 
Koi o Xflarrrj? tS>p dpeXtvOtpcov elaip' aia\poKep- 
8*19 yap. Kep8ov9 yap €P€K€p apxporepoi repay- 

pjOLTSVOVTCU KOU OP€l8q V7T0p.€P0V<nP> KCU ol fX€P 
Ktp8vPOV9 T0V9 p,€yt<JTQV9 €P€Ka TOV A^/X/AaTOf, 25 

ol 8' airo T<op (ptXcap KepSaipovatp, oly 8ei ScSopgu. 
apifrorepot 8ri od*p ov 8ei KepSalpeip fiovXopxpot 
oticrxpoKepSti?, kcu ircurai 8t/ cu roiavrou Xrjf^€t9 
dpeXevOepoi. €Ikot(09 8e rfj iXevOeptorriri ape- 

4. xufuvor^rtff] See the Com- 13. »»r« fux^ot] Lending small 

raentators on Aristophan. Vesp. 131 1. sums upon great interest. 

Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ETHICORUM LIB. IV. % 187 

Xevtkpia kvavrwv XkyeraC p*ltj>v re yap kxrn monky. 

* *» » / \^xv » \ f « Giving tad 

kokqv rxfs aowtas, *at fiaXkov ear* twtt\¥ afiap- uking. 
rdj/owtv r) Kara rr\v XexOtlaav daarriav. w€pl Liu,^. 
\uv abv eXtvdepioTTjTo? teal t&v dvriK€ifX€vtov 
S>KUKi(dv roaaJHr eiprjtr&a. 



CHAP. II. 

Of the Habits employed upon the expending of Money with 

sumptuousness. 

VULGAR PROFUSION— MAGNIFICENCE— MEANNESS. 

4 AOHEIE 8 9 av clkoXovOov Avai kcu irtpl money. 

ll€YaXo7rp€7T€ta9 8l€\0€lV* 8oK€L yap KOt aUTTJ ITtpl spading!* 

yprffwra ri$ dperrj elvou. ov\ aorrtp 8 9 rj tXev- Magnia- 
0€pi6rr)9 Suzreivei irepl rrdxras ra? kv XPVH^ l T . cen ™' 
10 7rpdijei9 9 dXXa irepl ras 8airavr}pd$ fiovov* eV™ aUerof 

TOVTOIS 8* V7r€p€\€l TT)f k\eV0€pLOVqTO$ fl€y€0€L habits - 

KaOdjrep yap tovpo/m auro wroay)fiaiv€i 9 kv \u?yl* 
Ou 7rp€7rovcra Sawavrj koriv. to 8\ fiky€0os irpos 
n. ov yap to avro Sairdwjfia Tpir)pdpxq> kol 

\5>apyj,0€(opcp. to irpeirov 8tj Trpo$ avrov 9 Kai kv tp 
real irepl a. o f kv puKpols r/ kv fierpcotf rear 9 
dgiav Sairavciv ov Xkycrai p.tyaXoirpeirris 9 olov 
to " iroXkaKi 86<tkov dXrjrfl'" dX\ 9 6 kv /xtyaAois 
ovtg&s, 6 fiev jyap fi€ya\o7rp€7rr/9 k\ev0epios 9 6 9 

20 eXevOtpios ovOev fiaXXov fieya\o7rp€7rr}?' ttj9 tol- 
avrr)? 5' e£ea>r 17 fi€v eWeiyj/tt fUKpoTrpeirtia 



18. vcXXmKi] See Homer's Odys. 20. rirtr f*m\X*>) «vUf*£t. Is not 
P. 420. the more. 



Digitized by LjOOQ IC 



188 ARISTOTELIS 

money. KOLkeircu, Tj S vTrepfioXr} fiavavaia kou aweipoKaXia 

f^ndifl*! *«i OaCU TOICLVTCU, OV\ V7T€p^dXX0V(T0U TCp fiey€0€l 
Magnifi- **/* * ^ € *> < *^' ^ °** °** ^ € * Ktt * ^ °^ ^ € * 

cenc * - Xapirpwopevou' varepov 8e wept avr&v epovpev. 
'O 5c ft€yaXo7rp€7rrj9 hriorripjopi eoiKev* to 5 
luriuetof irpe-jrov yap SvvaTou Oewprjaou kou Sawavrjcrai 
6cent. peyaXa ippeXcot. axnrep yap iv apyj) ehropev, 
rj eijis reus evcpyeiais 6p/£erai, kou o»v earlv. 
ou 8rj tov peyaXowpeirovs Sairavcu peyaXou kou 
7rp€7rovaai. TOtavra 8tj kol to, epya' ovtg> yapio 
eorou p£ya 8anravi\pja kou irplirov r<p epytp. axrre 
to piv epyov rfjs 8airavrjs a£iov Set elvai, ttjv 
8e Sairavrjv tov epyov, rj teal inrepfiaXXeiv. 8awa- 
vr/aec 8e tol roiavra 6 peyaXoirp€Trrjs tov kolXov 
€j/€#ea° kqivov yap tovto tou? aperou?. kou en 15 
fjSecos kou 7Tpo€TiK<os' -q yap oKpifioXoyia fJUKpO' 
irpeiris. kou ir<os koXXiotov kou 7rp€iro>84aTaTOVy 

<TK€^OUT OU/ pcLXXoV 7f TTOfTOV KOU TT&S IXayLjTOV. 

avayKatov 8r/ kou iXevOeptov top p€yoLXo7rp€7rrj 
elvou m kou yap 6 iXevOeptos SaTrav^aei a Set kou 20 
W 8ec. iv tovtol9 8e to piya tov peyaXoTrperrovs, 
olov pey€0o9 9 wepl tovtol tt)? iXevOeptorrjTOs 
ovotjs, kou airo ttj$ toys 8airavqs to epyov 
7rour]<r*i p€yaXo7rpe7T€OT€pov. ov yap rj avrq 
apery KTqpuaT09 kou epyov* KTJ\pja fiev yap to 25 
irXelorov a£tov TipucoTaTOv, olov ](pv<r6s> epyov 



3. *t(l Jt ht] Supra diximus ad p. spectator autem decorum I. et persons 

72. in universum hujus virtutis medio- quae impendit, II. et rei in quam im- 

critatem esse proportionem quandam. pendit, III. et pecuniae qua impendi- 

Jam nunc triplicem hujus proportionis tur, qua partitione ipse in describendo 

rationem profert, cum decorum hujus magnifico infra utetur. MICH, 
virtutis exstat, si proportio servetur : 7. U k^xil See p. 55. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ETHICORUM LIB. IV. 2. 189 

fie to pAya kou kolXov. tov yap toiovtov rj money. 
Oecopia Oavftaorrj, to fie /JL€yaXo7rpe7r€9 Bavpa- speoding. 

XTTOV. KOI €OTlV ZpT/OV dp€Tr/ fieyaXoirpCTTCUl €V Mtgnifi- 

ficyedei. "Eoti 8e tS>v 8airavr)p£TG>v, ola ^*yot*£V B °^ m 
5ra Ti/jua, olov tol rrepi Oeovs avaJdrjpjara ^V^^ kWn 
Karaa-Keval kou Ova loll ^ ofJLolco? 8c kou oaa *"*/>* SSThJ 1 " 
rrav to Saifiovtov, kou oaa irpos to koivov eityu- ^i**)* 
XoTi/JLijTa ioriv, olov €t irov ypprfttiv OiOVTOU Setp 
Xajurpm r/ Tpvqpapytlv rj kou laTtav rfjv rroXiv* 

10 iv arfourt 8 oiovrep ctpTfrai, kou irpbs tov irpdr- 
tovtol dva(f>iperat to rtV tov kou Ttvtov wrap^ovrcov* 
a£ta yap Set tovt&v elvcu, kou firj puovov r<£ 
€pyq> dXXa icai r§> rroiovvrt irp€7T€iv. 8io Trevrj? 
/lev ovk av eaj iieyaXoirpeirri^ ov yap eorcv d(f> 

15 odv 7roAXa Sarrav^aet Trpetrovr&s 9 6 & imxeip&v 
rfXiOtos' rrapa ttjv d£lav yap Kal to fieop, kot 
apeTJjv fie to 6p6w$. wpiirei 8e koi 0I9 tol Totavra 
irpovTrdpyei 8l avratv i\ 81a tS>v irpoyovav rj &v 
avrols fi€T€<rrtv, Kol T019 evyeviai kou toZs eVfio- 

2o£o*r kou oara Totavra' rrdvra yap Tavra fieyeOos 
e\€L koc ajjlco/xa. pjaXcora fiev odv toiovtos 6 
fieyaXoirpen-rjs, koi iv T019 tocovtois Sairavrj/iacriv 
r) fi€yaXo7rp€7T€ia 9 axnrep eipr/Tou' piytora yap ' 
kou evrifiOTaTa. Ta>j> 8e tfitW oora eicra7ra^Andinpri- 

, « / v v - v ,vatcacu. 

V5yiv€Tou, oiov yafio9 kou ei ti toiovtov, Kac ec 
irepi Tt rrdaa 77 7roXc9 oTrovSafa rj 01 iv d^tcofiaTi, 
Kal 7repl £iva>v fie vrroSoxa? kou drroarroXaSy Kal 



2. fa»(f«] Jutp) dicebantur qui- ceps erat *{%$t'ut{v. Dixere autem 

cumque ad conventus sacrorum aut et faMgw banc ipsam administratio- 

solennia sacrificia aut etiam oracula nem. CAM. 
ablegabantur. Quorum scilicet prin- 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



140 ARISTOTELIS 

money, icopcas kcu aprtS&pedf' ov yap €t9 eavrop Scorcunf- 

•ptMfaf. por 6 p&yakoTrpenrp aAA' eh ra kouhl, ra Se 

Migaii- S&pa Ttw apaBripaxriv €x ei Tt o/aoiop. peyaXoirpe- 

**"** Trow 3c kcu oIkop KaraxTKevdaaxrOcu irpeirovr&s 

rip irXovnp 9 scoapos yap rts kcu oStos. kcu 7rep\$ 

ravra pdXXop Scotopop wra iroXvypoput rcov 

epy&p* KaXXiara yap ravra. kcu cp kKaxrrovs to 

irpeirov* ov yap ravra appofiei deols kcu dpOpeo- 

7TOl?> OV& €P Up$ KCU TOXfxp' KCU €7Tl T&P SaWaPTJ' 

parxop ckootov p*ya> cp rip yepei, kcu peyaXo- 10 
irpeiriararov pkv to 4p peyaXcp pkya^ kvravOa 
bt to cV rovrois peya. kcu 8ia<f)epei to ev rq> 
epytp peya rod iv ry Sarraprjpari' &(f)aipa pep 
yap rj Xt/kvOo? ij koXXiotti €X€i peyaXo7rpen-eiap 
ircuSitcov Scepov, rj 8e rovrov rtpr/ ptKpop #cail6 
dpeXevOepop. 5«a tovto earn rod peyaXoTrperrovf, 
€P <p ap 7r<Mj7 y4p€tj peyaXoTrpeTrm wotelp' to 
yap roiovrop ovk evvlrepfSXijrop, Kal e\op Kar 
Vulpr aijiap rov 8a7raptfparo9. Toiovtos pep ovp 66 
peyaXoTrpeTnjf, o o wrepfiaXX&p kcu fiapavao$20 
rco irapa to Seop dpaXio-KUP vTrepfidXXei, axrrrep 
tlpr/rat* kp yap rot? piKpols twp 8a7rapr)par<op 
7ToX\d dpaXiaKei teal Xapirpvpercu irapk peXos, 
olop epapioTas yapiKco? iori&p, Kal KcoptpSots 
yppryy&p ep rip irapo8<p woptftvpap ela(f>epcop^& 
coowep ol Meyapew- kal irdpra ra rotavra movqcrei 
ov rod kclXov epeKa, dXXa top ttXovtop em8eiK- 



20. /fetal*** ] «• ftg**ii rixwWM ««< X, u &< *** ij8^irri»Sf ft ri;giv*f!*. Schol. 

*m{jk fimfof, 7 itri **f*ir+, t) l^yer upon Plato's i'heaet in tfekker. Com. 

}M*ifi/tit«. ol ft fidretwop vh k*mi$t*- Cr. ii. 363. See Heindorfs note on 

*** k*i mpfmn*. ln§t Vt frmmvfv The&t. p. 176. §. 85. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



KTHICOBUM LIB. IV. S. 141 

wfuvof, koJ &a rtwra oiofuvos $uvfui£<ur0tu, MONEY. 

Svnslvtui 

teal o5 fiev Set iroXXa avoLXaxr*i> oXtya Sajrapwp, spm<ting. 
o5 $ oXtya, iroXXa. *0 5c fiucpovrpcirrp wept MagnkL 
7rajn-a eXAetytt, ical to /Myurra avaXcova? ip pi*py MMt ' 
4 ro KaXov awoXei, kou o tc op woirj fUXX&p, icau 
cfkott(dv rr<bs av iXa\toro^ apaXoxraty teat ravr 

6&Vp6flCV09, KOI TTOLPT oloflCPOS /*€l{fi» 7TOl€CP 7f 

Set elai fiep ofa> al *j;€i? avreu koklcu, ov pjfp 
aveiSri y iytifxpowi Sta to fir/re fiXafttpai t£ 
l07r€Aa? elvon fitfre Xiav atrxwtoi*?* 



CBAP. III. 

Habits employed upon the desire of Honour, or ambition of being 
distinguished. 

THE VAIN-GLORIOUS— NOBLE-MINDED— MEAN-WINDED. 

7 *H Si u€yaXoi/rvYia 7repl fieydXa fiev kou 4k honor. 

, , v 9 v ~ *> , x Ambition 

TOV OVOpJlTO? €OlK€P €IPCU, 7T€pi TTOta €0*71 of receiving. 

irpSrTOP \dfi(Op.€P. 8ia(f)€p€l & OV0€P T7)P e£lP 17 Nobleroind- 

tov Kara tt/p e&p arKOiretp. Sok€l 8e fieyaXo- The °^ ct . 

15^i>X°r €tpat 6 /jL€yaXa)P avrop a£«3i> afyos a>y*"JJj£ rof 
6 yap firj icar a£iap avro irotSiP rjXiOios, tS>p 5€ habits - 
kot aperrjp ovSeh r/XiOior ovtf apor)T09. fieya- 
Xofoxor, (icv oIp 6 elpri/iepo?. 6 yap fiucp&p 
agio? kou TOVTCOP agtojp iavrop <r<o$p<op, fieya- 

2oA(tyi;xos $ ov' ip fieyifct yap ?J /teyoAoi/wx"** 
coo-rrep kolL to koXXos ip p.€yaX(o a&pwri, 01 

11. A ft wx^vxi*] Quod hanc eadera veterum Atheniensium impri- 

virtutem Aristoteles nostra loco tarn mis propria habebatur. ZELL. 

copkwe et accurate prss mnltis et aliis 22. « »***♦#] Compare the Rhe- 

• describit, haud dubie eo pertinet, quia tone i. 5. 



Digitized by G00gle 



1« ARISTOTELIS 

HONOR. flUCpol f> OOT€tOl KCU OVflft€TpOl 9 KoXol & OV. 
Ambition « ** /. < \ ,v ~ > /*- * ~ 

of receiving. O 0€ fieydXcOV eaVTOV OgUOV CLPOglOS (OV ytWVOS 

Noblemind-O 8e fieiffiVCDV 7} <z£iO? OV TTOS \aVVOS. 6 8* £XaT- 
edness. / a v> > i » / 'v » / 

tovcdv rj agios fJLUcpoyv\09y eav re fieyaXcov eav 
re fierpicoPy eav re kcu puKp&v afjtos cSi/ en c'Xar-5 
tovcdv avrov dljiol. kcu puaXicrra av 8o£eiev 6 
fJueyaXt&v agios' ri yap av ewoiety el firj 
Toaovrtov rjv aijios ; eari 5?; 6 fieyaXoyjrvxos tg> 
puev fieyeOei aKposy T€p 8e an Set fieaos 9 tov 
yap tear a£lav avrov d£iol. ol 8* VTrepfiaXXovo-t 10 
kcu eXXehrovaiv. el 8e 8r/ fxeyaXcov eavrov aljiol 
a£io? wv y kcu fJuaXiOTa tg>v /leyiarrcovj irepl ev 
fjuxXicrra av ettf. i) 8 d£la Xeyercu irpos tol €ktos 
dyaOd. pAyiarov 8e tout av deirj/iev b toIs Oeols 
dirove/iofiev, Kal 08 pudXtorr e<f>ievTcu ol ev a£«»-i5 
yuoLTLy Kal to eirl tois KotXXiarois aOXovy tolovtov 
S 17 TL/irj m fieytarrov yap 8r/ tovto tS>v 4ktos 
dyaO&v. irepl Tifias 8r/ Kal drcfMia? 6 fieyaXo- 
\jrvx6s ecmv a>s See. Kal avev 8e Xoyov <f>aivovrat 
ol iieyaX6^tv\ot irepl Tifitjv etvaC Tifiij? yap 20 
fjuxXiaff ol fieyaXoc d^tovaiv eavTOw, KaT d£iav 
8e. 6 8e fUKpoyfnrx ? eXXei7r€L Kal irpos eavTov 
kcu irpos to tov fieyaXoyjrvxov d^lcofia. 6 8e 
\avvos irpos eavTov fiev wrepfiaXXet, ov firjv tov 
Pecuiiari- ye /leyaXoy^vxov. 'O 8e /ley 0X0^x09, etirep^ 

ties of the ^ , v > v * v . /> 

noble- T(DV fieyiOTTCOV aglOS, apKTTOS OV eiTj /JL€l£0V0? 

minded. . v t ■ , v «. N / « v 

yap ael o peXTvcov agios, Kai fieyiaTCOv o apicrro?. 
tov m aXr)0(bs apa fieyaXoyjrvxov Set dyadov 
elvat. Kal So^eu & av elvcu iieydkotyvx ov T ° * v 

13. rk ixrh ityaU] See the Rhe- 19. JLnu K Xiyvi] Without argu- 

toric i. 5. ment. Is self-evident. 



.Digitized by VjOOQ IC 



ETHICORUM LIB. IV. 3. 



143 



eKoarrf apery p*ya, ovSapxos r av appofioi peya- honor, 

\otyv\€p <f)€VyUV 7rapaCTH<raWt, OV$ a8lK€LV' TLV09 of receiving. 

yap evetca 7rpa^€i aicrxpd, a> ovOev pcya; Kajff Nobiemind- 
eKourra 6 ema-Kcnrovvrt Tcapnrav ytAoios (paivoir 
6 ay 6 fieyaXoyjrvxos p.r) ayaObs a>v. ovk etr/ & av 
ovSe Ttfirjs a£ios (f)av\os &v m rijs aperrjs yap 
aOXov rj Tifirfy Kal airovipjerai rols ayadols. eoitce 
pev odv ij p^yaXo^vxioL olov Koapos ris elvai 
t£>v aper&v* pjel^ovs yap auras iroicl, Kal ov 
lQytverai avev €Keiv(ov. Sia tovto x^^roi/ rfj akrj- 
Oeia pueyaXoy\rvxov zwaC ov yap olov re av€V 
KaKoKayadias. MaXiarra pep oiv ttc/h ripa? Kal Hit actions. 



2. «-«f«*"nVaw/] sc. x*'e* ( - 

11. inv x*X»xkyafi*i\ Without phi- 
Uuophy. The great attention paid by 
Socrates to the lovely as well as the 
virtuous (r« xaXii rt xa) Hyatt*), and 
the intimate connection between the 
two, is familiar to the reader of Plato's 
Dialogues. From habituating the mind 
to love that which is beautiful to the 
senses, Socrates wished to lead his 
disciples gradually to the contempla- 
tion of that which was really and un- 
changingly beautiful, until the love 
of that which is supremely good and 
supremely beautiful ended in one and 
the same thing. (See Repub. 401—2. 
Sympos. 210.) r$vr$ yk{ )« Wn rs 
l{t£s la-) rk X^trtxk litat 4 v** XXXtv 
&yt*4eu iu*x,»t**n **• «*»&« *** xaXm 
\xtifv tnxm r$u xaXtS a$) Wanitat, 
Ze*%£ Iwata^aifMit %£*ptf«f, <*«*« iter 
W) )u« xa) k*o Itntf M vratr* rk 
xaXa rupara, xa) aa*$ rSt xaXSv 
ruuaratv W) rk xaXa \*irtil%ufAara t 
xa) *«*« r£t xaXSv Wtrnbivuxratt W) 
rk xaXa paint****, ** T * ** *** *** 
(AmittfAMTHt W \xtif ri u4$nf*a riXiv- 
ritnt, t lent ovx £XX«» ft avrcv Ixtinv 



cm? xxXiv fidfafta, xa) yiip ahri rtXtv- 
rZ* « Un xaXit. Symp. 211. c. 
With Socrates then and his disciples 
the enquiry after the beautiful and 
the virtuous was never separated, and 
hence they called those who sought 
for moral beauty, and consequently 
the virtuous and good, xaXa) xa) 
kyaitL In subsequent times, how- 
ever, though this term retained its 
meaning, the inquiry after beauty 
and virtue was disunited, as is well 
expressed by a modern writer. 
" Sed vis et natura r§5 ayaiw deinde 
apparuit maxime, postquam id Cynici 
tandemque Stoici a pulcro et decoro 
exemplo ipsi suo, vivendi philoso- 
phandique ratione disjunxerunt. Nam 
apud germanos Socraticos sic ilia con- 
juncta fuerant, ut nee pulcrum aesti- 
marent nisi quod bonum, nee bonum 
nisi quod idem pulcrum esset. Undo 
virtutem vocare amabant xaXixaya- 
tiau Sed Aristippus et Cyrenaici ri 
xaXit, Antisthenes et Cynici, e quorum 
secta Stoici extiterunt, r% kyxtli 
unice, certe maxime prosecuti sunt. 
Heusde Init. Phil. Plat. ii. 1. 49. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



144 ARISTOTELIS 

honor, aripic? * pcyaXoyfnrxpf iarty Km em flip rah 
•tttctim*?. fuyaXcus tcm wro tAp awovSaimv p,*rpito$ -qtr&rf- 

Nebfemnxf- O'eTOly Off TV>V 04K€ia>P TVyyaPWP t) KfU iXaTTOPBP' 

aperip yap xarreAofr ovtc op yipovro aijla rtfirf 
oi> fjnjv aXX' cbro5e£er«/ ye T<p f&i €\uv avrovsb 
/uc/£a> aim* arropefietp. Trjr Si napa r&v nr^pvrndP 
*«i 67T4 fUKpois irafiirap oXiyatpr/tret,' o& yap rov- 
ton* a£ios. tyftOMt? Si kcu mTifila? 9 ov yap ecrrat 
SiKams Trepl avrop. paXiara jjuev odt> iarip, 
axFwep etpryreu, a peyaXtf^uyos irep\ Ttpa?, oww 
pifp> aXXa not vepl itXovtop koi Swatrreiap k*$ 
irourap evrvyiap koll arvyiav perpUdf e£e4, crrrmf 
av yitnjraxj koL out evruy&p Trepiyapr)^ ecrrcu 
ovt* aruy&p ireplXvnos* ovSi yap Trepl rtfirjp 
wrms eyei &e peytorop op. at yap SupacrrekuAb 
kcu 6 irXouros 8ca» ttjp riprjp eoriv alpera' ol 
yovv expPT€9 avra TtpSucrOai hi outSp fiouXoprat. 
<p 5^ jcat 7) ripif /MKpop eartj Tovrq* Km raXXa. 

mntrXtes ^ L ° VTTCpOTTTai 8oKOU<TlP €LVOU. AoK€L Si KOL 8 

^"ded*" T ** € ^ rv XV/ JMTa oifpfidXXeo-Bat wpo9 peyaXo^fnTyiap. 20 
ol yap evyepeis ol^lovptoll Tiprjs kcu ol Svpaarev- 
opt€9 r) ol ttXovtovpt€s v cp uTTtpoyrj yap, to 8? 
ayaBcp xmepeypp nap ipriporepop. Sto kcu ra 
Tocaura peyaXoyfrvxoTepovs iroiel" Tiptoprai yap 
V7TQ tipwp. K€tr aXrfOtLca* & Q- ayaQos /jlqvw25 
Ttprjreos' <p 8 ap<fxo vwdpxei, paXXop ai^iovrcu 
Tiprjs. ol $ avev aperr}? tol roiavrm ayuda e)(OPT€f 

See also De Geer's Diat. in Polit. the state in opposition to the undistin- 

Platon. principia, p. 93. guished populace (ry %yt«). See 

In common use, however, this Stallb. Thtrod. to the Meno of Plato, 

term was employed to denote those p. xii. Ed. 182T. 
who had enjoyed the honours of 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ETHICORUM LIB. IV. S. 145 

ovt€ Sttcalco? iavrow pLeyaX&p d£iovariv ovre opd&s honor. 
fjL€ya\6yj/vxot Xeyovrou' avcv yap aperfj? ircurre- of receiving. 
X0S9 ovk iarrt ravra. irrrepoTrrai 8e teal vfipumu Nobiemind- 
Kal ol tol rotavra exppr€9 ayaBa yiyvovrtu. avtv 

&yap apcTrjs ov paSiov (frepeiv eppeXcb? tol €vtvxH~ 
fiara' ov Swapevoi 8e (ftepetv teal oiopevoi rtov 
oXXodu inrepeyew €K€iva>v p*\v KaTafypovovaiV) 
avTol 8 o ri cut rvypni irparrovaiv. pupovwou 
yap top pLeyaXoyfruxov ov\ opotoc owes, tovto 

10 Be dpwriv eV oh 8vvavraC ra p&v obv Kar apen\v 
ov irpaTTOvai) Kara(f>povovac 8t) r&v aXXcov. 6 
8* peyaXoy^v\09 Sucaloos Karafypovel (Soijdfa yap 
aXqOas), ol 8e iroXXol tv\ovt<o9* Ovk cotc 5c His conduct 
fUKpoKivhvvos ovde (ftiXoKivSvvo? 8ia to oXiya to, 

UTLpmr, peyaXoKLvSwOS 8c 9 KOU OTaV KCp8vV€VJ/, tude. 

axf>€i8r)9 tov filov ©$> ovk a£iov ov iravrcw {fiv. 

Kal olos e$ iroieiVy evtpytTOvpevo? 8' oltryyveraC 2. Libe- 

\ \ \ < / \ & t / \i»Kty. 

TO ptV yap VTT€p€)(OVT09) TO UTT€p€\OpjeVOV . Kat 

avrev€py€TiKo$ irXeiov&v* ovtco yap irpoaro<f)Xr)ar€i 
20 6 inrdp£as kou *?otcu e$ ireirovd&s. SoKovat 8*) 
Kal pvrjpov€V€iv 069 av Troir)<r<o<rtv €#, a>i> 8 av 
irdOaxriv ov' iXaTT&v yap 6 iraO&v ed tov irotrf^ 
aavTOs 9 fiovXerai 8 VTrepiyeiv. kol tol p*\v r/Setof 
OKovei, tol 8 atf8w m 8co Kal ttjp Q4tw ov Xeyciv 
25 ray evepytaias r^ Aw' 068 ol Aaiccoi/cy 7rpoy 

20. h*0v*i] See Thucyd. ii. 40. 'AS«»«J*v, «r« fAr rtvt 'AS«mu'mv §1 

24. eSrit] See Homer's II. I. 503. AMifa/M»M*i*«fc«M»i7,«'#vr*vl«'i- 

25. »; Amm»m] ri ft *■£> Amxthu }JJ»rr» Uivrtf, 4 T *»r<i X?**** *V* 
pnim Tfurn Uv§^tt K«XAirSir*# U *Atnvm4vtWt*rMu*MV,T0U+*flfiitM,nitTt. 
ry *•(•*■? rm 'EX&hm»£f , in &*&mi»t £f )<A r$4r*f tthrtut WJfytfHf* *&$ 
**t rjit Hmummh IfAfimXXitTMf Ivtp^mf *£, tttftftm^i* 9 !&****' Schol. See 
A«*afap«»M o-^i r#vf '/Jntu'ui* *•!*• however Xenophon's Hist. Gr. vi, 
t**%i*$ lUfMff X&yrrti T M t£* 5. $. 33. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



146 ARISTOTELIS 

honor, tovs *A0rfvouov9 9 aAA' a ireiropdeaup e$. Meya* 
of receiving. Ac^t/got; &€ kou to jirjOtvos SetaOou rj yJyyiS) 

Noblerniod- Vmjp€T€iP &€ TTpoOvyuCO^y KOU * ITpOf fl£P TOW €P 

aPuofiari kou €\rrv\uus fieyow etpcu, irpbs 8e tow 

Inhuman- / , . ~ x x ♦ , . x m 

new, con fUCOW fl€TpiOV T&P fUP yOLp V7T€p€X€tP XaAcTTOPS 
dact, and x , ****•'* s » » > * 

outward KOU O"€flV0V 9 TO>P 0€ pddlOP, KOU €P €K€lPOl9 fl€P 
circum- ' /i » » / » *\ ~ 

stances. a€flPVP€<TUOU OVK ay€PP€9y 6V 0€ TOl$ TCLTTClVOtS 

(ftopriKov, axrrrep €is tovs curOtvels hryvpi&o-dou. 
kou cis to, evrifia fir/ Upcu, rj ov rrpayrevovcrtv 
aXXoc' kou apyov eipou kou fieXXrjrrjp aAA' j/10 
O7T0V TLfirj fxeyaXrf rj <?pyop 9 kou oXiy&p flip rrpaK- 
tucop, fteyaXtop 8e kou opofiaurr&p. apar/Kouop 81 
kou (fyapepopuaop etpou koll <f)aP€p6<j>cXop' to yap 
XapOavtip <f>o/3ovfi€vov. kou fxeXeip Ttj9 aXrjffeias 

flSXXoP Tf T7J9 86lpJS 9 KOU X4y*LP KOU 7TpaTT€lP 15 

<fkLP€pto$' irappr)<riaxm)f yap Sia to Karacfrpopeip. 
8co kou dAijdevTUCO?, rrXr/p ocra firj 81 eipaypeiav* 
etpODPa 8e 7rpos tow iroXXow. kou irpo? aXXop 
fir/ SvpourOou {jjp aAA' rj irpbs <f)iXop' SovXikop 
yap, 810 Kal irdpres oi KoXaxes Or/rtKOt kou 0I20 
roareipol KoXaKes. ov8* davpxxxmKos' ov&ep yap 
pAya avrcp icrrip. ovSi fiprfo-UaKO^ ov yap fie* 
yaXoyjruxov to airop.pr}fWP€V€ip, aAAro T€ kou #ea#ca, 
dXXa /jlSXXop rrapppav. ovS apOpanroXoyos* ovre 



» *» V 



yap wept avrov epti ovre wept eTtpov ovre yapyt 
tpa eirouprJTOu fieXet avrcp ovff oirtos oi aXXot 
tyiytoprai) ovti ot5 errouperucos iarrtp' Stowep ovSe 

16. fc& *) Mmrm^ntn] Compare affaire. Which is much more ra 

the same use of this word in Thucy- reality the case with the truly magna* 

dides, ii. 62. ntmeus, the philosopher, as Plato ob* 

24. MprtfX'fyt] Wot given to serves. See Thest. p. 173. 
talking about other people and their 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



tremes con- 



ETHICORUM LIB, IV. 8. 147 

KOKOXoyOSy OV&€ T<QV lyOpSWy €t flff St vfiplV. HONOR, 
x v » / * tf >v i Ambition 

kcu 7repc avayKcucov rj jwcp&v r/Kiora oAo<pi//>ri- of receiving. 

K09 KOI SetJTUCOS' <nrOv8d{fiWOf yap OVTW *X UV Noblemind- 

wepl ravra. kcu 0I09 KetcrrjaOcu (taXKov ra kclXcc 
5/cot aicapira r&v KapTvipxov /cat axf>€\i/JUOP' avrdp- 
kov9 yap fiaXXov. kcu Klvqo-is Se fipadela rov 
fityoLkotyvxov 80KU etvai, teal ffxotnj /8a/>€ta, /cat 
Xi£is crrao'ip.os 9 ov yap oirtvaTiKos 6 irepl oXiya 
owovSdfav, ovSe ovvrovos 6 pufjOkv p.lya oiofievos' 
10 7} S oljvcfxavta kcu ij rayynjs 81a tovtcov. Tot- The ex- 

OVTO? fl€V Oibv 6 /XCyaXoi/ri^OS', 6 & c'AAttVcOl'Bidered. 

9 luKpo\f/vxo? y 6 §* uir€pfiaXX<oj/ \avvos. ov #ca/cot M €an _ c 

* 9 5> «■* 9 » »? f * \ minded. 

fup ovv ooKovaw twai ovo ovrot ov yap #ca- 
K07roco[ tiaiv' ^pjaprqpAvoi fie. 6 pkv yap fUKpO- 

l&yjrvxos a£ios &v dyadcov tavrov awoorepel <*>v 
£^169 ioTtf kcu eoiKe kokov €%uv ri 4k rov fifj 
ajjtovv eavrov r&v ayadcov, ical ayvo€iv 8 iavrov' 
(bpeyero yap av a>v a£io? rfv> dyadS>v y€ ovr&v. 
ov pr/p TjXldiol ye ol roiovroi Sotcovaiv elvai, 

20oAAa fiSXXop oKvrjpoL tj rouavrq 8k 8o£a Sotctt 
/cat \upovs irouiv* Zkootoi yap e(j>Uvrat t&v kot 
a£iav 9 afyioTavrai 8e kol tS>v irpd^eeop ra>v koXS>v 
kcu tS>v iTrtTr)8evpjaT(0v a>9 avdjjiot ovt€9 9 bp,ou&$ 

& KCU TG>V €KTO? dyaOtoV. Oi 8k \aVVOl TjXl0tOl2. The 

26 /cat eavrov? ayvoovvres, kol raw ein<pav<Ds ©yrious. 
yap a£iot owes rols kvripjois iirvyj^ipovatVy eira 



5. £««{«•«] See Aristotle's Rhetoric, *#/)." MICH. Were such a reading 

i. 9. adopted, these characters would much 

20. Utnpi) Prstulerim lectionem resemble^hatof Shakspeare's Hamlet. 

uipl sunt partus intelligent^, i. e. ut See also Herod, vii 50. 
£ostratius interpretatur, " acres nimis 24. %*ufot] See Theophrast. Cha- 

et considerabundi ($&**** xa ^ •*'"*"- ntcU xxiv. wi$ \tx\p$eLu*t. 

l2 



Digitized byCjOOQlC 



148 ARISTOTELIS 

honor. e£c\eyx oirrcu Ka * caOfjrt Koapjovprou kou aryrj- 

Assbitkm x „ / \ n / >» 

oittcmring.fiOTl KCU TOt9 TOIOVTOIS, KCU f&OvXoVTCU TO, €VTV- 

NM*nind'X l 7f JLaTa faMP* CtVCU OUT (DP, KCU XeyOVCTt 7T€pl 

avrwv co? Sta tovtom Ttfirj&qa'opjevot. avrtTtderou 
Be rjj fuyaXo^rvxia rj fu/e/wn/n/x«* pJSXkop Tr}s& 
XavpoTfjTOs' kou yap ytyperau paXXop kou \etpop 
iartv. ij fiev o$p fieyaXotyjrvxta irepl rifirjv earrt 
fuyaKrfPj toairep etpr/rou. 



CHAP. IV. 

Habits employed upon the desire of Honor in small things. 
AMBITIOUS— NAMELESS— UNAMBITIOUS. 

HONOR EOIKE Se KOU TT€pi TCVUTqV €tPOU apery TO, 10 

id sid all 

things. Kaddirep kp rots irp&TOts kXe\6rij rj So£etep op 10 



The object- TrapoarXqauos e\etp irpbs tt)v \x£yako->\rvyLav axnrep 

matter of x f , n , y y , 

thesehabits.#eat 7) €A€VV€pLOT7)$ 7TpOS T7/P fieyaAOTTpeTTetaP. 

a/jufxo yap abrou rod pep peyaXov acfteorctcrt, irepi 
Se ra perpva kcu ra fjutcpa StaTudeaatP rjpas a? 
Set. (oairep S kp Xrjyj/et kou Soaret xpr)par(DV\b 
fieaoTT)? kari kcu v7repfioXrj re kcu eXXetyjrts, ovrco 
kou kv Tifirjs 6pe£et to paXXop rj Set kou %ttop, 
kcu to oOep Set kcu ©$• Set. top re yap <f>tXoTtpx)p 
yj/eyoftev coy kou pfiXXop rf Set kou odev ov Set 
Trjs TtpfjS e<f>tepepop 9 top Te a<f>tXoTtpop co? ov$20 



Chap. IV. small, Magnificence of great sums. 

These habits bear the same rela- So noblemindedness is concerned with 

tion to those in the last Chapter, as great, these habits with small honors. 
Liberality and its extremes to Magni- 10. «*£««•«<*] See p. 72. 

ficence and its extremes. .Liberality 16. b*%tfa\n] See Theoph. Charact 

being concerned with the spending of xxi. wig} jiwx#«f «X#r4pj«f . 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IV. 5. 149 

€wl T019 KctXoif Trpooupovfxevov rifiaadcu. *Eor£ honor 

& * \ I v / » ~ « » * / * \ iii small 

OT€ TOP (pLAOTlfXOV €1TCUVOVfl€V CO? aVOfWOJ) KCU things. 

QiXokoXop, top 8e d<f>tXoTipop <w fierptov KOi Tbeex . 

/ jl * \ » ~ / * tremes of 

o-oxppova, Gxrirep kcu €p tow irpwroi? €t?ro/Lt€j/. J^™Habit 



b&rjXop & on irXeopa\w rod <j>iXorotovTOv Xeyo- iooie timti 

flCPOV OVK €7rl TO CLVTO del <f)€pOfJL€P TOP ^^OTtp.OP^J^^ 

dkX* eircupovpres p&p errl to pSXXop ^ ol iroAAo/, maan ' 
yfreyopre? & iwl to paXXop rj &t. dp<opvpov 8 
ovotjs rijs ^t€c^07^7^o$ , , <&? iprfprfs eoucev apj^urfbt)- 

lOretV ra aKpa' ip dls 8' iorriv wrepfioXr) kcu 
tXXetyfns, kcu to pinop. bpiyoprcu 8e rtfirj^ kcu 
paXXop rj Sec kcu fjrrop, earn 5* ore kcu g>9 Set* 
liroLvelrou yovv i) tlgus aurrj, fieaoTqs odea irepl 
Tifirjp av€OPV/JLOf. <f>aiP€TCU 8e 7rpb$ fiev ttjp <f)cXo- 

IbTtfiiav d<f>tXoTtpia y irpbs 8k ttjp a<f>iXoTifiiap 
<f>iXorip.ia 9 irpos dfi<f>0T€pa Se dpxf>OTepd irm. 
eouce 8e tout cipou kcu ircpl rds aXXas dperd?. 
apTLKCurdcu §* ipravff ol oucpoi (JhiIpoptcu 8id to 
firj (ovofidcrOcu top fieaop. 



CHAP. V. 
THE CHOLERIC— THE MERCIFUL— ANON. 

11 IIPAOTH2 5* earl pip pjeaoTqs irepl opyds, nAeox. 

CLVCDWJfJLOV 8' OPTOS TOV fJL€(TOV> a\^8oP 8e KCU The object- 
matter of 
these 

9. i^Mir] See p. 75. 6. the Magnificent. Those which I have a ' ' 

14. ktm/Mt] We have no terms to used must therefore be understood in 

express these habits or the relation a sense restricted by the matter, upon 

they bear to the previous, or the which they are said to be employed, 
extremes of the Liberal to those of 



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150 ARISTOTELIS 

nxeoi. r&v axpcov 9 eirl tov fieaov ttjv irpaorrpra <f)epo- 



Merdfoi- p*v 9 irpos rr/v eXXenfnv diroKXivov<rav 9 dvtowfiov 
oicrav. rj 8 inrepfioXr} opyiXoTq? t& XeyoiT av. to 
fMtv yap ird&os earlv opyfj 9 tcl S iftiroiovirra 

Themerci- TToXXa KOU 8lCUf)€p0VTa. *0 fi€V ofiv €<f> 61? &€15 

Koi olt Set 6pyitpfL€V09 y eri 8e Kai w 8el kcu 
ore kcu oaov ypbvov 9 eircuveiTcu* trpaos 8r/ ofrro? 
av etr/ 9 evrrep f/ irpajbrqs eircuveiTou. fiovXercu yap 
6 7rpao9 drapaxps etvcu koi /it] dyecrdcu wro tov 
ttoJ9ov9 9 aAA* g>s av 6 Xoyos Ta£y 9 ovr(o kcu hrlio 
tovtoc9 Kai eirl toctovtov \povov xaXeiralvetv. 
ap.aprd.veiv 8e SoKeT fxaXXov ewl ttjv eXXeitfnv' 
ov yap TipxoprjriKos 6 irpdo? 9 dXXa fiaXXov crvy- 
Theex- yva>fioviK09. *H & eX\ei\fns 9 elr dopyrjaia Tl? 

tremes con- ,. ^^ „ ft / , , e \ \ » 

sidered. ecrnv etff o tl orj ttot€, yeyeTOi. ot yap /IT) opyir |5 
fective. {pfievoi 4<f) oh Set r/XiOioi SoKOvaiv elvcu 9 kcu ol 
pjf &9 Set ilt)8 ore prjS oh Set' SoKel yap ouk 
cuaOdveaOai ovSe XxnrtioDai, fit] 6pyi{flfiev6$ re 
ovk elvcu a/ivvrucos. to 8e irpOTrqXaKt^Ofievov 
ave^eaOcu kcu tovs ouceiovs irepiopav' dvSpawo- 20 
2. The cho- ScbSes. *H §* vwepfSoXr) KaTa iravra pJev yiveraC 

eilC * \ X * > ft ~ V *1» « » ft - \ ~\ x 

Kai yap 019 ov oei 9 Kai e<p 01s ov oei 9 Kai fwXXov 
7} 8ei 9 Kai 6aTTOv 9 kcu 7rXeia> ypovov' ov fir/v 
airavrd ye T(p avrcp xnrap^ei. ov yap av SvvaiT 
elvcu' to yap kokov kcu eavrb a7roXXvac 9 kolv^ 
oXoKXrjpov tj 9 dxf>6pr}Tov ylvercu. ol fiev ofiv 
opyiXoi Ta\ea>9 p*v 6pyi£ovrac Kai oh ov Set 
Kai i(f> oh ov Sec Kai paXAov rj 8ec 9 iravoyrax 



8. favXtrm y&(\ Ut supra fafairmi 21. A T bwitfhxfi] See the Rhetoric, 
yk{ § &smro< »%«/. Id est, eo est animo i. 2. 
manstietus, CAM. 



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ETHICOBUM LIB. IV. 5. 151 

8e raxecof' o kou fZeXnaTov expvaw. ovfi/3aiv€i hatox, 
§* carrots rovroy ore ov Kar€\pvart rrjv opyyp aAA* Merciful/ 
avrairooiooao'tv y (papepoc €iari out rrjv ogvrrjTa, 

€LT a7TO7raV0VTai. 'YlTCpfioXrj 5* elalv OC CLKpO- Three spe- 

. ,,- ~ x x ~ , /v x . x , # ciesoftnii 

6^0AOt 0£€L9 KOU TTpOf TTCLV OpyiAOl KOLI €7Tl ItaPTl excess. 

O0€P KCU TOVVOpjOL, Ol Se TTLKpOl 8va8loXvTOl 9 X* 

jcai 7roXui/ yjpovov 6pyl{flprcu m Karexpwrt yap top 
0v/jl6p. iravka 8e yiP€TOu 9 orap avrcnro8i8<p' i) 
yap ripxopla iravti rr/9 opyrjs, rjSovrjp auri rrjs 

Iq\v7ttis ifiwoiovaa. tovtov fie pir) yipopipov to 
fidpos expvatp* Sia yap to firj iiri<f)ap€s eivai ovh\ 
ovfi7r€i0€t, olvtovs ovSels, iv airy h\ irojrai tt/p 
opyr/P xpopov Set. cart & ol toiovtoi iavrois oxXrf* 
poraroL kcu toZs pjaXiara <f)i\ois, XoActtow ic 3. x**-**** 

l&\eyofjL€P tovs i(f> oh T€ piq Set xaXeTraivovras <kgu 
pJSXXop rf Set teal irXeico xpoj/o*', K( u t*V BiaXXaT" 
Top,cpovg apev Tipxoptas rf KoKaaeow. Ty irpaoTrjriThhtx- 
$€ fiaXKop rr/p vTrepfioktfp apriTt0€p,€p m kou yapthwtrom 

~ x x / 9 /\ / xx ~ the mean 

puAAov yipeTcu apVpanriKGyrepop yap to Tipx*p*ir than the 

other. 

4. wrif/kxjf] Aristotle enumerates best friends and companions. The 

three species of anger and angry per- III. the violent and savage, which 

sons, el £»{/g«X«f— «« *t*pi — »l x*~ like the former admit of no recon- 

Xitm. The I. (whom we in pur ciliation till they have been revenged, 

language generally term hasty) are who are likewise guilty of two faults 

such as are easily provoked, which besides, first in being angry more 

is their principal fault, nevertheless than they ought, and secondly in re- 

they retain their aager but for a short taining that anger longer than they 

time. The II. the bitter and impla- ought But they differ from the 

cable, are guilty of three faults : first former, inasmuch as they do not con- 

because they retain their anger long ceal their feelings, 

and are not satisfied till they have 12. trtyaw] Cf. Homer's 11. A. 

had their revenge; secondly, because 81 — 3. 

they hide their feelings in their own i7«*i{ yti^ r% x**-* f y* **) *vr*f*ac 

breast, and do .not allow the persons xarawiypy 

who have offended mem the means «XA« y% x«j (Atwovrirhf l%u xiw 

of reconciliation ; and thirdly, be- fyga nXbiy. 

cause they are morose even to their i» sr#i*r«» liTn. 



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152 ARISTOTELIS 

nA#oi. aOcu. kcu irpo? to ov/i/Htovv ol yaXeiroi x«/>ow. 

Merciful- O #6 #COt €V TOtS TTpQTtpOV €tpT/TCU 9 KCU €K TG>V 

"^ Xeyoftepaw SrjXov' ov yap paSiov Stopurat to 
7tcw kcu rlat kcu iiri TToloi? kcu iroaov ypbvov 

6pytOT€OV 9 KCU TO P>*XP L TWOS 6p0W TTOtet T£ff5 

A slight r/ afiaprdvei. 'O p*v yap puKpov TrapeK&atvow 

mod of the OV Y€y€TOl 9 OUT €!Tt TO pXLAAOV OVT €lCt TO TfTTOV 

memo not ^ x , , „ 

blamed. CWOT6 ya/D TOW €AA€lirOPTOS €7TCUl>OVfl€V KCU 

7Tpaovf <f>ofA€P, kcu tow x a ^ eira ^ P0VTas avSpcbdets 
cor Bvvafuvovs apyetv. 6 Srj irocrov kcu ttcwIO 
irapeK&cuvcDv i^c/croy, ov pa&tov tco Xoyco mro- 
BovvaC kv yap Tots KaJff eKaora kcu ry ouadrjaet 
7} Kptais. dXXa to ye too-ovtov 8r}Xov 9 ore i) fuv 
pear) e£t? e7rcuper^ 9 Kajff rjv oh Set opyt^opteOa 
Kai e<f> oh Set kcu w Set /cat iravra tol roiaOra, 15 
cu & wrepfioXal Kai eXXefyetf %jreKrcu 9 kcu oti 
fUKpov fi€v ytvopuevat r/pefia 9 eiri irXeov Be ptSXXop 9 
eni iroXv Se a<f>68pa. SrjXop oiv ort ttjs fiearjs 
e£e<D9 avdeiereov. at pJev oiv irepi ttjv opyr/v 
e£etf dprjcrOcDcrav. 20 



CHAP. VI. 

THE OFFICIOUS— THE POLITE— THE CONTENTIOUS. 

social- EN fie reus o/uXiats Kai t$ ov{fiv kcu Xoycov 12 



Politeness. 



'Kcu irpaypA.T(ov KOtvwvelv ol fiev apeo-KOt Sokov- 

roiiteoess. 9 < / \ r^ \ , M v 
The object- <TtV €tV0U 9 Ot WaVTa TTpOS rjOOVTJV €7TatU0WT€9 KCU 

matter of 
these ha- 
bits. And 2. *{«rt(or] See ii. 6. particularly appropriate to the Athe- 
6. fuxpp r«tsx/Wf«v] Compare nians. See Thuc. ii. 137. sq. 
p. 79. 5. 22. 4f ir««] See Theophrast Cha- 
Chap. VI. ract. v. «{) i^trutms. 
The discussion of these virtues is 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IV. 6. 158 

ovdlv avriT€ivovT€$> aAA' oiopuepot Selv aXxnroi social- 
tois kvrvyyavovmv elvai. ol & i£ ivavrias ™»- ' , 

tois irpos itavra aimreivovres kcu tov Xvrrstv jroiuww-B - 
ov& briovv <f>povri^ovres SvckoXol kcu SvaepiSes are dUtin- 
ZkoAovvtou. ore p&v oiv cu elprjfievai efjet? i^€#cra/ the different 

, » v* N \ tf t f / > , ends which 

€t<TLVy ovk aorjAov, kcu on rj pear] tovtg>v errcuverrj, they have 
KaJff rjp airoSe^ercu a Set kcu cot Set, bpuouos Sk 
kcu Svoyepavei. ovopua 5* owe anroSeSorcu avrfj 
Ti 9 €OCK€ Se puaXtara <f>tXia' toiovto? yap koTiv o 

10 Kara ttjv pearju e£iv diov fiovXopeOa Xeyetv tov 
€7rt€LKrj <f>iXov 9 to oripyew irpo&Xafbovra. 8ta<p€p€i 
Si ttjs <f>tXtas 9 ori avev traBovs carl kcu tov ortp- 
yew oh bpuXei" ov yap r£ <f>tketv rj kydalpeiv 
airoS4\eTCU CKoara w Set, aXXa Tip toiovtos elvai. 

1&6/JLOUD9 yap irpbs ayvviyras Kal yv(opipx>v$ kcu ovinf- 
0€t$ kcu aovprjOw avrb irotrjaet, irXrjv Kal €v 
tKoxrrois a>$ apfiofiu' ov yap Ofxolco? irpooijKti 
ovpt}0(dv Kal odveuov (ftpbwifisiv, ov& ai Xxnretp. 
KaOoXov fiey oiv etprjreu art a>9 Set opuXr/aei, OfPoUte- 

20 dva<f)€pG)i> Se irpos to koXov Kal to <rvpxf>4pov 
OToyaaeraL tov ptf Xvirelv r) avvrjSvvetv. coikc 
pJev yap irepl rfSovas kcu Xviras elvou tos ev tcus 
ofjuXious yu/oftevas, tovtiov 8 oaas p&v airr^ iorl 
pit) kclXov tj fiXaffepov avvqSvvetv, Svayepavslj kcu 

257rpocupr/<T€T<u Xvirsiv. kolv ry irotovvTi 8 aarxrj- 
pxxrvvrjv (f>€py 9 koI TavTTjv firj puKpav, rj fiXafiyv, 
r) S ipavTicoci? puKpav Xvwqv, ovk awoSe^ercu 
aXXa 8vo^(€pap€L. diafepovrcos 8 OfJuXr/aei tol? 



11. hm$i(u] Praestat hie habitus mcratur, quum amore ductus, non 
amicitiaB, que quidem non ipsa virtus ratione, amicus recto agaU MICH, 
inter instrumenta tantum virtutis nu- 



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154 ARISTOTELIS 

SOCIAL- tV d^UOfUWl KCU TOl$ TVypiHTI,, KOU fiaXXoP T) 

fyrrov yiKopifxot?, ofAolco? 8t teal Kara ras aXXas 

Politeness. ± jl * • * » ' * ' \/# 

OiOfpOpaf, CKOOT019 a7TOP€fJU0V TO 7r/)€fl"0I>, KOI Koff 

ovto pkv alpovfuvw rb avwjSwetv, \\nreZv 8 
€vXafiovfi€v09y toIs S airo^aivovariVy kav y ft€i£o>,5 
ovveirotuvo?) Xeyco 8e Tip kclXco kcu tcq av/xepe- 
povri. Kal t)8opfJ9 8 €i>eica Ttj$ elaavOis /xeyaXrjs 
Thew- fittcpa Ximrjaei. 'O fiep oiv fl€<T09 TOIOVTOS 

ioTiv, ovk covopxurrcu 8e, rov 5c ovinjSvvovros 
6 fiev rod ^8v9 thou oTOxatyiievos px t 8t aXXolO 
Tt ap€<rK09 9 6 8 ow(o$ axf)*Xeia Ti? avr<p yiym/Tai 
ci$ xprj/iaTa Kal oaa Sea yjyr)pwr<ov 9 KoXa£ m 6 
fie iraai Svaytpaiptov etpyrcu on SvaKoXo? koi 
SvaepLf. avTiKuaOai 8e <f>alv€Tai to, a/cpa eavrois 
8ia to av<owpx>v tivai to pAarov. 15 



CHAP. V1L 

THE VAIN-GLORIOUS— THE SINCERE— THE SELF- 
DETRACTOR. 

social- IIEPI tol aura 8e oy€8ov earn kcu ij tt}? aAa- 13 



{flveias pLeo-orrjs' avcowpjos 8e Kal avrrj. ov yjEipov 

Sincerity. i>> \\ / »\/i~. ~\ \ ' \ * 

The object- ° € K0U Ta * TOtavra ? €7T€X0€IV fiaXAOV T€ yap OLV 

matter of cl8cl7}p.€V TOL 7T€pl TO TjQoS, Kaff lEKaOTOV 8l€X0OVTCS 9 
habit* \ ' f \ » \ / * «,* 

uwin ' koi pL^aoTqras etvai ray apcTas 7n<JT€vo m aip.€V ai/,20 
inl iravrcov ovtgds €\ov <tvvl8ovt€$. ev 8rf Ttj> 
crvtflv ol p.ev irpos r)8ovr)v koi Xwnju op.iXovwes' 

Chap. VII. possesses no appropriate term, although 

Aristotle now proceeds to discuss we may very well define it by the 

another class of habits, which are words sincerity or candour. Being that 

concerned with the conrereation and virtue which neither exaggerates nor 

intercourse of daily life; To express extenuates its own merits, 
the mean of these habits, the Greek 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IV. 7. 156 

etpnvTcu, irepi St r&v dXndevovrav re kcu yfrtvSo- social 
pepcop em&pjep opouos ip \6y019 kcu irpd^ecn kcu. 



rq> irpoowoirjpaTi. Sotcei 8rj 6 pip dXatfov wpoa- StMm% f' 
•iroirjTiKOf rS>v ip8o£ayp elvcu kcu pif xrjrap\0PT(op kcu 
&pei£oPG>p r) virdpyei, 6 8e eip&p dvdiraXiv dpvei- 
aOcu ra \nrdp\ovra rj eXarrco irotelv^ 6 8e peaos 
avOeKOOTO? ri9 cop dXrj0€UTLKW Kol rep (Step kcu rep 
Xoycp, ra vrdpyppra opoXoy&p eivou irepi avrop, 

KOU OVT€ P*Ltfi) OVT€ eAaTTOK COTl $€ TOVTCOV 

10 eKcurra kcu evcKa twos iroulp kcu prjdevos. €Kooto$ 
8 olof iarty TOiavra Xeyec kcu irpdrrei kcu ourto 
£jj, lap p-q twos epeKa irparrg. Kaff axrro 8e to 
pip yfrevSof (f>avXov kcu yftetcroPy to $ dXrjdh 
kclXov kcu iircuperop. ovtu> Se kou 6 pep dXrjOev 

Utikos pecro? cw> eiroupeTos 9 ol 8e fovSopevoi dpxf>6~ 
repot pip i^€/cro/, paXXop & 6 dXaffip. TlepiThe sincere 

r / & v / *\ x ~ » N described. 

€KCLT€pOV O etJTCOpeV, TTpOTepOV 0€ 7T€pi TOV OAT)" 

dewLKOv. ov yap irepi rod ip rats opoXoywug 
akrj$€Vovro9 Xiyopep 9 ov8 oaa eh dSiKiap rj Succu- 

IQoovprjv avpreipet (aXXrjs yap cur etrj tolvt dperfjs), 
aAA* ip oh prjOepo? rotovrov Swuftepovros kcu ip 
Xoycp kou ip j3i<p aXrfBevei rip njv eijtp toiqvtos 
elvcu. 8o£ei£ 8 ap b towutos iirteitcrp elpcu. 6 
yap <f)c\aXrj07is, Kal ip oh prj 8ia<f>epei dXrjOevcov, 

2sdXrj0eva.ee #eai ip oh 8ia<f>epeL en paXXop' coy yap 



5. «Jf*#] Becesnt paulo longiue in 6b quidvis et dioriimiiantis, nee per 

hoc Titk) deeeribendo Theophrastas a jocum nee satis modeste, sed ut alteri 

mtgistro. Nob enim aped turn i^mu* inoommodet Copiosos in noc dis- 

cap. i. tarn ienis est disamalaiio, quaiis crimine explicando est Casanbonns. 

iile Socraticus lnsus, quern enndem et ZELL. 

Aristoteles hoc loco inteHigk, sed potius 7. «Mi»«#rtf] See Zell's note upon 

aliquanto robustior neqnkia aimukn- this passage. 



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156 ARISTOTELIS 

social- alaypop to \fev809 evXafirjorerai, o y* kcu itajff 

/«Vrn TfvXafitlTO' 6 &€ TOtOVTOS €iraiP€T09. €irl TO 

8tDcenly * eXarrop 8c paXXop tov aXrjOovs airokkivei* e/i/xe- 
Xeorepop yap (fxilperai 8ia to hra\6€is tos irirep- • 

%2I!*" &°^*s elpai. "O 8e iiettfi* t&p wrap^oproop 5 

7rpocnroiovfi€PO? prjOePos tpeica (fxivXcp pep eoucev 
(ou yap av €\oupe T<p ifrcvSei), pdrcuo? 8e <f>au- 

P€TOl fiaXAof f) KOKO?. €i & €P€KCL TWOS, 6 flip 
86^7/9 Tf TLfJLTJ? OV XutP ^€KT09 9 <*>? 6 aXa£(DP, 6 

8e apyvpiov, 7} oca el? apyvptop, daxijpoptoTtpo?. 10 
ovk 4p rg Svpofiei & iorlp 6 dXa(p>p, aAX' ip 
rg 7rpoaip€<r€i' Kara ttjp e£ip yap kcu rip TOioaSe 
elvcu d\a£<0i> iorip, atajrep §au Tfevorrjs 6 pep 
Tip yf/cvSei avr$ yaipa>P) o 8e 8o£rj? opeyoptpos 
ff KepSovr. ol p&p odp 86£t)9 X^P lv aXa^opevopepocu 
to, Toiavra irpoowocovprai 4<f> oh ewacpos ij evSou- 
pjopurpLQ?, ol 8e K€p8ou9 9 (op teat airoXavais iori 
toIs TrsXas kcu a SiaXafieiP eort prj opra 9 olop 
pjavTip <to$6p rj iaTpop. 8ta tovto ol nrXcurroi 
irpoawoiovprcu to, Toiavra #eeu aXa£oP€voprai' eorcZO 

Tbeself-d«-y^ fa aVTOL? TO, Upt}p£pa. Ol 8 €tp(DP€9 cVl TO 

cXaTTOP Xiyopres \apt4orepoi pep to. rfffrf <f>aipop- 
toC ov yap K€p8ov? JW/ca Sokovctc Xeyeip, dXXa 

5. i 7H pul") See TheophrasL sake of glory he pretends to the goods 

Charact. xxiii. *•»{) kXm^»nimt. of nature or chance, as beauty, riches, 

11. U rip ivtdpu — *t—t£i*u] Ar- and the like ; for sake of gain to those 
rogance consists in the principle and things which bring pleasure to others, 
determination, and not in the power the reality of which is not easily/ de- 
of boasting. Just as the liar. For a tected. The first are foolish rather 
liar is not he who can but who will than vicious, or rather are both fool- 
tell a lie. And, equally as the arro- ish, and, in some degree, vicious. The 
gant, he is guilty of this fault either latter still worse, not indeed as far as 
because he delights in a lie, or for this habit is concerned, but because 
the sake of glory or gain. For the they are also unjust. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IV. 8. 157 

<f>€vyovT€s to oytcrjpop' pjaXiara 8c kou otrot tol social- 



ITY. 



cp8o£a airappovprou, olou kou ^coKpanj^ ciroici. 
oi 8c kal tol puKpa kou tol <f>aucpa irpoairoiov- nctr, y- 
ficuoi fiavKOirapovpyoi Xcyourou kou cvKaTafypourj- 
6Toi ciaiv. kou cplotc aXa^opcia <f)aiu€Tai, olou rj 
tS>v Aokcovcou co-drjs* kou yap rj irrrepfioXr) kou rj 
Xiap cXXccsfns dXafioutKOU. oi 8c ficrpuos yjmpjcuot 
rrj clp&pcia kou ircpi tol firj Xiap Cfiiro8a>p kou 
<f)ap€pa cip&pcvoficpot yapicurcs (f>aiuourcu. aprir 

WK€L(T0CU 5* 6 aXa(flDP <f)CUP€TOU r<p dXrjOevTLKco' \ci- 

pap yap* 



CHAP. VIII. 

THE BUFFOON— THE WIT— THE ASCETICAL. 

14 OY2H2 8c Kal auaTravaecof ip t$ f}iq> 9 kou social- 
cp ravrg 8iayayyr}s jictol wcuSia?, Sokci Kal euravda ■ 

clpou 6/uXia tis ifificXri^j kou ola Sec Xcyctp kou The object- 

„ . *f * t »^ \>/ a ' a > \\» matter of 

16 COS", 0/JL0U09 06 Kai OLKOVCLP. OlOlO-ei OC Kai TO €*> these habits. 

ToiovTOts Xcyciu rj tolovto&u olkovclu. SrjXou & d>s 

KOU TCCpl TaVT COTiU V7T€pfioX^ T€ KOU cXXcVsfnf 



2. 2«*f4rw] The tipmim of Socrates yvt fur/t , *$ U M lw iMp, t«* 

appears to be the ironical manner in n/M^emw^yvt- &mv»n y*t ikiyt §1 

which he always extenuates his abi- «*\eu») «» r^t^r fMr*n4%1as T 

lities when arguing with the Sophists, it** ri Sw/ut k«i rvt (i*u»t)*f 2 Urn 

This might readily be confirmed by dta v**ln{U*mi 'l«w*«v. Aspas. 
numerous passages, but the subject 6. A***>*>] »$ KAnmut IHnrmt 

cannot be easily discussed within the iT^«« Iwuemt /tint &XV W**** *** 

compass of a note. kynmm. rturt ft i+$Uvt, mt ftow, 

On self-detraction, or self-blame, ly*{drudf rim »m) /urpjrwrm l+ilu** 

Lord Chesterfield has some very good rffutu. hk & rb* #f rt{« turixum* «-*» 

remarks. rnt 4Xagm/«f i%mt •h hu+tftoymft. 

4. ^mw9mn^y»\ &mvn*+m*rf(- Schol. Par. quoted by ZELL. 



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158 ARISTOTELIS 
AovT€t fkn/wAoxoi 8okov<tcp curat kcu <f>opTtKoi> 

The mean yXc\6pjEPOl TTOVTW* TOV ytkoiQVj KCU ftoXXoP OTO- 

tno^'ge. x a &l UV01 T °v y*Xarra irotr)<rcu tj rod Xeycur 

neraUv con- »/ % \ x *» \ / . * . 

admd. cvayriijuova kcu fir/ Xwretp top aKcarrropjepop 01$ 
8c pajr avrol av clirovrcs fujOcp ycXotop roiV tc 
Xcyowrt 8v<r)(cpatPOPTC$ ayptot kcu (TfcXrjpol Sokov- 
aip curat, oi & 6/ifttAifc ttcu^optcs cvrpchrcXoi 
irpoaayopcvoPTOt, olop cvrporrot* rov yap rfOow 

CU TOUWTCU SoKOVCt KIPT)<T€IS CIPOU, WTWCp 8c TO, 10 

acopxira 4k t&p Kiprjaccop Kpipercu, ovrco kcu to, 

Buffoonery jjfefy. 'J&TTlTroXd^OPTOf 8c TOV ycXotOV, KCU TCQP 

often coo- irXeioTcop \cupoPT(op Tff ircudia kcu irp o-tcconrTCtp 
puaXXop if 8*1, kcu ol fi&fwXoxoi cvrpcarcXoi 
irpoaayopevoPTcu w yapicprcs. ore 8c 8ia<f>€pov<ri,\5 

The mean KCU OV fJUKpOV, CK TG)P &pr)p*P(OP SijXoP. Tw 

particularly , ^ «t » ~ ^ ' * X t ' • ' . 

described. pLCCTTJ O 6f€l OtKCVOP KCU tj emd€£LOT7)S COTLP TOV 

& eirtSc^iov carl TOiavra Xcyctp kcu okovcip ola 



2. fr»(M\'»x"] Cur Gnecis dicantur blandis verbis, et risum sacrificanti 

Scums 0«pM&«;gM ( varia redditur ratio, moventibus uterentur, ut facilius quid 

Scholiastes Grscus frm/MXix*** P™- impetrarent. Hinc factum ut qui- 

prie ait ease aves, que cibi avidissima? cumque ridiculis uterentur dicereotur 

soleant etiam X*xui r*V fimfUtg, cap- /3«pMX/g«. G1PH. 

tantes si quid ex hostiis in iis reli- 5. •/ ft p4f] 

qumrum remanserit, et hinc dictos et Now by two-headed Janus, 

Scums hoc nomine, quaai ut aves Nature hath framed strange-fellows 

ilia undique cibum, tta et Scurne in her time : 

undique captent risum. Ex Suida Some that will evermore peep through 

hanc verbi rationem et originem elkao: their eyes, 

fUtp&ix™* proprie esse, qui dum vie- And laugh like parrots at a bagpiper ; 

than unmolentnr iis astant emendf- And others of such vinegar aspect, 

cantos particulam aut dolo captantes, That they'll not show their teeth in 

qui, quia de plebe et viles fere faerint, way of smile 

fame factum ut oranes vilioret et nil- Though Nestor swear the jest be 

lius fei homines dtcantur fim/uxJz*, laughable, 

qui rursus mendici hostiarum, quia Mereh, of Venice, I. 1. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IV. 8. 150 

t$ hri€uc€i kou iXcvOcpup apfiorret' &rri yap riva social- 

t ~ ' \ ' * a ~ / \ ITY. 

Trpeirovra r<p TOtovrxp Xeyeip ep irauoias /xtpet kou 
okovcip, kcu t) tov iXevdeplov 7rcuSia Staxfrepci rr}f Wtt 
tov ap8pairo8a>8ovs, kou ad tov irerrcuSevpiepov 
5#cal diraiSevTOV. tSot & av rty kou 4k t&p K&fjup- 
Swop tS>v ttolXouwp kcu tS>v koup&p' tois fi€P yap fjp 
yeXocop ij ouaxpoXoyia 9 toi? 8c fiaXXou rj inrovoia* 
SuMpepet & ov puKpov ravra wpos evvyjipxHrvpipt. 
irortpov o$p top eiJ crKamrovra opioreop Tip Xeyetp 
10 a 7rpeir€L eXevOepltp, rj r<p firj Xwrelp tov okovopto^ 

7f KOU T€piT€tP; 7) KOU TO y€ TOIOVTOP OUOplOTOP \ 

aXXo yap aXXcp /uoijtop t€ kou rjSv* rocavra 8e 

kou okovo'ctou' a yap xmopuivti cucovcdp, ravra 

Ka\ iroielp Sokci. ov 8rj Tap Troirjaci' to yap 

16 cKtopcpua XocSoprjpcd rt iorrip, oi 8c popuoderou evca 

\oi8op€LU KCoXvOVClP* ZSei & ICW KOU CTKGrtTTHV. 

8ri \apUt9 kcu *X*v64pios ovt<ds e&i, olop vofio? <op 
iavTtp. toiovtos p.€p o$p 6 puio-o? iorlp, €tr hrv 
Se&os eiT evrpaireXos Xeyerai. 'O 8k ficopoXoxo? The ex- 

# »\«v/ \v« *% v ~ tremts com- 

107]rrTG)P CO-Tl TOV ytXotOV, Kat OVT€ tdVTOV OVT€ TG)P pared. 

aXX(op onr€x6p£P09, €i yeXarra iroir)o-€i 9 #cai rocavra 
X4ya>v cap ovOep ap tnrot 6 \apUt^j tpia & oil? 
av olkovo-ou. 6 & aypio? 6ty to? roiavra? opaXia? 
axpeio^' ovOcp yap o-vfifiaXXo/JLCPOf ttoatc 8voy*~ 
25paiP€i. 8ok€l 8e rj apairavais kou r) rraiSca ip r<p 
{Hup elpac avayKalop. rpei? odp al €tpr/pL€POu ip 
T<p fii<p pveo-OTriTesy eioi 8e iraaai irepl Xoycop tip&p 
Kal irpd^cop KOtvcopiap. 8ia<f>€povo-L & art rj fiep 

5. t«w **f*tjZiZt] See Hor. Are our own country, in the times of 
Poet 261. sq. The reader may com- Charles II. and George I. 
pare the annals of dramatic poetry in 25. kUnt*i#ti\ Compare x. 4. 



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Wit, 



160 ARISTOTELIS 

-social- ircpl ak-qOeuiv cotip, cu 8e ircpl to tj8v. r£tv 8e 
.7T€pl rrjv rjSoPT/p i) pep ep reus ncuSuuf, r) 8 ep 
reus xara top oXXop filop ofukUus. 



CHAP. IX. 

BASHFULNESS. 



Bashful- IIEPI 8e aiSovs £9 tipo? aperijs ov irpoar/Keilfc 

hmbit Xeyetp' ir&Bei yap puKKop eoutep ^ eijei. opl^eroub 
yovp <f)6fio9 rvs a8o£ias> arroreXelTai 8e Tip irepi 
to, Setpa (j)6fi<p irapcnrXrjo'iop 9 epvOpaupoprou yap 
o\ axcryyvopepoi, ol 8e top daparop (f>ofiovpepot 
a>Xpub<np. acopaTtica 8rj <f)atP€Tat irco? eipai apxf>6- 
Tepa 9 owep 8ok€l 7ra0ovs paXXop rj ejjeco? elpat. ovlO 
iratrg 8 rjkucia ro iraOof appa^ei, aXXa r# pea m 
olopeOa yap 8eip tow tt/Xucovtov? alSrjpopas eipai 
Sea to ttoj$€i {fibpra? iroXXa apapTapecp, wro ttjs 
alSov? 8e KcoXveaOat. kou eiraipovpep tcop pep peeop 
tow cuSripopas, wpeafivTepop 8 ovSels av €7rat-i5 
peaeiep ori aAoyypTqXos' ovOep yap olopueOa Seep 
avrop Trpdrreip e<f> 0I9 earlp aXoyypr). ovSe yap 
emeucovs earlp rj altrxvpr), etwep yiypeTcu cVt tois 
(jyavXois* ov yap irpa/cTeop to, TOiavTai el 8 eari 



4. *i{) ft alhvt] In hoc capite sequitur. Plutarchus pudorem non 

agitur de verecundia seu pudore, utrum virtutem, sed calcar et stimulum ad 

etiam sit in numero moralium virtutum omnem virtutem esse dicit Plato in 

recensenda. Cicero quidem in Parti* ' Protagora inquit, deum hominibus 

tion. Oratoriis post enumerationem donasse pudorem et justitiam ut essent 

aliarum virtutum, earn postremo loco civitatum ornamenta et vincula et 

recenset, et non virtutem nominat, sed al trices amicitias MAG. 
earn dicit esse custodem omnium virtu- 6. &$<«*] See the Rhetoric, ii. 6. 
turn, qu8B dedecus fugit et laudem 



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AR1ST. ETHIC. LIB. IV. 9. 161 

to fiev Km aXrjOeiav aicrxpa to $6 Kara 8o£av, 
ovOkv 8ia(f>€p€i % ovSerepa yap irpajcria^ gktt ovk 
ouoyyvreov. <f>av\ov 8c kcu to etvcu toiovtov olov 

TrpCLTTttV Tt TCOU €UCT)(p&V. TO 8 OVT&S C\€tV <*OT 

&el 7rpai;€t€ Tt tS>v toiovtqw axayyvca-Qax^ kcu 8ta 
tovt oieadcu iwtetKrj ctvat, arowop* tiri Tots e#cou- 
0-1019 yap 7) ou8co9y €kcdv 8e o iTrtet/cr/s ov8£ttot€ 
irpa^et to. <f>av\a. €tj] 8 av rj al8m ££ inroOia-ea^ 
eiri€iK€9 % €£ yap wpd^ai 9 axoyyvovr av' ovk coti 

lofic tovto irepl ray apera?. el 8 tj avauryyvria 
(f)dv\ov kcu to prj aiSetadat to cucrypa TrparrttV) 
ovOev pJSXKov to TOiavTa irpaTrovra cuaryyvtaOat 

> / > v & » ©p e > / » ' • x x ' 

€7Tl€tK€?. OVK €OTl OVO 7] €yKpaT€ia ap€T7J 9 OAAa 

Tt? piKTrj' 8€LX07)O-€TaL 8e 7T€pl aVTTJ? €I> TOtS VOT€- 

\bpov. vvv 8e ire pi StKcuoavvrjs ernco/iev. 



11. tiMurxvrri*] See Theophrast 14. vrripv] In the seventh Book. 

Charact ix. ntf kuurx******* 



M 



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INTRODUCTION TO BOOK V. 



As in order to arrive at a knowledge of the species, 
we must first consider individuals*, in other words, to 
know the abstract we must first consider the concrete, so 
to discover the nature of Justice (Sixawo-ww)), we must first 
consider that of just actions (Mxeua) ; and if we learn what 
these are, we shall learn what are unjust actions (aouta), 
and consequently what is Injustice (abixia,) ; for the same 
science is of contraries, though the same habit (?£*$) is 
not b . 

If then the concrete (Sixoua) be used in more senses 
than one, so will the abstract (SixaiocrtJvi)), and so will their 
opposites o&xa and o&ixf* : and if the latter so also the 
former. The terms o&ixol or SBtxos are used in more 
senses than one, for they imply one who transgresses 
the laws (Tagavopi;), and also one who in the distribu- 
tion of this world's goods gives less and takes more than 
he ought (£ih<to$). Gives less, not that he. always abso- 
lutely gives less, for when evils are to be shared he gives 
the greater evil to his neighbour ; nevertheless as the 
greater evil is the less good, he may be said always to 
give less good. 

a aii) V Uri mmt fy$ umHxmr •» Post ii. 12, 23. The whole chapter 

ym^ rm tylrnXfUf Xiyu ri vyntdf i deserves the most attentive perusal 

2a,T^if, «XX* ft «*rr\ j} tTlu A$fl**f. by those who wish to be acquainted 

fa.** vt ri xafi**crt9 tyfastcu t, rh with the admirable method by which 

mmi4Xtu. }<i h7 kwb rSn iuJi»*mi Aristotle proceeds to investigate his 

!«•) rk tmliXtv /tivmfiaiwf. nrnt y«{ definitions. 
ml Ipmqtuat Xc^nw f/ix^t U rut b See note, p. 170, 6. 

j*mJ*X*u n U r$*s Atafif**. Analyt. 

M 2 



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164 INTRODUCTION. 

Since then the a$ixo$ is he who is Trotgavofjios and afvico?, 
Injustice will be, an efc irotg&vofiog and an ?£k flAeowxTix^. 
Consequently Justice will be an ?fif vo/u'/m), (observant 
of the laws), and an ?£i$ ev io-o'tijti or I<nj, (observant of 
equality). 

But since the laws inculcate the practice of universal 
Virtue, and forbid all Vice, an ffij voplpvi is that which is 
observant of universal Virtue : and therefore this Justice, 
which is termed universal, will not differ from Virtue, 
except in being relative, Virtue having regard only to 
one's self, but Justice having reference to others as well as 
to one's self. And therefore all further discussion of this 
division is needless, having been already included in the 
consideration of Virtue. 

It remains then for us to discuss the other division of 
Justice, which is a part of the former, bearing the same 
relation to it as a species to a genus, or a part to a 
whole, and therefore called particular justice (p*f <xig $txo»- 

OTW1J.) 

Now the class of actions upon which this is employed, 
is the distribution and division of this world's good, for 
when a man is just or unjust with respect to other actions, 
that kind of Justice or Injustice is expressed by a word 
specifying the particular act. Thus if a man commits 
adultery he is called an adulterer, but if he is guilty 
of this crime to obtain money by it, he is rather called 
7r\eovix.Tri$y sc. &hxo$. It is clear, therefore, that the pe^ixq 
a8ix/a, and pepixr) foxaiocruwi are used in a different sense , 
from the o\y\ ahxla. &c. the one, namely the former, being j 
on all actions, the latter upon those only which regard 
this world's goods. 

Now since men stand in two relations in this life, one 
in relation to the state, the other, in relation to each 
other as individuals, there will likewise be two kinds of 
Justice, one belonging to the former, the other to the 
latter. The first of these is distinguished by the name 
of Distributive Justice, the latter of Corrective Jus- 
tice. The former regulating the rewards or punish- 
ments issued by the State, the latter the voluntary or 

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INTRODUCTION. 165 

involuntary dealings of one man, in his private relation, 
with another. 

Now since in the distribution of the State-rewards 
regard must be had to the merits of Individuals to be 
rewarded, (and that merit is measured by their aglet, 
according to the degree in which they contribute to the 
object of the state,) this Justice must observe two ratios ; 
a ratio of the persons to be rewarded, and a ratio of the 
rewards to be distributed. That is, if the persons be un- 
equal they shall receive unequal rewards, and if equal, 
equal ; and so on. But that proportion which consists of 
two ratios is Geometrical Proportion; consequently the 
Distributive Justice must be according to Geometrical 
Proportion, and the rules which apply to one, will apply 
to the other. Thus let A, B, be two persons, a, ft, the 
rewards they are respectively to receive. Then 

A : B : : a : ft 
A : a : : B : ft 
A + a:a::B+ft:ft 

or A + a : A : : B + i : B. 

That is, A rewarded is to his original state as B rewarded 
is to his original state. 

But in the case of Corrective Justice, no regard is had 
to the persons of the Individuals who have done or 
received the wrong, for in this case all in the eye of 
the law are equal. When injustice therefore has been 
committed in the private dealings of men, and one man 
has more and the other less than he ought, their ori- 
ginal ratio is lost, and this the law strives to correct, 
by reducing the injured and injuring party to their 
original state, or to a similar ratio as before. It merely 
therefore considers one ratio, that of the things, and 
consequently acts according to Arithmetical Proportion ; 
by how much the greater exceeds the middle term, taking 
from it and adding to the less. For by how much the 
less falls short, the greater exceeds the middle. 

The following Analysis will more clearly show the 
divisions of these habits. 



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166 INTRODUCTION. 

Hebtive habits. 



I 



(In absolute goods.) (In all things.) ( In absolute goods.) ( In all things.) 



1 \ I 1 

Of the state Of social life Of the state. Of social life. 

Distributive Corrective ( \ 

Justice. Justice. In Involuntary In Voluntary 

In Geometrical In Arithmetical compacts. compacts, 

proportion. proportion. I Buying, 

\ 1 Selling, 

Force. Fraud. &c. 



The following passage from Plato will shew how 
much in the treatment of this subject Aristotle was 
indebted to his suggestion. % ft*v atqsrig o5r» yiyvoyAr^ 
fU<rov «v i%Qi f*>ovot$Xix*l$ xa) o\jftox£aTixijf *oAirt/a$, yg as) M 
(j,e<reveiv tijv mXmtair SouXoi ydq dv xa) SwTTOTa* oux av ttots 
yivowro p/Xoi, ovSe sv foatg rifjLalg hayoqsvopevoi pauXoi xa) 
cnrouoaloi. rolg ydq avhoig rot *<ra avura ytyvoir' ay, si fttj rvy- 
yam rov (Lsrgov, fod ydq ajj^irsqa ravra OT&<reoov ai iroXnslai 
TXijpowvTai. iraKxibg yap \oyog dKrfirig »y, oog Wor^g piXorijTa 
ohrsgyatyrai, \Lakx piv 6g9ao$ elgrfrou xa) sfLpsXabg, rj r\g 8* sari 
irors \<rtn\g v\ touto avro 8vvajuiy»), fod to /jmj <r$o$qa (raQyg slvou 
trfyfoqa \\iJag foaTaqdrrsi. SuoTv ydq JtroTiJTOiv o5<raiv, fyuovu/xoiv 
jwiv, fgyco S« efc TroXXd (rye^ov Ivavr/ajy, tijv ftev iriqav tig rdg 
rijxcig ttoutol iroXjg Ixavrj iraqayayslv xa) irag vojxoflenj^, tjjv fj&rqcp 
7<njv xa) (rratfim xa) dgiifwo*, xXfyco direviwoov slg rag foavopdg 
avzfiV rrjv 8e a^flsoraTijv xa) ag/o-njv iO-0-njTa ovxirt j&a&iov wavr) 
J5«v b . Aio$ yoiq 8jj xg/cij fori, xa) rolg dvtganroig as) o-fjuxqd 
fisv hragxsl, frav $« o<rov av «ragxe<r*j woX«nv 5j xa) f$jwrai;, 
wavr dyatd dwegyagsrar rep [Lev ydq psltyn tXsico, t<2 Se l>Jcr» 
tovi (TfjLiKgorsga vsfLsi, pMrqxa &«8o0<ra trqog ryv avroov <pu<rtv 
Ixariqcp, xa) ty xa) rifiAg /xe/$o<ri /uiv trqog dqsrvjv as) peigovg, 
rolg hi rovvavrtov syov<nv dger^g re xa) ira&siag tJ frqirov exa- 

« Arithmetical Proportion. b Geometrical Proportion. 

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INTRODUCTION. 



167 



Ti$oi$ dirovifLci xctrci \Ayov. irn yoiq 8ij tow xo) to voAjtixov 
fywv sif) rour avro tJ S/xa/ov •, 

The rest of this book is then employed in the dis- 
cussion of certain questions relative to the definition, 
and explaining the difference between the actions done 
from habit and not from habit, which will be better under- 
stood by consulting the following table. 



RELATIVE HABITS. 
Particular Justice and Injustice. 



Extreme on the side of 


Mean* 


Extreme on the side of 


excess. 




defect 


rw *Xf«f. 


r> /»!#»» or Zrw . 


ri iXmrrtf. 


J&»i«, the habit. 


)tM*vm f the habit. 


No habit. 


huh. 


i*»» 


JUmw. 


Shm*. 


)/«»«#. 


timttfUMt. 


klUnp*, the act. 


^M^r^y*^*, the act. 


rnJirnh n or +m. 


iitMtTw— must always 


&*4U#«'£«yi7»* 


&t»u*4w— must always 


suppose an lUiMv/MNf. 


1 


suppose an Auf. 


No habit. 


No habit. 


No habit. 


ftn i* *rpMi(in*f. 


ph I* +pm{ins*f. 


fin i» r^Mu^Mf, 


JOtMH ***t. 


Vxwtt «*t. 


*htm»V(Atfif «m$, 




more correctly 


more correctly, 




)inm*vpi94f, 


0X*rr<p«fMf. 




reduced to justice or 






equality. 




&4K«t rs, or «•** , or 


Ittuumftm or 


«3<««i> « or 


fiKttfin, the act. 


V»tu»9 n, the act. 


&\*(Mi, the sufferance. 


mXtKtTws, or 


%i»mm Wf&TTU *m% 


£3mmi *m*X u *"* 


£hm,m *{*ttu 


or • 


or 


nark r«p/3i/3sf*#f . 


But 
tutrk rvfA&tfitiMht is, 

l 


»«r& f»f*Pt&n*h. 


c 


i 


\ 

fin kyi99»t**fi . 
or 


1 


1 


|j%* /»« *pfavktv**s h 9 


arvxnf**- 


i/w^m^i. 


sc. 1m fi>/»*» *«2 «XX« 


*a.{*\iyui 


****** 


vaAf. 


\ \ 


1 


I 


v «vry, 




£xx« ^« 


IX T^MWfiriWf. 


c DeLej 


rg. p. 757. See also Gorg. 


p. 508. 



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ARISTOTELIS 

ETHICA NICOMACHEA. 

LIB. v. 

CHAP. I. 

Of Justice and Injustice. That there is a universal and a particular 
Justice and Injustice. 

IIEPI 8e StKCUOCTVW]? KCU dSlKldf tTK€7TT€0P 9 The mean- 
v / / 9 /> v ingofthe 

irtpi TToias re Ttryxapovap ovcrau 7rpag€is 9 kou terms ap- 
iroia /jLecroTrjs iariv i) Sttcauoo'vin), kcu to SIkcuop these habits 

/ / * *\ /i « ~ v > \ and their 

rtj/coj/ fie cro v. r/ oe criccy^ ?7/mi> €cttg> *ara n?* acts, «x- 

-»\ '/l * ~ / « ~ * V * min « d and 

&aVTT)V fJLtVOOOP TOIS 1TpO€lprifl€VOl9. Op<0fl€V Oi; defined. 

iravras ttjv Toiavrrjp l^iv fZovXo/ievovs Xeyeip 

StKouoa-vmjPf dxf> ^y wpaKTiKoi t&p Sikoli&p €ioi 

kou d<f>* fy 8lkcuoit pay overt kcu /SovXoptou tol 

SiKata' top avrop 5* Tpowop kcu wept dSiKia?, 



CH4*. 1. 
The thirty-third Chapter of the 
first Book of the Magna Moralia, 
contains a very clear and intelligible 
analysis of the important parts of this 
book. 

8. k<p* nt liMMssirfmywri ttai (hi- 
Xnrm ret )/»«u«] From which they do 
just acts, and Itaoe the will to do them. 
Aristotle adds the will, in order to sepa- 



rate them from the intellectual habits, 
into which the will does not enter as a 
component part He who possesses 
the science of medicine, whether he 
will exercise it or whether he will 
forbear, still possesses the intellectual 
habit, the science ; but he only pos- 
sesses the moral habits of justice or 
temperance, not who can but who has 
the will to exercise them. 



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170 



ARISTOTELIS 



a(j> fa aSiKOvac kcu /3ov\optcu ra aSuca. Sto 
kcu tj/jup irp&rov a? £p TV7rq> inroKeicrOco Tavra. 
ovSe yap top airrov ex^i rpowov eiri re t<op 
iirumifiSw kcu Svpdpje&p kcu iirl rwv e^ecop. 
Svpafju? pep yap kcu emorr/firf 8oK€i t<op kvavrudvb 
7] avrrj €lpcu 9 eljis 5* rj kvaprla t&p epaprixop ov 9 
olop cbro T7}9 vyicias ov Trparr^rai ra ipaprla, 
dXXa to, vyuiva /jlopop* \4yop*p yap vyietpm 
That the fiaSlfap, otop fiaSlgg ax ap 6 vytatpa>p. IIoA- 

one habit XaKi$ u€P ovp ypcopiCercu 7] tvavria etts airo rwio 

may bed--, /* ' ** * f ' , N \ , 

covered €PaPTlOS y TTOAAaKLS 0€ CU €g€l? CC7TO TG>P V7T0K€l- 
from its / # , / \ e » *./ 9 j / v e 

contrary fJLWCOP €ttP TC yap 7) CV€gia fj (f)aP€pa, Kai 7J 

both from KCt)(€^ia <f)aP€pa yiP€T0U 9 KCU €K T&P €V€KTLK(0V 
their *uo- f , ., x , , ^ , , , , , 

jects. 71 €V€£UZ Kai €K TaVTTJ? Ttt €V€KTlKtt. €1 yap €OTlP 

7j €U€^ia tcvkpottjs aapKO? y apaytcrf kcu ttjp *a;(e- 15 
jgiup eipcu fiaporrjra aapKos koI to evekriKOP to 

WOiTfTiKOP WVKPOTqTOS €P <TO/9#Cl. OLKoXovOei & 0)9 



4. l*irm/A*t m) iimfpc**] %»fAfu$$ 
Xlyti r^» &»Xf»r*«fer *«) frr*{M*r. 

Schol. 'Ewt^x is not here used in 
the strict sense to which Aristotle 
afterwards confines it. 

6. Vfrt V A IratrW] He who possesses 
the science of physic knows and can 
administer whatever is conducive to 
health or to disease, for his science 
takes cognizance pf both, of opposites, 
and is employed upon both. But 
the satne habit is not employed upon 
contraries, cannot produce contrary 
1pya. Heakhy acts can only proceed 
from a healthy habit, unhealthy acts 
from an unhealthy habit. He only 
who has the habit of justice can 
perform just acts, and he only who 
has the "habit of injustice perform 
unjust acts, neither quoad the habit 



can the just man perform acts of 
injustice, nor the unjust man acts 
of justice. Consequently just acts 
must be performed by a just man, 
and if we know one, we may from 
it discover the other, and vice vena. 
A very learned dissertation upon the 
word Ivruftis, and its particular use in 
Aristotle, will be found in Trendelen- 
burg's Edition of Arist. De Anima, 
p. 295. 

11. art rSf wramftitmi] Ab lis 
rebus qua? pariunt eos et qus sum 
tamquam fundamenta Strataqoe flic- 
rum. Victor. 

17. At U)rl #«xv'} 0v ykt At)AXJC 
if M ri **Xv h \ntwt* *«*• rnt lm+- 
ifat &l*&ir*i. Vw ^ pXtiv, in U 
T»«vx«Tf ffirt, *r$\\*x£f Xtypbtv,** 
fjufit* *4\\*x»s $v \iyvnu. Zrrt \m\ 
vfrrtv, tfn U rev fmripvVmnp* ytm- 



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ETHICOBUM LIB. V. 1. 



171 



eir* to woXti, 4au Oampa irX^ova\m Xeyryreu, kou 
%0arcpa nXcovax&s Xeycaffaij dlov €t to Sikguop, 
Teal to Jl&ucov. eouce 8* irXcovax&f Xeye&dou yj 
Slkouoctvvt) kou if aSucia, AXXa 8ia to ovveyyvs 
teivou ttjv bfuovvfuav avr&v XavBaPtt kou ov\ 
tdcrmp eni t&v iroppco SrjXr) fiaWov' if yap Star 
(f)Opa TroXXr} ij Kara ttjv tbtav, dlov ort xaXecrat 

IcXriff OpXDVVpJtoS 7} T€ V7TO TOV HV\€lHt T&V t$>(DV 

kou 17 tol9 Ovpas Kkeiovcriv. Ei\r)<f>tko 8r/ OThatJW 

10 aSt/co? woo-aycos Xiyerav. Sotcei fie o T€ irapavopjos i?*l^. 
aSttco? hvou kou 6 7rX€ov€Krr)$ kou 6 avtaoS) ©ore ST^xioi*. 

SfjXoV OTl KOU 6 StKOUO? €OT0U O T€ POfJUfWf KOU*™' 

6 t<r09. to fi€U Sikouov apa to vo/itfiov kou to 
io'OUj to S* aSiKOv to wapauo/iop kou to avurov. 
l&eirel 8e kou irXeovcKmjs 6 aSiKO?, 7TC/K luyaBa 
eorou, ov Trdvra, AXXa irepl oaa evTv\ia kou 
arvxid) a iaTi filv olttXS)? Ah ayaOa, Ttvl 8 



prinftrm. Schol. See the Topics, 
i. 13. which furnishes the beet com- 
ment upon this passage. 

A. mXXk }*« to *vnyyv$] But OH 
Account of the close affinity of the 
things themselves, the equivocation in 
their names is not so clearly seen, as it 
is iu things which are very remote in 
their natures from each other. Thus 
the equivocation in the term key, (to 
-suit the illustration to our own lan- 
guage,) meaning either the key of a 
•book, or the key of a lock , as the things 
themselves to which the term is applied 
are en widely and specifically different, 
is instantly perceived ; but the equivo- 
cation in the term junice, applying 
either to a particular justice, or to 
justice universally, the things them- 
selves being closely allied and differ- 



ing from each other, only as a part 
from a whole, is not so easily seen. 
The word iptnopM corresponds to our 
term equivocal, (Aristotle not recogniz- 
ing the division into Analogous,) as 
rvM»spM» corresponds to univocal. See 
Categ. c. i. 

17. k*\Zt <U) iymiA] Those things 
are said to be simply good which are 
so considered in themselves, and with- 
out any reference to the effects which 
they may produce. Thus health , riches, 
beauty, &e. are simply or absolutely 
good, though very frequently, rela- 
tively speaking, positive evils. Thus 
too, poverty is an absolute evil, though 
in many instances a relative good. In 
those persons, for instance, upon whom 
it acts as a task-master, and brings 
them from vice to virtue, &c. 



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172 ARISTOTELIS 

ovk act. oi & avOpwroi radra evyovrai kcu 8w- 
Kovatv' Iki & ovy aAA* cvyeaOcu put* to. aarXm 
ayaBa kcu avrol? ayaBa tipai, cupcurOcu Se ra . 
CLVT0I9 ayaBa. 6 & aSucos ovk act to ir\4ov 
oupeiraiy aAAa kcu to eXarrov cVl t&v olttXwS 

KOKG>V' aAA* OTl SoK€t KCU TO fUiOV KOKOP CFfaBoV 

Trow elvcu, tov & ayaBov iorlv 17 7rX€OV€^/ia, 8ta 

TOVTO 8oK€l 7r\€OV€KT7)9 tlVCU. €OTt & CtWCTOy" 

touto yap 7T€pte)(€i kcu kolvov. 



CHAP. II. 

That UniversalJustice is a habit of perfect obedience to the laws; 
and consequently as the laws demand the practice of every Virtue, 
and abstinence from every Vice, Universal Justice is Universal 
Virtue, and differs from it only iu being relative. 

M^lTare EITEI 8 6 7rapavofi09 clSlko? y\v 6 Se v6pLip.o$S 

H*m*. 8iKat09 9 8rj\0V OTL TTOLVTa TO, 1/OfUfld €OTL 7TW 

SUcua' to, T€ yap iapurpAva wro ttj? vofiodeTUcr}? 

VOflipa €OTl, KCU CKOOTOV TOVTGDV SUatOV €IVCU 

<f)afi€v. oi 8e vopuoi ayopevovac 7repl amain-cov, 
OTO\a^6fi€i/oi t) tov Kocvrj avfi<f)€povT09 iraxTiv r)\b 

TOLS aplOTOL? T) T0L9 KVplOlS, KaT ap*TT)V T) KttT 

8. Im t aW«] That is to say, the *£* Ytum§t, Sri ph nmrk r*» Ufa 

notion of more and less is included in Xiy^fwit ><*«u#nW m-Atr* rk Ufup* 

the word inns. The unjust man is )<*«#«, aAAa nmrk rk* nuuh. n*t 

called *m(4up*( and wXutimms or 41m- U»t yk^ r*t pipus *u0ifUfit rtt rmSr» 

*t. If we make use of the term £wr«r wtu Yixmtt Ire/, **) mirk )<»•<«. ubrk 

which includes the notion of more or ft *mt mbrk A k^um, ft **ppu%& fir/f, 

less, then we must suppose that the ft 1$ ilm$ 4» tin k^trnt. Schol. 

unjust man takes more of his share of 15. rr«^«^^t»ti ft r$S ««»$ nysft- 

good, and less of his share of evil ; but {•*••*] See the discussion concerning 

if wXMtinrnt, more of his share of good, justice prefixed by Plato to his dia- 

11. irri r»f Iijmmi] *p**urtu rl logue, De Republics. 

i 

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ETHICORUM LIB. V. 2. 



17S 



aXXov riva Tpoirov toiovtov" axrre eva puev Tpoirov 
Sitccua Xeyoptv ra 7roir)TLtca real <f>vXaKTCKa tt}? 
tvScupovta? teal r&v fiopuov avrrj? rr} ttoXitikq 
KOLvecvia. TrpooTOTTei 8' 6 vofio? tccu ra tov av- 

&8pclov epya 7toiclv, diov p.r) Xehretv rqv raj^iv 
prjSe (frevyetv fw/fic phrrecv ra ottXu, koL tol tov 
atfypopoS) olov pjj fiotx€V€tv fiij& vfiplfap, tccu 
ra tov 7rpaov, olov prj Twrretv pr)8e KOKVjyopeiv 9 
bpoUos 8e tccu koto, tos akXas aperas tccu puoyOrf* 

Wpca? to. p.lv tceXev&u to, 8* awayopevcov, SpOcbs 
p&v 6 Ktipevos opOco?, \eipov & 6 aTreax^Siaa" 
pevos. Avrrf p.ev oiv r\ Sucouoovvrj apen\ pAv That the 

> x / »xx» » « n ~ » x x * * <r habit, of 

tori reXeta, aXX ov\ anrX&s aXXa Trpos erepov. which these 

\ * \ ~ ^ N / / , actions are 

KCU Ota TOVTO 7T0XXaKLf KpaTlOTT} TOW ap€TOW the object- 



12. «{»ti» pit Un nXiW] The ex- 
pression rtkt/x kprn {perfect virtue) 
k used in three senses. I. The moral 
habit of fortitude is called rtktix 
«gir« in contradistinction to natural 
fortitude. II. A union of all the 
moral habits is called riXs/a i^irn. 
and this only, correctly speaking, is 
perfect virtue. And, lastly, that habit 
is called perfect virtue which is xxrx 
rnt t0fufdrtir*, engaged in rendering 
perfect obedience to the laws. This 
is indeed very similar to the second, 
including under it every other moral 
habit, and differing from it only in 
this ; the second is considered merely 
in reference to its being a habit of the 
soul \jfys tyxni), but this in reference 
to the laws, in being relative. So that 
perfect virtue and universal justice 
are in their subject and essence (ey 
uwxuftif* xx) rip ourta) ^ e sa me » and 
differ only in the way of considering 
them. If considered as a habit of the 
spul, then it is universal virtue, if as 



preservative of social happiness, then it 
is called justice. The latter however 
is more perfect than the former, inas- 
much as he who possesses it uses 
perfect virtue not to himself only, but 
also to others. 

12. Afini Un rtktix] Compare 
Theages de Virtutibus: ?»« «■• fth 

xi^fft fyxnrm, xx) rh pi» hyirxi ri V 
. Xvnrtu, xppirtpt 3) w*nvl»xnrm xms 
ewfUkvynrxi ikknktt , rixx ft yUtrm 
xprx xx) irxpxyxtix «ri{) JXjm rin 
ypu%Xf. xx) Sxx pXt «•• WtSvftnrixi* 
Xfrnrxt ftipt rxt $v%xi ry k*yt**$xSf 
yinrxt r*0{«rtJw %xx It r# ittffuVit, 
xfyuirnf l»a Ji ** /*&{«* m-arr* iixm- 
irm$ mvrm yi{ irrj» k isii{yt*M rait 
r$ xmMtat *"**af r»t ypvxMf xm rkt 
Aprils ««•' xXknkttt. xxi \<rm k iixxi' 
•rxg rvtrxyfiM rt rxt kyttyut r£* 
ptfUtt rxt ypv%xt xx) x(trx riXi/* xx) 
irxtux't^rxrx. rxtrx yx^ it rxirx. 
Frag. Pythag. Ed. Gale, p. 31. 



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174 ARISTOTELIS 

matter, is €iVOl 8oK*l fj StKCUOOVWj, KCU Qvff COlTepOf OV0 % 

virtue, but 4$09 ovTQ* Bajupxurrb? kcu irapoifiia^ofievoi <f>OfJLeV 
" iv he Succuoavvy <TvXXr)fi8r)v ttqat apery ew." 
kcu reXeia fuaXiora apery, on ttjs rcXc/ay apery? 
Xprjcrl? ioriv. reXeia & ioriv> on 6 sx&v avryvs 
kcu 7rpos erepov dvvarai rg apery xPW& a h iXX 
ov pjovov Kaff avrov' woXXol yap iv fiev rots 
QtKcioi? rjf apery Svvavrcu ypycrOai, iv he rots 
wpb? erepov aSvvarovaiv. kcu Sua tovto €v doKel 
*X eLV ™ T °v Buutop, on apxv &vbpa 8el£ei' 10 
7rp09 erepov yap kcu iv KOiwwLa rfdt) 6 apx o>v . 
8ia 8e to avrb tovto kcu aXXorpwv ayadbv SoKei 
elvcu y hucaioavvy fiovy rciv aper<Dy> on wpbs 
erepov iortv* dXXcp yap to. avfixfripovra 7rpdrrei 9 
y apxovn y kolvcdvcd. kokiotos fiev odv 6 #cali5 

7Tp09 aVTOV KCU TTpOS T0V9 <f>lX0V9 Xp<0fievO9 TTj 

puoyOypla, aptoTOs & ov\ 6 7rpo9 avrov rg apery 
dXXa irpbs erepov' tovto yap epyov \aXeir6v, 
avry fiev obv y htKotoovvy ov fiepos apery? aXX! 
oXtj apery ioriv> ovS y ivavria ahiKia fiepo?20 
That this #ca#c/a? aXX' oXr/ KaKia. Ti Se Staxfrepet y apery 

habit differs N e , „ , „ , 

from perfect Kai 7j OlKOUOOVVy aVTTJ, OyXoV €#C T(DV €tp7JfieV(OV 
virtue, nark ¥ y x e f/ \ # 5 » \ > ' >xx» 

«* <W earn fiev yap y avrrj, to o eivai ov to avro, aXX 

3. Ii M hmrbn] Theognis v. 147. our mode of considering it ; the subjec- 

12. iXkorpn Aymfh] He glances rum formal*, or formal part of the 

at the words of the Sophist Thrasy- essence is not the same. If we con- 

machus in Plato's Re pub. p. 343.' skier it as a habit of the soul, then it 

kyfi!* In n ph oUtuutevm rt »*) to is universal virtue; if we consider it 

)/««*«*, £XX/rfi«v tymih rtf ttrt, r$Z in reference to our social condition, then 

xftiTritif « »•) fyxotrot lttfA$i(4t, m- it is universal justice. The same ex» 

num, %% T4u irubpinon «•} vni^ir«vvr«f pression occurs again and in the same 

ftoJfifi, See also the Gorgias, generally, sense in vi. 6. 

23. Urt /th ykfi fi *M] It is the When Aristotle expresses the whole 

same habit, differing only according to essence, he uses the term *-• r« n» iTmm. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. V. 8. 



175 



y /i€v 7rpo9 erepop, Succuoovw), $ Se rotaSe <F£*y, 
chtA®? aperr}. 



CHAP. III. 

That besides the Universal Justice, there is a Particular Justice. 
What it is. 

4 ZHTOYMEN 8e ye ttjv h pepet aperqs That there 

* / . v / e * / t / is a parti- 

OlKCUO<rVl>r)V eOTl yap TIS, G>9 (pOfiei/. O/JLOUDf lar injustice 
-*\\ \ >» / ~ \ f ~ ft» called «rXi- 

5 06 koi 7T€pc aoiKias tt)s Kara p*po$. aiffietov $•*$*. 
ore ecru/ 9 Kara fuv yap ras aXKas puoyOrfpLas 

6 tvepy&v aducel p£v> irXeoveKrel & ovSev, olov 6 
ptyas ttjv aawiSa Sta StiXlav r) kolkcos tnrwv 
8ia xaXen-OTrjra rf ov fSorjOrjaas yjp^pjaxri hi ave- 
lOXevdeptav' orav he irXeopeicrjj, iroWaici? koi* 
ovhefiiav t£>v toiovt&v, aKka pjjv ovhe Kara 



Chap. III. 
After Aristotle has shown that 
Hfrifm iMmuftm is an aggregate of all 
the moral virtues, he now proceeds to 
show that there is another justice, 
which is a species of virtue distinct 
from the other virtues, as one species 
from another, and from the universal 
or ffuftn Itntfvtn as a part from a 
whole. For this habit concurs with the 
other moral habits in forming universal 
justice, and is a constituent part of it. 

This assertion he then proceeds to 
prove by a consideration of the oppo- 
site habit, in conformity with his own 
observation at p. 170, 10. (wxxtmt 
ftXt y«»{j£ir«M A lf«frSu Vfyt k*\ rns 
ImprUf). If there is a particular injus- 
tice which is a part of universal vice, 
then there will be a particular justice 
which is a part of universal virtue. 
The rest of the Chapter is taken up 



with proving the minor, that there is 
such a particular injustice, and that 
this vice is the taking more of relative 
good than is fair (sc. rXwigift). For 
he who acts viciously from the in- 
fluence of avarice, timidity, and such 
evil habits is not said to be wkuAums, 
consequently he who acts from wXw- 
vigj«, acts under the influence of a 
vicious habit, or particular injustice, 
different from the above-mentioned 
vicious habits, and consequently from 
universal vice, or universal injustice, 
of which they are the constituent 
parts. That is, he acts from a par- 
ticular injustice, different from the 
universal injustice, and consequently 
there is such a particular injustice so 
differing, which is called wXmm#«. 
2dly. The object of «-X»#»i#» is dif- 
ferent from every other vice, therefore 
vXim •£/« itself is different. 



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176 ARISTOTELIS 

Trdxrasy Kara Trovrjpiav 8e ye rtvd (yfreyopev 
yap) kcu Kar dStKiav. eoriv apa ye aXXrj ri9 
aSucia w pepos rrjs oXr}?, teal aStxov ri ev pepei 

2. rod oXov aSUov rov irapa rov vopov. En 

el 6 pev rov KepSalveiv eveica pLOt\evet kcu Trpoa-b 
Xapfidvcov, 6 8e irpooTL0e\$ kcu gqptovpevo? Si 
eiriOvpiav, ofiros pev aKoXaoros 8o£eiev av eivai 
paXXov r) TcXeoveKTqSj eiceivos S &81K09, a/coXaoTO? 

3.5^ oil* SrjXov apa on Sid to KepSalveiv. v En 

irepl pev raAAa irdvra aSiKqpuara yiverai i) 10 
hravuxfaopa eiri riva poyOrfpiav del, olov el 
ifioixevaePy eir aKoXaaiav, el eyKareXiire rov 
.irapaardnjv, eiri SeiXiav, el eirdra£ev 9 eif opyrjv' 
el & eKepSavev, eir ovSeplav pjoy^6r\piav dXX* 3/ 
eir dSiKiav. wore <f>avepov on eon, ri9 d8iKia\5 
irapa rrjv oXr/v aKXrj ev fiepec, ovva>vvpx>s, on 6 
opio-fws ev rtp avTty yeveC apxfxo yap ev ra> 
7rpo9 erepov e^ovai rr/v Svvap.LV, aXX' tj pev irepi 
riprjv 7/ yprfpara rj acorrfpiav, fj el rivi e\oipev 
evi ovdpjan irepiXafieiv ravra iravra, kcu 81 20 
r/Sovr/v rfjv dirb rov KepSovs, rj Se irepl diravra 
irepl oca 6 airovSaio?. 



10. *i{) pit r&XX*] If all vicious bearing the .same relation to universal 

acts, besides their common name of m- injustice, as these do ; that is, as 

justice, are referable each to their own parts to a whole. Consequently there 

peculiar vices, as an act of adultery to in- is an injustice differing from universal 

temperance, of desertion to cowardice, injustice as a part from a whole. Of 

and so on, but every act of undue gain both the term injustice is predicated 

is referred to injustice, it is plain that univocally (r»p*tvft»{) because the 

there is an injustice corresponding to definition of their genus is the same ; 

intemperance, cowardice, and so on, both of them being relative habits. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. V. 4. 177 



CHAP. IV. 

After some observations as to the relation of the Particular to Uni- 
versal Justice, the consideration of the Universal is dismissed, and 
Particular Justice is divided into Distributive and Corrective. 

5 OTI fiep o$p ei<rl biKcuoavvcu 7r\€lOV9, KOU That the 

ft v \ t / \ \ * x , / particular 

OTI eOTl TL$ KCU €T€pa TTOLpa TTJP OKlfP apCTTJP, injustice 

SijXov' tis be Kcu oirola np, Xrprreop. &&/9icrr<U same rela- 
te \ \ VA / / \ \ v l * 0D *° *he 
OTj TO OLOIKOV TO T€ TTapaPOflOP KCU TO CLVLCOVy Universal 
.****' / / \ > * \*> the more 
5 TO 0€ OlKCUOP TO T€ POfUflOP KCU TO HTOV. KOTO, tojthe ««- 
\ y \ / «/ » / >* / equal, 

fiep ovp to irapapofiop r) rrpoTepop etprjfiepij aoiKia 
koriv. eirei 8e to olvhtov kcu to irXeop ov tolvtop 
dXX* erepop G>s fiepos 7rpo9 oXop (to fiep yap 
irXeop airap apiaop, to & olplcop ov Trap 7rXeop), 
10 kgu to glSlkop kou Tj dSiKia ov Tavra oAA* erepa 

€K€IVCDV, TO. fieP G)$ P>Cp7) TO. 8 W oXa' fiep 09 

yap avTTj r] dStKia tt}s oXr/9 a5i#c/ac, 6/xoiW 8e 
kcu 7) SiKcuoavin) ttjs fii/auocrJi^c. (oare kou nepl 
tt)9 ep fiepei 8cKatoo-vmj9 kou irepl 7-770 ip fiepei 

IbdSlKLCL? X€KTeOP> KGU tov StKaiov Kal TOV aStKOV 
a>cravT(os. *H fiep odp icara ttjp oXtjp dperfjp The consi- 

/ » / \t5k/*\^<yv deration of 

T€Tayfi€P7j OiKaioo-vPT) kou abiKia, rj fiep rrjy oArjfthe Univer- 

»~« ~ * v N -v « & x ~ /Sal Justice 

apeTqs ovcra XP 7 ! "^ ^P ? olXXop, 77 be rq? KdKia?, dismissed. 
d(f>eicrdco. Kal to SIkcuop 8e Kal to olSikop to Kara 



6. ft ergfrigw— k%*im\ That is, the equal. For as the more is contained 
universal injustice, under the unequal as a species under 

7. to £v*r«f »«) re rXtot] The same a genus, and is therefore not the same 
ratio which the more (ri irXlo) has to as the unequal, so is the particular 
the unequal (ri £«#•»), particular jus- injustice included under the universal 
tice has to uniersal justice : for both are injustice, and differs from it as a 
contained as parts in a whole, par ticular species from a genus, as a part from 
in universal justice, the more in the «n- a whole. 



N 



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178 ARISTOTELIS 

Tavras (fxu/epov a* Sioptoreov' <r)(€8ov yap ra 
iroXXa tS>v vofiipxov ra diro ttjs oXr/s apevqs 
irparrofievd ioTiv' KaJff kKaxrrqv yap apcrr/v 

7TpOOTaTT€l jjjV KCLl KOjff €KaOT7)V pXT)(Q7)piaV 

kcoXv€l 6 j/o/ioy. ra 8e irotrjTtKa rrj? oXrjs dperqsb 
iari rtbv vofiipxov oaa vevofiodeTTjTai irepX ttcu- 

StiaV Tt\V 7Tpbf TO K01V0V. 7T€pl $€ TTjS Kaff 

tKOOTOv iratSela?, Kaff 171/ airXm avr/p dyaBos 
ion, irorepou ttjs 7toXltikt}9 iariv 7) erepa?, 
vorepov Siopiareov' ov yap tareo? ravrov dv8pi\o 

Particular T * ayadtt €ll/ai KOI TToXlTn 7TaPTl. Tlfc 8* 

Justice di- ' f / x « , t \ 

videdinto Kara fiepos SiKaioavvr}? kcu tov tear avTt\v SlkoIov 

butive. ||/ aiv ioTtV €t8o9 TO lv TOLLS Siai/OLUU? TLiim V 

2. Corrcc- ^ / ^^ v „ ' ~ 

tive. xprjfiaTOov 7) Ttov aXAft)j/ oca /icptaTa tol? koipco- 

vovcrt ttJs 7roXiT€ia9 (cV tovtois yap ecm /can 5 

aVUTOV €\€tl/ KCU ICOP €T€pOV €T€pOv) , €V 8e TO 

kv Tois avvaXXaypAxxri 8iopO&TtKOV. toutov 8% 
fikprj 8vo' tg>v yap ovvaXXayfuxrtov to. fuv cov- 
ered iari tol & dKOvaia, eKovaia jxev ra roidSe 
diov TrpdaiSy G)vf) 9 dai/etcr/io?, eyyvr/, XPV "^^ ira>p<*-20 
KaTa0r)K7}, ixlaOcoais' €KOv<ria 8e Aeyerat, otl r\ 
dp\7) tS>v (rvvaXXayfiaTODP tovtwv eKOvo-to?. 7W 
8 aKovaieov Ta fiev XaOpala, olov KXoirq, fiotxeia, 
(papfxaKela, izpoayar/^la^ 8ovXa7raTia, 8oXo<f>ovla 9 
y\r€v8ofJuapTvpia, Ta 8e Plata, olov cuKia, 5ecr/ioy,26 
OdvaTos, ap7rayrj, Trr/pccac?, Katajyopia, irpoTn)- 

XaKLGT/XO?. 

10. ov y*£ U»*$ ravrii\ See the Poli- tions of each individual shall harmonize 

tics iii. 4. This is indeed one of the with and promote the final end of the 

principal objects in Aristotle's Politics, state. See the note to the last chapter 

to examine how a state shall be so of the Tenth Book of the Ethics, 
governed, that the final end of the ac- 

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ETHICORUM LIB. V. 5. 179 



CHAP. V. 

Of Distributive Justice. That it is according to Geometrical 
Proportion. 

6 EIIEI f? O T aStKOS aVKTOS KCU TO dSlKOV Thzl the 

v *~v tf \ / / t ~ , / just act (r* 

avicrov, or/Aov on teat fieaov ri eart rov avicrov. *;«««,) is a 

« &*y\* m »tt \ / u mean 

tovto o earn to lo-op ev ottolcl yap irpagei (^ r #» «). 
kcrrl to irXkov kcu to tkarrov^ iori teal to Ixtov. 
5ei oSp to aSifcov avicrov , to SUaiov Icrov' enrep 
kcu avev Xoyov Sotcet iracrtv. kirei 8e to Xaov 
fikaov, to SUatov /xeaov tc av elr/. *Eoti Se to That as far 

v w / * / . » / / N asitisa 

KTOV €V €AO)(LOTOLS OVCTW avayKT) TOIVVV TO mean it 

/ v v 9 r v / -n must be be- 

otKatop /xeaov re kcu ktov ecvat \_Kai irpos Ttj tween two 
lOieat Tio-iVy teat I) /x«/ /xeaov, t4J/g>j> (^raura o least; as 

€OTl 7TA610V Kai eAOTTOV), fj KTOV €<TTl, 0V01V, just between 
? fc\ j/ / > / v \ v , two persons. 

17 06 oiKaiov, Ttatv. avayicr) apa to otKacov ev 
ekaylcrTOLS eivai Terrapacv' oh re yap SUaiov 
Tvy\avei ov, Svo early kcu kv oh tol 7rpay/xara 9 
idSvo. Kal 7) ai)Tr) carat iaorr/f, oh Kal kv oh' 
coy yap eKecva e\ei to. kv oh, ovtco KaKelva e\ei' 



Chap. V. there are not two extremes. Likewise as 
9. tut) vpt n] These words Dr. every act of justice is relative (<r$/f «) 
Card well has omitted in his edition, that is, %U Utft *«■•*, (to use the words 
and Bekker included in brackets, of the Mag. Mor. p. 37 .) and must 
Aristotle wishes to prove that the dis- presuppose an act of injustice, and 
tributive justice must be according to consequently the injurer and the in- 
Geometrical proportion. He says, jured, the SUtxt and &i*wpttot, every 
therefore, that every just act inas- act of distributive justice must pre- 
much as it is 7<r«» or pi**t, {l^rt) ro suppose two persons as well as two 
7r«»ieSr«»)mustbe between two things, things, and must therefore be in four 
for there can be no 7m where there terms at the least, 
is not more and less, no pin* where 

N 2 



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180 ARISTOTELIS 

ei yap pa) uroi, ovk ura Zj-pvaip, aAA' £pt€v0€p 
al fuz\cu kcu to, tyKXijfiaTa, orap rj uroi fir/ ura 
f) fM7j uroi ura eymri kcu pc/juoptcu. eri *k tov 
kot a£iav tovto StjXop' to yap Sikcuop £p tolls 
8uxvofiou9 OfwXoyovai iravres kot a^iav rivab 
dtip €ivai, ttjv puevroi a£iav ou rrfv atrnjp Xeyovat 
iravrct \nrapytiVy oAA* ol pip SrjfiOKpaTCKol 4Xev- 
Oepiavy ol 8 6\iyapyiKo\ ttXovtop, ol 8 tvyeveiav. 

This justice Ol 8 OpiOTOKpOTlKol up€T7)P. J&OTIP apa TO 81- 

is thereto , , x x 9 , , , s 

w Game- kcuop apaXoyop ri. to yap avaXoyov ov pjopop tori 10 

jmctfrc fWPCtStKOV apldfWV tSlOP, oAA* oAcffff dptOflOV* 7] 
proportion, x , x , , / » \ x ' * » ' 

yap avaKoyia laorr/s tori Aoyatp, kcu €p TtTTapaip 
£Xa\ioTOis. 7} fiev oiv Si-gprffieprj ore kv Terrapo-i, 
irjXop. dXXa Kal tj oupeyrj^ r<£ yap £pl w Svoi 
XprJTac kcu 81$ Xeyei, olop w rj tov A irpos t^j/i& 

TOV B, OUTCOS KCU 7/ TOV B TTpOS T7/P TOV T. 81$ 

o$p rj tov B eiprjTac' coot tap i) tov B T€0r) 81?, 
Terrapa eorai to, apaXoya. tort 8\ Kal to Sikcuop 
£p TeTrapaiv lka\ioTOiSy kcu 6 Xoyos 6 aVTOS* 
SiyprfPTOu yap ojiouds, oh tc Kal a. corai apa 20 
coy 6 A opos irpos tov B, ovrtos 6 T 7rpo? top 
A, kcu £paXXa£ apa, at? o A 7rpos top T, 6 B 
7rpo9 top A. coot€ Kal to oXop 7rpos to oXop' 
07rep rj pofir) avpSvdfa Kap ovtcos ovpreOrj, 
dtKalco? avpSvafiet. 17 apa tov A opov r£ T icai7 



11. p4ta)iX45 kylfAtZ] Of numbers instance 
which consist of units. Such as we 
use in Arithmetical calculations. 

13. iipgn/uS?*)— tvnxnt ] Disjunctive 
—continuous. 

15. 4 rcS A] Sc. y?*wn. For 







/J 




21. it i A 7^] 
tion to this Book. p. 


See the Introduc- 
165. 



ETHTCORUM LIB. V. 6. 181 

r) tov B rip A <rv£ev£i$ to iv Siavofirj SUaiov 
eon, kou fieo-ov to Sikguov tovt earl tov irapa 
to dvaXoyov' to yap dvaXoyov fieaov, to 8e 
Sikouov avakoyov. KaXovai 8e Trjv TOtavTrjv dva- 
bXoyiav yecofieTpi/c^v oi pxrfh)yxLTiKo'c iv yap tj} 
y€CDfi€Tpucr} av/xfiaivec kcu to oXov irpos to oXov 
orrep eKarepov 7rpo9 eKarepov. Earn, & ov <Tvveyr)s why inch 

tt «»v/.>\ / 9 > a ~ * proportion 

avTrj rj avaAoyia ov yap yiverou eis aptVfJXp opos, must not be 

*v*nx 9 jn, ~ * ' '\ continuous. 

<p teat o. to fiev ovv oikcuov tovto to avaAoyov 9 
10 to 5* olSlkov to irapa to dvaXoyov. yiveTat apa 
to fiev TrXeov to 8e eXarrov. oirep kcu iiri t£>v 
epycov avfifiaiveC 6 fiev yap dStKciv irXeov €\et 9 
6 f? d8tKovfievos eXarrov tov ayadov. inl 8c 
tov KaKOv dvairaXiv' iv ayadov yap Xoyco yiveTat 
15 to eXarrov KaKov 7rpo9 to fiel^ov ica/cov' eort 
yap to eXarrov kolkov pSXXov alpeTOv tov fiei- 
£ovos, to & alperov ayadov, kcu to fiSXXov fiet£ov. 
to fiev ofiv ev el8o? tov StKaiov tovt eoriv. 



CHAP. VI. 

Of Corrective Justice. That it is according to Arithmetical 
Proportion. 

TO 8e X017TOV €V TO 8lOpd<DTtKOV> O yiveTat ev The nature 
N x / v ~ e / \ rs of the Dis- 

20TOI? avvaXXayfjuaat Kai tols eKovaiots Kat tols tributive 

Justice 
briefly re- 
stated. 
2. rwr Wr) r*v <r«£« «•• afaXayn] would do in continuous proportion. 

Justice is a mean of that which violates As thus, 

proportion; that is, of the unjust. Com- Achilles : Ajax : : 12 : 6 c Disjunc- 

pare, to V tfotxBi ro <r*£* r§ kt&koyo*. m fi : : y : 1} tive. 



line 10. 

8. ov yet{ yinreu] For one numeri- 
cal term can not designate at once a Where stands for Ajax and the 



^ C nuous. 

itands for 
person (f), and a thing (•). As it number 12. 



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188 ARISTOTELIS 

Gucovcrcoi?. tovto 8c to Slkoiop aXXo elSo? Zyti 
rov Trporepov. to pep yap SiapepnrjTtKOP Slkcuop 
tg>p kovp&p ouei Kara ttjp apaXoyiap eari ttjp 
tiprffiewjp' kcu yap euro xp-qpudrcov kolpccp iav 
yiyprjrai rj Siapofirj, eorcu Kara top Xoyop top 5 
avrop opwep €\ovai irpos aXXrjXa tol eiaepexdepra' 

KCU TO oStKOP TO aPTUC€Lfl€POP Tip SlKaiCp TOVT(p 

Corrective Tapa to dpaXoyop iortp. To & €P T0L9 avpaX- 

Justice re- 

Kardi mere- XayuXUTl SlKCUOP €OTi U€P l(TOP TU KCU TO aStKOP 

lyone ratio , v > , . , , , k,i a 

siaceitcoD-ai/i(roi/. aAA ov Kara thp apaAoyiap eKeipnp aAAalO 

aiders only >\, / i \ \ / 

the act and KaTa TT)P aptOflTJTLKTjP. OV0€P yap 8ia(j)€p€L, €L 

t ons, and is €7Tl€lKrj9 (bavXoP dir€OT€prjO'eP 7/ (bavXo? €7TL€IK7J, 

consequent- , , , , x ^ , 

ly according OVO €L €/JLOCX€VCT€P €7Tt€tKm T) QavXOf OLAAa 7TO09 

to Arithme- ^ , y ft , \ , , , , 

tical Pre- TOV fiXdfioV? TTJP 8ia<pOpaP pJOPOP /3\€7T€L O POfl09 9 

portion. x „ f y , f x ^ t 

ICai XPV T0U W LO'Ol^y €L O p.€P aOlK€L o o aoi- 15 

KeiTai, Kal ei efiXayfsep 6 8e fiefiXaiTTCu. coore 
to olSckop tovto apicrop op IcrdfietP Treiparcu 6 
SiKaarrjs' Kal yap orap 6 pep 7rX7/yy 6 8e TraTa£r), 
t) kcu KTeiprj 6 & airoOapr), SirjprjTOu to irddos 
Kal T) irpai^is els aptaa" aXXa ireipaTai rg ^r/piia^o 
Tho excess ladfieip, d(j)cup(DP tov KepSovs. Aeyerai yap <oy 

of the in- airAtOS €L7T€LP €7TL TOLS T0L0VT0L9, KOP €1 p.7) TICTLP 
jurer, and ,~y v \ / & ? ~ '/- 

deficiency OLK€lOP OVO pa €LT), TO KtpOOS, OLOP TCp TTaTa^aPTL^ 

ofthelnT" Kal Tj (flpla tg> TTaOoPTi" aAA* frrap ye peTprjdy 

ipectiveW TO TTOiOoS, KaXeiTai TO p,€P &)pia TO 8e K€p8o?.25 

expressed «r \ x / nj x / nv 

by the terms (OOT€ TOV p.€P irXetOPO? Kai €XaTTOP09 TO LCOP 

9. 1c4t ri) That is, an equality j ratio is the number 2. 
but different from that of distributive 13.«XXir^ r*u fixdfbvt lmQ*£&f — 

justice. u I f*h mhnii) Urin Sri rrt* J&»*uu 

11. xara, rtif ittfipfinxm] Arithme- *«/ /3X^/3i»» • 'AprrorlXnf Xiyu *At »1 

tical proportion consists merely in one nx«<r*w»«} &t*u*i*i pXi \iyuvi r«v 

ratio. Thus the numbers 2:4:6 rn* -^vxh xMxtmfaw, frXmimwiai H 

are in arithmetical proportion ; their rh us **ft* t %pi(**rm. Scholiast. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. V. 6. 188 

fieaov, to 8e KepSof kcu 17 fafila to fitv ?rA«H"»*«*»» »"d 

£mmmi 1 of 

to & eXarrop ivapruos, to fiep tov dyaOov irXeop which Cor- 

TOS KOLKOV & eXaTTOP K€p8o?, TO & €PaPTlOP {flfJUa* tice seeks 
* * / > v * \ ' * *' the mean. 

©1/ 171/ /i€<rop to urop, o Xeyofiep ecpac olkouop 
5C0OT6 to i7rapop0€OTiKOP Sckouop ap etq to fieaop 
tflpicts kcu KepSovs. 8cb kcu otclp dp.<l>L(rfirjT&ai.p y 
eni top SucaaTrjp KaTafavyovaip* to & eir\ top 
SucaorrjP Upou Upou iorlp eVl to Sckcuop' 6 yap 
8tKaxrrrj9 fiovXercu tlvai olop Slkcuop €p^tv\op 9 
\0kcu fyiTovai StKaoTTjp ixecr OP) kcu koXovcip tpioi 
fieaiSlovs, coy idp tov fieaov TV\(oaij tov Sucalov 

T€v£6fJL€P0l. fJL€(TOP apa TL TO SlKCUOP, €?7T€p KCU . 

6 8ucao-TT]9. 'O .8c SucaoTrjs cirapuroi, icaiHowthe 

tt 9 v t 9 \ mean is 

toowep ypafifir/? eif aptaa T€TfJLr)/i€PTj9 9 <p to discovered. 
\5fi€i£op TfJifj/xa tt]9 rjpucrtias wrep^h tovt d(f>€iXe 

KCU T(p iXaTTOPl TflTjfiaTL 7TpO<r€07)K€P. OTOP 8\ 

.8ix a 8uup€0rj to oXop, tot€ <f>a(rip Zytip ra 
avrtop, otolp Xd/3co(ri to utop. to 8 tcrop fieaop 
earl ttjs iiei^opos kcu eXarropo? Kara tt/p dptO- 

5. *• \***»t$»rt*ii\ Since con- In many instances, this is impossible, 
sidered in reference to their dealings as in murder: and then the judge 
with each other, the law contemplates reduces the injurer to the state of the 
all the citizens of the state as equal ; injured. But in Greece, as in the 
when an act of injustice has been earlier ages of our own and other na- 
com mitted, the only object of the law tions, when reparation for offences and 
is to bring the parties, the injurer and ill-deeds, even of blood, could be made 
the injured, to their original equality, by money, justice could take place ac- 
Their original state then is the ftirot cording to the very letter of these rules 
and Tr#» to which they are required to to a much greater degree of perfection, 
% be brought : for at present they are than in civilized countries, where, as 
in extremes ; one on the side of excess Thucydides expresses it, men have 
the otber of defect As much there- continually gone on adding to punish- 
fore as the injurer, that is the gainer, merit, with a hope to deter offenders, 
exceeds the mean, or his original state, until the most have ended in death, 
so much does the Judge take from the furthest limit of it. U rot $ut«rov al 
him and add to the loser, the injured. xtXkat &*f*w*. iii. 45. 

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184 ARISTOTELIS 

TUttymo* flTJTlKTJV OLVCikoyUXV. AiCL TOUTO KOU OVOfUZ&TCU 

mctning of SlKCUOV, OTl toty* ioTLV, &OW€p OV €? TC9 etTTOL 

%immm. ' 8i\ouov 9 kou 6 Sikoott)^ SixoottJs. iirav yap Suo 
urcov axpoupeOrj otto Oarepov, irpos Oarepov Se 
7t/>oot€00, Sval Tovroif V7r€pe\€i Oarepov* el yap& 
dxjygpeOr) p£v, fir/ 7rpo<r€T€0ri 5c, evl av fiovov 
\nrepel\ev. tov fieaov apa ivi, kou to fieaov, 
off) ov a<f)r}p€07) 9 ii/L tovt<& apa yvaptovfiev rt 
re axfrtheiv Set airo tov irXtov €\ovto9 9 kou tl 
irpoaOeivcu ry eXarrov ZypvrC cp fiev yap to 10 
fieaov V7rep€x^h tovto irpocrdzlvai Set Ttp eXarrop 
exppriy cp & u7r€p€\€Tai 9 afaXeiv airo tov /i€- 
yiarov. Ixrou al eij) <&v AA BB • IT aXXrjXai?' 
airo tt)9 AA d^ypr/adco to AE, teal 7rpoo m K€ta m d(o 
tj} TT to 4<f> 9 tov TA, wore 0A77 77 Arr tt}? 15 
EA V7r€p€)(€i t<$ TA Kal T<p TZ* tt}? apa BB 

The same TG> TA. EdTt 8k KOU €7TL T&V aXX(OP T€\V(OV 

proportion „., ~ x v . x > / v 

io the art*. TOVTO aVTJpOVVTO yap av, €L flTJ €7TOL€l TO 7TOCOVV 

kol oarov kou olop 9 Kal to iraoypv hraay* tovto 

The origin Kal TOCOVTOP KOU T010VT0V. *J&XqXv0e Se T0L2Q 

of the term* >/ ^ <y >■/ \ n / * * ** 

InpU and OVOfJJLTa TOVTa 9 T) T€ (jJfJLia KOU TO KtpOOS, €K T7)$ 

kQU- 

13. Uu mi] This will be better un- loss or equivalent given by the patient, 

derstood by the following lines. that is, the buyer, was likewise of a 

A E A corresponding quantity or quality. The 

B B word «■!£»£» appears to me to mean in 

r Z r A. this place, rather the production of the 

The dotted line EA is the same as the arts, and when used by Aristotle in a 
line TA. strict sense implies production as well 
17. Un V* x») W) tSv ixkttf rtx**t] as the mere arts themselves. But here 
And this takes place likewise in the Aristotle expresses two ideas. That 
arts and commerce. For they would the exchange of the production of the 
be destroyed (as no one would care to arts is according to these rules, other- 
exercise them), unless the production wise the arts themselves would be de- 
of the agent, that is, the seller, was of stroyed, and consequently their pro* 
a certain quantity and quality, and the ductions. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. V. 7. 186 

ifcovaiov aXXayfjs* to fiep yap irXeop €\eip 7/ 
tol iavrov KepSaipecp XeyeTcu, to & eXarrop t&p 
6 £ &PXV? tfltiiovo-OoU) olov kp ry dyveladcu kcu 
ircoXelp kcu kp oaois aXXois aSeiap e8<oKep 6 pojjlo?. 
oorap oc firfTe irXeop fir/T eXarrop aAA aura ot 
avrcop yevrjTCU, tol avr&p <f>ourlp e\eip kou ovt* 

{flfUOVCrOai 0VT6 K€p8aiV€lV' <D<TT€ K€p8oV9 TWOS 
KCU fyfliaS p&CTOV TO StKOUOP koTl TG>P ITapOL TO 

tKovatovy to lcop e\eip kcu irpoTepop kcu vorepop. 



CHAP. VII. 

That simple retaliation is not Justice : neither can it exist in States. 

8 AOKEI 8e Ttat kcu to avrmeirov&os elpai Simple re- 

, ^ , „ t , v taliationis 

tnrXco? otKaiop, cooirep oi Ylvaayopeioi eipaaap' not Justice. 
<bpi(\ovTO yap airXcos to SiKatop to aPTi7reirop0o9 
aXXcp. to & apTvneiropdos ovk kcfrapfioTret ovr 
kin to SiapefirjTLKOP 8lkcuop out kiri to 8iop0a>TL- 
15kop' KaiToi fSovXoprai ye tovto Xeyecp kcu to 
'PaSafidpdvos StKatop' 

el xe Tridoi tol x igege, 8/xij x liiia yevoiro. 

woXXaxov yap Stacfxopel' olop el apyrjp e^cop 

kiraTa^ePy ov Set dpTt7rXr}yfjpac 9 Kal el ap\opra 

20 kirara^ePj ov 7rXrjyrjpat /jlopop Set aXXa Kal ko- 

Xao-Ofjpcu. eri to eKovaiop Kal to o.kovo'cop Sea" 

(bepei 7T0Xv. 'AAA* kp fieP TOLS KOlP(0PLaLS Retaliation 

according to 

9. ri to* %x M ] The having what is before. After the act of correction as 
just and equal, the same afterwards as before. 



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186 



ARISTOTELIS 



proportion ra £ y aXXcUCTlK€U9 OVV€)(€l TO TOiOVTOP SlKCUOV TO 

for *ute*. airrareirovOos, kot avaXoyiav kcu ftrj /car iaorrjTa* 
ry avriTToieiv yap avaXoyov avfifieuet rj woAzy. 
rf yap to kok<d9 ^jrovo-tv' el Se fir}, SovXeta 

8oK€L €tP€U y 61 fit) dvTl7rOlT}<T€l' fj TO €$' €L 8e& 

fir}, fUTaSoais ov yiverai, tj} fteradoaei 8e avfi- 
fUvovaiv. 8u> kcu Xa/>moi/ upou ifiirodcov ttol- 
ovvrcuy Iv avrcaroSocris y m touto yap 18iov 
\aptro9* avBuirqperrja'al re yap Set r£ x a P ura ' m 

The rule (M€lKd> KCU IToXlV OUTOV ap£oi Xapi^Op&VOV. Uoi€l 10 

and met li oil * x 9 

of it. 8e rrju avriSoau/ ttjv kot avaXoyiav r) Kara 
SidfitTpov ov£evf~is, olov oltcoSofw? €(f> . a* A, 



2. umf k*mX»y\m*\ \m%% ft urn) 
TlXmrm rn mmXtyif rtttry rtS ItmmU* 
xfirtm I* rn mJurtsf. &c. Mag. Mor. 
p. 37. 

3. t$ kt*t*uuv] Compare the 
Politics, ii. 1. (p. 29. ed. Goet.) 

4. 9 yAf ri *m*m% ^nrtStrtw] For 
either men when they have received 
an injury seek to retaliate, otherwise 
they consider themselves in a worse 
condition than slaves, or when they 
have conferred a favour expect a re- 
turn; otherwise there would be no 
interchange of good offices, and society 
could not hold together. For this 
reason the Temple of Gratitude, that 
is, of the Graces, was built in the most 
frequented parts of the City, that all 
might constantly be reminded, that if 
they have received good they ought to 
return it. A/a ravr* x«) r^iZt clteSv U 
rtf *«y x«g<V«», h pirn «?r« rth £*(»» 
tflt*aXt9 lerfetirreu «£$ rn £«£/#■«- 
/uimv **) hfavreu xm) to pit lnrr^«- 
$$at *£${ r}> tZ wi**n*ir» h rvpjhXn 

mMt fyx*' *9ti7wtm rad arriftf 
ytrttt. Schol. See also Seneca 



de Beneficiis, i. 3. (p. 316. Ed. 
Vogel.) 

U.« x*rm itdfurpt rvgf •&; ] This 
will be better understood by the fol- 
lowing figure. 




Suppose A = Builder, B = Shoe- 
maker, C = House, D = pair of 
Shoes. 

Since then the Ruilder A, is to 
receive from the Shoemaker B, a cer- 
tain quantity of his production D, for 
which he is to give an equivalent of 
his own work C, if C equals D, 
then the exchange (A xark ha/ur^n 
rv£tt%it) at once takes place : if not, 
their respective productions, C, D, must 
be equalized. The production then of 
each artificer must be commensurable. 

But since C is so totally different 
from D and both from the many 
productions of the various classes of 
society all of whom are desirous of 



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ETHICORUM LIB. V. 7. 187 

a/cvroTOfW? €<f> <p B, oUla i(j> cp r, inroSrjfia 
£<f) co A. Sec oiv \afi/3av€iv rov oIkoSo/aov Tapa 

TOV CTKVTOTOflOV TOV €K€LPOV €pyOV 9 KOI OLVTOV 
€K€LV(0 /JL€ra8t86vOU TO OVTOV. €OLP G&V ITpCOTOV fl 

&ro Kara tt/p avaXoyiav *crov 9 €tra to avriire~ 
7ropdo? yevTjTaiy eorai to Xeyofievov. el 8e firj 9 
ovk tcrov, ovSe otj/jl/jlcpcl' ovOev yap K&Xvei #c/>€it- 
tov elvai to dcLTtpov epyop tj to darepov, See 
obv Tavra IcraaOfjvai. tvTi 8\ tovto Kal cVl 

iot&v aXXav t*xvg>v' avrjpovvro yap av 9 €i fXTj 
kiroUi to iroiovv Kal o<rov Kal oiov 9 Kal to iraa^ov 
eiraa\€ tovto Kal to<tovtov kcu tolovtov. ov yap 
4k 8vo iarpcov yivtTai KOipeovla, dXX' e£ laTpov 
Kal yecopyov, Kal oAcay erepcoi/ Kal ovk Xacov' aXXa 

15tovtov9 Set laaaOfjuai. 8tb irdvTa avfifiXTiTa Set 
7tco? elvat, 6>v IcttIv aXXayrj. i(f> b to vofxicr/jL 
iXr/Xvde, Kal ylverai ircos fieaov' iravTa yap 
fierpei, qmtt€ Kal tt/p vrrepoyjiv kcu ttjp €XX€L\jnp 9 
iroaa arra 5^ viro8r)pjaT Xcrov oIkiol t/ Tpo(f)rj. 

2,0 Set ToivVV 07T€p o'lKoSo/JLO? TTpOS CrKVTOTO/JLOV, TO(T- 

a8l v7ro8rj/JLara Trpo? olKiav r/ Tpo(f>rjv. el yap 
fir) tovto, ovk ecrTai dXXayij ovSe KOivcovia. tovto 
c¥ 9 el fir/ tara evq ttco$ 9 ovk eorai. Aei apa evl Need the 

/ ~ „ & » x / /i r common 

Tivi iravra fxeTpeiaoai 9 cocnrep eAe\urj irpoTepov. measure of 

„ ts> > \ ~ \ »x n / « / * ' produce, 

25 TOVTO €(TTL TYj fJL€V aATjOeiGL Tj XP €la > V 7ra3/ra lhe «- 

change of 
which 
money is 
interchanging one with another, the Politics, i. 3. See note p. 188. the symbol, 

question arises, what common measure 14. x*i »t>* Umi\ That is, not equal 

can be found by which we may as- in reference to their different produc- 
certain the different values of these tions. This, must, be carefully borne 
various productions. That common in mind, or the passage which follows 
measure, says Aristotle, is need ; of is wholly unintelligible, 
which money is the symbol. See the 



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188 



ARISTOTELIS 



ovvtyEt* el yap firjdev Seoivro rj p,r) 6fioia>$> 17 
ovk earou aXXayf/ r) ov\ V avrq. olov 8 wraXr 
Xay/xa tt)9 xpcias to i/ofua/ia yiyove Kara <rvv- 
6i)Kt]v m kcu Sea rovro rovvofia e\u vofucrfia, oti 
ov (f)vcr€c aXXa vopxp earl, kcu i<f>' r)p2v /Li£ra-5 
/HaXetv kcu 7rotrjaou axprjorov. eorau, 8tj o,vti- 
ireirovOo^j orav laaxr&Q, coarre onep ye&pyos wpo? 

(TKVTOTOftOP, TO tpyOV TO TOV CKVTOTOflOV 7Tp09 

to tov yecopyov. el? ayf\pja 8 avakoyuts ov Set 



9. tit *x*P* * ktmXeyUt ] We must 
not bring them into the figure of pro- 
portion when they exchange. Suppose 
A = Builder, B = Cobbler, 500 
= House, 2 = pair of Shoes. This 
then is the original state of the parties ; 



A :500 



B:2 ' or 500 = T- 



But the result we wish to arrive at is, 

A B 

that — = r^ ; in other words, that 

the following ratios should be equiva- 
lent; 

A :500 : : B:2 
A : 2 . : : B : 500 

which can never be according to the 
rules of Geometrical proportion. And 
is that very error of which Aristotle 
says, &f$Qwi{ms t£u rag &ri{«£«f ri 
trip* **{». sc. B. and 500. This 
then appears to be the meaning of the 
whole chapter. 

Simple retaliation is not justice, 
neither can it take place in the deal- 
ings of man with man. For states 
do not consist of one class merely 
whose productions are all alike ; not 
of physicians, for instance, who might 
exchange one bottle of physic for 
another of equal value, and thus simple 



retaliation take place, but of various 
classes, all of whose productions are 
different. If these then are to make 
exchanges with each other, it cannot 
be according to simple retaliation. 
Yet one must exchange his produc- 
tion with the other, or society could 
not hold together ; the husband* 
roan with the shoemaker, and so on ; 
that is, the husbandman with his corn is 
to make an exchange with the shoemaker 
with his shoes, so that the parties shall 
be, the husbandman with the shoes 
and the shoemaker with the corn, (n 
mmrk oUA/Mrpi rv{tt%t(.) p. 186. n. 
But as the corn is of superior value 
to the shoes, the shoes must be equal- 
ized to the value of the corn. The 
shoemaker must give either as many 
shoes, or the symbol of the value of 
as many shoes, as is the value of the 
corn, and thus both objects of ex- 
change being equalized, the exchange 
takes place. But this exchange is not 
according to the rules of Geometrical 
proportion: neither can it be. For 
though in their original state the 
parties may be in the same ratio as 
their productions, yet when their pro- 
ductions are equalized that proportion 
is destroyed. The parties are to be 
linked together according to what 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IV. 7. 189 

* ayeu/y orav dXXdj-copraC el 8e prj, dpxf>OTepa$ 
eljei tol9 imepo\a9 to erepov oucpop. aXX' otou/ 
exfoat to. avT&Vj ovro&s Ixtoi kcu kolvcovol, oti 
avrrj r/ laorrjs Svparat eif avro&v ylveuQai. ye* 

5 copy o? A, Tpo(f)r) T, anvTorofios B, to epyov 
avrov to laacrfiepop A. el cf ovtcd (jltj r/p apri- 

7T€7rOP0€l/OU 9 OVK OV TjP KOIVIOVIOL. On if TjOtnetd 

yjpeia avpe\et cooirep tv ti op, StjXol oti otolv 
pjf ep yjpela (otriv dXXrjXtop, rf dpxf>oTepoi rj arepos, 

10 ovk aXkaTTOvrai) Gxnrep otolv ov e\et avros Ser/Tai 
tl? 9 olop otpovy 8l8ovt€s (tltov e£aycoyrj?. Set 
apa tovto Icracrdrjpat. inrep 8e ttjs /xeXXovoij^ 
dXXayrjs, el pvp p*)8ev SetTai, oti eorat edp 
8er)0rj 9 to vopacrpa olop eyyur/T7j9 eaff T)plv % del 

15ya/> tovto (f>epoPTt eivai Xafietp. irdaxet fiev ovp 
koll tovto to olvto' ov yap del taop SvpaTat' 
ofia>9 fie fiovXeTou fieveiv /laXXov. 8to Set irdvra 
TeTifiTjaOcu' ovtg) yap ael eaTat aXXayrj, el 8e 
tovto 9 Kowcovla. to 8rj pofiicrfjLa cotnrep fierpov 

20 crv/JLfieTpa Trovqtrav Itra^eC ovtc yap dp fir/ ovoys 
dXXayrjs KOtpcopia r)P y ovt dXXayr/ 'ktottjto? /lit) 
ovoi]9 9 ovt ItTOTrj? fir/ ovtrqs crvp./JLeTplas. rfj pip 

would be diametrical conjunction in exchange according to the rales of 
Geometrical proportion, but not to Geometrical proportion. 

Husbandman A B Shoemaker 



Food r A + (r— A) Shoes equalized to r. 

m . A A 

That is, — = 



r A + (T— A) 

That is, A is in the same proportion 7. Srt V h ^im] The best comment 

after his exchange as before. on this subject is the Politics i. 3. 



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190 ARISTOTELIS 

ofip aXrjdeia ahvvarov tol tocovtop 8ia(f>€poPTa 
<rvfJL[i€Tpa yep€<r0ai, irpbs 8e ttjp \pelap €v8*)(€Tai 
i/capcbs. ev 8r) n del elvcu, tovto 5* i£ vTroOeatm' 
810 pofita/ia KaXelrai' tovto yap iravra woid 
avfifierpa' fieTpeiTaL yap iravTa POfxia/JLart. oi/c/ad 
A, /jlpcu fic'ica B, kXIptj T. to 8r/ A tov B fj/Mov, 
el 7T€VT€ /jlpcop a£ia 77 oiia'a, ^ %<rov' rj 8k kXipt) 
SeKarov /xepoe to F tov B' SrjXop tolpvv iroaax 

KklVai taOV OLKla 9 OTL 7T€PT€. OTL 5* 0VTG>9 r/ 

aXXayr/ rjp irp\v to popLurpua tlpai, SrjXop' 8ta- 10 
(f>ep€L yap ovStv rj icXipai irevre olpti oiKias> r/ 
oaov al 7T€PT€ kXlpoi. 

Conclusion T/ U€P ofip TO aSlKOP KCU TL TO SlKatOP €OTlP,9 

of the sub- ^ ^ ' 

ject. siptyrai. Stcoptcrpepcop 8€ tovtcop SrjXop on rf 

8ucai07rpayia fieaop earl tov aSuceip /cat a8i-l& 
K€i(r0ai' to fi€P yap nXeop €\€tp T ° ^ tXa-rrop 

In what i(TTlP. 'H 5c SucatOCVPT) U6CTOT77P eOTiP OV TOP 

sense Jus- 
tice is f|if 

13. ri f*\t 4ut «•> «£*«»] In the tween inflicting and suffering injustice, 

concluding part of this chapter Aris- (f*i*» r»v ahxtTt xa) mhxMtu.) 
totle explains some ambiguities con- 17. A ft li**i*rvwn fueimt'} Justice 

nee ted with his definition of Justice, is a habit i» ptrlrnn, not because it 

He has already shown that the just stands in the mean between two vi- 

thing (ri }/*«*«») is a mean between cious habits, but because its actions 

more and less ; he now shows how {}ixM*pyl*) are in a mean between 

justice itself is a habit in a mean, committing and suffering injustice, 

(t£if if fatirnrt). first showing that its between too much and too little, 

acts {}ixtu**tmyiM.) are a mean be- Thus, 

The habit. The habit. No habit. 



aitxut, or ii$uu*m'{myu9 t a}i*t7r4&t. 

ri *ki»t. or ri ftUtt or ri Ikarvt. 

The act. The act 

Thus, because }4x*4*W£*yt7t is a mean and not because it is in a mean be- 
between the more and the less, Xxm- tween two 'other habits, as is the case 
•Vtwn is said to be a habit if ptrinrr*, with the other moral virtues. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. V. 7. 191 

avrop rpoirov toas irporepov aperals, aX\' otlu turinri, 
fiecrov €otlv r) o aoiKia rcov a/cpcw. kcli tj /i€J/finition. 
Succuoavvrj earl Kaff rjp 6 SUouos Xeyerat irpoK- 
TLK09 Kara irpoaipeatp tov Sucaiov, kou 5iai/€- 

5flT]TlK09 KOU aVTty 7Tp09 aXXoP KOU €T€p<p 7Tp09 

erepop, ov% ovroas eoare tov /jl€p alperov irXeop 
airy cXclttop fie r<£> ttXtjo'lop, tov fiXafiepov fi* 
avajTraXiv, aXXa tov taov rod kolt apdXoyiap, 
bfioias 8e kcu aXXco irpos aXXop. *H fi* aSucia Definition 

,« > / ~ »*/ *> * v « a N of Injustice. 

lOTOVPCLPTLOP TOV OLOlKOV. TOVTO O MTTIP V7r€p(3oA7J 

kou eXXenf/is rod axfreXl/xov rf fiXafiepov irapa to 
avaXoyop. 8to wrepfioXr) kcu €X\€i\fns 17 aSucia, 
on wrepfioXri? kou eXXtiyfseca? iorip, e(f> avrov 
fiep v7T€pfioXr]9 fi€P tov atrrX&s axfreXl/wv, iXXci" 
Myjre&s 8e rod fiXafiepov* iirl fie t£>p oXXcop to 

fl€V OXOP 6/JLOICD9, TO 8e TTOLpa TO OLPaXoyOP, 07TO- 

r€/>eoy erv\€P. tov 81 dSi/tr/fiaro? to pep eXarrop 
to a8iK€t<r0ai iaTi, to fie fiel^op to a8iK€ip. 7repl 
ptv odp SiKOioavprj? kcu a8iKia? 9 ti? eKarepa? 
20€ot«/ r) (frvais, elpTjaOa) tovtop top Tpoirop, opolco? 
fie kou irepl tov Slkulov kou aSUov kolOoXov. 



15. W) ft t£p «AX«»] The unjust but is not always consistent in award- 
man always acts contrary to propor- ing that which is disproportionate to 
tion. Taking either too much of what the same persons, for at one time he 
is good, or too little of what is evil ; gives the more to one, at another time 
and this rule he always observes in to another. And the man whom he 
respect to himself. And in the case has favored to-day, he will injure to* 
of others, in short, he adopts the same ; morrow. 



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19S 



ARISTOTELIS 



CHAP. VIII. 

Of the Social or Political Justice, and its two parts : the Natural and 
Arbitrary. 

That an EIIEI & COTIV oSlKOVVTa fjLT)7T(0 aSiKOV €IVOU,10 

notneces- o TTOld aSucnfJULTCL aSlK(Dl> rj8ri aSlKOf €<TTIV €Kflt- 
sarily an * * / * ' * \ * / 

act of in- <m)V aOLKlOLV, OIOV k\€7TT719 Tf llOV)(OS 7) \r)0"n)9; 

7) ovtg> pev ovSev 8 to lae t, ; koll yap av avyyevoiTO 
yvvaua €18009 to y 9 aAA ov 8ia wpocupecrem 5 
apfflv aXka 81a 7ra0o$ 9 aSucel fiev odv, aSucos 
& ovk eoriv. olou ovSe KX€7mj9 9 cicAe^f 8e, ovSe 
poiyps, €pjOL\(Eva-€ 8e' opolco? 8e kou eni t&v 
aWcov. Tim p&v oiv €\u to avriireirovOos 

TTpOS TO SlKOUOP, tLpTjTOLl 7TpOT€pOP' Set 8c fir/ 10 



10. }f7& f*h Xmttatuf] Having com- 
pleted his definition, Aristotle proceeds 
to examine certain divisions of Justice, 
both proper and improper, common in 
his time. As, the political («vAj**s4i), 
the (Economic (ti*tt*^xti), the magis- 
terial (3irw*0ri»f?), and the like. The 
question then is, under what head are 
we to class that Justice of which we 
have been speaking? To which he 
answers, under the Social (*»\trmfi) ; 
which is the only division absolutely 
and properly (&*x£s, not **t« ft it a - 
<p*£(ir, see p. 210.) Ilxcttov. This he 
divides into two, Natural and Arbi- 
trary; which are included under the 
Social as species under a genus. For 
Social Justice is the bond and union, 
the order and arrangement of the 
social condition of mankind ; (woXtrt- 
xyk xuMffiut rafys, Pol. i. p. 5.) which 
was considered by Aristotle as his 
natural state, (&dpwt <p6*u w*Xt- 
rtxh ££•» Pol. i. 1. p. 4.); the 
Social being the only condition in 



which his natural tendencies are deve- 
loped, and in which he answers the 
final ends of his being. ««» yk^ ?*«#*r«'» 
Irr* rw ynfcuts rsAirSi/riK rrnvrti* 
fmph i^it (pvrtt iTnm ixdcrtu Pol. ib. 
p. 3. See also Cic. Acad. i. 5. 

The existence of the moral sense or 
natural justice (tpvnxri lixctioeurn) is 
not therefore to be sought (as often 
has been done) in savages, in crea- 
tures, who, as far as the purposes 
of their being are concerned, are not 
men, much less the Arbitrary, but 
in those who are in a social and 
civilized condition. And hence it is 
that Social Justice is of much wider 
extent than the other divisions of Jus- 
tice, including Natural Justice, since 
the Social is the only natural con- 
dition of man j and the Arbitrary since 
certain enactments are necessary for 
the very condition of the existence 
of society. For all society is formed 
with a view to mutual defence 
and sufficiency immediately, for nap- 



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ETHICORUM:LIB. V. 8. 193 



~* 



XavOaveiv oti to ^tjtov/jlcuou eari kcu to airX&s 

SlKCLLOP KOU TO TToXtTLKOV StKOLlOV. TOVTO 8t koTLV 

km koukdv&v fiiov wpos to slvai avTapKeiav, 
kXevOkpcov kcu tcrcw rj tear avaXoyiav T) KOT 
&api0fwv' coore oaoLs puq k<TTi tovto, ovk eari 
tovtois wpos aXXrjXovs to ttoXltlkov SUouov, 
aXXa tl 8lkollov kcu Kajff o/jLOtorr/Ta. tori yap 

hlKCUOV, oh KCU VOfJLO? 7TpOS OVTOVS' VOUOS t? 9 kv 

oh dSiKia' r) yap 8Lkt) Kpicns tov SiKalov kcu tov 
10 ol8lkov. kv oh & aSiKia, kol to olBlksZv kv tov- 
tow, kv oh Se to a8iK€iv 9 ov iraatv aStKia* tovto 
8 cart to irXtov avTcp ve/xeiv tcov airXm ayaB5>v y 
tkwrrov 8e tS*v airXcos KaK&v. 8to ovk ktbpLtv 
apyeiv avOpamov, aAAa tov Xoyov, oti kavrip 
lb tovto 7roi€i Kal yiveTcu Tvpavvos. eari 8 6 apytov 



piness prospectively, (*{h »fc J>«w way as a man is said to be just to 

«vr«{xi/«f; or, as he expresses it in himself. See p. 210, 15. 
the Pol. p. 3. ytu/iitn »vw r»Z %nr 1. rh £r&*>f Vt»eu»t] avr) rtv xv^m$ 

mxtt, iZtm Vt <r*u tv ^n». See also **) aXniZf 3/»«j«f. Schol. See the 

ibid. iii. 4. and 5. p. 81. 85. Plato's Politics iii. 5. (p. 86, 7. ed. Goetl.) 
Kepub. 359. 372.) and all *m**m 2. r»t7r» IS lrri»] Compare the 

implies an absolute or relative equa- Politics I. 1. (p. 3.) fi V t* vkulp** 

lity, (jj **t ktetXoyimt tj »mr* a(i4ft6t t x*f*£* *«»«>/« rikiief, *iktf, n th ***nt 

an Worm rtu &tX Uf *"* fyx 19 ***- ix owmw H as *** »vr»fKiieis— • il /mi 

Compare Pol. ib.) If, therefore, iwdptus xmhm t> /**&* itopitot I»* 

Social Justice cannot exist elsewhere muv*£*uat elfi* pipf *ikt*{, 
than with men in a social condi- 4. *m) "em 4 »ar atmXtyieti] See 

tion, it is clear that where there is the Politics iii. 4. p. 82. 
no equality, there can be no justice. 9. )/»« sg/rif J The same definition 

But there can be no equality in unity, occurs again in the Politics i. 1. p. 5. 
consequently, as there can be no equa- 14. &kxk ret \oyoi\ But reason or 

lity between a man and his wife, or the law, which is not subject to be 

his child, or his servant, all being warped by human passions. Compare 

part of himself, it is equally clear that the Politics : <fcXA* U»s Q*iy rts £» ri 

the conjugal, or ceconomic Justice are mv^t ¥k»s cLifyuxot tJtai, aXXa. ph 

different from the Social, and are only *epor, (pavktv, ?£«>«•« yt ra rupfralwvrK 

called divisions of Justice metaphori- w*6n *t$ *n* A'VX*'- »*• 6 * P* "• $* e 

cally and not properly. Tn the same also cap. xi. p. 107. 



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194 ARISTOTELIS 

<j>v\atj tov Si/calov, el 8e tov 8ucaiov 9 kcu tov 
urov. iirei 8 ovOep avrtp irXeop eipcu Sotcei, airep 
Sucaios* ov yap ve/xti irXiop tov anrXcos ayaOov 
avrtp, el firj wpo9 avrov apaXoyop €otlp' 8tb 

€T€pCp 7TOl€l' KOI SlOL TOVTO aXXoTplOP €LVOLl <f)acriP 5 

dyaJBbp tt)p 8iKCuo<rvpr)P 9 KaOdirep €Xi\6r) kcu 
irporepov. jJUo-00? apa tis 8ot€os 9 rovro 8e tl/itj 
kcu yepas' or<p 8e fir) iKava ra roiavroy ovrot 

TheW*- yivoVTCLL TVOOPPOL. To 8i SeOWOTlKOP 8lKCUOP 

ran and ' ' 

*««?<»*> Ka \ T q TrarpLKOu ov ravrou tovtois aAA* o/jloiop' 10 

from the QV yap €OTlP ttStKia ITpOf TOL OLVTOV aTT\&9 9 TO 
Vi»cu». 8e KTTJpjOL KCU TO T€KPOP 9 €G)S OP Tf TTTjXlKOP KCU 

fir) ycopi&Ofy a)(r7r€ P P-tpo? avTOv 9 avTov 8 ovOels 
TTpoaipeircu fiXdiTTeu/' Stb ovk eoTiv aStKca vpw 
avrop. ovtf apa olSikop ovSe SUaiop to ttoXltikqv* 15 
Kara pofiop yap r)p 9 kcu 4p oh €7T€(f>vK€L elvcu 
po/jlos' ovtol 8 r)aap oh V7rdp\et icrorrfs tov 
apxeip kcu apxeo-dat. 8tb fidXXop wpbs yvpaiKa 

€OTl SlKOUOP 7) WpOf T€KPa Kal KTrjfJUlTa' TOVTO 

yap iorc to oIkopo/jllkop SUatop' eTepop 8e Kal 20 

Social Jus- TOVTO TOV TToXlTlKOV. Tov 8e IToXlTlKOV SlKUlOV 

lice divided * \ i ' * > *^ ' j ^ x 

into TO fl€P (pvaiKOP €<TTl TO 0€ POfUKOP 9 (pVaiKOP fJL€P 

1. Natural. \ \ » \ v * / \ » 

2.Arbi- to irapraypv T7JP aVTTfP €\OP OVPa/JLlP, KOI OV 

T<p 8oK€LP 7) flT), POfJUKOP §€ O ££ a/>X*7? PtV OV0€P 

8ia(f)€p€t ovtcds r) aXAav, otop 8e dcbprai, &a-25 
<j)€p€i, olop to fipas XvTpov<r6ai, r) to alya Oueip 
aXXa fir) 8vo 7rpo/3aTa, *tl o<ra eiri t£>p Kaff 

5. tta <rwr% AxxJrftn] See p. 174, 12. xTVfU] His slave. See the Poli- 

12. note. Justice is the good of an- tics i. 2. p. 6. 

other, and not of him who dispenses it, 13. pi^t alrtv] See the Politics ib. 

otherwise rewards would not be given p. 1 1 . 
him for dispensing it. 



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trary. 



ETHICORUM LIB. V. 8. 



195 



eicaoTa i/o/jLO$€Tov<rtP, olov to 0v€ip BpacrlSa, 

Kal ra ^70£(r/LtarQ)&;. Aokcl & eviots dvax The opinion 

/ ft \ \ . / » / \ that there is 

iravra roiavra, ori to fiev (pvcrei ajKivr)TOv /ecu no such 
iravra\ov ttjv avrr/p ex€i dvvafiu/, (ocnrtp to Natural 

\>/i'a * » it ' ' x *\ Justice re» 

hTTVp KCU a/VOQ€ KGU €U lit p (TOLLS KCU€L, TO, 06 futed. 

SUaia Ktvovfuva opcoaip. tovto 5* ovk ivtiv 



4. «r«-tf rfr r»{] Compare Cic. 
de Repub. iii. " Jus enim de quo 
quaerimur, civile est aliquod naturale 
nullum j nam si esset, ut calida et 
frigida ut amare et dulcia, sic essent 
justa et injusta eadem omnibus." This 
was the opinion of the Pyrrhonists and 
was afterwards supported by Carneades, 
the founder of the New Academy. 
The examination and refutation of it ' 
occupies the third book of this Dia- 
logue of Cicero. 

The opinions of the Sophists, who 
were the great supporters of this doc- 
trine, is thus stated by Plato, de Legi- 
ons p. 889. hciii tJfrn «*£«rfo Qa*n 
•vft **%**, *v Qv*u itWm\ ttet vipttg 
xm) wmwt iXXfUt aXXtsf, Ury Xxmtrt 
Xaurtitfi ttnmftfkiyxtm* npottrrffnw 
xa) oh xa.) ra xuXa Qvtu ftkv AkXm 
i7mu, 9*f*f 3) frf£«' ra ft ih Yuuum titf 
uuu rb «*«{«*«? (potu, aXX* aptyf&n- 
rtvvrtkf imrikut aXknXats xal fttrart- 
hftivtH L%i ravr*. d T »9 furmfatrm* 
xm} ««-«», vin xvpm txarrm tSitat, yty- 
*i/t,»tet ri&x xa) r«Tf tifM»$ a,X\' *i> 2n 
rm $wru. See particularly the Gor- 
gias, p. 482. sq. comparing with it the 
Repub. 338. sq. Protag. p. 337. 
Theaet. p. 172. 

5. I* Xli£r«jf] The same simile is 
used in the Platonic Dialogue, Minos, 
p. 316, which is partly devoted to the 
consideration of this subject 

6. T9uv o* *&»] De hac autem 
quaestione, an jus aliquod sit natura 
(quod tamen negabat Archelaus pre- 



ceptor Socratis, teste Laertio : [ii. IS. 
Menag. ibid.] et Callicles Sophista 
apud Platonem in Gorgia, p. 482. 
et postering Epicurei omnes) videatur 
Plato in Gorgia et Minoe et libra 
primo et decimo de Legibus. Cicero, 
lib. i. de Legibus. Alexander Apbro- 
disi e nsis pulcherrime in Lib. ii. de 
Anima, apud qus^snonem hanc, an 
jus aliquod sit natura. Et Simpti- 
ciufl in prasfatione Physics **pd+i*f. 
GIPH. See Cudworth's Im. Mor. 
p. 2. and Plato there quoted. 

— rturt T §hx frrit •Zr*$ 1%ot] It 
is not true absolutely, that all justice 
is variable. For among those who are 
in a natural state who are not per- 
verted or depraved, it ever has the 
same immutability ; not every where 
absolutely, but every where among 
those who are in a state of nature. 
Thus that which is naturally pleasant, 
is so, notwithstanding there may be 
some to whose appetites as being de- 
praved, as being unnatural, it is not 
so. And thus naturally the right hand 
is better than the left, though there are 
some who are left-handed, and natu- 
rally men have five fingers on each 
hand ; and if some are not so born, 
it does not follow that the being 
born with five fingers on each hand is 
not natural. And thus, if we can con- 
ceive that Justice exists among the 
gods, as Plato thinks, Justice would be 
altogether the same and every where 
invariable amongst thein, as being in 



o2 



Digitized byCjOOQlC 



196 



ARISTOTELIS 



Difference 
of Otmn 
from W- 

HflfUl, >/- 

n*t&? from 

htHUMflM. 



ovt<09 *X ov > aAA' icrnv w. kcutoi irapa ye rot? 
Oeois lac*? ovSapxo?' irap rjplv 8 iari pAv tl kcu 
<f>vcr€i, Konjrop pivroi Trav. dAA* opxos earl to 

fl€V <f>V(T€l TO 8 OV <f>V<T€l. TTOLOV 8* (j)V(T€L TtoV 

kvheypptvwv kcu aAAo? e\€iVy kcu irolov ov aAAa5 
vofUKOv kcu a-wOr/Kg, ehrep apxfxo Kiinjra ofioiw, 
8rj\ov. kcu eirl t£>v aXkoov 6 avros apfioaei 8io- 
piafios' (f)vo-€L yap r/ Seijta Kp€iTTa>v 9 kolitoi kv8i- 
ytrai Tivas a/KfriSeijlov? yepeaOou. tcl 8e tcara 
ovvOrJKTjv kcu to avpxf)€pop tS>v Sikgludp opioid koTi 10 
toZs fiCTpotf' ov yap irapraypv tea tol olvrjpa kcu 
avrrjpa p,erpa 9 aAA* o5 p,ep g>povptou 9 pei{fi>> oh 
81 Tr<o\ov<nv> i\aTT<o. opoicos 8e kcu to. pit) <f>v<riKa 
dAA' avOpanriva SUoua ov Tavra Travraypvy iirei 
ov& at iro\iT€icu, aXka pla puovov iravraypvXb 
Kara (f>v<rip rj apiarr/. T<3y 8e SiKatcop /cat 

VOpip&V €KOLOTOV 0)9 TOL KoOoXoV 7Tp09 TO. Kdff 



the perfect state of nature. W herefore 
we are not to form our opinions as to 
the non-existence of Natural Justice 
from considering those who are in an 
unnatural and corrupt state ; any mere 
than seeing some men are left-handed, 
ought we to say that the being right- 
handed is not natural. But among 
men, although this Natural Justice 
exists, fainter or stronger according to 
their condition, it is every where muta- 
ble ; for all men are more or less de- 
praved. Just as men may by employ- 
ing the left hand more than the right, 
become eventually left-handed, all of 
them if they will. 

1. xalrti «r«£« yt *§7t htitt] ri 31 
Mtuvu *»(& yt ro7t hut wl*p£t 1**t 
7g»f. vgif rhf r»v UXarattot 3«£«» 
Awn)** ilri Xtytvrof inut xa) i» w7{ 
heli Ymeut* *m) *{o alrov «r»j» avro~ 



ItMtutfvfnv. Schol. See x. 6. 

4. «»~er 31 ipiru] It may be asked 
then, since all justice is variable, the 
natural as well as the arbitrary or 
juridical, how shaTl we distinguish the 
one from the other? This is easily 
done, says Aristotle, who illustrates 
this observation by an example. For 
as the right hand is generally stronger 
than the left, and few men only are 
left-handed, so in determining what is 
naturally just and what is not so, we 
must consider whether it exists the 
same among the generality of nations ; 
and if so, it is natural. But that 
which is not generally the same, but 
varies daily and in almost all places, 
such as measures of food, liquids, &c. 
this is merely juridical and arbitrary. 

17. ig rk *a4»X»u *£<f Ttt nmi 
txcttfra] The £3i*«f bears the same 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ETHICORUM LIB. V. 8. 197 

etcaoTa €\eC ra fiev yap irparrofuva 7roAAa, 
tKtivcov 8 ckootov ev' koBoKov yap. 8ia(f)€p€l 
8e to aSiKTjpxi kcu to oSucop kcu to SiKalcofxa kou 
to Sikouov' clSlkov pkv yap iari Trj (f)vcr€i tj 
STajjei' to avro 8e tovto, orav wpax/9§ 9 aSi/crj/id 
iarij irplv Se irpa\6rjV0Uj owroo, aW* clSikov. 
bfiotxQS 8k kcu SiKalcofia. KaXeiTat Se fiaXXov 
hiKaioTTpayripja to kolvov, BiKalxopja 8e to eiravop- 
O&fia tov aBiicqpxLTOs. Kaff iekcuttov 8e avr&v, 
10 irold t€ €i8rj teal woaa kcu 7T€/h irola Tvy\av€i 

ovra 9 vorepov eirurKeirriov. Ovratv 8e r<3i/Th«quei- 

* / \»*r ~ » / * * *■ \ tion started 

OlKaUDV Kai aOLKCOV TCDV €lpt}fl€VG)V, aOLK€L fJL€V at the be- 

\ * <■> tf e / . \ / ginning of 

Kai OiKaio7rpay€ij OTav ckcdv ti? aura sparry this chapter 

tf &» * v > >» ~ v <s ~ > x x » discussed. 

orav o a/ccov, ovt oubiKei ovtc oiKOucnrpayei oAA 
15^ #cara o-v/jl^^tjko^ oh yap avfifiefirjKC Slkcuoi? 
elvai 7) a8tKOL9j irpaTTOWiv. dSUrj/xa 8e koi 
8tKai07rpayrjfia coptarat t$ eKOvaup kou aKOvaicp* 
OTav yap €kovo"iov t), yjreyeTou, a/ia 8e kou aSitcrffia 

TOT €OTlV' GJCT €OTCU Tl aSlKOV fJL€V 9 dSlKTJfJLa 

20 8 ov7TG>, iav /JLTj to eKOvatov wpoa'g. Xeyoo 8 

€KOVO"IOV /JL€V, (OOTTtp KCU 7TpOT€pOV etpTjTai, O OV 

Tis t£>v i(j> avTCp ovtcov elSm kou fir/ ayvoebv 

irpaTTTj /JL7jT€ OV /JL7)T€ (p flT/T€ oh €V€K(l> oloV 
TlVa TV7TT€l KOU TlVl KOU TLV09 €V€Ka 9 KOLKtLVtOV 

2b€K0urrov /jut/ KaTa ov/xfiefirfKos firjSe /8/a, aowep 



relation to *M*nfi» as a common noun are and are not done from habit, and 

to a particular. The precept of the distributes them under, their different 

law is general, " Thou ihalt not steal" heads, will be better understood by 

the particular instances of transgres- consulting the Table in the Introduc- 

sions of the law are innumerable. tion to this Book, p. 167. 

11. Srr*v ft rSt &*«/«»] The con- 21. *■£««£«»] See the earlier chap- 
elusion of this chapter, in which Aris- ters of the Third Book, 
totle distinguishes between acts which 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



196 ARISTOTELIS 

€1 Ti$ Xofi&P TT)V X € *P a &VTOV TWTTOL €TtpOP, 

oif\ €K(op* ov yap enr avr&. ip8i\ercu 8k top 
Timrofievov Trartpa eipou, top & art fikp apdpanros 
17 t£p Ttapopr&v T19 yiP&cTKeip, oti 8k Trarrip 
aypoelp. o/jlouos 8k to toiovtop Suopiadco #cat5 

€7Tl TOV 08 ePCKCL, KOU 7TCpl TTfP Wpa^LP oXrjP. TO 

8rj aypoovfiepoPj rj /itj aypoovfiepop fikp fir) eV 
auT<p & op, 7) fiia> okovctlop' iroXXa yap kou 

T&P <f>VO"€l VWap\OPTtOP €l80T€S KOU TTpaTTOfJUZP 

kou 7raxrxofjL€P 9 g>p ovdkp ovff e/covcnop ovt olkov- 10 
atop to-TiP, olop to yrjpdp rf a7ro0prjo-K€ip. eari 

& O/tOUOS 67TI 7W a8lK(OP KOU T&P SlKCLUQP KCU 

to Kara avp.fiefir/KO^ kou yap ap tt/p Trapcucara- 
6r)Kt)P avroSolr) tis Akcop kou 'Sea <f)6f3op> op ovre 
8Uoua 7rpaTT€iP ovre SiKouoirpaycip (f>aT€op aAA' 15 
17 Kara ovpfisfirjKOS. o/xouos 8k kou top aray#ea£o- 
p&pop kou aKOpra ttjp irapaKaTa0T]KT)P p.rj airo8ir 
Sopra Kara ovpfisfhiKos (frareop o8ik€lp kcu tol 
clSlkcl irparreiP. t£>p 8k eKOvauap to, fikp 7r/>oc- 

Xofl€POt 7TpaTTOfl€P TOL & OV 7TpO€\6fJL€POL, 7TpOeX6'20 

fievoc fikp oaa TrpofiovXevcrdp,epoi, airpoatpera 8k 
oaa airpo/3ov\€VTa. TpiG>p 8i\ ovcr&p fiXafiobp twp 
ip tolls KOiPCDpicus, tol fikp /iter aypolas afiapTr/- 
fiard €otlp, map pjjTe op fir)T€ /jltJtc © firjTe 
ov €P€Ka tnrcXafie 7rpa£r)' 7} yap ov fiaXeip ^25 

OV TOVTCp T) OV TOVTOP 7) OV TOVTOV €P€Ktt CSTjOt), 

aXXa o-vpefir) ov\ ov eW/ca (pr/dr/, olop ov\ wol 
Tpdoig aXX! tpa KePTr/oy, tj ov\ op, t) oi>x m. 
orap p.kp odp irapoLXoytos tj fiXafir/ yepr/Tou, 

22. rp£v In] See the Introduction 23. afut^rnfutrm] See the Rhetoric 

to this Book, p. 167. • i. 13. 



Digitized by LjOOQ IC 



ETHICORUM LIB, V. 8. 199 

aTvyrjfjuoLf orav 8* fit) 7rapa\6ya>? 9 apev 8i kolklos, 
afuipTTjfia' apjaprdvtt pkv yap orav rj dpyrf cV avrqi 
J7 T7j9 atria?, arv\ei o orav efowv. orav 0€ €to<o9 
fieu firj TrpofiovXevaa? 8e, dSiKrj/xa, dlov oca re 
5 8td dvpjov kou aXXa irdOrjy oca dpaytccua rj <f>v<rucd, 
crvpfiaivti tois avOpomois' ravra yap (SXaTrrovrts 
kou apjaprdvovrss dSiKOvcri p.4v> kou dSiKT/pard 
£otu/> ov fievroi ira> olSikoi 8t,d ravra oi>8e 
Trovqpoi ov yap 8ia puo\6r\piav f) fiXafir)' orav 

10 5' €K irpoaipiatm, £8ikos kou poyOrjpos. 8io 
KaXcas ra 4k Qvpjov ovk €K irpovoias KplveraC 
ov yap ap\€i 6 Ovpxo ttol&p, aAA* 6 opyiaas. 
en 8e ovSe ir*p\ rod yevtaOou rf /jltj djA(f)L(rfir)- 
revrai, dXXa irep\ rod SiKaiov* eirl (jbaivoptvy 

15 yap dSiKta r/ opyrj {ctlp. ov yap (ooircp kv tois 
avuaXXaypourt 7rep\ rod ysveaOai, apX^urfirfTOvo'iV) 
a>v dvdyKTf top erepou elvai fiox&qpov, av pi) 
8cd \t)Qt)v avro Spcbaiv' dXX bpoXoyovvrw 7T€pl 
tov irpdypxirosj wepl rov woreptos Sckcuov dp- 

20<j)i<rl3r)Tov<riv. 6 8 9 eirif}ovXev<ras ovk dyvoel, 
coare o p&v oiercu abiKciauaL, o o ov. av o €K 
7rpoatp€<r€G)s fiXdyjryy dSiKei. Kou Kara ravr Recapitu- 

r}8ri ra dSiK^para 6 a8iK(bv d8iKO? 9 orav irapa 
to dvdXoyov y r/ irapa to Xcfov. bpo'uos 8* kou 

2&8iKat09, orav 7rpo€Xop€i/os 8iKCU07rpayr}. StKato- 
7rpay€i 8*, av pbvov £kg)p sparry. tg>v & a#cou- 
atcov ra p4v kari avyyvcopoviKa ra 8 ov <rvy- 

5. iwytuitm J) <pv*ixm] %Ui ft wntn rational and appetitive parts of the 

$ttri»«, f(»rif , xSkrtu, $i(l«t ittmyntum, soul: ttrtt terns It $u%y r^iref rwri 

31, n7y», y$ypa. Schol. lm re 6v(jhu%U, \*l»»vp* »t ry \«ytr- 

15. &mlf 4 i?yn J On which account rt*if <p6*u lat fin M mm»nt *(<>$*)< 

Plato placed anger midway between the &«f S«(?. Repub. p. 440. 

Digitized by LjOOQIC 



200 ARISTOTELIS 



/. 



yv&powca' oaa pev yap prj pjovov aypoovvres 
aXXa kcu 81 ayvoiav apaprdvovo-i, avyyvcopovLKa, 
oca 8e pr/ 81 ayvotav, oAA' ayvoovvrts pev 8ia 
iraOo? 8e prjre <f>vciKov p4\r dvOpamivov, ov 
avyyv&povucd. i 



CHAP. IX. 

Several questions considered in reference to committing and 
suffering acts of Injustice and of Injury. 

i. Question AIIOPH2EIE 5* OLV Tlf, el IkOLVCDS SuopCOTOlW 

considered. N ~ »* ~ /% \ >* - * > 

7T€pi tov aoiK€L<ruai Kai aoiKeiv, irpcorov pev et 
tcriv cocnrep J&vpnri8r)$ etprjice, \eycov oltottods 

fxrjTtga xarixra tijv s/wjv, fya-yhs \6yo$ 9 

kxeiv kxowrav, $ dikoixrav oty kxdv 10 

TTOTtpov yap coy dXtfdcis tcriv evcoira dSucelo-ffcu, 

7/ ov, aAA* okovclov airav y a>ar€p kcu to a8uc€iv 

H. Ques- irav €KOvciop. Kal apa Trap ovt&s rj eKeivco?, 



2. V &yttai\ See p. 92, 12. justice must not be involuntary as the 

inflicting of it is voluntary ? 

III. Whether every one who suffers 
Chap. IX. from an unjust act suffers from an act 
Having observed in the previous of injustice? 
chapter, that he who inflicts and he IV. Whether the person who gives 
who suffers injustice is respectively or he who receives more than he ought 
voluntary and involuntary, he is now commits an act of injustice? 
led to examine the accuracy of this V. Whether any one can do in- 
sentiment of Euripides, which is op- justice to himself? 
posed to the above assertion: and 8. Evpvftnt'} See Euripides, vol. ii. 
which gives rise to the examination of p. 980. Ed. Ozon. 1833. Michaelis 
five questions. Ephesius and a Scholiast quoted by 
I. Whether a person can suffer Zell, attribute these lines to the Bel- 
an act of injustice, and be at the same lerophon, but it is much more pro- 
time a voluntary patient ? bable that they are derived from the 
11. Whether every suffering of in- Alcmson. See Euripid. ib. p. 849. 

Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ETHICORUM LIB. V. 9. 201 

(ocnrtp kou to dSiKeiv irav £kovctiov, r) to /xev 
eKovaiop to & ducovcrtov. 6/jloud? 8e kcu errl TOV 
dcKcuovaOcu' to yap Sucauyirpayeiv irav eKOvcrcoVy 
©or evXoyov avrtKelaOax ofiouo? Koff tKarepov 

6 TO T d8cK€L(T0€U KOI TO 8lKCUOVO"0cU 7) €KOVO"LOV 

*»/ 9 * ****'/* \ » \ 

TJ CLKOVCTLOV €CVCU. OTOTTOV O av OOg€L€ KOI 67TI 

tov SiKCUOvaOou, ei irav eKOvatov* evioi yap 
SiKaiovvrat ov\ eKOvres. 'Ibn-el Kal toSc 8uiiro- Hi. Quei- 

pf)(T€l€V aV TIS, TCOTtpOV 6 TO aSlKOV 7T€7rOV0a>9 

10 aSuceiTai iras rj (ocnrep kcu eVt tov irpaTreiv, 

KOLL €7TL TOV iraa\eLV ioTLV' KOTO. aVflfiefiTjKOS 

yap cv8e)(erax ere dfi(f>OT€pcov fieraXafifidveiv t£>v 
SiKdicov. 6/LtotW 8e SrjXov otl Kal iwl tg>v d8iK<ov* 
ov yap tovtov to TaSuca irpaTTZiv r^J dSiKeiv 
15ov8e to dSttca irdoyeiv tg> dSiKtiaOai. 6/401W 
8e Kal €7rl tov SiKaioirpaytlv kcu StKaxovadou* 
dbvvarov yap dSiKelaOcu /jltj dSiKOVvros t) hiKax- 
ovaOax fir] SiKaiOTrpayovvTO?. Ei 8 9 iorlv No one can 

airXws to abiKetv to pXairreiv eKovra Ttva 9 to injustice to 

*> t , ,*/ x * v ? x « ^himself. 

20 tKovra eioora kol ov Kai <p kou G>y, o o 

aKpaTT)? €K(OV fi\a7TT€l OVTOS aVTOV, €KG>V t av 

dSiKOLTO Kal ivScxoiTO avTOv avrov dSiKeiv. eori 

8e Kal tovto ev ti tS>v diropovfiivcov^ ei iv8i- 

Xerox avTOv avTov dStKelv. en €Kwv av tls 8l 

25aKpao-iav vtt aXXov fiXairTOLTO £k6vto9, wot 



19. r§ &ixut re (ZXm*tu* ixitra] is not possible to do an act of injustice 

If injustice consists merely in volun- (*J**i/V) to one's self: though it is 

tartly injuring another: then what possible to do injury to one's self 

Euripides says is correct ; but if this (£x£rru»). This will be more clearly 

definition is not correct, but we must understood by referring to the Table 

add to it another particular, viz. that in the Introduction. Compare p. 199, 

the patient must be involuntary, then it 21. «» V ix vpcuprutt /3Xa^t» «}**u. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



90S ARISTOTELIS 

elff CLP CKOPT O&lK€Ur0CU. 7) OVK 6pdo9 6 StOplCfiOS, 

aXXa irpoadereov Tip ftXanrretP el&ora kcu op kcu 
<p kcu a>9 to irapa ttjv €K€tvov fiovX-qaw ; £Aa- 

1TT€TCU fiiv 0$P TVS €KtOP KCU ToSlKa TTOOyeL^ a8i- 

Ktircu 5* ovOetf €K<6i>' ovOel? yap fiovXeTOi, oi>&5 
o OKparrjsj aXXa wapa ttjp fiovXtjaip wparrei' 
ovt€ yap fZovXercu ovOeis b fir/ oleTcu elpcu 
airovicuoPj 6 T€ oKpaTrjs ov\ a olercu help irpar- 

T€IP 7rpOTT€l. O 8t TCL CLVTOV 8l8oV?, aKTWep 

Ofirjpos (f>7jat Sovpcu top TXovkop ra> Aiop.rj8et\o 
" XP^ a€a X a ^ K€ ^ ov y eKaropfiot epveafiouDv" ovk 

A8tK€lTCU' €7T CLVTKp yap €<TT£ TO SlSoPOU, TO 5* 

aSiKelcrOcu ovk eir avr<o 9 aXXa top aSiKovwa 
Set imapx*w. Trepl p*v oiv tov aSuceurOcu, on 
ov\ €kov<tlov, SrjXop. 15 

iv. and v. En 5' fOP 7TpO€L\6fJL€0a 8v eOTLV elweiP, 7TOT€- 1 2 

Question* , , „ c , \ \ * *, v 

considered. pOV TTOT aOlK€t O V€lfia? irapa TTfV O^LOP TO 

irXelov r) 6 ex<ov> kou el eortp airrov avrov aSiKeiv' 

€1 yap €V84\*T0U TO TTpOTtpOV Xe\6eP KOU 6 8ia- 

vepx&v d8iK€i aAX' ov\ 6 e\<av to wXeov y el t^ 20 
irXeov erepcp 17 avra> vepei eiSaw Kal €kcdv, ovto? 
avros avrov aStKei. oirep Sokovctiv ol fxerpcot 
wotetp' 6 yap emeucy? eXarraynKos eoriv. 17 ovSe 
touto olwXovp; erepov yap dyaOov, ei erv\ev 9 
hrXeoveKTei, otov Sotpjs rj tov airXcos kolXov. eri%b 



10. "OfjLfi^t] Horn. 11. Z. 236. right to take, but in so doing he takes 

23. 4 »Vfr r§vr0 *«\*vf] It is never something else as an equivalent to it, 

absolutely the case, says Aristotle, that either the gratification of his own bene- 

any man who distributes, don distri- volent feelings, or the friendship of 

bote less to himself than he ought, him to whom he surrenders his right, 

He may give less of that which he is or reputation, or such like, 
distributing to himself than he has a 



- 



ETHICORUM LIB. V. 9. 



803 



XveTai Kal Kara top Siopurfibv rov dSiKelv' ovdev 
yap irapd rqv avrov irdoyei fiovXrjatVj (oare 
ovk dSucciTOu 8id ye tovto, dXX* ehrep, fSXaTrrerai 
pjovov. Qavepov 8e kou oti 6 8iavepxov dSiKei, that the 

- * \ % » » « * \ / v »/. » \ * \ distributor, 

5aAA ov\ o to TrXeov e\a>v aei ov yap cp to an d not the 

y«» t / »ft«**-wv»^\e/ ^ receiver, it 

aOLKov vwapx^i aoucei, aXX <p to e/covra tovto un j ast> 

7TOt€lV' TOVTO # O0€ J/ Tj ap\V Ttj9 7rpd£ea>S, ^ f ^ U " 

ecrnv iv r<5 Stavefioim aAA* owe €j> r<p Xa/xfidvoiTt. 
en ewel 7roAAax©ff ro 7TO£6i^ XeycTat 9 icat eirnv 

10 car ra a\f/vxa Kreivei Kal tj %€ip Kal 6 olKerrjs 
iinTd£avTOS) ovk dbiKel fiev, woiel 8* ra aStKa. 
ere el fiev ayvoS>v tKpivev, ovk dSiKei Kara to 
vopLiKov SUaiop ovl? dSiKO? r) k plat 9 eOTiv, eari 
8 coy aSiKO?' erepov yap to vopuKov StKaiov Kal 

15 to irptoTOv' el 8e yu/coaKcov eKpivev dSiKW, 7rA€- 



9. in i*u r«AXag«f ] i 2g« huvi- 
fjutt <rh «*Xi«» K&titu tutf eturo, «XX* ovy^ 
i it%ifttw 0& ya( •*•' ahrtjf \trrtf w 
a%X.n, xttfet tspirmt. §u ya{ i «r«j*i> 
ra Stbixa. atntui Xiytrai, 1/ ph Mark 
rv/i(&t(}fix9t, &**n Xiyirat *«) h #•){ 
t)*nvu* n fAa%*n* n Xtto$ , «*«^' #iif «&* 
7#vif *{£* w 0«mc/ «u% «0* lavrZ* 
*£aTT§orm' eQixtc ph yk( xot&etv, 
a$t*ovri Si ofoapSf. Paraphr. 

12. ayviSf ix^tiv] He who dis- 
tributes, acts either wittingly or un- 
wittingly. If the latter, it is from 
ignorance of Natural or of Positive 
Justice, or of both. If from an igno- 
rance of both, though he may have 
done an unjust act, he has not done 
an act of injustice. Neither if he has 
made a wrong distribution, knowing 
the Positive but ignorant of the Na- 
tural Justice : for in so doing he has 
acted according to the Laws. Neither 
'if he has made a wrong distribution, 



following Natural but ignorant of 
Positive Justice; for then he obeys 
the Moral Law. But he who makes 
an unjust distribution contrary to the 
dictates of both, knowing both, or of 
one or the other knowing one or the 
other, commits an act of injustice. 

15. ri rf£r«»] Natural Justice. 

— ii ft yii**%Mt] But if, knowing 
both species of Justice, a person hath 
made an unfair decision from motives 
of popularity or revenge, he is unjust, 
taking more than his due in the shape 
of popularity or revenge. Just tfie same 
then as if a person were a partner in 
an unjust act, so he by giving an undue 
decision from such motives has more than 
his due, and is partner in an unjust act, 
although he may have no share, or 
less than he ought, in that which he 
distributes. As in other instances, he 
who adjudges a field to a man who has 
no right to it is a partaker in the in- 



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204 



ARISTOTELIS 



ovtKrei kou avrb? r) \apiros 17 Tipuopla?. toairep 

odv kov €% ti? fieptacuro tov dStKTjfiaro^y kou 6 

Sea raXrra Kpivas dfiUcD? irXeov e\eC kou yap ear 

etceivcov 6 tov aypov Kpivas ovk aypov aXX 

Three vul- apyvpiov eXafiev. Ol & avOpanroi i(f) eavrolslS 

touching oiovrai €ivou to aSiKeiv, 810 Kal to SUaiov elvou, 

wjutticc 11 paSiov. to 5* ovk eoriv* ovyyeveaOai piev yap 

stated; ~ / \ /> \ v / \ 

rg tov y€LTOvos kou iraTa^ai tov ttXx\<tiov kou 
Sovvai tt) X*ipi to apyvpiov paSiov kou eir 
avTOiSj aXXa to a>8i jfyovras ravra iroielv ovre 10 
a. paSiov ovr tir avrols. *Ofwia>s 5c Kai to 

yv&vou to. SiKOua /cat tol aSiKa ovSev otovrou 
aoipov elvou, on 7T€pl (ov ol vo/xoi Xtyovaiv ov 



justice, though he has not the field but 
money to bias his judgment. And bo, 
not he that receives more than he 
ought, but he who distributes to 
another more than he ought from im- 
proper motives, if the receiver have 
no part in bribing the distributors, is 
unjust. 

5. «* 3* &*4{**9t] Aristotle here 
refutes those vulgar errors originating 
in men's incorrect notions of justice and 
injustice. 

I. That any one can at any time 
do an act of injustice, and consequently 
an act of justice t and therefore be a 
just man. 

II. That any one can determine 
whether an act be one of justice or 
injustice. 

III. That a just man can do an act 
of injustice. 

To which it is sufficient to answer, 
that as all actions both of justice and 
injustice can only result from habit, 
and habits can neither be acquired 
speedily nor lost directly, so neither 



can he who has not the habit of 
justice perform an act of justice when 
he will, nor he who has not the habit 
of injustice the act of injustice. The 
just man cannot have at the same 
time within him the habit of justice 
and injustice, and consequently can- 
not perform an act of injustice. Nei- 
ther is it easy to determine whether an 
act be one of justice or injustice, 
thougb it be done according or con- 
trary to the strict letter of the law. 
A man may obey the law from frau- 
dulent motives or transgress accident- 
ally, but the first is not necessarily 
an act of justice, or the second of 
injustice. And in all judgment con- 
cerning acts of this kind, many cir- 
cumstances must be considered to de- 
termine the quality of the act, which 
is not easy nor in the power of every 
one, and requires not only a knowledge 
of positive but moral justice; which 
brings us to the subject of the next 
chapter. What is Equity ? 



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ETHICORUM LIB. V. 10. 205 

Xo&eirov ijvvuvai. aXA' ov tovt iorl ra SiKOta 
dXX! rj Kara ov/ificfir/Koy, aXXa 7rc3r irparTO/icva 
ical 7rc3y V€fi6fi€va SUaca' tovto 5e irXiov epyov 
rj ra vyiuvd eiSevai, cVel Katcel fieXt Kal oivov Kal 
biXXefiopov teal kclvctw kcu to/xtji/ elSevai paSiov, 
aXXa 7T(3ff Set vet/iac irpos vyieiav kcu rivi kcu 
7Tot€, tocovtov epyov oaov larpov tlvcu. At' in. 

avro 5c tovto Kal tov Slkcllov diovrai elvai ovOtv 

rjTTOV TO aSlK€tP 9 OTL OvOlv t)tTOV 6 SlKOUO? aXXa 

10 Kal fiaXXov Svvcut av (ekcuttov wpai^cu tovtcdv' 
Kal yap avyytviaOai yvvauci Kal iraTa^at^ Kal 
6 avSpelo? Trfv aairiSa afalvai Kal orpaxfrel? 4<f> 

OTTOTCpaOVP Tpi\€lV. 'AAAa TO SctXaiveiP KflUaod refuted. 

to a8iK€iv ov to TavTa woielv earl, irXrfv 

15/cara crvpLfiefiriKOS, aXXa to d)8l fyovra ravra 

iroieiv, totnrtp kouL to laTpeveiv Kal to vytdfieiv 

OV TO T€fJLV€lV 7/ fir) T€flV€lV 7) <j>apfiaK€V€lV 7) flTJ 

(papfiaKeveiv soTiv, aXXa to g>ol. eaTt oe Ta 
StKoua £v tovtol9 ols /jl€T€otl t£>v airX&s ayaOcbvy 
^Oexovai 8 9 wr€pl3oXr)v kv tovtois kcu eAActf/ai>* 
tols filv yap ovk Zcttiv v7T€p/3oXr) ovtcov, olov 
lam Toir Oeols, tols 8 9 ovOev fiopiov axfreXt/iov, 
rots aviaTtos KaKols, aXXa irdvra /3Xa7TT€i, toZs 
8e fitypi tov' did tovt avOptimivov i<rTiv. 



4. rl *WV] So asserted the 19. kwX»t kym0»if\ See p. 171, 

Sophists. 17. 



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306 



ARISTOTELIS 



CHAP. X. 

Of Equity. 

Justice and I1EPI 8e hrieucetOS KCU TOV €7Tl€l*COl/?, 7n3? €Y€l 14 

Equity not x \ 

opposed. ^ yLt€^ iirieiKeta irpos SlKCUOOVVTJV TO St €7ri€lK€? 

npos to Slkcuov, e\ofievop eariv ehrelv* ovre yap 
coy tclvtov airXtos ovff d>y erepov tS yevei (f>ali/€Tai 

CTKOTTOVfltVOLS) KCU OT€ /JL€V TO €7Tl€LK€S €7Tai1/OVfJL€V 5 

kou avSpa tov tolovtov 9 cocrre kcu iiri ret aXXa 
hraivovvref p,€Ta(f)€pofAev avri tov dyaOov to ernei- 

K€9 OTL (3e\TtOV 8rjXoVPT€9' OT€ Se T<p Xoycp 

aKoXovOovai (fxzlveTau Sltottov el to iirieiKes irapa 
to Sikcuov tl ov eiraiveTOV eoriv" 7) yap to Sitcaiovio 
ov airovbouovy rj to eirteLKes ov SiKaiov, el aXXo 9 
fj el afi(f>(o (nrovScua, Tamov eaTiv. -q fieu ovv 
air op la a\ef>ov crvp.fiaLvei Sta Tavra irep\ to eiriei- 
Kes 9 e\et 8 airavTa Tpoirov Tiva bpOcbs kou ov9ev 
imevavriov eavTols' to re yap eirietKes 8tKacovl5 



Chap. X. 
On the subject of this chapter, see 
also the Rhetoric i. 13. 

6. wra x«) leri] So that we trans- 
fer the term from its original meaning 

to other acts besides those of equity; 
instead of using the term good, using 
that of equitable, when desirous to 
vse a higher term of praise to a thing : 
indicating thereby that equity is better. 
— U) rit &xxm] To the acts of the 
other virtues. 

7. TO i*iUXtf] to l«?i*xfrtig«v 
Bekker. If this reading he retained 
the sense will be, shewing that when a 
thing is more equitable it is better. For 



instance, if we say, temperance is more 
equitable (i«**w*i«r«£#») than courage, 
we indicate thereby that it is better. 

9. 14 to inuxif] Since equity is 
commendable, nothing which is con- 
trary to equity is commendable ; jus- 
tice is contrary to equity; therefore 
justice is not commendable. Tbe 
fallacy in this syllogism is in the 
word justice, used in a partial sense 
in the premise, distributively in the 
conclusion. Some justice is contrary 
to equity, viz. that of which equity 
is the correction, and that particular 
justice is not commendable. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. V. 10. 207 

tlvos ov fUXnAv iari 8lkouov 9 kou ov\ m aXXo 
tl yevos ov PcXtlov iarc tov Sucaiov. tovtov apa 
Sikcuov kou iwieuces, kou d/x(f)OLv awovSaioLv ovtolv 

KpeiTTOV TO €7rL€LK€9. 7TOL€L &€ TTJV dlTOpiOV OTL 
5 TO €7TL€LK€9 SlKOLlOV fl€V tCTTlV, OV TO KOTO. VOfJLOV 

8e, aXX* tiravopOcopa vopipuov StKalov. outlov 8 
otl 6 pjev vo/ao? KadoXov 7rw, 7T€pl ivlcov 5* ov\ 
olov re 6p0£>$ tnrelv KadoXov. 'Ei/ oh odv dvdyicrj in what 

fl€V €L7T€LV KadoXov, fit) OLOV T€ 8t 6p0CO$ 9 TO G>$ Equity is 
3xv x , Nn / « / »• ~ v better than 

10C7TI TO TrXtOV Xa/ipai/€L O VOfW9 9 OVK ayVOCOV TO Justice. 

dfiapTavo/ievov. kou €o-tlv ovSev tjttov 6p0a>$ % to 
yap dpAprrjfia ovk iv T<p vopxp ov& iv T<p vo/to- 
0€Tjj aXX' iv rfj (f>va€L tov irpaypuaTOs icrrLV' 
evOvs yap TOLavn) r) tG>v irpaKT&v vXq iorlv. 

l&OTav ofiv Xeyy fxkv 6 vo/io? KadoXov 9 o-Vfifir} & 
€7rl tovtov irapa to KadoXov, totc 6pda>9 e^ei, 
y 7rapa\€L7T€L 6 vofioderrjs kou rjpuapTev dirXcos 
ehrcov, liravopOovv to eXX€L(f>0ev 9 o Kav 6 vo/jlo- 
6im)$ avT09 ovtg)9 av eiiroL 4k€l wapcov, #cat ei 

20jj5ef, €i/OfJLO0€T7)(r€u av. Slo SUatov fiev €(ttl 9 kou 
fieXTLOv tlvos dLKatov, ov tov a7rXcof 8e dXXa 
tov did to drrXw d/AapTrj/jLaTOs. Kdl Zcttlv Equity de- 

tf »i/ « ~> ~ > / /% i fined. 

aVTt) 7/ (pV(TL9 T) TOV €7TL€LKOV9 9 tiravoputopxt VOfJLOV, 

rj iXXeL7T€L 5ia to KadoXov. tovto yap outlov 
25 /cat tov fifj irdvTa Kara vo/xov elvai, otl 7T€pl 
ivlcov dSvvaTov OeaOaL vojjlov, cootc ^(frlapxiTOs 
del. tov yap dopiorov dopLoros kou 6 Kavcov 
kcrTLVy aowep /cat ttjs Aec-fila? oiKoSofJufj? 6 ftoXl- 
fidivos Kavdiv' irpos yap to o"x^fta tov Xidov 

14. Sxii] See p. 7. expression in the Rhetoric i. 1. p. 

28. (uXl&im *«>»t] Compare the 2, 2. (Ed. Bekk.) 



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306 



ARISTOTELIS 



fUTCuavctTOi kcu ov fjjevet o kolikdv, kcu to yfnf 
<f>tafia wpbv to. irpayfiara. ri piv oiv ecrrt to 
eirt€iK€9 9 kcu oti SUcuov, kcu twos fieXriov 
8ikouov 9 SrjXov. (fxivepov & 4k tovtov kcu 6 

€7Tt€tKT)9 TL9 eOTtV' 6 yap T€OV TOIOUTCOP TTpOCU- 5 
p€TtK09 KCU TTpOKTlKOSy KCU 6 p,T) OKpif3o8lKaiOS 

cVt to xeipov aAA* eAarrcmicos', Kahrep eycov 
top vopjov fiorjdov, cwteiKT/s iariy kcu T) eijis 
avrq €7ruiK6ta, SiKcuoavw) tis oiaa kcu ov\ 
erlpa tis e£i?. 10 



CHAP. XL 



A person 
cannot com- 
mit against 
himself an 
act of 
Universal 
injustice. 



IIOTEPON & iv8i\€Tac iavTov dSiKetv rj ov, 15 
(fxivepov 4k tg>v elpr/p^et/coj/' tol pev yap eari tcov 



6. pi 4*{j/3«3/*«u#f] For accord- 
ing to the proverb : Summum jus 
summa injuria. 



Chap. XI. 

Aristotle resumes the consideration 
of the question proposed in the pre- 
vious chapter ; whether a man can do 
an act of injustice to himself ; which 
question is copiously discussed in the 
Gorgias of Plato. 

12. r&- fAv 7*£ \rrt] Aristotle re- 
peats the distinction already stated in 
the early part of this Book, between 
acts done contrary to universal and 
particular justice: and infers that 
consequently all acts of injustice suf- 
fered, must be those contrary to one 
or the other justice. Aristotle shows, 
that a man can inflict neither the one 



nor the other class of actions upon 
himself. 

A case is supposed. " When a 
man commits deliberately an injury, 
not from a spirit of retaliation, which 
act is forbidden by the law, does he 
not commit an act of injustice X f 
We grant it. " He then who commits 
suicide, commits such an act of in- 
justice : does he not?" This we grant. 
" And upon himself." This Aris- 
totle denies : affirming that he injures 
the state of which he is a member. 
And this is evident, for the state shows 
its sense of such an injustice by pu- 
nishing the person who has committed 
it Thus a person cannot commit an 
act contrary to universal justice upon 
himself. Suicide is said to be an act 
contrary to universal justice, since a 
man who commits it disregards all 



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ETHICOHUM LIB. V. 10. 209 

Sucauov ra Kara iraxrav aperrjv xnro rov po/iov 
rerayfieua, oiov ov KeXevet diroKTivvvvai iavrop 
6 v6fw? 9 a 5e /jlij KeXevei, dirayopevet* en orav 
Trapa top po/jlop fiXmrrg fir) dprtfiXdirTGyp, tKCDP, 
&aoiK€i, €KQ)v be o etdco? kcli op koli <p. o de oi 
opyr/p iavrbv <r<f>aTT(DV £kcdp tovto Spa Trapa 
top opdbv Xoyop, b ovk ia 6 po/jlo?' dSiKel apa. 
oAAa nva ; r/ rqp ttoXip, avrop o ov ; ckcdp 
yap 7raax€t 9 dduceirai 8* ovOcls £k&p. 810 Kal 

10 r) 7roXis {jjfuol, Kal Tis aTifila 7rpo<reoTi r<p iatrrbp 

StaxbOelpavTi a>$ tt)p ttoXlp dSiKOvpri. "En orP »rt icu - 

Kaff o aoiKOS o puovov aouccov Kai fir) 0X00? (pavXoSytic*. 
ovk toTw aSitcrjaat iavrop. tovto yap aXXo 
iicelvov. ecrTi yap wees 6 aSucos ovtod irovripbs 

15©o"7re/> 6 5«Aoy, ov\ a>$ oXr/p tycov ttjp irovrfpiav, 
(oar ovSe Kara Tavrrjp dSiKei' a/ia yap av Tip 
avrqi elrj dtyr/prjaOai §cal Trpoa-KtiaQai to avTO" 
tovto 8e dSvvaTOV, dXX del ev rrXeioaip dvdy/a] 
eipat to oucaiov Kai to aoiKOP. eTi 0€ €kovctiop 

20 re Kal 4k irpoaLp4(rem kcu irpoTtpov* 6 yap 
Sloti erradey Kal to avTO avrnrouov ov Sokcl 
dStKetP' avTO? 8 iavTOV, tol avrd a/ia Kal irao-yei 
Kal 7TOt€L. €Tl €17) dp €KOvra d8iK€i<r0ai. 7rpo? 
8e tovtols, avev tS>v Kara fiepo? d8cKT)fldr(OP 

2&OV0€19 d8lK€L 9 flOl)(€V€l 8 OvSel? TTJV iaVTOV OvSe 
TOl\(OpV\el TOP iaVTOV TOIXOV OvSe kX€7TT€C tol 

iairrov. oXco? 8e XveTai to eavTov dSiKeiv Kara 
top Siopio-fiop top ircpl tov €Kovcrl(09 dStKeio-Oai. 



positive duties, (*{o*r&rru i vo/ms rat mprdf. p. 77, 10.). All of which, of 
rov atytitu X^yx viiii—xtLl rk tw course, by such an act he neglects. 
#«ty«w - ipoi'stf % ««} xmrit ret$ &\X*f He is, in fact, a traitor to. his country. 



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WO ARIST. ETHIC. LIB. V. 10. 

TodoU Qavtpov 8e kcu art dfxcfxo p&v (f)av\a, kcu to 

to fuffer in- a8cK€Ur0cU KOI TO d8lK€LV' TO fl€V yap eXoLTTOV 

justice. **\x/v » \ ' \ * 

TO 06 7TA601/ ^tV €OTL TOV fl€CT0V K0U aXT7T€p 

vyieivov fitv iv laTpacrj, €V€ktikov 8e €v yv/iva- 
otikt/. aAA' opxos yeipov to aSuceiv' to fiev ydp&. 

aSlK€LV fXtTOL KOLKLOLS KCU yftetCTOV, KCU KOLKiaS 7} 

tt}9 reXeia? kcu a7rXa>$ ^ iyyvs (pi) yap airav 
to tKOvcriov /xera a8iKia$), to & dSiKeio-dcu avev 
Kcudas Kal dSiKtas. Kajff avro piv oiv to dSt- 
K€iaOat fjTTOv <f)avXov, Kara avfifiefir/Kos 5* ovOevio 
KCoXvei /JLelfiov tlvcu kokov. aAA* ovSev /xeXet r# 
ffyyy* dXXa 7rXevpiTiu X4y€t fxei^co vovov irpoa- 
UTaiafiaTO^' Kalroi ylvovr dv 7tot€ Oartpov Kara 
evpficfhjKO?, el wpQarrraia'avTa Sid to wecrcty 
ovfifiair) vtto tG>v ttoXsii'uov Xi](f)dfjvai Kal awo- 16 

Metaphori- 0CW€LV. Kara fl€Ta(bopdv , §\ KCU OflOlOTTfTa 

callyaman , , , „ ^ , v , N 

may do an COTIV OVK aVTCp 7Tp09 aVTOV OlKaiOV OAAa T(OJ/ 

actofjustice , „ , „ N , , x „ ^ 

andwjus- aVTOV TUTIVy 0V TTaV 0€ OlKatOV aAAa TO 0€- 

tice to him- \ * \ , r % / \ 

self. CnrOTlKOV 7] TO OlKOVOfUKOV €V T0VT01S yap TOlf 

Xoyoi? 8iecrT7iK€ to Xoyov *j(ov jxepo? tt}? ^wx*? y20 
Trpbs to aXoyov. sis a 8rj fiXewovai kcu Sok€i 
elvat dStKia wpof axnov^ on iv tovtoi? cot* 
irixryeiv ti irapa tos iavT&v 6pei»€i9' axnrep 
odv apxpvri Kal apyo/JLeuco elvcu irpbs dXXr/Xa 
SUatov Tt Kal tovtqis* 7rept fiev oSp StKcuocrvvrfs^ 
kcu Tobv dXXcop tS>v t}9ik<ov dperG)v 8icopi<r0<a top 
Tpimov tovtov. 

5. x**t n r * &t*tn\ Of this one sam Platonis disputationem attingit qui 

would have thought there never could lib. iv. de Repub. in fin. duo facit 

have been any question. Yet so it justitis genera, interioris et M ezterioris. 

was. See Plato's Gorgias, p. 469. GIPH. 

4'73. sq. Plat. Rep. 579. Apolog. 30. 24. fy^n *«} •^•/*i»y] ; See the 

Leg. 728. Pol. i. 2. p. 7/ 8. 

16. xaret fiiret^dv] Breviter copio- 

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INTRODUCTION TO BOOK VI. 



Aristotle now proceeds to complete the analysis of 
his definition of Moral Virtue, and at the same time to 
discuss the Intellectual Virtues, the division of whieh 
was spoken of at the close of the First Book, p. 48. 

Now Aristotle had defined Moral Virtue to be ?£«; 

as &v & <pgovtfjM$ 6gi<renv (p. 69.) ; in which definition three 
things remain yet to be explained : 

1. What is koyost 

2. Who is <p§ovifto$ ? 

3. What is jrgo«/gf<n$ ? the consideration of which was 
left unfinished in iii. 3. p. 100. see n. 

The nature of these then we now proceed to examine. 
And our enquiry is; What is that Koyo$ which always 
directs us to the true mean in all Moral Actions, since, 
there are many kinds of Ao'yoi : and what is that Virtue 
of the fgovipos by which he is enabled exactly to dis- 
cover this true mean ? But to ascertain these, we must 
examine in what part of the soul they exist, and what 
Tufyoi or Virtues there are whose object is truth. If 
then there be two parts of the soul, as there would 
appear to be from there being two kinds of matter only, 
Contingent and Necessary, upon which the soul can 
operate, one of these will take cognizance of the Truth 
in Moral, the other in Scientific Matter. The first of 
these then will be the Deliberative, the otjier the Scien- 
tific part of the soul. And in whichever of these the 
\6yo$ is employed in finding and determining the truth 
in moral subjects, that will be Aoyo$, and that the virtue 

p2 



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212 INTRODUCTION. 

of the QymfjLOf which we are endeavouring to discover. 
Now since necessary matter is that upon which the 
Scientific part operates, it cannot take cognizance of 
Moral Truth which is not Scientific, consequently can- 
not be that kfyos and that Virtue which directs the 
Moral Habits to the truth. If, therefore, we can dis- 
cover how many Habits there are in both parts of the 
soul which take cognizance of Truth, we shall discover 
which direct our Moral Habits, and what are our Intel- 
lectual Virtues. Now the matter upon which they can 
operate are two; necessary and contingent: the ends 
which they can have in view are only three; truth 
purely, moral truth, truth in production, consequently 
these habits can be only, 

(1.) One which has Moral Truth for its object 

(2.) The other which has Truth in production (t^i). 
(3.) Which has Scientific Truth. 

But the matter of the latter subdivides itself into 
either pure demonstration, or the principles of demon- 
stration. And consequently there will be, following the 
same analogy, a distinct habit for each, the first being 
science (S^iot^x*), the other apprehension (votfc), or the 
union of both which is wisdom (o-of/a). 

Accordingly we obtain five divisions of Habits, all 
having Truth for their object. 



Abstract Truth. Practical or Moral Troth with pro- 
| Truth. duction. 

<~ * I I 

1. Acx«<. 2. U rmkycm. 3. This habit 4. This habit 

This habit will be, This habit will be, Will be, will be, 

%t ptr« Xiyv Xfy /Kir* Xiyv Tfyg fttra Vyt furk 

AKhMs «*«£) w iXnhvt wt(i r*t Xvyo itKn- \iy»v «A»- 

&?%£*. l£ btX"*> '*"* «•$«*- twt ****- 

(sc. k**t*txrt*n). nxn- TIKJ. 

1. sc. uvt. 2. Wtrrnt**- 3. sc. <pp«wtf. 4. sc. nvw». 

I l 

United they make up 
5. 0§f!m. 



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INTRODUCTION. 213 

The examination therefore of these five Habits, tWrqjxi}, 
ripcmj, you;, <Pg£vi\<rt$, and <ro<p/a, occupies the following book; 
together with a consideration of their utility for pro- 
moting the happiness of man. 

Aristotle then has not thought it necessary in this 
Book to investigate all the Intellectual Habits, reserving 
the consideration of them for another treatise*. His 
principal attention is directed to those which form the 
intermediate link between the rational and irrational 
soul, and which have unmixed truth either theoretical 
or practical for their object (ipyov) b ; and hence the con- 
sideration of <rofla bears but a small proportion to that 
of fgivrio-ts, and one of them (vou$) is left so obscure, that, 
without recurring to his other writings, it is by no means 
easy to understand several portions of the ensuing 
chapters. It may be therefore useful to consider briefly 
such of the intellectual faculties of the soul as are not 
explicitly defined in the following Book. 

The faculties of the soul may be divided then as 
follows : 

The Faculties of the Soul 
are divided into 

i 





Rational. 

i 


1 
tnnxmi. 

I 


\ 
Irrational. 

1 




f 
1 


«* 


1 

I 


&c, 


1 
See p. 


1 

wOf. 

hAt»M. 


always of 
good. 


l 

of good and 
evil.connect- 
ing the Irra- 
tional with 


t ) 


45,15, 






the Rational 












soul, being 
a compound 
of \Ay§s and 












%&{. 




- 





Of these, as has been already shown, Aristotle divides 
* The third book of the Treatise De Anima. b See p. 47. and the note. 



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214 INTRODUCTION. 

the purely rational according to their object-matter, 
confining rncrrijp) to necessary matter with demonstra* 
tion, and $$6yq<tis to contingent matter. See the division, 
p. 212. Of such faculties then as are concerned with 
knowledge (yvawrixai), the lowest is alo-ftjo-j?, that of the 
five senses. These when employed, each upon its pecu- 
liar object-matter, seldom err c . But they have a common 
object-matter upon which they frequently are at fault d , 
such as motion, rest, number, figure, and magnitude, 
(xhw*$> hppl*, agttptfy *xqp.*i piytQo$ *). But besides this 
a«r0i|<rj; which Aristotle designates by the name of ft** <x*<r0ij- 
n$, there is another which is called xoivif aMrpn^ of which 
he speaks in the 6th chapter of this Book, p. 240. For as 
every sense is confined to its own peculiar object-matter, 
there must be some other sense which compares the dif- 
ferences of things sensible with each other. Not yotfc, 
although somewhat resembling it f , for vow* cannot judge 
of things sensible. Not that vov$ is ignorant of their 
differences, but it uses this organ for the discovery of 
those differences; for without sense it is impossible to 
judge (yvwvou) of things sensible; and which, because it 
judges of all the energies of the senses, is called common 
(xoiwj). Contrary to the other senses this faculty is both 
incorporeal (oura>iMLTo$) y and acts at any time (&xgova>$). 
For it does not at one time know that a thing is bitter 
and another time white, but at the same time (h t» 
avrw yw) that it is both bitter and white *• 



c t fA> yk{ alrhtrtt rSt tbitt it) * Compare De Anima, iii. 2. $. 10. 

iXnitt. De Anima, iii. 3. §. 3. Com- Uderi ph $Sv aJdnrtf r$v fartuufAnv 

pare also ii. 6. §. 2. and iii. 3. $. 12. «<VS«tm7 UrU, »*dt&vr* It rf *l*4n- 

d See De Anima, iii. 3. $. 12. r«(«V ? aMnrtpw, »m) *(ltu rag rt» 

• These are called the common vmxupinv alrtnrov ii*Qo{df, «n Xm*- 

matter of the senses, not because they *}» f*h *«2 pix** tyst, yXvxv ft xmi 

are common to all the senses at once, nxfir ytvstt. aptmf J* 1%u r»vro ««2 

but because they are subject to more M rSt £xx»». Wu ft »«) r$ Xtvxh 

than one ; for instance, sight and touch ««) re yXvzu ««) turner* rm mlHnrSf 

can both judge of magnitude. See De *pt U**rn x(infiUf, rift *m al*4m- 

An. ii. 6. fipti* Urt Ita^u ; dfmyuti ft «/*Afa- 

f Set Chap. ix. mUtnvk y*t irrw. f jm> Xfetv Zn 4 



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INTRODUCTION. 216 

Neither of these faculties are concerned with action 
(*g££j; !l ) except accidentally. 

The next in order is imagination ($avraW«), the power 
of presenting visions to the mind ', a motion proceeding 
indeed from the senses, not of the senses but of the soul, 
being necessary to fo&voia, and itself requiring ocMi\<ris, yet 
differing from both. Differing from sense (afrfip-jf), be- 
cause sense cannot energize without the presence of the 
sensible object, and we have power over our senses but 
not of our imagination \ Differing from fcncrrijpj and 
fou£, because they are always of the truth (oAqfamxa/), 
whereas imagination is more frequently false. Differing 
from opinion, because upon opinion follows belief or 
persuasion (wfori* 1 ), but not upon Qavrourla; our feelings 
and affections also immediately sympathize with W£« but 
not with QotvTot<rloi m . And, further, Ufa does not exist 
in brutes, but ^avrourla. does; the former is a rational 
the other an irrational faculty. By fayrwrla, they are 
guided in their actions either who have not reason, or 
whose reason is clouded by passion or disease tt . 

The next of these faculties is W£a, which is employed 
either upon conclusions in contingent or in scientific 
matter, but without knowing the process by which such 
conclusions were deduced. And in this respect also it 
differs from science («n<rrij/xi)) , for science knows both 
the conclusions and the process by which it arrived at 

*k& m Urt r« 1*%a<ro9 ttMnrn^ur By thinking on phantastic summer's 

dveiyxn y^ n> farifunr mvr§v »£<u/v heat? 

«■# xfitat. #£«•« Wi %%x*w>Mo*t IMx*' Richard II. Act i. Sc. 3. 

veu »{Utn %rt trt^n rb y\vnv rtu l iigp /»>» txvrw *lrrtt, thx lftf;gif»«< 

iTmu. ». r. X, De Anima iii. 3. $. 8. 

*» See Chap. i. p. 220. m 7r*t pit )*l«f*ptv tutor rt ft 

■ *$ ififxdrtt y*{ fort *unr**i*t, f«0S£«», tbfbs rvfi*dr%of*it, Spurns to 

De Anima, iii. 3. $. 4. »«v /«£{«X««»* **rk ft rkt f*tr**'mt 

k O, who can hold a fire in his hand «r«vr«f ?x«p" 8**n At •* h*ptm U 

By thinking on the frosty Caucasus? yt*$y ret )uv* $ *«^«xf«. De Anima 

Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite, iii. 3. $. 4. 

By bare imagination of a feast? n *«< fc« *> faint* xm) IfUmt tltm 

Or wallow naked in December's rmt mletiftrt, r«XX« *«r *vrat *{dr- 

snow rtt rk £y a, rk pit Ita ri ph t%ut 

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216 INTRODUCTION. 

such conclusion °. To use the expression of Aristotle (see 
p. 11, 11.) it knows the on, but is ignorant of the &ioti, 
in which it resembles the aMh\<n$ of the irrational soul p . 
They, therefore, who have not science may yet act supe- , 
rior to irrational animals, by holding the conclusions 
derived by others, and by being guided by their opinions. 

The last faculty then of which it is necessary to speak 
is iov$ 9 which differs from ala-dr^trig in operating alike on all 
object-matter, from ^avraaict in always being true, and for 
the same reason from Stf£«. From exiernj/xij and Siavoia, 
because it apprehends by intuition without having need 
of a process of reasoning *. This faculty is possessed to a 
degree by all mankind, for the first principles of morals 
and science exist to a degree in all mankind, otherwise 
they would be unable to comprehend the self-evident 
truths of the one, the axioms and definitions of the other. 
But as it is the most noble faculty of the soul, so it is 
possessed in an eminent degree by few ; growing to per- 
fection only by experience', in those who keep their 
appetites and passions in subjection. It is that faculty 
which in morals does at once what is right, without the 
process of an argument, not because it is any wise allied 
to shrewdness or conjecture, but because it is the eye of 
the soul disciplined and accustomed to the contemplation 
of the truth, which by its very nature recoils from false* 
hood. 

The following are the remarks of Philoponus upon 
this faculty in his Commentary on Aristotle's Treatise de 
Anima : tou 8« you igyov to air\*i$ irgoo-fkkxlf net) xgelrrov ij 
Karat awo'Seif w &n/3aAAeiv rol$ treaty fiouriv. cZcnrg^ yag j? aXxJijq'if 
wgoo'/SaAXouo'a Tv%pv to> Aeuxw, ij rape rm a^^ftoTi, xgeTrrov $ 
K.OLTOL aerrfiieil>w auTOu rrjv yvcwrw eo^ev ou yap fo~nai vgb$ ravra 
trvXkoyKTfjLOVy Sri toSp eor* Aeuxo'v, aXKot ajrAjj brifioky touto 
yivuxncef ovroo xtx) 6 vov$ dwXrj «n/9oAjj ywoixntu tol vorjTot. 
xgtrrroy $ xarei awo'Siifiv. y U yt tou you higyeia ixelvoi$ fjJvotg 

mot, Jav ra /«(/«, rk ft Is* ri irm*- ° See p. 227. 

Xwr«W«u r&$ t$v9 {tun ««Su « mV«* P See Metaph. i. 1. p. 3. 

it Z*if t m«* m Me*™. De Anima * See p. 239. 

iij. 3. $. 15. r See p. 249. 



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INTRODUCTION. 217 

• 

xotfotyivtreu, olg tig ixqov xa&aqiwg xa) h%\vrrip.ty yiyovw 
dfixMou, xa) diet, rm xa$agrixa>y dqtroov dQavr&araag xa) t\yjx 
aWirjO-fcos hvegyeiv <ruv*j0j<r/tfvoif. ten yag • vou$ olov ifyg ryg 

^X^ tiAiiototi). toutou rofvuv too voo fi xa) pi} pertgo- 

ftev 01 toAAo/, a\\' *yyri rivet. xa) IvBaXfueret $ia0f0i)X£V tig *)fwtf. 
Taura 5s Iotiv a? xoiva) twoia*, a; avaffooWxrcoc;, /uaXAov $e xgfJTToy 
r\ xaret, a*ro$gf£jy, irayre; yjycecrxojxfv. olov ot* t<£ Tcp aurcji Tcra 
xa) aAAijAojf Tiro, iVi Wv airo Tcreov Sxa afottgdrj ret xaratetxifuvet 
Icra yfygrai, iri M jravroc; ^ jj xaTapao"i$ ^ q awo'pao'is, oti flravra 
tow dyatov ty/rraf, xa) oVa TOiaura. *po$ yag -ri^y TouYeov t/otiv 
xaracrxsufc ou oWjtuta, dXXd xard xjcfrnjv fjn/3oX^v xfthrov $ 
xara andhetgiv raura yivicxofiev, aurai ouv »$ tlnofitv cd xoiva) 
hvoiou diet. Tarrwv ympftvcu IvoaAftara tow you t Jenv ivafyefc . 810 
xa) agppjy cwi<rTy}(jLYtf riv vow xaAooo-jv r , o^rivi to) vo^ra yiyaVxo- 
ftey. rag) toutou xa) ffv toij aroSsixrixoi; • 6 , Apio~TOT«A.ij$ irqhg 
rob; vopltyvrag jttij tlva* fcrioT^pip sAeysv, ot* ou jxrfvov smorjjpjy 
elvcu Aeyopev ctXXoL xa) agp^v «r»or^/xijj, J touj o§oi»j yivcecrxo/xfv, 
O£ouj Asycoy rftoi roLg xowdg ewolag, xa) touc; ly toic; <TvMoyi<TfLolf 
igouj, $s7 ydg 7ravTa cruAXoyio~judv airb xoivcuv fwoicov fjc«v t^v 
"SX^S oSriveg tag sTiro/xfv airo to? you [xai] wgoj j)jua; porrcoenv. 
avan-o&g/xTeos yog T<r/xev 0V1 to'o* tj ivdqconog e<rriv 9 $ \J/u%*i, ? *"' 
toioutov. >) Tfli voijto) fgouj pijo**, co g weqara rmv oVrcoy, ogo$ yig 
tcriv, &$ ^ijciv 6 yeoofur^g 9 T«yoV Ioti ntgag; otg^rjv ouy iiri- 
0Ti)ft)j^ cpijo-i Toy youv clyai, &' airou yoiq f%0|ttfy Taj xoiv^j 
two lag, oflev >J Siayoia co; airo aq^mv rag eTiemjjxoyix^e; aTo8f/f«j 
Toierrai l . 



r See p. 234. operates on things internal, and is 

• Perhaps for i**\*n»»7t. See note called »% *m4nrt*is. But an opera- 

p. 232. tion on things internal is either upon the 

1 This writer also, in another pas- Universal or Particular. If upon the 

sage of his commentary, gives the Particular it causes Imagination, if 

following account of the different cog- upon the Universal it causes nut, in 

noscent faculties. the proper use of that term (r«t xvtfmt 

The gwntic energy (y*»*tt) is em- mw), But this knowledge of the 

ployed either upon external objects Universal is either above and without, 

and causes sensation («7rSfw), or or with the use of the syllogism; in 

upon internal and causes perception, the former instance producing the 

in the more general use of the term theoretical w*. (see p. 239. n.) both as 

(»«Mri{«f »•»«»). I My more general, to the habit and the energy, (<•}» St»- 

because imagination (QmirmeU) also {»«»•» m»» t« ««/?&» xm) Ui^yumw); 



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218 



INTRODUCTION. 



ib the latter, Um properly, (»•£&* 
I10.1** mm) mwri^m uwiXn^tt *). For 
txriXn^H is applied both to h£nm 
and to Ug». (See p. 230, 11.) 
But if it energise in the inferior way 
or according to syllogism, (•/ ft #«- 
£«W A *•«£ ruXXvysr/u* U%tyn*u) it 
produces )«£« and MXar^tt tu^im- 
The &«w« which is employed on 
theoretical or scientific matter (**£«- 
cmm), produces science; but when 



employed upon contingent 
(«t««rl), if they require deliberation, 
fgfarjf, for fyiftirtt requires delibe- 
ration. But if this contingent matter 
do not require deliberation, it pro- 
duces the arts. For the artist or 
artizan does not deliberate as far as 
he is an artist, but as far as he is 
a man. Philopon. in Arist. de An. 
P. iii. b. 



* 24mm and vwiXn^if seem frequently used in common both by Aristotle 
and bis commentators, (see De Anima iii. 3. §. 4. and 4. $. 3); but they differ, in 
that ktnm is the progression of the mind in the discovery of truth, i+ixwpis is 
the determination or supposition of that truth, or what is supposed to be true, in 
the mind. The one is in motion, the other at rest. 



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ARISTOTELIS 
ETHICA NICOMACHEA. 

LIB. VI. 



CHAP. I. 

The connection of the Intellectual with the Moral Virtues. The 
object of the Intellectual Virtues generally investigated. 

EIIEI 8e rvyyavofi^v rrporepov eiprj/coref or* introduc- 

* ~ % / «~/i * ^ > » - x tion totae 

0€t TO fieCTOV CUpCUrUCU KCU flT] T7\V V7T€ppOArjP subject of 

fxrjde Tqv €AA€tyfni/, to oe fic&ov eortv cos* o 

Xoyo? 6 opdos \eyei, tovto 8i€\a>p,€i/. iv iraaats 

5 yap tcu? dprjfievou? c^ccrt, KaOamp kcu eni t&v 

a\\(0l>, €OTL TIS O-K07T09 7Tp09 OV aTTofiXeiTCOV 6 

tov Xoyov cycov kirurtivti kcu avirjoriv, kcu tl? 
iorlv opos tg>v (leo-OTrJT&v, as fi€Ta£v (pa/iev 
elvat, T7)? wrcpfJoXf}? kcu ttj? cAAe/^eov, ovcra? 

10/cara tov opdov Xoyov. eort 8* to /a€v elirecv 
ovtcds akqdh fiev, ovdev 5c <ra0€f' kcu yap iv 
tvus aXXou? tVi/icAc/atr, irepi ocra? eortv iiri- 
orTrj/JLrjj tout aXr/des pev threiv, otl ovt€ irXelco 
ovre eXeiTTG) Set irovetv oi)8e padv/xetv, aAAa ra 

l5/i€<ra Kal a>s 6 op do 9 Xoyos' tovto 8e fwvov 

2. r> f»iwf] See ii. 2. &ri(0#x£r «•) iXXityw i**x/f#pi», % 

5. x*4**i{ W) rSw £xx»t ] •« #u rfXXA ««2 Ir) w «£»»». Schol. 



p#f#f r£f xarec *r*s i^tr*$ 7£f*» rat 



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2S0 ARISTOTELIS 

€\cov av Tis ovOlv av elSeii] wXeov, otov irola 
fifi irpocr<f)€p€(r0cu irpos to crcofia, el rt? ciireiev 
on oca f/ iarpucrj tceXevet kcu m 6 tglvttjv *x<ov. 
bio 8€t Kai irtpl ray rijy V v X*7 y *& L * M P*> vov 
aArjdes elvat tout eipr/fievov, aAAa kclI 8ia>pi(rfi€-5 
vov ris t lariv 6 opdos Aoyoy kcu tovtov tis opos. 

The subject Taf 8r/ T7J9 V^X*?* a/)€ray 8l€\6/JL€VOL T0LS fl€v2 

menced. etpac tov rjOovs €(f>a/JL€P ray 8* riyy 8uivoias. irepi 
ftev oiv t&p rjOiKtov SteXrjXvOafJLev, 7rep\ 8e raw 

XOLTTCQPy 7T6/H ^l^p/y TTpttiTOV €l7TOJ/rey, \ey(Ofl€P^0 
Thera- OVTm. HpOT€pOV fJL€P 0$V iX^X^V 8v tlvcu 

drtibtml ^PV TV* ir v XVSy ™ T€ Xoyov ex ov kcu to oXo- 

divided a.c- *■» «* X \ *•» x ' V x * * 

cording to 7 0v% vvv ^ € W€ P l TOV XoyOV €X 0,/TOy T0V aVTW 

matter?* TpOTTOV 8tatp€T€0P. KOU V7T0K€l<rdG> 8v0 TO. XoyOV 

Iat0 ' expvra, %v p&v § Oecopovfiev tol towlvtol ra>j> ls 
6vt(dv Screw al apxpu fir) iv8(xpvrw. aXXw? ^X €t ^ 
€P 8e <p tol ivSexoftepa: irpos yap tol t$ yiv€i 
€Tepa kcu t£>v tt)$ tyvyrj? (lopuov erepov Tip 
yevet to irpos etcaTepov 7re0i>#eoy, ehrep Kaff djioi- 



11. ^firtfi] See p. 48. instances.' Since, therefore, the object- 
17. rtf yitu trt^m] If the object- matter of the soul is different, it is 
matters upon which the soul may be probable that there are corresponding 
employed be specifically different, it is parts of the soul to energize upon the 
probable that there will be different different matters, 
faculties of the soul corresponding to But the object-matter of the soul is 
the differences of this matter, which either necessary or contingent, and 
will be employed upon it. And this therefore we may conceive a division 
may be inferred generally from ana- of the soul generally into two parts, cor- 
logy. responding to them. The first of which 
For as colour differs from flavour, will be deliberative, \»yirn*U or /br- 
and noise from smell, so are there Xtvrtxif, or }$mrr$xit t see p. 231. (for 
different senses which are respectively deliberation is only employed upon con- 
employed upon them. We distinguish tingent matter,) over which we have 
noise by hearing, flavour by taste, control, (see iii. 3.); the other into 
colour by sight, and so on in all other scientific (tarm/Mwxfr.) 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 1. 



221 



orr/rd rtva kcu qlK€LOT7jra 17 yv$Kri? inrap\€i avroi?. 
Aeyea-00) Sc rovrtov to filv hrumffJuoviKov ro fiei.TheZWi- 
XoyioTiKov* to yap fiovXeveauat kcu Xoyigeo-vai contingent. 

. »\«k\ / \** \ > «k TKe Set- 

TavTOi/, ovOet? oc fiovXeverai irept r&v fir/ €j/oe- entific or 
/ v XN v ■ « \ x ' * NeceMary. 

5ypiAtv(ov aWco? €\eiv. <oore ro XoyiariKOv cotip 

€1/ Ti fJLtpO? TOV XoyOV €)(0VT09. ArjirreOV ap The virtue 

tfcarepov tovtcov tL? ti ficXTiaTrj €&$' atrnj yap vestigated, 

x e , « *, , % n * * x bv ei.min- 

apern tKarepov, r\ o apery irpos to tpyov to mg the ffyw 
ouceiov. Tpva o eaTiv eu rg yvxg ra tcvpta 
lOirpa^em kcu aXqdelaSj ala&rjo-LS l/ov? ope&f. 



3. Xvytrrixir] Compare de Anima, 
iii. 9. §. 3. h rt vif X*yt*Tut$ y«f « 
fbvXnrtt yinrm, **) it rSf «&•?? £ 

6. ju^tim] The genus of every 
art, science, habit, &c. is discovered by 
considering the matter upon which they 
are respectively employed ; and this 
was termed by the Schoolmen, the sub- 
jectum materials, (fa*). The differentia 
is found, by considering the end and 
object which each has in view ; which 
they also called the subject um for male. 
Now truth is the subjectum formale 
of the virtues or habits both of the 
deliberative and intellectual parts of 
the soul ; but of the former, the *u6- 
jectum materials is necessary-matter; 
of the other, contingent. The defini- 
tion, then, of the respective habits of 
the scientific and deliberative parts of 
the soul will be, of the one, those 
habits which have the aptitude of dis- 
covering the truth (&K*tti/<rti ) in neces- 
sary matter ; of the other, those habits 
which have an aptitude at arriving 
at the truth in moral and contingent. 
Aristotle then proceeds to investigate 
the difference between these two kinds 
of truths, by first explaining what is 
meant by truth in morals. 



Now though Aristotle has said that 
truth is the I^ytt of the intellectual 
virtues, he has given no direct proof 
of it; for this is nearly self-evident. 
For if beasts cannot share in «*{«&* 
much less can they in truth. These, 
therefore, action (<{«&*) and truth, 
are peculiar to man, and must conse- 
quently be peculiar to that part of 
him by which he is distinguished from 
brutes. The l(y* therefore of the in- 
tellectual part of man must be either 
*t*bt, or kXntum, or Jtk&u* pur* 

9. «?/« T irr/t ] Since the best 
habits of the soul are to be discovered 
by its operations {tf/y»), Aristotle 
therefore proceeds to examine the 
principles and first causes of all ope- 
rations, and thence to show what is 
the peculiar operation (#/»i7#» !&•*) 
of each part of the rational soul. 

10. fVi •£•&*] &/*9* fy* rmSra 
Kirnnx* »*rk *'**•*. nut »*) «£(&*. 
ftSt % i ?"** «• XiytZipw ««J 
i «•{«*«***• fc«f ifii ft enf iw&rmw 
rif riku xmi a Sffyt tn** r&v wktmr 
•Z y*t h •£•€«, «Hm *tx>l r»» *{«*«-<- 
xtZ 90V' re *% ir%mr»9 «££« rnt *(&~ 
\%mt iSm tukoym rmurtt %fo <p minim 
rk *i9oi/fT«, Sfiltf tttu h*w* *^««- 



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«« 



ARISTOTELIS 



rovrtou 8' ri cuaOrfO'if ovSc/iias &PXV irp**i;*W 
SrjXop 8k t$ to. dr/pia ai<j(h)<Tiv pkv €x<eiv 9 ffpd- 

Thetfyn /-€6t>? 8k UV KOtVCOVelv. "EoT* & OTT€p iv SwLVOlQ. 

of the Deli- ^ . T 

berative Karcuj)aat9 kcu (X7ro<f)ao'i9> tout iv bp4£u 8ia>£t$ 
*wi- K(u tyvyrf omjt iirtihy) 17 7)0uaf aperrj t£ i9 npoai-b 
pentcr/, rf 8k irpoaipeais opeiji? fiovXevTiKr/, 8el 
81a ravra top re Xoyop aXrjdfj elpou Kai ttjv 
opcfjtv opOrjv, chrep 17 irpoaipeai? cnrovdaia, kcu 
ra aura top pkp (f)dvai rrjp 8k 8i<ok€lp. avrrj 
fjL€i> oiv 17 Siavola kou 17 aXrj&eca irpaKTUcq.Xb 

OftheSd- Tw 8k 0€(DprjTlKfj? 8iaVoia$ KOU fir/ TrpaKTlKr}$ 

entific part. 



4*4*4. rh ifi*r#«i* <yk{ unu* *m) )i* 
rwrt 4 i**r0tm «#m7, Xrt mfx* *Ms 
Ur* »> ift»r». De Anim. Hi. 10. 

Compare generally the whole of the 
third book of this treatise, and also 
De Anim. Motione, with the sixth and 
seventh books of the Ethics. 

1. tiiifums l(x* w^un] The 
reason of this he himself explains in 
his treatise De Anim. Motione, cap. 
vi. if»/Kf> p\* tt **) rk tufvvra to 
£«m , ttJatmt [**) alwinrn] **) f «»r»- 
rUf Km) wpmipm ««) (U6Xm*t* *m) 
Svpii *«) UvfcpMnr rmSrm ft wdwrm 
mwytrmt iff mw mo) Jfigiv. *m) yrn^ 4 
f«»r«#/« »«2 4 «Xr#Vif r*t «&r*» ry 
'? ^«f«» f#»»«* tyriKk yk{ rdrrm' 
iiaflpvri ft ««r« r«f tlpiftiw U 
&XXms Imfi&t. (See De Anim. Hi. 
3. sq.) (iavXn'iS ft ««) fty*fc ««> l«- 
#V'« r«»r« Jgigiif « A wpmipmt 
xuthf }mtoim$ *•) #$;t"f *rri *«} r> 
*(MM£ir/» •$ *2t ft ri to»wiirfir, 
vpmprjp, mXXm ri r*f wputrSt 
rix»f . Compare also De Anim. Hi. 7. 
$.2. 

— rg^gi**] For all «?«{<f is the 
subject of deliberation. ft y*( «{*&( b> 
•It r$ /3#frXifW«* ««} #Sfrw r J «*^«t^ 
eitftmtpuptrtiu. Schol. 



10. 4x4/imi ir f ««n«if] The deli- 
berative part of the soul is employed 
upon contingent matter, and the scien- 
tific upon necessary matter ; it follows 
therefore that action (*gS{if) is the 
i^yn of the deliberative part of the 
soul. For alt deliberation is for action 
and in contingent matter; but all 
<r{«|fr depends upon r^iMf, all 
wpmpmt is mwt and Iffyt, conse- 
quently Mt* and i^t are the prin- 
ciples of all moral action. But all 
good moral action, (for we are seeking 
the peculiar excellence (ri %Z) of this 
part of the soul, in order to discover 
its Afirif), is not without correct rea- 
son (Xtyot ttXnH$), and correct l{t&t. 
That is, the reason must call good 
that which is really good, and *t*&* 
pursue it, according to the dictates 
of reason. The pursuit or avoidance 
of the i/ugif must harmonise and cor- 
respond with the affirmation or nega- 
tion of the reason. For if either 
reason call good evil or evil good, 
and the fftgif act accordingly; or if 
the reason be correct, but the Spfa 
be rebellious, no good moral action 
can be produced, 

11. rife K St»£«r'«»f} Compare 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 1. 



*Xo 



fA7/8€ TTOirjTLKrjS TO €<J KOU KOKto? ToXt)$€9 €<TTl 

koI ^€v8o9 9 tovto yap ion iravrb? Scauorp-tKOv 
€pyov, rod 8e npaKTiKOv teal Btavorp-LKOv 17 0X77- 
Otta ofioXoyeos expvaa rrj opegei 177 opdrj. Ylpa- The reia- 

y, \ * 9 \ , if n , f tionshipof 

5£€w fi€P ovv apxv irpoaipeaif, offep rj Kivrfaiste-m. «*# 

j NX >> ? * ' ** v J- % «#ifi#w, and 

ccAA ov\ ov evetca, TrpocuptcrecD? oe, opegis Kai;& ( ,in 

x / e<// . *> ^ v » * ~* \ human ac- 

XoyO? O €V€Kd TCP09 OlO OUT OLVCV VOV KCUtioos, ei- 
* / v » v »/» ~ > \ nr> e / plained. 

otavouxs ovr avtv -quiKq^ eariv egtco? rf irpocu- 

p€<ri9 m €inrpa£ia yap koI to tvavrlov iv irpdtjet 

\Oav€v Siavola? teal jjdov9 ovk €otlv. Sidvota 8 

avTTi ov0€i> Kwel, oAA' 77 IW/ca tov koi rrpascrucf)' 



Aristotle DeAnima,iiL9.$.7. mXXmxtt 
#oft ri X$yt*T$xh xm) I xaXsv/ttw w»f 
\0vl9 i MiM' i u\t y*{ itmynnxit 
•vfit t#s7 r^axrit, #vft Xiyts xt() 
ftvxrtS xm) Imxrw »Mit. — JtXX' nit 
Srmr tutpi rt rum/m, &tt xtktvtt f iv- 
ytn % luZxtn, «7#» fWdxn %tX9u7rxt 
ftfi$£irTt ft $6, •tssAiM* ft f#0f7Wbf, 
h ft xttfl'm xnurmt, At ft nM, frig** rt 
mtyunt. trt xm) \xtrdrr»rrt rw fv 
xm) \*yv*nt vnt Imtmmv fttyw rt i 
3i*xm #& xtnTrxt, mXXm xmrk rht l«- 
hx4m* w^drru, iUt i mxfmrjf. 

4. Wfsegi** ft\t #?v) ilwin ti lrt 

Writ, Iwxytt ri S Inxd nut, 1%* 
^nkmUy c>» kiytt xm) r^t 1$dftm» rh 

U *W( WQOXTiMXtg *{fMZ§pr*9 4 y*{ 

lr/rm/Mw«ik XAtta »bx tnxd rnt 
Iripv ri **£ Uwf xXnAf A+Mxiprn. 
dXX' %x u T ^ *$**(**( U»c$ f*ixV T# ^ 
t^iT* *fo> xXnhtxt, xmidxtf »«> 4^n 

i7{ur«*. Trr< r«w rw/)»r» ix r5» i«^»- 

/»if*»? ?T1 >/TT» 4 Jff&f , A *^ T?r T«tf 

Xjy#v xflruts xa) tw &**}*?%** tl Sfyf* 

T»V ipxffr*4 94 V^Xfi/WIMF, 4 ««) •#*» 

fi'^ivA X*y#», n xx) mfxiprit Mum- 
itrm, xx! furk r)tt &*ftu&v rav Jfyir 



iX»« ixi frm g ri «|^m^wi Xwiyinvw. 
Xiyt ft wxSfTt m±v I mymSh iTnm 
r»XX»yi\ifUft ri xar ipfyt ytynit, 
h *«) *pnyurxi rnt w^MujIru*, J«^- 
n^tff ft ft r#» rf#w#» i^irxu V #J 
r#v ir v^Mu^iru ^c^«v/r«f Imrvyxxm 
I wpaspv/Mff Schol. 

5. d>xn] wpmlpttt is the inoCi'm 
bat not the objective J^x^ of ^H^' : 
that which puts it in motion, but not 
the object for which it is pat in 
motion. But the motive tygjfc of 
rpmipat is tpZif and the objective 
*(%*> the object to be obtained, (ri' 
•3 Xnntt xml ri kymiii) : wherefore 
wpmittfif is not without moral virtue 
and )tx**x. Not without moral vir- 
tue, since the «£«&r must be in proper 1 
subjection; not without )*«»«•, since 
the xJyn • tnxd rtut must be em- 
ployed. 

10. fc«W T *M] 1td*«m of it- 
self moves nothing, but the objective 
and practical hdw does; and this 
same is also the principle of the pro- 
ductive Itantx : for every producer 
(vnm) produces for some end, and 
the thing produced is not an absolute 
end but relative, and for something 



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224 



ARISTOTELIS 



avrr) yap teal T7j$ Trotr/racf}? «/>X ct " cvckcl yap 
tov iroiei was 6 iroixbv, kcu ov tcXos dnXw 
dXXa irpos ri koL twos to irouryrov. dXXa to 
irpaicrov* Tf yap ewrpa^ia tcXos, t) & ope£if 

TOVTOU* 8lO 7) OpCKTiKO? VOVf rf TTpoalptGlS 7\h 

opefji? StavorjTtKrj, kcu i) Touxorrf dpyrf avOpamos. 
ovk tori 8e irpoaipeTOV ovOev ytyovos, olov 
ov0€L9 7rpoatpeiTai lAiov TreiropQrjKevaC ovSe yap 
fiov\ev€Tat TT€pl tov ytyovoTOs dXXa Trepl tov 
€<rofi€vov teal ivSexoficvov, to 5e yeyovo? ovk 10 
€v8l\eraL fiTj yevecOai* 8io 6pQ£>s *Ayd$<ou 

[jl6vqv yoLq avrov xa) teog OTtplcxeTaiy 
ayivrjTOL iron iv Surer* iv if wexpotyfuvot. 

dfi(f)OT€pcDi> 8r/ tg>v vor)TiK<ov iiopicov dXrjOeta to 



ulterior. But the end of the practi- 
cal faff** (r) <rt«xr/»)» i* SOIDe thing 
complete and absolute, for %vT^x\m 
is the end, which is the object of 
%&t See p. 230, 3. 

5. U $ Ipmnmit'} Since l&t is the 
motive principle of wpmipfit, and 
fytfyt must be directed and governed 
by the practical Ii^mio, vpmipfts may 
be called either i^tnnx^s t»vt or tyfyt 
X*t»nrt*n. And such a principle is 
man ; for beasts cannot possess intel- 
lect, nor perfect beings be swayed by 
appetite and deliberation. 

The following is the paraphrase, ge- 
nerally attributed to Andronicus, upon 
the whole of this obscure passage. 

Kafi ft iutpnmn n )<«»«• #Wiwf 
Urn «{£«, ovUt y*{ xttu, mkXu pint 
xmii wfmxrtxm rSn ilpipLnn Urtt i{%h 
rn$ r« i(ilu>f mo} rnt wpmtp*t»f mm) 
rnt *{*£**$. in ft**«) riff *§tnrunit 
*tX* !#«» 4 w^xxrixh mSrn lf«M»«, 



lut^u ym? wunrutn *t*xrtxn;' n pit 
yk{ w^xxrtxn *•» kymUv rix* ix u 
muri rl iv r^mrruv ri it.ym.in, xxt 
f**XV wvrw **»Tu t i+*s tv *(*%* «"« 
ry «£f$u ft*wr« % ft wwiTiKn uvri 
Urt ri Vfxrrtn tv ri kymiit, xmi 
rix§t i%u vn* MpMriw ivftupt«M«f. 
mm) ri ph rtXtt rnt w^mmrsmnt *«/ 
mvri Wri. ri ft rikf rnt vnirtmnt 
*(ot tj. mm) ykf *{if r%9 tLvtptWt 
mrmpi^trm. rh» yk^ *fikum§ rw k*${m- 
«-#« \nru. l«r«) r»<ra» 3v*£ i%u viXss n 
wptnTtxh lUtw xa) §& lrrf» k(xn mm) 
mirim, rkt «*^i^» kiy* r§» isy*6*v, 
TWT9 *(%i* Ijgu r*p tiUu rix»vf n 
*Hnrt*n kwi y*£ rnt Aymint *?*• 

%Wt fl MpMTiHI ll&tUft&wJ*' 2f£ T*Sr* 

km) mvrnt *tx,n Xiytrmt. lrt) Ik Af%fi 
Urn h imnl* rnt i&utt, 4 ft »(*&t 
rnt wpmp*u»$, %U &* 4 *fitt*it i 
Ipxnxh uuf n Ipfa iwnrtxt. rmSrm 
T Aw %1n b futf rif \»ytx«f C«T» h 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 2. 226 

tpyov. Kaff as oiv pLaXiara t&ts dXr/devo'Ci 
itcdrepop, avrai dperal apxfrolv. 



CHAP. II. 

Of Science. 

3 APSAMENOI oiv avcodev ir€p\ avrcov iraXiv The intei- 

N / v * v *'x/i' f i * ^lectualha- 

Aeyay/jLev. ccrro) or) oiy dArjaevet 77 yvyyi ry bits are 
hKarafyavai r\ a7ro(f)di>cu, irivr* top dpiBpav" ravra 

$ €OTL T€)(P7J y iirLCT-fjpLTfJj <f>pOV7)<Tl9 9 CTO(j)la, VOVf* 

vwoX-qy^et yap kcu Soijrj ev84\€Tai StayjrevSecrOai. 
eiricrrqpr) p&v ohv ri dcriv, evrevdev <f>avepov, 
el Set aKpifioXoyeicrOai kolL /it) dicoXovOeiv rah 

lobpLOiorqa-iv. Uames yap inroXa/ifidj/o/iePj oxheobject- 

emoTa/ieda, pr) ev8e\ea0aL aAAo)? e\eiv* ra & Science. 
ev8e\6peva aAAco?, orav e£a) rod Oecopelv yevrjraty 
XavOdvei el evTiv rj puq. e£ avayKqs apa iarl 
to €7rioT7jTOV. dtStov apa' to, yap elj dvayicqs 

\bovra dirXm iravra dtSia, ra 5* dtSia dyivqra 

5. »«<r«?rft«* \ iwfAnu] In affir- p. 199. 
motive or negative proposition*: -ng) 15. mrXZt] Aristotle divides neces- 

y*{ rvrtirsr km) Imipwh Urt ri -^tuiit sity (ri JttmyxmTn or Ig Atdyunt) into 

r% %m\ to ikfitis. De Interp. cap. 1. two kinds, k*\*s and Ig vwiuutf. 

See also de Anim. iii. 6. The first is that which is simply and 

10. ifMsirtirti] Tangit proculdubio in its own nature, eternal and immu- 
Platonem in Theaeteto ubi imprimis table ; the second, only conditionally 
ejusmodo similitudinibus scientia ratio so ; as, for instance, to use the illus- 
explicatur, p. 197. ZELL. tration of Eustratius, a man is of ne- 

11. rk y it}t%iftir*] Compare the cessity sitting whilst he is sitting, («#t 
Topics v. 3. (p. 186. ed. Tauch.) ri xaJMat whirr 9 At *Mt,r*i i x*tr>- 
£««» ya^ ri aletnri* I|m ytiiftiw rnt f***»S •$ kt&yxmt i7»«* Xiy&ptt ri x*#j- 
mU4nrt*s HnXop yinrm, *$*t\{ yfy *4mt mvrit, AXX* »v%) mvXZf.) Under 
Wm u in wr*££u, &« ri rn mUHru this head maybe reduced the divisions 
f*Jur yw^tri. See also Analyt. of Nece»sity enumerated in Metaph. 
Prior, ii. 23. p. 134. and Post. i. 33. iv. 5. p. 92. In his treatise De Part. 



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ARISTOTELIS 



The origin KOU aCpOapTCL. En 8l8aKT7) TTOXTa klTUTTf\fXq 

and cause * ~ ? \ \ » * /i' » 

of u. ook€i eivou, kou to eiriarrfTov /laor/rov. €k irpo- 

yivaHrKOfievap 8e Tracra SiSacrKaXla, cocnrep kcu 
iv rots avaXvTiKois Xiyopuev' (J) puev yap 81 
€7rayayyr}s> tj 8k avXXoyurfup. rf puev 8rj eirayar/Tj^ 
apXV eari kou tov kolOoXov, 6 8e auXXoyto-fios 
£k r&v KadoXov. eicriv apa ap\au ilj a>p 6 <rvX- 
Xoyta-fWfy <ov ovk tori a-vXXoyta-fios' eirayaryr) 



Anim. i. 1. p. 10, Aristotle thus briefly 
describes the two : n S* ktiyxn in pi* 
enfMtifU, 7r* tl Xxttf Irreti ro §Z Xnxm 
rrnvrm mteiyxn IrrM^w, M Vt. trt l*rU 
•Zr-t i%»tr* xm) THpvxJr*. See also 
p. 3. Anal. Post. ii. tO. $. 9. And for 
a more philosophical dissertation on 
this intricate subject, Phys. A use. ii. 
9, with the commentary of Simplicius. 

1. in Mmxrn] *AX« fit xm) 
ho'xrxxXjxn y\ h r*w xirtSf hv^nnxri 
fitmXktr o5r$t ym{ hlarxtpftp §t rag 
mlrimt Xiyrrte ri() ixxerti. Metaph. 
i. 3. p. 5. 

— }*}«««-* «rSr« \<ritr*fi,n\ All 
science is teachable, but all teaching 
must proceed either by induction or 
syllogism, (/Lucrtcinptt A iwxyvyy 4 
inrdufy.) Induction is one principle 
of science, viz. of the universal, (*tx* 
Iw *mi *»» xx4oX»u % - aivtetm 3i tx 
xmihXtv A»fffr«J u fin W Wayatynt)% 
inferring the truth of the universal 
from the truth of each particular, 
inferring the whole from the whole 
parts contained, (htxtwrtt re xaiix»v 
1$k r&S 3»jX#» iifOi r* xerfixmmi). 
The universals, so arrived at, are 
the *{%*) of the syllogism. For 
both, therefore, there roust be a 
certain prognosis; for induction, of 
the particulars which are known by 
«JW*r/f, (UwgtiiMM 3s pn i;prr«f 
*t*4n*» i&vmrit); for the syllogism, of 



the premises which are arrived at by 
induction ; and consequently all science 
must proceed from a certain prognosis ; 
consequently there are certain prin- 
ciples of science, of which science 
itself cannot take cognizance. See the 
Analyt. Post. i. 18. p. 177. 

4. atia,\pTtxt7f] Analyt. Post. i. 
cap. 1 — 6. 

5. \rmyiyh »?%»] Compare Anal, 
ib. p. 145. **ffa ^tbxwxaXim, xx) *ar* 
fiainrtf hxwirtxfi tx *pv**£%$u*9f 
yinreu ytcLnttf. — ifteiuf e% xai *t£t 
T$vf Xiyus, #7 ri 3j« rt/XXrytffUi* xx) 
•I it* i*myvynt, mfi^ir^u y*( 3<« «£#- 
yiytatwxsfiiwt *mu9txs rrir o^ibaexa- 
\lotr ol pi* (the Syllogism) Xxpfi*- 
writ it rafit %o*iitr*t, ol ft (the In- 
duction) ouxwtrtt rb xmioXtv 3<* top 
J*»X«> tiMt/ to xmiixam* For the dif- 
ference of the Syllogism and the In- 
duction, see Analyt. Prior, ii. 25, and 
an excellent paper in the Edinburgh 
Review, Vol. lvii. 

7. *£#«}— rvXktytrftig] Such are 
axioms, postulates, definitions in ma- 
thematics, first principles, self-evident 
truisms in other sciences. Compare 
Anal. Post. ii. 3. §. 9. ml k^ x ^ w 
ar«3ii'£i«M' f£ff*&t, Z* trt »vx inwrm 
mrottiZuf Vtiuxrmi T^n^tv, n 1*»mu 
** *C%*) a\+»hiXT*) xm) <r*t eif^iit 
*{%**» »•) «5r' lit Aftu^n fimiiurmi. 



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tton. 



ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 3. *87 

apa.) H /i€i/ apa eirixrrqpT) €<mu €£*? cnro- it* defiw- 
SeiKTtKTj, teal oca aXXa 7rpoc8iopt£6pe0a kv tois 
avaXvTi/coi?' orav yap ir<os iricrevri kcu ywoptpot 
avr<p axriv al dpx a h errioTarai' el yap p,r) paXXov 
brov ov flirt paapaTOSy Kara cvpfiefhjKo? t%€i rr/v 
€7riOTTjp.r)i/. 7rep\ puev 0S1/ iirtcTqp^ 

TOP TpOTTOV TOVTOP. 



CHAP. III. 

Of Art. 

4 ToO S* kv8€\OpeVOV aXXcoS €)(€IV €OTl Tl KCU The object- 
\ \ f tt «>» > \ / x matter of 

TTOvrjrov Kai irpaxrov, erepov 6 ecrt ttoitjcis KaiArt. 

\QTTpa£lS m 7TlOT€V0p€V Se 7T€p\ aVTCOV Kttl TOLS €^DD- 

repucoif Xoyois. ware kcu r) fiera Xoyov t£i9 
irpaKTiicrj Irepov icri rrJ9 pbera Xoyov wolt/tiktj^ 
ei~€(o$ Sio ovdc irepiexovrai xnr aXXrjXtop' ovre 
yap rj Trpa^Ls iroii]ciSj ovre irovqcis irpa£l$ icriv. 

15 E7T€i & r) olKoSofJUKT) T€yy7) TL9 €CTl, KOU 07T€/> Art defined 
*ff* \ x / / \ > * / v °y one of 

€£i9 ti$ fiera Xoyov iroLTjTuai, koli ovoepia ovre its species, 

Te^PTJ €OTlV TJTlf OV fJLCTa XoyOV WOITJTIKT] €£«£ rally. 



4. ofX*'] Wt0rm*t«u % »1*f*iU Ym- Chap. III. . " 
rr#» arXZf—orttt n»t <r* «*«'«» •»*/**$* Tbe affinity of Art to Science 
ytt**xut 1/ 9>* rb wfetypm Wrn, to (see p. 228, 4. note) is perhaps the 
Uioof mtTi* Uri, xeu fjtn if$i%t*4eu reason why Aristotle treats of it next 
twt a,XX»*i 1%***- Analyt. Post. i. 2. to Science. 

p. 147. 13. fi^i^wrw] That is, they are 

5. xctTo. ffV(A(Zt$fin.»$] In other words, not included one in the other as 
he will possess merely opinion (3#£«). species under genus; they differ from 
«k yet? lumtttf o-vXX»yt0-tiftiffif §n each other as species from species. 
3Ja.ta.rot h 4>v%n, Xa/3#tw« h 3«£« ri 16. tvtt/xtct] Aristotle here ex era - 
0»tL*%£tt9igM mvw fi«y$9 oT}t9 §ri Mat*- plifies his own rules : converting his 
T#f. See Philopon. in Arist. de An. definition with the thing defined, in 
ad initium. order to ascertain its correctness. 

a2 

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228 



ARISTOTELIS 



ioriv, ovre TOLavrrj r) ov riyyq^ ravrov av evq 

T€\vy kou e£i? fiera Xoyov dXrjOovs ironyriKq. 

Ho * art . is *E<rn 8e t4\vtj iraaa 7repl y*vt<rw y kcu to T€\vd- 

oo it* own g €iV ^ Ka \ OecopeW 0TTC09 av yevrjrai Tl T&V ei/Se- 
yppAvcov kcu elvou kcu prj elvcu, kou cov tj dpxyb 
ev r<p iroiovvri cCKKa pirf 4v rip iroiovfiivcf ovre 
yap T(bv e£ avdyicqs ovrcov ^ ytvofievtov r) T€\irrj 
eoTiv, ovre tS>v Kara <j>v<ru>' kv avrols yap expvm 
ravra ttjv apyfav. iirel 8e iroirjcrts kcu Trpafys ere- 
povy avdyK-q ttjv riyyr)v 7roirj<r€(Ds aAX* ov wpa-10 

An affinity £e(Q? tlvai. Kai TO01T0V TIVOL W€Ol TOL OVTa koTLV 

between act 

and chance, rj Tvyr) kcu x) rexyrj, KaOdirep kcu *Aya$a>p <f>T)(r\ 

" t^x 1 "! tvxh v *<t € p£* Kai r ^xn T*yy*) v " f H p.*v 



4. 4t*p7f] Art is employed in 
three things, in generating (Vij) yin- 
«»), in inventing (n^»«^m), and in 
contemplating (Si«£m). In their na- 
tural order these operations are in- 
verted. For the artist is first employed 
. in contemplating the thing he wishes 
to produce, considering not merely 
whether the matter, proposed to be 
operated on, is contingent, but also 
whether the principle of operation 
is within himself. 

— 4u*p7*] For art deals with 
universals equally as science. Science 
also equally as art is derived from 
experience. The one differing from 
the other in this, that art is about 
generation (yinrst), science about 
essence (•»). And this perhaps is the 
reason, why Aristotle, instead of con- 
sidering uS$, has placed the considera- 
tion of Art next to Science. Compare 
Post. Analyt. ii. 15. U ? ifi+ufat * i* 
*ttrro{ fytfitmms t$u **4'o\ou h r « 
$»X$. *•*> bh <r«{« r« *<>\\6, § at 
It S,*m*n It \*n ixuvosf ri nurd, vi^ns 



i^X,t\ Kai Wirrnpne Uv p\t wt() yinrn, 

12. rvxn] ymrmi T U rife prnpnt 
tfiwufia. rtus **$t*««t> «m y*{ **XX&) 
pniffi Ttu avrov 4T(*yf**T*s fumt if*- 
TU^tetf %v*mfitt &T»TiX*uri t **) toxu 
rXtftv Itirrnfty xa) rl%fip op*i4* tttas 
iprufi*. aTtfiuttu 3* l<wny«*i xa,) 
ri%n hat riff Ifivu^tLf rtff it^ctfttt. 
n ftlt yk{ Xfjbru^m Ti%9tiv Walnrt*, St 
Qnn TlSXof itfig xiyit, n ¥ ittru^m 
Tv%m. ytftreu Ji rt^vn, •ra.t U w»kx£» 

yun*w •?£* r«rv ifMitn vwiktufns. Meta- 
phys. i. 1. p. 2. Compare also the 
Post Anal. ii. cap. 15. p. 231. (Ed. 
Tauch.) 

— T ^Xi] -A- certain degree of af- 
finity exists between art and chance, 
because both of them operate as it 
were upon the same matter, and both 
are causes external to their matter. 
See Phys. Aus. ii. 5. 

1 3. r'%x*n tux,h »] See the Schol. on 
Plat. Gorg. p. 338. Bekk. and Pflugk 
in Eurip. Med. p. xxiv. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 4. 889 

oiv rexPTj, docnrep eifn/rai, eljts ti? ficra Xoyov Definition 
akqOovs TrouqTLKq eoru/ y r) 8 are\via rovvavrlov 
fiera Xoyov yfrevSovs Trotr/racr/ e&f, irepl to ip$€- 
\6/jL€i/ov aXXm ex.eiv. 



CHAP. IV. 

Of Prudence or f {fan* . 

5 IIEPI 8e (bpoirijaew ovrm av XaBotuev, 0eo>- The object. 

, / / \ , / * ^matter of 

pr/o-avre? twos Xeyofitv row (ppovi/iovs. ookci &**$. 
8r) (f)pov[fiov elvcu to hivaaOai kglXco? ftovXcv- 
aaxrdcu irtpi to. airnp ayaBa kcu ovftiftipovra, 
ov Kara fJLtpof, o\ov irola irpos vyUiav r) ioyyp, 
lOaAAa irola wpof to eS (jjv. crrifitiov S* ort kou 
tovs 7T€pi ti <j)pop[fiov? Xeyo/iev, otclv irpos TeXos 
ti oirov8alov €t5 Xoyia&vTai, <oi/ firj iort Te^yrj. 

(OOT€ KCU 0X(Of OLV €17} <f>pOVtflOf 6 fiovXtVTlKOf. 

fiovXevcTou $ ovOch wepl tg>v aSvvdrcov dXXa>9 
Ibeyctv, ov8e twp fir) evSeypfievw ai)TCp TvpdJ-aC 
gxtt ehrtp €7ri(m7/i?7 fikv fur d7ro8ei^€a>9 9 (ov 8 
cu dp\al £v8*xovrai aXXco? e\€iv, tovt&v firj tcmv 
aTroSet^y Trdvra yap iv84\CTCu kcu aKX&s *X €LV > 
Kal ovk eaTL fiovXevaaaOat irepl tS>v i£ dvdyicqs 
20opt(dv 9 ovk av eirj r) (f>p6vq<ns iiriOTrj/ir/ ovSe 
Tiyyr)) e7riOTrjfirj fiev oti ivbiyerax to irpcucrov 
aXAo)? *X €iV 9 T ho n ) ^ ° TC &^° T ° yivos irpa* 

Chap. IV. must be contingent likewise; wmir* 

14. favktvsrmt] See iii. 3. yk^ Ifi't^trat *«} &XXts i%u*,for all 

16. St* tlwt^\ The apodosis is at the conclusions drawn from such premises 
•uk <£» tin fi Qfiwrif. are contingent likewise; but the con- 

17. Tivrm* fit Urtt] For if the pre- elusions of demonstration are neces» 
mises be contingent, the conclusions sary. See chap. ii. 



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£30 



ARISTOTELIS 



IU defini- £eO>? KCU 7TOLr)(r€<D9. AcOTf T<U apa aVTTfV tlvCU c£*J> 

oXtjOtj fiera Xoyov TvpaKTiKqv irepl ra avOpwnrco 
ayada kcu kclkol' rrj? fiep yap Troirjaetos erepop to 
reXos, rfj? 8e 7rpal;€(Q9 ovk av etr/' €<m yap avrrf 
Confirmed -n ewrpaizla rc'Aoy. Ata touto YlepiKXea *cai6 

by general N r * , , , , r „ 

opinion. TOV? TOIOVTOV9 (ppOVlflOV? OLOfl€Ua €U/Ol, OTL Tflt 

ai)ToZ$ ayaOa Kal ra tols avOpcoirois hvvavrax 
Oecopeiv' €tvai 8e toiovtovs rjyovpL€0a row olkovo- 

And a fUKOVS KCU TOVS 7ToXlTLKOV9. Ev0€P KCU T7JP €TVr 

nominal de- , , , «,, f 

finition. <ppOCTVV7]V TOVT(p 7rpO<rayOp€VO/l€V TG> OVO/JUtTl, ©910 

cr(o£ov<rav rrjv (frpovrjaiv. (ra^ei 8e rr/v TOtavrrjV 



2. rk Mptxtj kymid] Compare 
Archytas de viro bono : er^etnu- 
futTH fiiif yk^ kyitrm rr^amyif. «rJU»- 
r&pn Hi mvfitpkrfit, rS Ik nfrfut Ms, 
r*t $vx*t Hi *'»f • ?«f Ji «*«^ T^t (&t$t 
liUmijMfwmt Qpi&wtt- el/Av yk{ etrtfit 
Wrt Qfifmrit, il pti Wi**mpL* rat «t() 
rif &U* tu&mifAirtnas , •} Wiwrk/ut rSt 
x*r* Qven kii^r* kymtSt. Frag. 
Pythag. p. 18. 

3. 7ri^«y ri riXtff] Production dif- 
fers from action : for the end of pro- 
duction is different from the act of 
production, but the end of action 
(*•{•&*) is not different from action, 
being action (turfm^U). 

11. r»£«i/r«y rhf fyinwt] This ety- 
mology is derived from Plato's Craty- 
lus, 411.B. 

— r*£w] It preserves a right ap- 
prehension of moral good and evil : 
for pleasure and pain do not pervert 
our apprehension on all subjects ; for 
instance, of mathematical truths; for 
the drunkard or debauched has fre- 
quently as clear an apprehension of 
those as the temperate and sober. 
Pleasure and pain pervert our right 
apprehension of moral truths, when 
from pleasure we choose the evil, or 



from pain avoid the- good. In other 
words, vice prevents us from seeing 
and pursuing the end and the good 
which we ought to pursue, and this 
end is the principle of moral actions, 
(at ft\t ya{ £{£«' rSv x^mxTth ri tv 
fax* rk rptxrk), and consequently 
pleasure and pain pervert our appre- 
hension of the right principles of mo- 
ral action, (it xotxi* <p4§L?rtttn *(%*( ». 

In the vicious man, therefore, the light 
of nature and revelation has become 
darkness ; he calls evil good, and good 
evil, and acts accordingly. 

Since then ty#»«rjf must select the 
right means to a good end, (*•{•# riXsf 
n t+tu&titn il Xoyi^tTtu), it roust pos- 
sess not only what we call prudence, 
but also a correct apprehension of what 
is a good end, must possess a certain 
degree of moral virtue, for moral vice 
is destructive of this apprehension. 

The terms rix*. ri »v hi**, and 
k{x*> are synonymous throughout this 
passage. 

1 1 . rnt rurnvnt icix*^'*] As pre- 
serving such a irrikn^tit as ty«9*#«f, 
that is, the faculty of judging correctly 
of our own good and evil, and acting 
accordingly, (r^axnxht *n(l rk *»- 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 4. 281 

uTroXTjy^cv* ov yap airaaav inroKyj^nv SiaQOelpu 
ovSe diaoTp€(f)€i to tj8v kou to Xirmypov, olop 
OTi to Tpiywvov 8v<t\p bpOtus leas vfci rj ovk 
€\€t 9 aXXa tcl9 7re/H to irpaKTov. ai /lev yap 
bapx<u t£>v irpaKT&v to ov eveica tol irpaKToC 
tS 8e 8i€(f)0app.€pcp 8l r)8oprjv rj Xvirqv €V0V9 
ov <j>aiv€Tai rj apxv> ov8e Sell/ tovtov €P€K€P 
ovSe 8ia Tovff aipeiaOat iravra koll 7rpa.TT€iv m 
eon yap 77 Kaida (f>dapTiKr/ apx^' ® crr> avayicT) 
10 ttjv (frpoirqaiv e£tp thai p,€Ta Xoyov aXrjOi}, 7repl tol 

avOpdymva ayaOa wpaKTiKrjp. 'AAAa px)v rc'xj^yArtdiffer- 

\ 9 \ y / 1 / ^»>v \ en * from 

fl€P €<TTIP ap€T7) 9 (ppOPri<r€CD9 O OVK €OTtP Kaity/w,. 

kv fJtev re^yrj 6 4kg)p afiaprapcop alp€T(i)T€po$, irept 
8e (j>povq<nv rjTTOVy coenrep Kal irepi tol? apeTas. 

\b8fj\ov odv OTi apery tIs kari Kal ov reypy). 
Svocp 8 ovroiv fiepoiv rfjs ^v\t}9 Ttov Xoyov 
e\6vT(ov 9 QaTtpov av eHr) aperrj, tov SoljourriKOv' 
r} T€ yap 8o£a 7rep\ to *v8€\op.€vov aAAcoy *X €LV 
Kal rj <j>povr](Ti$. aXXa px)v ov8* e£i? fi€Ta Xoyov 

ZOfiopop* (rrj/ielop 8 oti Xr/dr/ tt}? /jlcp ToiavTtjs 

etJ€(D9 tOTl, (f>pOVr)<r€G)S 8 OVK €OTLP. 



6^-rtf ayaJa. xm) xxxeL) The term xecxlm xou i^irn- xm) yk^ tvtxrir xa) 

urpkt)\pn is variously applied, as Aris- kymih thai n^virnv ««2 awufit . fy#> 

totle teaches us in his own words : M tn*t*t 3i »Srt «««/« Uriv, xhvwarn ya.{ 

% x«j *v*nt vnt vT»Xn\piM{ 3<«$#g«/, Qpfipif riv* QavXer »7mm, ovn «£ielj. 

Wtfrn/Mi xtu 3»g« xa) QfJpufit xmi mvrh y*{ irr«» x^trn mprh il ot(trn( 

rifmrria rovreav. De Anima iii. 3. wx tera, »v y*{ fudrns f*-\r'ornr»% % 

§. 5. It is already in this place ap- Paraph, 

plied to two very different faculties, 13. mS^trttri^t] See p. 62. 

lmrrn>» and ^nr/r. See the Intro- 18. Kg«] See vi. 1. p. 220. 

auction to this Book, p 218. 20. X*W»] See i. 8. p. 38. 
12. Apr*] *nt fut rlx»m Srr2 xui 



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232 



ARISTOTELIS 



CHAP. V. 

Of Apprehension, or ttvs. 

The object- EITEI 8 Tj iwiOTrJllT) 7T6/H T&V KoBokoV i(JTiv 6 

matter of »'xi \ ~ ss- » / v » \ *? 

M J? # . V7T0ATJY19 KOLL TtOV €£ 0U/ayK7J9 OVTCDV, €iai 

dpxat t£>v airo8tiKTG>v kcu iraarjs iiriarrqiirj^ Qfiera 
\6yov yap r\ emorr/firf), tt}? apxv? T °v ^ 7r *" 
arr/Tov ovt av intcrrr/firi etrj ovre riyyt) ovrez 
(frpoPT/ats' to fiev yap iwioTriTov airoSeiKTOv, cu 
8e Tvyx av0V(rLV oiacu 7repl ra ivSexofieva aAAco? 
€xe«/. ov$€ 8r/ ao(f)ia tovtcov iariv' rod yap 
ao(f>ov 7T6/H ivuov e\€tv air68cii~lv £<ttlv. el 8r/ 
0I9 aXrjdevo/JLev kcu firjSeTrore Stayf/evSofxeOa irep\ 10 
ra fitf iv8exofi€va rj kcu evSexofieva aXAco? *X €tv > 
i7TLOTr]fir) koll (f>p6vr)<rLs iart kcu ao(f)ia kcu wuy, 
tovtcov 8e tcov Tpi&v fi7)0€v ivSex^Tat elvcu (Xeyco 
81 Tpla y (f>p6vr)<nv hrurrriiirjv <ro(f)lav), XehreTai 
vovv elvat tcov apx&v. 15 



Chap. V. 

Concerning this habit, see the Intro- 
duction to this book, p. 216. and p. 
234, and p. 239. Aristotle in this 
chapter describes merely one office of 

1. h \*itrn(t.n] In) rXt «ri^) rht 
ittnwt s|u»t mis mXntiv*fitt, mi fitt mi) 
kXnius tin* mi Hi Wt&ix**™ r$ •^tvlof, 
oJof lol* mm) Xoyirpos, mknfn * mt) 
Wtm(t.n mm) tout, mm) •iXit Wirrnfitu 
ax{i(Zirrt(of iXXo yitts n nut. mi T 
«(£•) r *' mvdtiltmv ym^tfimrt^m$, 



ixtrrnpn T £«*«#« f*trm kJytu irri, 
rSt a.{X*f Wurrtpn (At turn at tin. 
sari} V *utit mXnfartpi iw}i%trm tlweu 
Wtvrnpnt n twt, fug mt tin r£v m^x**r 
tm rt WVTM9 rmmort mm) *n **••- 
1u\u*s m{x% •»* mrfiufys, «frr «w3* 
irtrrfatit Wirrnpti. ti tdv pnftt &XX* 
**{* IrifrtfAtir %x»f*» yins mentis, 
t9vg «y tin Wtrrnpnt «£g<t. Analyt, 
Post ii. 15. p. 232. 

4. \eytu] See chap. ii. 

9. n{ t \fl»>] See p. 234, 5. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 6. 



«S3 



CHAP. VI. 

Of Wisdom, or «f i«, how it differs from f(inrn ; and of the several 
kinds of Qfinrit. 

7 THN Se <ro<f>iai> tv re rats Ti\vcus roh ok/h- The proper 

n ' \ f * 5>/5k ? jt%. tt/ and impro- 

peararoc^ ras re\va9 a7rootoo/x€i/, oiov Q>€t8cav per um of 
XiOovpyov <ro(j)ov kol TloXvKXetrov dvSpiavro- #-#?/«. 
Tcoibvy kvravOa pkv vbv ovdev aXXo (rrf/Aalvovre? 
$tt)v ao(f)Lav r) otl dpenj re\vrf9 iarlv' elvat Se 
rivas cro(f)ov? olofieda oXcos ov Kara ficpos ovtf 



Chap. VI. 

The following passage from Metaph. 
i. 1. p. 2—3, clears up many difficul- 
ties connected with these habits. n pit 
iprufia r£t Kafituurr* len ytSeit, n 
ft rf£»<f t*»f xetfoXtu- at ft *{4J£u( «*) 
at yitieug <ra**t rig) ri **ti*<urrot 
it fit. — i«r tu* &vtv rnt Ipwu^tas 1%$ 
ns rit Xiyt ««) ri xmfiXou pit ytt- 
{i£y. ri V if xur* *ati**mt tynn, 
*»\XtLxt{ )i«fMtgrJW'sr«..^->£AA' ipmt ri 
yt sthlxttu *•« ri Iwmtu* rn «;£►•. <rn( 
Iprufias o**{%ut osipttm pmXXot, km) 
fQ*ripv$ rthf rt%urmt rmt Ipwiiptt 
uroXupfiaroptt, is *ara ri ttlitm 
piXXot itx»Xt4§v**t ri)* rofimt raft. 
r$vr» ft, Sri tt pit rht mlrimt ttrturn, 
#i T ov. »t pit ymf Iprufu ri Sn 
pit lean iiirt V tux 1**n* t ti ft ri %Urt 
mmi rht mlriat yvt^owi. ft) *•) rtfa 
&t%iri*r**mt *»{) txamt npwripvt 
xmi pSiXXst lift mm ttpfypt* rmt X U V~ 
rt%t2t, xeu r*$*riptt$ Sn r*t mir/mt 
rm wuupiftt 1ea*n. 

On the use of the term v§p U, as 
applied in its translation sapientia ex- 
clusively to the knowledge and study of 
causation, " divinarum humanarumque 
rerani turn initiorum caussarumque 
cujusque rei cognitio," see Cic. Tusc. 



Disp. ▼. 3. and Arist. Met. i. 1. p. 
3,4. 

5. iThm ft ntmt] We conceit* torn* 
are wise absolutely, universally and not 
partially, not wise in one particular 
subject and upon nothing else. 

Aristotle explains the particular use 
of the term wisdom (r*$M») when 
applied to the arts, and then infers 
the nature of it generally (r*f£» 
SXvt) ; assuming that there is such a 
general wisdom from the opinions of 
mankind, and the quotation respecting 
Margites. By wisdom in any particular 
art, he says, we understand the perfec- 
tion of that art, and those are called 
wise, who are most exact in their art : 
consequently wisdom must be the 
most excellent of the sciences ; of the 
sciences, because none other habits 
than science admit of exactness and 
perfection. 

But he who is entirely wise must of 
course know the principles and axioms 
of science as well as the deductions 
from them, and consequently wisdom 
is composed of simple apprehension 
and science (mv and Inrrnpn) ; or, in 
other words, an l*trrnp*i with tevs for 
its head. 



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834 



ARISTOTELIS 



aXXo ti (roQovf, axnrep "Ofirjpos (frrjaw kv Tip 
Mapyirji " tov 8 ovr ap a-Kairrqpa deol Oeaav 
ovt aporrjpa out aXXa)9 tl ao(f)6i/" coare SrjXov 
on r) aKptfiearaTTj av tg>v iTriorrjfJuov etr} tj 
iticompo- (ro(f)ia. Aet apa tov ao(f>oi/ fir) puovov tol eie5 

nent parts. ^ , ,.., *\\* \ \ \ »> 

twv apycov etdevou, oAAa kou irepi to$ ap\as 

aht)0€V€u/. coot* etrj &v r) cro(j>ia pov? kou km- 

oTT/fJLTj) axnrep KtfaXrjv €\ovaa emorr/fit) tS>v 

iu differ- TifJUGndr&v. Atottov yap €i Tts T7)v ttoXitlktiv 

tP»wt. yf tt)v fypovrfviv cnrovSaioraTqv ol€tcu elvcu, cl\0 



3. r#f#»] On the earlier and va- 
rious uses of this word/ see Diog. 
Laertius in V. P. prooem. §. 12, and 
the notes of Menage, ibid. Some re- 
marks upon it will also be found in 
Clemens Alex. Strom, i. $. 25, and a 
more complete dissertation in the notes 
of Muretus on this passage. 

8. £?«*£ *tl«Aif»] A science of 
things the most honorable, as possessing 
a head (m«v) ; being complete and per- 
fect, i p\r fvt rnt ytZrn %x u T *t 
sXkntslas vm *{X»** * ^ Infrfftn 
%opiy«itfAir*f mirks X«/u/3«»iw» i* rev 
m? irtiluxttw ra otxum *{»&X»f*M<rm. 
3eV Iwti n esfi* »•) vk$ *(%** **X U 
in i t4V(, sm) I* rSf *{X" f »* * 
Iwirrtftn, sin it t*vt ipm xm) Wtrrjftn. 
h* rovr* xm) xt$*\m \iyt U rsug 
XvtfrnpMit l*i%ti, »ri tarvrf/t* r»t 
Tifu$tTMT*t irri. vifumtrart to tci i^- 
X*** — n to *•*)** l*d «£r«riX&f mm) 
Ig \*vrns t%u T*t *{%*$ *** rtvr* 
*«) Wtrrnpn Xiyvrsu psr* utfstknt, *t 
%W*em *i$«Xifr, nns ler)t a! &{X»*' 
Schol* See a somewhat similar use of 
the word x$fmX*t»r by Plato in the 
Philebus, p. 48. Gorgias, p. 505. D. 
and the passages cited in both places 
by StaHbaum. 

& rifjumrmtvi] Of things eternal 
and immutable: riif jW»» r* npu*- 



n^«. See p. 43. 10. and particularly 
the Metaph. x. 1. p. 211, sq. See 
the Index s. v. rips*. 

Aristotle has purposely left the dis- 
cussion of this and the previous habit 
incomplete, as pertaining rather to 
other subjects than Ethics. 

10. fyotwr] Aristotle is very care- 
ful in distinguishing Qpnnt from 
r«?/«, for many philosophers, and 
among the rest Xenocrates the Chal- 
cedonian, evidently confounded them. 

§sm$ rnt r§S}Ut Irirrnftnt r£f *i*r»i 
mirimf x*l rw wrrif tfoms sTmt $nr$* 
rn$ Qpnrn nytptwt iirrn*, rnt ph 
WfanTixhf rii9 ^s JU0{nnxtit h on 
#«f/«v ¥*&{x Uf £fS{»«''np- }*•**{ n 
fakt esfi* fp*nrtt, to f*br m« Qtimftt 
fftm. Clem. Alex. Strom, ii. 5. $. 24. 
p. 441. ed. Potter. See Wynperase de 
X. C. p. 181. This tenet he appa- 
rently derived from Socrates and Plato ; 
from the former, who thought all the 
virtues were sciences, (see vi. 10. ad 
fin. and vii. 2.) ; from the latter, who 
asserted that ftbnrtt was the soul's 
contemplation of the eternal ideas: 
1r*9 ft yt otvrn *mf mirnt mrf, UtTrt 
•1%tTm4 sis ri Jtm$»^n rs *m& is) •».— 
*«A it *»yy**nt •$** mmo at) /ttr 1 
tnsitev rt ytytsrw—nmi *iw*»rmf rt 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 6. 2S6 

fiyj to apurrov t5>v ev r£ Koapup avOpamos eartv. 
el 8rj vytetvov p*v kcu dyadbv erepov dvOpdmois 
kcu i^Ovarty to 8e XevKov kcu evOv TCLVTOV dei> 

KCU TO (70001/ TCLVTOV ITaVTeS OLV V.TTOUV, <f)p6vip,0V 

6 8e erepov' to yap irepl avro eKacrra efi de&povv 
<f>atev av eivat (f)povtp,ov, kcu tovt*j> eTTLTpfyecav 
avTa. 8to kcu tS>v Orjpicov evta <f>povLpd <f>aartv 
iivaiy oaa irep\ top olvtcov fSLov e\ovra (f)alp€rou 

8vvapUV TrpOVOr)TUCT)V. Q}CLV€pOV 8e KCU OTl OVK And from 

„ * *< it \ « N %**/.» \ the political 

10 av evq r) aotyia Kat 77 iroXiTiKr/ 77 awn) ei yap^in^. 
Tqv 7repl Ta oxpeXi/xa Ta ovtoIs epovcn cro(f)lav, 
7roAAai eaovrat aoc^tat' ov yap pia irep\ to 
airavTCov ayaOov tg>v {ft&v, dXX* eTepa irepl 
Zkoxttovj el fir) kcu iaTptKT) pia irepl irdvrcov tg>v 

Ibovreov. el 5* otc fleXTiaTOv avOpoyiros tcdv aXXcov 
{ffcov, ov8ev 8ia<f>epeC kcu yap dvdpamov aXAa 
7roXu OetoTepa Tr/v (f>vaiv, olov (f)avep(OTaTd ye 
e£ cov 6 Koapos (rvvecrrqKev. 'Ek 8r/ twv Coufirmed 

» / *~n tf « At » v \ » / bythegene- 

etprfpevcov orjXov otl rj aocpia eari kol emorr/py rai opinion 

\ rs ~ / *» j / a \ % a of mankind. 

20 /cat vovs tcov TtpicoTaTcov ttj (pvaei. Oto Aya- 
£ayopav kcu QaXfjv Kal tovs tolovtovs aro(f>ovs 
pev, (f)povipovs ft ov (j>a(riv eivai y oTav 18<d<tiv 

vu vX*m», xa) «?£> Uum Ai) **ra ftfamt holds, as it were, a middle 

rmyra i*mvvmt t%a t *trt rudrm station, being the connecting link be- 

ty«*r«/tiNf. — **) r»vr* mbrnt ri tween the irrational and purely scien- 

*&npm ftinitit xUknrm. Phwlo, tific parts of the soul. See note p. 47. 
p. 79. D. See also the dialogue of 15. f&Xrtmi] Wisdom is superior 

Lysis and the Philebus, p. 69. While to fyhneiu because its object-matter is 

these three exalted ty/wc into #•?/«, superior to the other, and the habit 

the earlier philosophers, such as De- operating upon the better matter is al- 

mocritus and Empedocles, degraded it ways the better, 
into mere «1rhnt $ (see Metaph. iii. 5. 22. fpvjpM* t §S\ See Plato's 

p. 76. sq. De Anima, iii. 2. p. 64.) ; Gorg. p. 486. C. and Aristot. Pol. i. 

and in this they were followed by 4. p. 21. ed. Goettling. 
many of the sophists. With Aristotle 



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286 



ARISTOTELIS 



dyvoovvra? ra avfKf>epovd 9 iavrois, kcu irepirra 
fieu teal Oavfjuurra kou x ^ 6717 * Ka * Sou/jlovuz 
elSepcu avTOv? <f>acrtv, ayjvqara 8\ on ov ra 
Byconti- dvdpdmtva ayafia (flTOvaiv. *H Se (frpovrjats 8 

deriogthe \ \ » /i / v \ * v o \ ' * 

difference of 7T€Ol TO. OLvQpvmiVa KCU 1T€pi (OV €OTl pOV A€V- 5 
the object N , , ~ » v 

matter. aaavcu tov yap (ppovifxov fiaALCTTa tout epyov 
elvai (fxtfxev, to ed /3ov\€V€(rdai, /HovXevercu 
8 9 ovdels 7repl t£>v d8vvdr<ov aWw ^X €iV ^ 
ov& oa(ov firj reXos ti eoTt, kcu tovto irpaucrov 
ay ado v. 6 & airXtos evfiovXos 6 rod dpiarov 10 
ap0p(O7rcp tS>v irpaicrcbv aTo\axmKos Kara tov 



6. favXivtrnHmt) Seep. 229. Aris- 
totle here recapitulates what he had 
said concerning fttnieis,in order more 
clearly to distinguish it from #»ffo. 
They differ, he says, in their object- 
matter, they also differ in the ends 
which they have in view, practical 
good being the end of ftineis, con- 
templation or 0u>('tm the end of r*$<«. 
If we appeal to the sense of mankind, 
so far are they from considering prac- 
tical good as the end of «-•$/«, that 
they have derided philosophers (•/ r#- 
l«/) for despising it. 

2dly. Wisdom is always employed 
on universals (ra xmtiXtv); whereas 
ffirnrif being practical, must be em- 
ployed upon particulars. For all 
moral action turns upon particulars. 
For in all moral action, we do in fact 
go through, however imperceptibly, a 
syllogistic process ; of which the prin- 
ciple is the universal, the application 
to practice the particular premise. 
Thus, to use the illustration here em- 
ployed by Aristotle, he who is truly 
ftiwfw, and would apply his tyforri* 
to practice, must know not only that 
all light meats are easy of digestion 



(which is the universal premise), but 
also the particular (act, that this or that 
meat, such as bird's flesh, is of this 
description, and this is gained by experi- 
ence. Without this particular premise, 
there is no acting at all. For he who 
knows the general principle, that all 
light flesh is easy of digestion, and yet 
knows not the particulars under that 
universal when presented to his senses, 
cannot act at all ; and consequently, 
he who knows the particular fact, that 
all birds' flesh is easy of digestion, and 
yet knows not the principle upon which 
it rests, viz. because it is light food, 
and all light food is easy of digestion, 
appears rather to possess pitmen , than 
he who knows the principle only. (In 
the same sense, indeed, as the saga- 
cious animals who appear to exercise 
in some degree this sense in providing 
for their own good, are said to possess 
fptnrtf). The relation which the for- 
mer bears to the latter, may be com- 
pared to that of a master workman 
and his man, the former giving the 
rules and directions, the latter apply- 
ing them to practice. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 6. 287 

Xoyurpav. Ov$ iariv r) (f>p6vr/at9 t£>v koBoXov ^ f 
pjovov, aXXa Sec kol ra Kajff tKoara yv&pifav* Ur as well" 

\ ' « * \ ~ >• \ \ /* «* at of the 

7rpcucrtK7j yap, r) de wpagts 7repi ra Kaff etcaora. universal*. 
&o #cai ei^toi ovk elSore? erepcov eiSorcav Trpauc- 

&TtKG>T€pOL, KOLL €P TOlf aAAoi? 01 €fl7T€tpOt' €*L 

yap clSeirj on ra Kov(j>a vbrreirra tcpea Kal vyuwd, 
wola 8e KOv(f>a ayvool, ov wotrjcrei vyieiav, aAA' 
6 elSay? on ra opviQua KOv(f>a Kal vyieiva Trovf)- 
crci paXXoi/. r) 8e (f)povr}<ri9 TrpcucrtKr)' <oot€ Set 
10 dfx(f>co e\eiv 9 rj ravrrjv fiaXhov. evq 8 av n? 

Kal evravda ap\iT€KTOvtKr). Ear* 8e teal rj Tbe three 

TTOXinKT] Kat 7) (ppOVTJCTL? 7) aVTTJ fl€V €gl$, TO kinds of 

fievroL elvai ov ravrb)/ avrcus. rr}? 8e irepl iroXtv 

r) fl€V G)9 apyiT€KT0VLK7] <f>pOVT)<Tl,S VOfJLO0€TLKT), t) 

15 8e cos* ra ko0' eieaora to koivov €\et ovopu 
ttoXitikt)' avTT) 8\ TTpaKTUcr) Kal (SovXevTucrj 9 to 
yap yjff/Qio-pa irpaKrov m to ^cryaTOv" 810 iroXi- 
T€V€(r0at tovtovs povovs Xeyovaip, povoi- yap 
irpaTTOvaiv oUtol oienrep oi x €L P OT *X P0U ' ^ 0lce * 

11. **) h *«\i<rtxn] This will be more clearly understood by the following scheme. 






I 



( \ I I 

Maj. Prem. Min. Prem. Maj. Prem. Mm. Prem. 

or «'{«je«7jen. 
f) pit (ZovXiurtxtl 

The •l*»t$fu*h may easily be filled up in the same way. 
13. iTmm] See note on p. 174, 23. 17. Ir^»r«] See note p. 239, 11. 

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888 ARISTOTELIS 

Si kcu <f>poinjat9 fiaXurr cipcu r) irepl avrov kcu 

€VO) KCU €\<U CLVTTf TO KOWOV OVOfXO, <f>pOin)(Tl9. 

€K€iva>v Si r) fur otKOvofua, r) Si vopuodeaia, 7] 
Si iroXmxi), kcu ravrr^ r) flip fiovXevracr) r) Si 

Individ —! SiKOOTIKt). Et&>? fUV 0%V Tl OLV tit) yP(D<r€w9 

c*aooitx\4 T o OVTtp tlStPCU, aAX* €\€l SlAUpOpCLV TToWt/V' 
fromtke kcu SoK€i O TO, 7T€/M OUT OP €lSto? KOU SlOTpifkoV 

<f>povipD9 uvcuj ol Si iroXiTiKOi TroXimpayfiovef 
Sib EvparlSr)? 

woof S* iv Qpovoirp, i taqrp OTgoy/xoVoo? 10 

ev tokti xoAXoTj qgiS/xq/xevco orgfltrou 

Isrov lurraffyiiv ; 

robs y«£ wegiavovf xal ti *(>cur<rovTa$ xXiov . . . 

{j/rovai yap to avrois ayaBov, kou olovrai tovto 
Seiv irpaTTtiv. £k TavTr/9 oiv ttjs Sof^s eXrjXvdeM 

TO TOVTOV9 <f)pOVlflOU9 tlVOLl' KCUTOL IxTO&S OVK 
€OTl TO aVTOV €& <XV€V oiKOVOfXlOLS OvS aVZV IToXl" 

T€iaf. eri Si to. avTOv Trios Stl 8ioiK€iv, aSrjXov 

Conse- K€U aK€7TTeOV. ^7)fl€L01/ $ icTTL TOV €lprjfJL€VOV 

quentlyas v * / x % • / v n * a 

ttfm*H de- KOLl OtOTl y€C0fJL€TpLKOl fl€V V€OL KCU /JLaUrjfiaTLKOL 20 

much on y'lVOVTCU KOU aO(f>ol TO, TOlGLVTa, (f)poVLflO? & OV 

experience, &»//i v & *r ~ /* <* / 

young men OOK€t yLV€CT0OU. OUTLOV O OTl T(DV KOU €K(WTa 

cannot pot- > « • / a / / * >• * / 

sen it. cotlv r) (ppovrjat?, a yiveTou yv&pipua. €£ tfnreipias, 
v€09 b* epireipos ovk €OTtP' irXr)0o$ yap ypovov 

5. ywwf] Some books read fp war dg subjoins, r* •£«-«? wZf l%7 h«- 

ffams, which isevidenUy a gloss. And »„-, ^„ Xw . After »*rj supply *y«- 

some translate f^u Jw»f #{*» *«XXj»», by j # ,, 

the words " sed multum in re discri- 9. EJprAw ] See Euripides, vol. ii. 

minis est. ,, Whereas I rather think p. 962. ed. Oxon. 1833. 

we should understand them as used 21. «^/J That is «-«?«} on the sub- 

p. 8, 3. e* »«A« wmtrttT i X u l^kf jects here mentioned, not #«f «) in the 

««} «X^fn». And as Aristotle after- proper rfnd restricted use of the term. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 6. 



339 



iroul tt)v ifuretpiap' hrei kcu tovt av ri? cricc- 
yf/acTO, 8ia tl Srf fiaOrj/xaTLKOf jxtv wals yivovr 
av, ao(pos r) (pvcruco? ov. r) ori ra fiev Si 
acfxupeaecDS iortv, t&v fl* at apyal i£ ifnreipias' 
6 kcu ra p*v ov irioT€vov<riv oi vioi aXXa Xeyavaiv, 
Tcbv 8e to tL kcTiv ovk adrjXov. en r) apxtpria 
r)' irepl to koOoXov ev ry /HovXevaacrOai r) irtp\ 
to Kajff exaaTOP' r) yap oti rravra ra {Japvorad/xa 

vSaTa <f>av\a, rj OTt ToSl fiapVOToOfJLOV. OreThediffer- 

^ ,* S* e Jl ' » * ' JL ' . ~ \ cnce Of ?{•- 

10 rj (ppovrjais ovk eiri<rrqfLr)> (pavepov jov. yap w < ( from 
iayarov eoriv, aiowep etpr/Tat' to yap irpaKTOViM,&. 



3. vfhf n Qu*ix»$] In metaphysics 
and physics. 

9. on 3* h fynwi] Aristotle pro 
ceeds to state the difference between 
Q tomtit and l<ri#"T^u,and Qpmtit and 
*eug. Science (lrirrii^*i) is employed 
merely about universals, Igwirj; upon 
particulars as well as universals. 

4>(/w/r differs from nut, because 
their object-matter is different. Both, 
indeed, are upon extremes, but oppo- 
site extremes : <p(ain<rn of extremes be- 
low, ttvg of extremes beyond the reach 
of science ; $t«wt$ of particulars, of 
which alrtmrii takes cognizance ; revs 
of the first terms (w^Srtt fy*), the 
definitions and axioms of science. 
4>{ortiri{, consequently, is of the ex- 
tremes which are the first to us, the 
last to nature; uvs of extremes the 
first to nature, the last to us. 

The real sense of hS* must be care- 
fully borne in mind, and distinguished 
from that division of it of which he 
treats in chap. ix. For Aristotle di- 
vides vvt into two, the theoretical, that 
employed upon the principles of sci- 
ence, and the practical, that employed 



upon the particulars of human actions : 
oirrct i tcu$, o fih «{) <r* xaJiXtv 
xarmyniwt, • ft **$ rot xafixewr*. 
xet) i fi\f trig} ra x«4i\eu l*n xmf ft 
etl \m*rnp>(Lt tifiTv tra^ayitttrtu , if ««} 
4u*£tiri%lf jtftpafyrcu, i ft <riji r« ««Si- 
xeurra tea) *£axrti, if x<t) *{*xnx9t 
Xtyirmt. Eustrat. f. 109, b. The 
former is used here. 

11. lr£«TM/] This term Aristotle 
himself explains in chap. ix. i t»vs 
r£v \*%*T9n \t etfitpirt^a.' *«) y«g rSv 
fj*T#» *g«» kcu rut xtxfcrtn >.-~ i pit 
mar at r»s «r«ft«£i/f rSf fannrttv optt 
xa) *£tlra/f, o t I* rms *£ecxTtxm7{ 
rtu Xtx&Tov Kit) iioiwfiinv K») rn$ 
\rigmt *goTaa-t*s (the minor premise.) 
If we proceed from particulars and 
sensible objects, we arrive at the 
universal, (the inductive method) : if 
we commence with universals we end 
with particulars, (the deductive or 
syllogistic method) : the result is in 
both instances expressed by the term 
r> i*x*ro9. So that this term may 
express, a universal or a particular, 
in necessary or contingent matter. 



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240 



ARISTOTELIS 



tolovtov. airruceircu puev $7} rep va>' 6 fiev yap 
vov? t£>v op&v a>v ovk €oti Aoyos, Tj 8e rod 
iayarov o5 ovk cotiv iwurrfjiir) aAA' aurfhqvis, 
ov\ rj rS>v ISuov, aAA' ota aiaOavofieOa oti to 
iv rofc fxafajfiaTiKOi? tayarov rpiycovov' trrqaenuh 
yap KOKei. aAA' avrrf fiaXkov atar&rjo'i? rj <f>po- 
w)<ti?, eK€LW)s & aXXo €1809. 



2. Jf aim Urt Xiyet] Of which there 
is no demonstration. 

3. mJrhrtf] I do not mean that 
*%eH*H which is any of the Jive senses, 
but that by which a mathematician 
perceives that a triangle is the last 
and the simplest of all rectilinear 

figures; (for there he rests, and seeks 
no further). This faculty is however 
rather *7e4nets than e)sJtiiei$, but yet 
a different species from that, because 
*){in*ti is a rational, *7*e*n*i( an irra- 
tional faculty. 

Aristotle distinguishes miriness into 
two kinds: the mere external sense 
which is conversant only with external 
objects, and an internal one which 
operates without them, and independ- 
ently of sensible objects ; to which he 
compares this ftiwmnc. For not only 
on particulars tyiw* is exercised, 
which are cognizable by the senses; 
but also in weighing and scrutinizing 
particulars, and examining and com- 
paring them, and in this resembles a 
faculty, which is called common sense 
(nanh *t*4n*ti)* See the Introduction 
to this book, p. 214. 

5. ernetrm y*{] Compare Phys. 
Aus. vii. 3. ri yke hats%ne*t xm) erntat 
rh ?/«>««> Wiermeiai x*t Qprit Xtyd- 

(A%4*. 

6. *XX % *trn /MtAXo] In/ *t(i 



rih *e*%rtn **) fiaoXtorSw slenxt* mm) 
rmZr* sTmu xa it xmeret ami *i*4nr* % mm} 
wte) TmSrm rm> Qpmen **r*yinH*t, 
it A« ri Xeyt£aiuan r^m^wt *vran 
ifmrriftifn, Sevte evyxpwn rturmt 
re* ptrk Q^nnesmt *le4*9se4m raS 
**0i**er*, »*t rati *rX£c, Htm xmrk 
rnt xatni* aHeineir ri y*e. •If *\*$**a- 
(**$*, ravra OnXai nrat rn *•»« aueineu 
**f nt hsu9 weaeyinreu ri *le4*ne4m^ 
9ri$ pi* ri lort km) xi*h <r^»( xutr* 
\neyaoe* rk nleinr*. A yk\e us rttrt 
0*t*ip%*tt **rk rk mloinrk yinrmt, Zt 
h7 rn ***n *l*tneu> 7/ *•; i»y*iats 
Xptptm mhrsTs rale %tett)ipts x*rk 
yift reae&aXXn IT mbrZ* alettirsJs. 
ixiitn et fits* ««i h mvrn ion, urn* 
*Wf£ ratarnr* rnk rat/rn* rnt x«> 
wemr* rn kxXZt ***** -rratt *l*4nou. 
oil Xiyofiif, Qneif, mMneit rht ran 
titan *MnrSt, 7m 4 r*i, j? 3/ *lo4nrn*w» 
rnif itt0ytir*i, iXX* rt*vrnt XiysfU* 
iersitf *t*0n*u **x£g **) xsnZt *lei*u- 
pit*. $t\r) %\ r*6rnt /**XXst iTmbi 
aSeinen c*j» fi.tr k {ppfneuis, Sri rut 
\Syf x*i \*t*r**if t ixtitn it ecXaytg 
rt **) knn , ier*r»f. Sen aut ri fitrk 
Xayao xaurrai rou *nv Xayov, raeavrat 
xptirratt *\*$4t*%mt h Qpifna-ts rns raS 
*le4nrav tllas *ieHru*s. tie **} &XX* 
•!>•# ixiitn h oSeinett r*orns rns 
*t*4n*i*t, ats *«i ri Xayntet rati *Xayse 
trta 09. Eustrat. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 7. 



841 



CHAP. VII. 

Of Good Counsel, or ibfavxl*. 

10 TO £r)T€tv 8e kcu to fiov\€V€(rdai 8ia(f>€p€i m what* 
to yap fiovXeveaOai {flreiv rt icrrcv. Set 8e 
Xafieiv kcu irepl evfiovXla? ri eori, irorepov e7r*- 
orrjfnj tis r) 86£a r) evaroxUt rf aXXo ri yevos. 

hhnorfipLri fiev 8r) ovk cortv' ov yap £t)TOv<n ircpl 
w uraxrtVj t) 8 evfiovXla fiovXrj ti? 9 6 fie &ov- 
Xevofievo? CrjT€t kcu Xoyi£ercu. dXXa fir)v ov8 
€voTO)(la' avev re yap Xoyov koi ra\v ri r) 
woToxla, fiovXevovrai 8e woXvp ypovov, kcu 

lO0a<ri TrpdTT€Lv fiev Seiv rayy ra /3ovX€v0€vra, 
fiovXevecrOai 8e fipaSecos. tn r) ayyivout erepov 
/cat r) evfiovXia' €<m & evarox^ tls r) ay^ivoia. 



Chap. VII. 
Having thus far investigated the na- 
ture of those habits which have truth 
for their objecj, (ots aXtib&u ft ^i#* 
rif tmrafmnu ft a*o$drw. vi. 1.) Aris- 
totle now proceeds to consider certain 
others which are intimately connected 
with fymwf, and which naturally 
arise from the remarks which have 
been made upon that habit For re- 
specting (puffins it was said, that it 
required and indeed partly consisted 
of good deliberation, (r« tuwiat *«- 
A»r favXivfarfat ri{) ra abrtf ayatd, 
p. 229, 7 ; and again, nv Qpti/tcv 
fiaXifra r»ur i^yct tJtai (paptf, ri itT 
fatXtvwtm, p. 236, 5.) ; there imme- 
diately then starts forth a question, what 
is ilfavkU, does it consist in the fitness 
of the means proposed for the end, and 
may that end be any end ; or does it 



consist of the two united, good means 
and good ends ? For we have already 
seen that a degree of moral virtue 
must reside in pitting, p. 230, 11. sq. 
These doubts Aristotle now proceeds 
to resolve, by considering at greater 
length the nature of ibfauXta, and sub- 
sequently proceeding to explain how 
far judgment and candour are con- 
nected with <p{ivn*tf. 

12. w*T*x'im, rif n ay%iwa] Com- 
pare Anal. Post. i. 34. p. 201. 4 V 
ay%iwd lrrtt tumxf* nt it kwniwrtf 
xfrtf r§u f*U»o. §?•* fi rtg ft*« In 
4 riAjfrfl ri Xaprfi* at) i%u *(»( rif 
tlXut, rm%v Intonft ha ri rtor§ f In 
ha ri XetftTU* d*o rou fiXitu % ha- 
Xtyiutnv «'X«vr/y tyta hiri 3aM*£ir<M' 
ft hirt fika in i^^o) rtv mvrev. 
* rn.tr a ya% ra curia ra uUra, o it** 
ra 2*; «, lyivpri . Therefore dy%iv«a 



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242 



ARISTOTELIS 



not an i^«- 
cuf either 
of science 
or opinion. 



In what 
i(/«V*f it 

consists ; 



ov$€ 8rj 8o£a i) cvfiovXla ovSe/xla. 'AAA' €7rci 

6 imp kokw fiovXevo/JLevo? afiaprdvei, o $ d5 

6p0W /30V\€V€TCU 9 SfjXoU OTl OpdoTT/f TIS 7) €V$OV- 

Xia ioTiv, ovr thnoTrfiirfs 8e ovre 86^9' cVt- 
arr)fiTi$ piv yap ovk tcrriv opdorrjs (^ov8e yap 5 
afiaprioi), Soljrjs 8' bpdorqs aXrjOeta* a/xa 8* 
kou apiarou rjSrj irav ov 86£a kariv. aXXa 
/irjp ov& auev Xoyov rj evfiovXia. 8uwoias apa 
XtlireraC .won) yap ovttod (fxw-ts' Kal yap ij 
8o£a ov (jfTqais aXXa tyaats tls rf8r}, 6 Scio 
fiovXtvoftevof, kav re €& lav re tca/ccos #ou- 
X€V7]Tou y {jjT€i n Kal Xoyt^ETOi. 'AAA* bpdorqs 
ris icmv rj evfiovXia fiovXij^ 810 rf fiovXrj £97- 



k an unpremeditated assumption of 
the middle term, that is, of the cause 
why the major term is predicated of 
the minor term in the conclusion : in 
this, therefore, it differs from tt&uXim, 
which does nothing without time and 
meditation. 

6. a^rm Kh,] See p. 94, 24. sq. 

8. iikfims — XtUnvsu] sv&eakia is a 
species of correctness {i^jHrnt ), but not a 
correctness either of science or of opinion. 
Not of science, because correctly speak- 
ing there is no correctness of science, 
since there is no incorrectness of it; 
not of opinion, because the correctness 
of opinion h mere truth without action, 
(see p. 95); and further, opinion is not 
search but assertion, (f *W, the generic 
term of the negative and affirmative 
judgment of the Logicians); whereas 
tv(lw\m has not yet arrived at this state, 
(■»v*n y*f iC*» <ptUt<,y but searches and 
deliberates. But yet, though sufaukm is 
neither science nor opinion, it must still 
belong, somehow to the ha**M, because it 
is not without reason, (aXXat /ut» ««5* 



2m ¥ XJyv H svfieaXm, euaeUst if 
XiinrM). It cannot be excluded 
from it (Imbmm), as it must be if we 
followed Plato's division of the soul. 
What itfirns then is if? an fyerns 
/bvXiff : and before we can discover 
what tbfUwXi* is, we must examine 
into the meaning of the term ifternt, 
that of fievkn having been already 
determined. See p. 96. Such ap- 
pears to me to be the meaning of 
this intricate and involved passage; 
many 'Other interpretations have been 
suggested, for which the reader must • 
consult the different commentators. 

But Aristotle may mean to say, that 
tb&MtiJm is a species of )*«»«•, since 
&«£»«« is that exercise of the mind 
wbieh has not yet arrived at decision 
(fm*tt), but is in a state of progression 
to it. Compare Philoponus in Arist. 
de Anima : 3mbmj« V* Irri, t» etn M 
rttm haivu* furmfimiwtvat ««£ **£*r*- 
ttmt i*) top^ar/tuva, ig oZ xm) rfc» 
*\ti*t> ilxxorn. This I think the more 
probable interpretation. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 7. 843 

rqrea irp&rov tl koll ir*p\ tL 'Eire* 5* 17 6pdoTq$\. Good 
TrXeoi/ax&s, SrjXop ori ov iraxra* 6 yap aKparrjs 
koll 6 <f>avXos o 7rpoTL0€T(u ISeip 4k tov Xoyiapuov 
T€viJ€Tou, ©are 6p0m cotcu fiefiovXevfJievos, kolkov 
5 fie fieya eiXrjifxo^. fioieet & ayadov ri elvcu to 
ed fitfiovXtvcrdaC rj yap roiavrrj opOotrjf fiovXrj? 
€v/3ovXia 9 7) ayadov revfcttK^. 'AAA' ecrre #a*i2. Good 

rovroi; ycvoei avXXoyt&pxp tv\€iv, nat \uv 
fiet 7roirjcrai tv\(eIv 9 -8i o5 & o#, dXXu \^v8ij 

10 tov fieaop opov tlvaC ©or ov8 avrq 7ra> euj8ou- 
A/a, Kajff tjv ot Set p.€v Tvyx&vet, ov pivroi hi 
ov eSet. En tan iroXvv ypovov /3ouAeuo/ie- 3. Sufficient 

ww rux**" Toy fie raxiJ. oi/kow 01/tf eTce/pi? 7ra> 
tvfiovXla, aAA' opdoTtj? rj Kara to d>(f)eXifxop, /cat 

16o5 fie! /cat a); /cat ore. ert core /cat a7rAa>? et? /3e- 

fiovXevcrQcu koll wpos ti reAoy. 17 /xei/ fii; airX&s 

■ 17 71700* ro reAor to awXcos KaTopOovara, 17 fie 

TIS V 7TO09 TL Te'Ao?. Ei fiw 7W (bpOvlutDV TO (e5 Complete 

~ c , / v * » /,/ e x definition 

fieflovXevoifat, rj €vfiovXia eiij av opdorqs rj icaraofrf^eXm. 
20 to crvpxf>€pov irpos ti re'Aoy, o5 7) <f>povr)(TL? aXrjOt/f 
viroXrpfyls eortv. 



17. to rix*l r« riXt ri JutXHt that a good end is necessary for 
Happiness ; *pt ri vi\§§ means tend- tlfU»Xm t but of this tbfavXlm itself can- 
ing to Happiness. When tbfUvXi* not take cognizance, because it does 
aims at the first, then tufavki* is not commence till the end is fixed 
absolutely perfect, when it aims at and proposed, and then only delibe- 
any of the others only partially, upon rates upon the means to that end. 
one particular object. See p. 94, 18. The forming of a right 

19. iftmt n ttmra re riptffftf] conception then of the end must be 

A correctness as to the means to an end, the part of some other habit, and 

of which end tyine-it forms the right that is ftinms. See p. 230, 10. and 

conception. It has been already stated the note. 



b2 

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244 ARISTOTELIS 



CHAP. VIII. 

Of Judgment, or rvnrif ; and Candor, or ywfut. 

OfJudg- E2TI 8e kcu t) avv€<ri9 kcu tj acrvpeaia, Kajff \\ 

ment and a x / \ \ » / v/* «*x 

iu object- as Xeyo/xep ovverovs kcu cutvvctovs, ova oXco? 

matter. \ *\» / * & / > s / > * 9 

to avro eirtarrifiri tj dogy {7ravT€f yap av -qorav 

OVV€ToC) OVT€ Tl$ flla TG>V KCLTO. fl€p09 eiriOTTflJU&Vy 

olov larptKrj irept vyiuv£>v rj ye&fieTpla ireplb 
/xeyedovs' ovt€ yap 7T6/H tG>v ael ovtcdv kcu 
aKunjrcav r) ovvearls iorw ovt€ wept t&v ycyvo- 
fi4vcov brovovVy aXXa wepl cov aTToprjcretev av tls 

Difference KCU f$OvXev<TCUTO. AtO 7T€oi TO aVTCL fl€V TV 

ofJ » d /- . , , , » v *x 

ment from (j)povr)(r€l €<mv, OVK €OTL 0€ TOOTOV aVV€&l$ KOI 10 

f&WS* , / . « X X JL ' » ' » . 

<ppov7)(TLs if fxtv yap (ppowjai? eiriTaKTiKT) eoriv 
tl yap Set irpaTTtiv rj fir], to re'Ao? avTrjs iarLv* * 
T) fie ovveais KpiTiKt) puovov* Toutov yap avveais 

Judgment KCU €VOVV€ala KCU OVV€To\ KCU €VOTJV€T0t. "EoTl 

& 0VT€ TO €\etV T7/P $pOVr)<TLV OVT€ TO XaflfiaV€LV 15 



Chap. VIII. (p^itnrtf. Consequently they are also 

1. rvnnt] Both rt/nr** and y**f*tt distinguished in point of time, rvviw 

mean judgment But efomt is a being subsequent to ftitneit. It fol- 

mere judgment as to measures : y»»(*n lows therefore, that rvnns cannot be 

to persons. In the first there is no the same as the possessing or acquir- 

moral virtue, there is in the second. ing ftitnns (##«•• ri l%ut rtit Qpmm 

15. oSrt «) Xm/tfiAfut'] rh ya^ Xttp- *5n to XapfZeitur). In order to point 

$Jnui <p(ipfif(f. Irr) ri pmii&tu* £<rt{ out more clearly the difference be- 

l ftiupof ynurmu. Paraph, tfaxrtt tween them, Aristotle introduces the 

and l{«m»f have the same object- illustration of a master and his pupil, 

matter, but differ in species. The For as the pupil apprehends and 

latter seeks and discovers what ought forms a correct judgment of the pre- 

to be done, and gives directions for cepts of his master, so does rtW* 

it, but the former merely forms an of the dictates and directions of fgl< 

opinion concerning these operations of $nns. 



defined. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 9. £45 

r] ovvecris' aXX aoTrep to puav0avup Aeycrea 
gvpupai, orap XPV T0U *"0 iwurr^fiij, ovrm cV 
rtp yj>y}<r0ai rr} 86£r) cVi to Kpipcip irepl tovtg>p 
vrepl a>p r) (frpovricrt? i<mv, aXXov \4yopros, kou 
bKpivsiv koXw' to yap eS r£ KaXm tovtop. 

KCU €PT€V0€P 4\r)\v0€ TOVPOfUZ 7j (TVVS&VSi *<*& 

rjv €vovi/€TOi, 4k Tqs £p t$ fiap0ap€tp* Xeyo/iep 
yap to fiap0dp€LP ovpiepcu 7roAAa/u?. 

H fie KaXovfievri yvcopr), Kafi tjp evyp&fiopas Of y^fa. 

10 kcu exciv (f)afiep ypcoprjp, rj tou emeucovs iarrl 

Kpio-ts opdrj. oypetop Se' top yap eirueuaj pjakiord 

(j)afi€v ecpat ovyyi/oDfioviKov, teal emeucc? to e\€tp 

wept epca ouyypeofirjp. rj 8e ovyypaprj ypcofxrj 

ioTl KptTLKTJ TOV €7Tl€LKOV? 6p0T). Opdrj S' 7) TOU 

I5a\r)0ov?. 



CHAP. IX. 

Some general remarks upon the foregoing habits. 

12 EI2I 8e iracrai ai eijets evXoyeos €l$ TavTO *&•***. y*»* 
Tuvov&ai Aeyofiev yap ypcofirjp Kat ovpeaip icaiandM**, 

9. y**(Afi] Etiamsi prior ilia facultas admodum se habet ssquitas ad justi- 

* rvturif perspicientia, etiam sit facultas tiam. MAGIRUS. 
judicandi de rebus, tamen non est 

eadem cum pnesenti facultate. Nam Chap. IX. 
*inns ita simpliciter de rebus judicat In this Chapter Aristotle proceeds to 
et prommtiat, quales sua sunt natura ; explain the affinity of the three last- 
si sunt bonae vel raalae, tales quoque mentioned habits with ^imns, to which 
prommtiat: yum fin autem in judicando they are so inseparably united that it 
adhibet aquitatem et moderationem, cannot be perfect without them. That 
et mavult in benigniorem quam in affinity consists in three things ; I. all 
deteriorem partem quandam accipere. are in the same subject-matter, the de- 
Habet ergo ynipn se ad *utt*it, quern- liberative part of the soul ; II. all are 

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246 



ARISTOTBLIS 



are all 
the same 
object. 
Matter, 
human 



<f>p6y*f<TLi' kcu vovv cirl tovs aurovs eTrufxpovre? 

yiKDflTfV *XetV KCU VOVV 7)&Tf KCU (ftpOVlflOVS' KCU 

avv€rov9' waaai yap cu Swajui? ahrcu rwv 
ia\ara>v €iai kcu r&v ko0 Zkootov, kcu kv p&v 

T$ KpiTlKO? CIVCU TTtpL CM 6 (f)p6lH/JL09 y aVVCTWb 

kcu tvyvtofjuw T) ovyyixofuoi/* ra yap emeua} 
KOiva tg>v aya&wv iaravrtov iariv iv rip irpos 
aXkov. cirri 8k row Kajff CKcurra kcu tS>v karyarfdv 



employed upon the tame object-mat- 
ter, human actions; III. and all an 
produced bj the same efficient cause. 
For although some men appear natu- 
rally to possess a greater degree of 
mint* and y *L §» * than others, yet these 
faculties can only be perfected by use. 
and habit 

They differ from ftimttt in the fol- 
lowing respects, fttom first exerts 
the proper means and aim. at the ends 
proposed. Upon these proceedings of 
f^nxwn is 0-vrtra or ytif*n exerted 
accordingly as the occasion requires. 
The first perceives and apprehends 
those things which Qpn&tt commands 
and passes a correct judgment upon 
them : the second, also judges of the 
commands of Pf»*w, chiefly consider- 
ing the persons, their opportunities, 
wishes, times, and such like ; correct' 
ing, when need may be, any error, 
which may arise from following strictly 
a general law or precept, and when a 
fault would be committed were the 
commands of ty«W'r, (using Q^tntif 
in a loose sense,) in that particular 
instance obeyed. 

*h srputruMt* • y*t vttf rk xa4ix**ra 
Mtiff i vr^mxnxit Urn. Ss xm) Xoy^fMf 
Xtytrat it X«y<£*" xm) fur^St r»t 
9{mrff*iw9 %*m0rtv. o y«vt (fcittf/ut 
it &«Ae«>> xm) m*%u4wm* Wfif to ri>.it 
mfck f(/ufi4t Xtytrmt, in ft »{/m» «« 



xmXZt mwu wi w t i u , mm) it Of« *»* riXsmt 
If Amot r mt i i xm) iur*nr«f ifftd£t- 
rmt, in Hk mmrm r# ky ubn *•*$ vrmut- 
ftiftt TpeJ h rtt xm) vptyfufif. miriwt 
rt xm) *{•**§ tat x^intt VfifUHS 
tityvimm fnMnrm. Im r«m r#i rnvtit 
mm) Qptn*n l%ut #r« mvf *g««e»M? 
xm) *imn§ xm) ywimmi Xi y ^i*, in umr* 
mvrrnt Xn^yvfuwt wt£t c« m'^mrrifum, 
Schol. 

2. mot n%i] t\ si k%i wptUnx* ry 
fdvt i%ut, mSv %x Uf *&* tt*in, hiXtnrt 
furm rh* rS* w^mymmnn wXvwu^imt 
i **{) «•« wptnra mi* cjf ^«%n «i£#- 
yiwrmtt xm) fan m*» }%*** Xiytrmt i 
TtXXk t$*9 KtH **$in Ktu %tb (*m*pZ 
X%***» T»vrn h£*fU9*. Schol. 

6. royytiputr] tvyttifutv, evyyvir- 
fun, and Wtuxru, are here used 
synonymously ; as are Wumm and 
y*»pn 

— r« y*i Wm*n] ««»e n \*n\xu* t 
x.m.) ra *ȣ* rnt Wiuxuag xfitifitr* 
*i.yr** Ir-ri t£w kymimt t^ T^« w 
QptlfiL*i xctr^UvfMutt, *(h &XX*». r$v 
\*tux»v( rk* •txtmt lHuxwft&nv lti{- 
yu»t. * ymf trt^tt i« Q{§p4*t*t xmts^- 
4*7 rmur i*su*ht x^mi ty»t ynquf 
%£»jpi»*s xm) ruyyimpn rh y*£ ttvrm, 
tin* u*6Xiif*t*M, it W^Mt^irm t rif rt 
QptifAf xeu Wittxu JfXX' i pX* ftiu- 
p$t if xiret irt{y*t *x) KmTt^Hf 1%u 
*£>( mvrd, i 1% Wiuxht it llXw itt{- 
yn**»r*$ *uro( x^tutf (*trk ypiftat rl 
mu tvyyttfont- Schol. 



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847 



iravra ra irpaKrd' /cat yap top <f>p6vi/iov Set 
yivto<TK€iv avra, teal 17 ovvcais /cat rj ypdjfirj wepl 
ra TrpaxTa, ravra $ €<r\ara. Kal 6 vovs 7WThe object. 

9 / 9 * » t t m \ \ ~ / matter of 

€a\aT(ov €7r afitpoTepa /cat yap tow vrpeoreov^ m0 re 
bop&v Kol rtov ioyar&v vovs kori /cat ov Aoyoy, plained! 
kcu 6 fiev KOdTa ras airobei^eis rtov ajuvrjroDv optov 
Kal 7rp(orcop, 6 8 f kv tolls irpaKTuccu? rod kayarov 



3. i uSt r£i l*%drm] Since miv, at 
it has been already observed, (see p. 
23?. n.) is of two kinds, both active 
and speculative, the one employed upon 
particulars, the other upon universals, 
by which science is acquired, and since 
there are certain principles of human 
actions, the knowledge of which is of 
the utmost importance for the proper 
understanding and performing of the 
actions themselves, Aristotle here pro- 
ceeds to explain at greater length what 
faculty it is which apprehends those 
principles, and how the apprehension 
of them is effected. These principles 
he calls by other terms, extremes and 
particulars (caw m*J lumrrm mo) r£t 
l#X««-»f). For commencing with uni- 
versals, and progressing from these, we 
arrive at particulars, which are there- 
fore called extremes, because we are 
able to proceed no farther. But twt 
is not merely of these extremes, but 
also of extremes both ways (caw l*%£- 
rm W kpfirtf), of speculative as 
well as active principles: for since 
those things which are by nature prior, 
are in the knowledge of man posterior, 
and, on the other hand, those things 
which are prior to us are in nature 
posterior (Bee p. 11), it must of course 
happen, that if we commence with those 
things which are prior to us, we shall 
arrive at last at what is prior to nature, 
at universals, the principles of sci- 



ence, (the extremes in one way); 
but if we commence with those 
things which are prior to nature, we 
shall arrive at length at what is prior 
to us, at particulars, the principles of 
actions, (the extremes the other way). 
So that Mtrjr is consequently of those 
things which are both first and last 
(«<%*} *** U%aT») t to nature and to 
us, and the same things are at once 
both principles and extremes. 

5. »«2 »i X/y#f] And not reasoning 
or tylhgitm. Here Xiy* corresponds 
to Icwcripe as used in the second 
chapter of this book. And by this 
remark, Aristotle still further distin- 
guishes the nature of apprehension 
(»•**), from science. 

Although apprehension is divided 
into two, it is not actually so divided, 
but only in reference to its energies. 
It is the same faculty, whether em- 
ployed upon the first principles of 
science or of morals. m«7» 32 p«r< rb 
* Mwrot ph r« ww'f , Xrt^n ft mJ frtgw 
vy Ittfyuf. i ykf It njui mi* Unc*t 
pb iut^m «*} rk **r mhrh xa) rk 
*furr* 4ut(tiTt»is l*«, rk J* «vry 
rvfn{TfipitM juu # •/{•»« f***(V 1*hbf 
*«j fvtfu£*t mat w^mrrmt «£«*«*•# 
Irrt xa) *nfMt£$Tmt \*tU*t ph *vf rks 
l*i*rnfMtf fUvif<rn*tt, •vrt*( ft cig} rk 
*£*mvk xmrmyinrm. ***%'»*( ph c» 
kXnftt knvpr»u. «tt ft ra kyaftt 
nmrtfif*. Schol. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



948 



ARISTOTELIS 



These ha- 
bits ac- 



koli ev8€\ofX€VOv kcu tt)s erepas TrpOTacrecDS' apxpu 
yap rod o5 evetca ahrcu* 4k r&v Koff €Kaara yap 
to koBoXov. rovrtov oiv e^iv Set cuaOrjaiv, aurq 
S iarl vovs. Ato #ecw (f)vaiKa Sotcet clvai ravra, 

quired only Ka l <hv<T€t (TCXbbf fUV OvSelf, yVG>p.r)V 8 €\€LV JCai5 

by expe* 

nence- OVV€<TlV KCU VOVV. O7]fl€l0V 8 OTl KCU TOl? rjXtKLCUS 

olo/teda axoXovdelv, kcu fj8e rj rjXiKia vow e\et 
kcu yiHDfirjv, <hs rrjs (frvcrem aulas ovat)$. 8to 
Kal apyji kcu reXos vods' 4k tovtcov yap cu 



1. \ripn wprinuf] Minor pre- 
mise or particular proposition. See 
▼ii. 3. 

— &{%ml y*t\ •* fA* AfAtf** Xiyi 
rj $»ru wfjmrt, t*x»r* 3t ti/ut. rk K 

rn Qv*u' rmSrm ft rk lr%mra rn fv*u 
4gX<u tin *«2 mlrut rtS riX§vt nv 
w^mxrw km) yk{ kri rm \t r J mlwifou 
nmf Inmrrm &3«r**piMf Wfdrrur rk 
gvftfiptrm npjf mbrtilf xec) r$7f &XX*i(, 
mm) If tft *pt rl £nir&vf*tnt &<pi£ipufm 
rlXif xeu kwo rourttt rSn f*i(t**t W#- 
XtKtif ***** twiyvrt* Xiyvt Qpnput 
yitifuU w£t rat h r!f 0/p +{££us. 
hk roiir* to? rht «*»Xj«7»»» yyZtn 1%U9 
rSv /ttigijuvr 4 rsMvm ft yrZrtt inu 
ptiftv yinftitn u!vt \»rt uS$ ym\ lent n 
ymwt$ r£h «/»I#mv km) *£v Ag£»». Pa- 
raph. 

3. mlc-tnrtt — u»t] The knowledge 
which is derived from particulars may 
in one sense be termed *1*$nnt, and 
also mi*. Sense (mtrinnt) inasmuch 
as by means of this faculty we take 
cognizance of particulars ; apprehen- 
sion (m%), inasmuch as we refer those 
particulars so acquired from «Mn*it 
(see p. 214.) to certain general heads, 
by which we deduce rules for our 



guidance upon other and similar occa- 
sions, clearing and strengthening this 
eye of the soul. Sense and apprehen- 
sion have this in common ; both ener- 
gize without the use of middle terms, 
without syllogizing, the one upon the 
objects of apprehension, the other upon 
objects of sense. In this they also 
have a similarity: all demonstration 
proceeds upon principles and universale 
first gained by apprehension. In ac- 
tions, on the contrary, setting out with 
the principles derived from the senses, 
we refer each particular to the nut 
w^oKTiKit, and thence form certain 
deductions. Consequently, he who 
has had the greatest experience, will 
have this faculty in the greatest per- 
fection. 

4. $t*i*k Icku] For since these 
habits turn chiefly upon particular 
acts, which can only be known by 
experience, and experience is only 
gained by age, and nature is the cause 
of age, therefore nature may in some 
sense be said to be the cause and 
author of these habits. 

9. &(%n KMI rikf] I yk{ T4Vf, K*§~ 

its rf{ffr«j, xa) §iu{nnx«; \m mm) 
Wfaxrixif, kkH d(%ri *tu rlXf. «{£« 



* Propositions not obtained by the use of a middle term, not the conclusions 
of previous syllogisms. Such of course are all summa genera. 



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dnroSelgeis kou irepl tovtcdv. aoare 8el irpocriyfiv 
t£>v i/iirelpav kou wpeafitrrepoov rj <j>povipxov reus 
avairo8etKTOL9 (fracrecri kou Soijaif ov\ fyrrov r&v 
mroSeiljeG)!/' Sea yap to e\etv 4k ttjs €fi7recpias 
5ofifia bpwcriv 6p6S>$. ri pkv oiv coriv rj (frpoirqcns 
kou r) <ro<f>la 9 koI irepl riva exarepa rvyyavw. 
oScra, kou oti aXXov rijs tyvyrjs fioplov apery 



cKarepa, etpTjrcu. 



CHAP. X. 

Of the utility of r#f /• and ptfn*ss, and which is superior to the other. 

13 AIAIIOPH2EIE 5" av ns irep\ airr&v riFirstand 

/ /» c * \ if »»*/! « Second Ob- 

lOXPV "^ ^ curty. rj fiev yap cro(pia ovoev P6a>/7€tjecuon. 



(i\t xaf Zen <rmr W(*r*f £(%»' Irri 
yfSftt **) tu0^nrt»if kiytreu, «£gft 
ya^ Unrn aw£*S£t*t rix»t & mmf lr«v 
yMwf irrt r£t n*f Xtutrrm nmX U 
tlrtntu mm *{atMTix}( Xiytrtu. <rif) 
rovrw ytq m\ £«>«3i<gfif, xml roSrd 
l«ri ra Awduxvm xm) »!g raura rs4.iv- 
r*4*t i dxduutus ty%**** &*• *** ***- 
•Xov **TmfUuf*n. Paraph. 



Chap. X. 

Aristotle having explained the na- 
ture of wisdom and <ppwtt, now pro- 
ceeds to consider two objections which 
he supposes may be raised; I, as 
to the utility of these habits, and 
H, as to their comparative dignity. 

Tlie 1st objection, that wisdom con- 
tributes nothing to happiness, may be 
stated in the following form. 

The happiness of man is the good 
of man, which is both contingent and 
generated, 



But wisdom theorizes upon nothing 
which is generated, (ct&tfumt l#ri 
yttiru*. See also p. 235.); and 
consequently contributes nothing to 
happiness. 

The 2nd objection, that P{«mw 
contributes nothing to happiness. 

If Qptwrtf be useful and necessary, 
it is so either to him who has acquired 
virtue, or to him who has not yet ac- 
quired it. 

It is not useful either to one or the 
other, and therefore fpnfit is not 
useful to happiness. 

The minor of this syllogism is thus 
proved. 

First, It is not useful to him who 
has virtue ; because virtue is of itself 
an active habit, and will produce acts 
accordingly. For so he who has a 
healthy habit of body will perform his 
energies accordingly, to which the 
mere knowledge of what is healthy 
contributes nothing: so likewise the 



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250 



AHISTOTELIS 



Neither 



ft"*?* 

cootnbote 

to happi- 
ness, and 
areconse- 
qocntly 



Objection 
at to the 
relative 
dignity 
of wisdom 
and fftm- 

9*U 



1. Reply. 
They are 
eligible for 
their own 
takes. 



c£ W earcu eirftaifjuDi/ avOpmros, oibepuas yap 
ion ytvi&uos. rf & <j>povr)<ris tovto pkv c^ci, 
aXXa twos cvckcl Set avrfjs, elirep rj fuv (frpowjcrls 
iorip r) irepl ra SUoua kou KaXa kou ayada av- 
0panrq>, ravra 5* kariv a tov ayaBov kariv avSposs 
irparT€tP 9 ovdev Se irpaKTuaorepoi ra> tiStvou aura 
evfjuev, €LTT€p eijei? ax opcrai elaiv, wowep ov8e 
ra vyieiva oufic ra eveicrucd, oca /jlt) t$ iroielv 
aXXa Tip airo ttjs l£ca»? tivcu XeyeTou* ovOev yap 
irpoKrucerrepoi Tip €\ecv tt/v larpiK^v kou yvpwa- io 

OTIKT/U €<Tfl€l>. €1 fie flT) TOVT00V X^P LV <f>pOVip>OV 

Qereov aXXa tov yiveadau, tois overt <nrov8aloi9 
ovOev av etrj XPV ' 1 / 10 ^ * Tl $ °v$* T °w PV 
expvciv' ovOev yap Swlcret avTOvs ex*w r) aKXois 
e\ovat ir€L$€<r0ai 9 licavm t e\oi av -qpuv ayoweplS 
Kal 7T€pl tt)v vyleiav' fiovXopuevoi yap vyuuveiv 
opuos ov pavdavofxev iaTpucrjv. Tlpos 8e tov- 

tois &TOWOV av eivai 8o£eiev, el \eip(ov ttjs <ro<f>ias 
oicra Kvpuarepa avTTjs earaC rj yap iroiovaa 
ap\€L kcu €7nTaTT€i irepl eKaxrrov. irepl 8r) tov- 20 
tow Xeicreov' vvv pkv yap iproprjTat wepi at/raw 
puovov. Ylp&TOv fiev oiv Xeyopev otl koJS 

avras avayKalov aiperas olvtos elvou, aperas y 
ovcra? emaTepav eKarepov tov fiopiov, kou ei fxrj 



mere knowledge (^hnnt) of what it 
good, just, and temperate, tends no- 
thing to the production of tuch acts. 

Secondly, It is not useful to him 
who has not yet acquired virtue. For 
if he who has not yet acquired vir- 
tuous habits, is desirous of performing 
virtuous acts, he has only to imitate 
the actions of the good man. For, to 



continue the illustration above, he 
who wishes to acquire a healthy 
habit, and perform the energies ac- 
cordingly, would never think of learn- 
ing the science of medicine for that 
purpose, but would be satisfied with 
following the directions of him who 
did possess it, of his physician. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 10. 



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noiovat fxrjSev firjSercpa avr&v. Ebrccra /cats. They v 

~ / » <> \ *\ « / »xx»« eligible as 

WOtQUCTl fl€V, OV\ G>9 lOTpLKT) 0€ Vyi€UZV, OAA CO? parts of 
t t t tf e ^i/»a / ' v happiness. 

97 vyteia, ovreo? rj ootyia cvocu/mopuxp pepos yap 

ovcra Tr}s oXr/9 aperijs ry e^eaOat itqici teal ry 

bivtpytlv evSaifiopa. *En to epyov dTroreXeiTatS. fffc**, 



%%*# \**/i\>/.c indispens- 

icara ti/j/ <ppovr)criv kcu tt\v rj&uajv aperrjv 7) able to 

x % ~ » /i> « ^virtuous 

TOP (TKOTTQP TCOltl OpVOV> 7} 0€ actions. 



/ICV 



y«p 



ap€T7) TOV (TKOTTQV TTOlCi, QpVOV> Jf 

<pp6i>r)cri? ra 7rpo? tovtop. (tou 8e reraprov 

fxoplov tt)s foxy}? ouk hrriv apery TOtavrq, tov 

\O0peirnKW' ovOev yap cV avrcp irparretv 17 /417 

Trpdrreiv). Hep), fie tou pafiXv ttvax Trpax- 



2. in Wfis4] Not as efficient 
causes, as the objector has supposed, 
but as parts of happiness. 

5. In r% If?**] Aristotle here re- 
futes the proofe of the minor of the 
second objection. He observes, that 
fpnrw is useful for happiness, be- 
cause moral virtue cannot operate 
without it. For to every virtuous 
action a good end as well as good 
means are required. But moral virtue 
only forms and directs the appetite, 
which being irrational cannot reason 
upon the end, but only fix upon it 
when presented to it, and further also 
requires ftUnnt to discover the proper 
and sufficient means for the attain- 
ment of that end. pgfaw then selects 
and orders the right means for the 
attainment of that end which moral 
virtue has sought out and selected; 
and consequently ${ifn*t$ is indis- 
pensable to virtuous actions and to 



r>. **#**#] Aristotle here refutes 
the allegation of the objector, that a 
person can perform the energies of 
virtue, without possessing p{*m*H, 
merely by imitating - the aetions of 



separable 
from moral 
virtue. 



others and following their directions, 
as the sick man can attain to health 
without learning the art of medicine. 
To this Aristotle replies, by saying, 
that imitation alone is not sufficient 
for the performance of virtuous actions* 
for which four properties are., required 
as already has been stated, ii. c. 3. 
First, mat the agent should know 
what he does; secondly, that he 
should act from deliberate choice (U 
(•{Miffa**) ; thirdly, that he should 
act from the love of virtue itself; and 
fourthly, with consistency and per 7 
severance. Moral virtue then makes 
the wpmiprnt correct, causes k to fix 
upon the good and to avoid the bad. 
This however k not sufficient, but the 
means for attaining that end when so 
found ought to be good likewise; 
but the discovery and determination 
of the means which are to be put 
in action for obtaining the object of 
our choice (•#• \*utns tnxm cSf mm 
vpirrM&u) belong not to moral vir- 
tue, but to some other faculty. What 
that faculty is, Aristotle now proceeds 
to< 



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262 ARISTOTELIS 

rucarrcpovs Sid ttjv <f)p6w)crii> t&v tcaXcov kou 
SitcauDv, fUKpov avcoOev dp/creov, XafSoirras dpyrjv 
ravTTjv. cocnrep yap kou tol SUoua Xeyop.ev irpdr- 
roirras rwas owrco StKalov? elvai, dlov row to, 
vtto r&v vopjcov T€rayfi€va ttolovvtols rj okoptosS 
r/ 01 ayvoiav rj ot erepop n koli py 01 aura 
(jcacroi Trparrovari ye a Set /cat oca XPV T0V 

OTTOvSaiOv), OVTOW, a& tOLK€V, ZoTl TO 7TW e\OVTa 

irpaTreiv eKaora a>or eivai dyaBov, Xeyco & olov 
8ia irpoaipeaiv kou clvtg>v evetca t£>v irpaTropevtov. 10 
ttjv fiev oiv irpoaipeaiv 6p6r)V iroieZ r] apery, 
to & oaa eKelvqs eveica iretfvKe irpaTTevOai ovk 
(*v»t$is, etm ttjs dperijs aXA* irepas Swdpeeos. AeKTeov 

thesameai , N , m v 

^turif o eirtonjaao'i aatoeorepov irepi avrcov. eon orj 

stripped of , A x ~ * / * a> » \ 

moral vir- Tl$ OVVafllS f/V KOAOVai OeiUOTTJTa* OUTTJ O eOTl 15 

tue )' / * \ \ y « ~, \ 

TOiavrrj (oore Ta irpos tov xmoTeuevra vkoitov 
crvvrelvovra hvvaxrOai Tavra irpdrreiv kou Tvy\d- 
veiv avT&v. av fiev odv 6 vkottos y tcaXo?, 



3. Yt»eu* kiyfut] See p. 197. virtuous action, otherwise all who pos- 
15. iuMmra] A technical word sessed it would be virtuous, which is not 
applied to this particular use even by the case. Something else then is re- 
the Pythagoreans. Compare Clinias : quired. Then only is it virtuous, when 
U»» fdt tZi %xwrt rb n*m*if ««2 the end it has in view is good and praise- 
<yr*rrt*)t pkpt *ur*s [&c. t^trit], worthy. But the faculty which deter- 
)ur$l ci mm) /win) wvftminirat. Ui mines and fixes on the good end is cor- 
31 ri Mt*it r% xat wecuftrizit, XWt"' rect W»«t toat l8 ' moral virtue ' there- 
at Ma) Wtu*U$. Frag. Pyth. Ed. Gale, fore to constitute perfect %*nimt moral 
p. 29. virtue must be united with it, but iwirtis 
18. exorot] Every one who wishes so united is the same as Igfarir, which 
to act fixes upon some end, but re- always has a good end (see p. 230, 11. 
quires a certain aptitude or faculty, n.) therefore P{«w* is not without 
by which he may fix upon and per- moral virtue. ro»<r» ya^ ittHpifu )tWr»; 
form those things which tend to the fymrutf. •n h fih r£f +ps ri» kwXSs 
end proposed. This faculty, as given riUrit *vtT%\»forv* tytvprixn Irrt %v- 
us by nature, is called htteme, but utfu$, n Xl <p(4$ncn r£f srpt rh vym 
is not sufficient of itself to constitute a r»»cfr, **) In h (ui» Qptnets Vgns \» 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 10. 



258 



eiraiveTT) icmvy op Se (fxivXof, iravovpy!xC 8th 
koll tow (ppovifiov? Seivovs koll ircLPOvpyov? <f>a/i€v 
eivai. eari & -q <f>povr)<ris ov% rj SetvoTT)?, oAA' 

OVK Sv€V T7)9 8wdfl€a>9 TOVTT)9. 7) 5* eljtS T^> 
^OfJLfJUOLTl TOVTCp yiP€TOU Tt}s ^l^P OVK OLP€V ap€T7)$, 

G)9 eipr/rai re koll eori 8rj\op % ol yap <n/AAo- 
yiafiol t&v 7rpaucTG>v &PXH V *X 0VT ** eicrcp, eireiSr) 
roiovSe to rcXoy kcu to aptorov, OTiSr/wore op* 
€otg> yap Xoyov xapiv to tv\6v. tovto & el 
lOfir/ Tip aya0<p, ov <j)alv€Tcu' 8iaarp€<f}€t yap r) 
fio\0Tjpia koll SiayfrevSeaOai iroiei wept tols irpouc- 
TLKa9 ap\a9. a>OT€ tyavepov ore aSvi/arov <j>po- 
VLiiov elvat urn ovra ayajOov. 2#e€7rr€Oi> $« And moral 

/ \ » ~ \ virtue is in- 

ttolXlv koll wept aptTTJs' kcu yap rj apery irapa- separable 
Ib7r\t]0-UD? exei a>9 r) (ftpovrjais irpos tt)p SeivoTTjra' -m- 



virtue bear- 



tm Tt rns }u**r*ros, ^mdfuuts writ *«d 
ttyotat, x«2 U $\)9i*t vpvurnt rSn 
U h/ut Xiy*. ?»' If •**$ WtyittiTmt. 
Schol. 

4. h * %*) This habit (f^w**) 
is generated in this eye of the soul, 
(that is, ud$ *t«»ri%'ot. See p. 239, 
9. n. 246, 1. n. and 247, 3. n. 
not without moral virtue), ry SfAfutn 
Tsvrf rnt yp»xns. Htm rif ts(vf*iff »m) 

W£*xrt*is ««%• Schol. 

7. imJth r*i'»fbi] Docet prudentiam 
(fynnc-tt) absque virtute esse non posse 
nunc in modum. Dictum est supra 
syllogisroos partim esse theoreticos, 
partim practices, utrique notum est 
sua esse principia. Practici princi- 
pium finis est, non secus atque theo- 
retici hypothesis, inquit Aristot. vii. 8. 
Finis igitur nisi viro bono bonus con- 



stitui non potest. Vir improbus malum 
semper et improbum finem sibi deligit: 
nam hsc improbitatis est vis, ut in 
scopo et fine deligendo aberrare nos 
faciat. Virtus, inquit Aristoteles, sco- 
pum et finem tuetur, vitiura perdit 
et corrumpit vi. 4. quod rectum 
solus vir bonus recte judicat, improbus 
non item ut supra dictum iii. 4. de 
voluntate. Jam vera quia prudentis 
potissimum est syllogismum practicum 
concludere, ut cujus est proprium 
ratiocinari quid agendum quid non 
agendum sit, hinc efficitur ut si recte 
concludere velit, quia principia ad hoc 
recta sint oportet, id est finis quod 
absque virtute fieri non posse djximus, 
virum quoque bonum esse debere ut 
rectum prius constituat finem. Ad 
summum virtus et prudentia mutuam 
tradunt ope ram. GIPH. 

10. Wrftyu y»el See p. 231. 



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854 



ARISTOTELIS 



ingthesaro«ov TWTW pi€P, OfJLOlOV 84* Ot/T® K(U r) (f)V(TlKT) 
moral vir- dp€TT) TTpO? TT/P KVpldV. TtOXTl yap SoK€t littZtfTa 



tue, as 



hlnrmto r ^ v TjOwP VTtdpytlV <bV(TU 1TW' K€U yOtp SlKGLlOl 
KCU (TOXppOPCKol KOl dp8p€tOL KOI TCtXXa <XO/i€I> 

evOw 4k ycperijs' oAA* ojjuo? ^t/rov/iep trepop ri& 
to Kvplco? dyadop kou ra roiavra aXXop rpoirop 
V7rapx<eip' kou yap iratcrl kcu 6rj plots al <f>v<riKGU 
vrrapxpvcnp c^etf, oXA* dpev pov fiXafiepal 0«/- 
poptoi oiaou. irXrjp too-ovtop eoucep bpaardai^ 8n 
axnrep acofiarc ioyvpep apev o\fs€G)$ Kipovfiepq* to 
ovfi&aipci cr(f)dXX€cr0at uryvp&s 8ta tb firj €\€ip 
ctytv, ovrto kou epravOa* iap fie Aa/3rj povp, ip 
rip irpdrretp 8ta(f)€p€L. r) $ e^w o/iota od<ra tot 
eorai Kvpuos aperr). wore Kaddirep erri tov 
8o£aoTiKOv Svo ia-Ttp eiSrj, fcworqs kou (frpoprjo-if, 15 
ovreo Kal €7ri tov r/ducov Suo iori 9 to fiep dpenrj 

<f)V<riK7) TO & T) KVpld, KOL TOVTCDP 7) KVpla OV 



1. 4 f**»« Ap*t] Virtus autem 
hssc natura) Aristoteli nihil est aliud, 
quam lytk sea appetitio (sic vertitur a 
Cicerone) et impetus quidam ratione 
vacans sen ix«y* ut ibidem Aristo- 
teles in Mag. Mor. i. cap. ult Quare 
et hoc loco earn in pneris et beluis 
reperiri ait. Diximns et supra iii. c. 5. 
p. 108. de styrff seu nature bonitate, 
ubi dictum alios ad alia natura esse 
aptiores: cujus •b$*i*t pars qusedam 
est haec virtus natura insita, nam et 
hie infra ityvfawt* dicitur, de vir- 
tutibus natura insitis agens. GIPH. 

3. ftfru w*t] As a certain natural 
aptitude which we call )w/rw pre- 
exists and predisposes the mind to the 
reception of fffat'if , so a certain na- 
tural virtue precedes and renders it 
fit and apt for the acquisition of vir- 



tue properly so called (*•£«« cftr*'.) 
The same relation which tarim* 
bears to qtfmtit, does natural to ac- 
quired virtue. ?(MWf is a habit, \Ut- 
Nrnf is not: fpnt*n contributes the 
means only to those ends which are 
recommended by moral virtue, \Uinrnt 
to any end. So acquired virtue is a 
habit, the natural is not. Acquired 
virtue, fixing on the good end, only 
admits those means which f&mmt has 
determined ; natural virtue regards not 
the character of any of the means to 
the end it proposes, fffarjf and 
moral virtue are inseparable ; he who 
possesses one must possess both, he who 
loses one must lose both. If moral 
virtue be added to farinrr, then it be- 
comes pptnrtt : if ftinmt be added to 
natural virtue, it becomes moral virtue. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 10. 



955 



yiverat avev ^poi^crecw. Atoirep rwis <f>acri whence 

/ % , % , / * * ^ / tome infer- 

iracras ras aperas (ppovrjaeis €ivai, kcu ZaucpaTTjs red that 

* » /«#» »w ~ & « / * \ virtue was 

Tr/ ft€j/ opUco? eQqrei rg o r/fiapravtv art /jl€p &$**«. 
yap (f>pourj(r€i9 $€TO elvcu iraxrw ra$ aperas, 
brjiidpravev, ore & ovk aveu (ppourjaecoy, koXqk 



2. 2**{«r«f ] See Xenophon's Mem. 
iii. 9. $. 4. and Plato's Charmides and 
Laches. See the Introduction to the 
Seventh book of the Ethics. 

5. inv Qpffautt] To constitute a 
good action, a good end and good 
means are requisite. But to consti- 
' tote good means, they must not only- 
he sufficient for effecting their purpose, 
bat likewise morally good, and conse- 
quently require moral virtue in the 
person who is to choose them. But it 
is not sufficient merely for moral vir- 
tue to fix upon a good end, but it must 
cause good means for attainment of that 
end, good actions to be put in motion. 
Therefore neither can fyimm be ac- 
quired without moral virtue, nor moral 
virtue without Q^mtn. This seems 
like arguing in a circle ; to explain 
which Aristotle says, we are possessed 
by nature of two faculties correspond- 
ing to moral virtue and igfowr, 
without the moral goodness and per- 
fection of either. Natural virtue and 
cleverness (f w<*<k «f ire **) httirnt). 
Natural virtue fixes upon a good end 
generally, htternt generally chooses 
the right means to that end : and the 
exercise of these natural faculties causes 
them to ripen into the perfect virtue 
and perfect hnirns- that is, tyfofr*. 
The one reciprocally operating on the 
other, and both ripening and reaching 
their perfection in the soul at once. 
But though such is Aristotle's account 
ef the progress of man to moral perfec- 
tion, he does not appear to think that 



to such a perfection, though mankind 
may almost infinitely approximate, they 
can ever reach. It is a perfection of 
his being not reserved for him here. 

For if moral virtue cannot be formed 
without Qpwtt , certainly it cannot be 
by lunrru ; and if f f/nw cannot be 
formed without moral virtue, then it 
cannot be formed by natural virtue; 
neither does it appear therefore how 
the two together, hninit and natural 
virtue, should ever ripen into Qtttn- 
nt and moral virtue, which are perfect 
and unerring habits, although they 
may infinitely approximate towards 
them. For let it be supposed that 
such a perfection is attainable by man, 
he could never be a sinning or an 
erring creature; moral virtue would 
ever guard him from fixing on or even 
wishing a bad end, from the possibility 
of- any germination of evil habits from 
inward acts, and his Qptnnt would 
entirely preclude him from any error as 
to the means, from the influence of 
bad external acts. Qf«W<f would ever 
keep him alive to the calls of moral 
virtue, moral virtue would always en- 
force upon him the right impressions 
as to Qp'tiwt. Such a man could 
never have the wish or morally the 
power to do wrong. Suppose either 
one or the other, then at once he loses 
both these habits. So that Aristotle, 
m reference to these habits, only con- 
siders man transcendeotly not what 
he ever is or can be in this world, but 
what he supposed he might be, virtue 



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366 ARISTOTELIS 

iXeytv. OTj/ieiov fie # koi yap vvv itdvr^^ orav 
oplfawat Tr/v aperrjv, irpooTideaai rr/v e&v, 
throvrts teal wpos a iort, ttjv Kara tov opdov 
Xoyov' opdos 8 b Kara ttjv (frpovrjacv. eoucaai 
fi^ fiavrevtcrdai ttg>9 airavrts art 17 rotavrr) c£i?6 
apery ioriv 17 Kara ttjv (f)p6vrj<riv. Set Se futcpbv 
fierafirjvcu' ov yap puovov rj Kara tov opdov Xoyov, 
aXX 17 fjuera tov Opdov Xoyov *£& dperi) kariv. 
opObs fie Xoyo? Trepl t£>v toiovtcov rj <f>p6vrj<ri$ 
eoriv. ^OKparqs fiev odv Xoyov? tcls a/ocraylO 
$€TO elvat (eirioTTJfia? yap elvai iraaas), r/fiei? 
Conclusion fie p.erd Xoyov. ArjXov ovv €k tg>v eiprjfievcov 

ofthesub- & , ,, , y 1 , v 

ject ; and oti ov\ oiov tc ayauov eivai Kvpuo? avev (ppo- 

encetobc in/CT€(09j OvSe <f)pOVLflOV aV€V TT]S TJ01K7]9 dp€T7)9. 

iu dXXa kcu 6 Xoyos Tavrg Xvoit av 9 <p StaXexOelr) 15 

TO dv oti x<opi£ovrai dXXrjXcov al dperal' ov 
yap 6 ovtos evfyvioraros irpos airacras, axrre 

TTJV fl€V 17817 TTJV 8 OV7TCO €lXr]<f)CD9 l<TTaC TOVTO 

yap Kara p.ev ray (pvcriKa? aperas €v8i\€T€u y Kajff 
as fie a7rAa>s XeyeTou' dyados, ovk iv8c)(€Tai' apja 20 
yap TTji (ppovrjaet pxa ovarj ttoxtoi wrdp^ovaiv. 
SrjXov fie, tcdv ci firj irpaKTucrf rjv, ore eSei dv 



itself and his capacities for it having an believe in a future state ? 
unlimited tendency to perfection. But 10. xlysvt rkt it^%rm$ ] See the In- 

a perfection never to be developed in traduction to Book vii. 
this world. To such a perfect state, 21. fuf. •$*$] Sic Stoici quoque 

we may apply the words which Aria- omnes virtufes unam esse putaverunt, 

totle uses on another occasion : i ft quippe qui, ut Socrates, rationalem 

ru0vro( &p tin &f»t *(f/rr«t n «««' tantum in virtute partem reliquerint 

&t$t*w$r $v yk^ p &*$£**{( Utip firm Cf. Diog. Laert. vii. $• 125. w ft 

fin^trmt, &XX 9 f tu'n rt U mvr$ m^trett Xiyvfit m*r*x*\w4uf mXkn- 
v*&tX u ' *• 5* Can we suppose that . kmt, xmi rh pUt l%»fra *a*«s !^«>. 

a man holding such language did not MICH. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI. 4. 257 

aVT7)9 SlOL TO TOU /JLOpioV dp€TT)P €LVCU, KGU OTl 

ovk eorai rj 7rpoaipeai9 opOrj avev (f>povr/<r€co$ 
ovo av€V aperrjs rj fiev yap to t€Aos, rj 0€ 

TO. TTpOS TO T€\09 7TOl€l ITpaTTUV. 'AAAflt fl7}V**ft»b 

bovSe Kvpia y earl tt}$ ao<f>ias ovSe tov @€\tiopos p tfnmt. 
fioploV) cocnrep ovSe tyjs vyieia? 17 XaTpiKtf ov 
yap XPV TCU wTTli **^ ^P? omrm yevrjrai' eKeivrj? 
ovv evetca kirwaTT^ ccAA* OVK iKClVrj. €Tl OflOlOV 
KOLV €1 TIS TT)U 7TO\lTlK7}V <f)ai7] ap)(€lP T(OV d€&V, 
10 OTl emTOLTTtl 7T6/H TTaVTa TOL €V Tjj 7ToAei. 

3. n/At—ilM] Virtue— ft«w<f. 



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INTRODUCTION TO BOOK VII. 



Aristotle having discussed the Moral and Intellectual 
Virtues, now proceeds to consider those which are em- 
ployed on a particular class of pleasures, namely, such 
as are connected with those pleasures which admit of 
excess, the pleasures of Touch and Taste* He has 
not included the consideration of these in that of the 
previous Moral Habits, because some of them, such as 
axqourla and kyxQ&Teix, are not perfect Habits, and conse- 
quently the former cannot be properly considered in 
the light of perfect Vice, nor the latter in that of 
perfect Virtue. In the perfect Virtues there is a 
perfect and willing obedience of the appetitive to the 
rational part of the soul; thus the crafg«v has his 
appetite perfectly subservient to his reason, and has a 
pleasure in the very exercise of that obedience. But 
the continent man has not yet arrived at such a state, 
much less the xotpregixog. The former obeys his reason, 
but that obedience is attended with pain, which, as we 
have seen in the Second Book, p. 59. indicates that the 
Habit is imperfect. 

Further, as there is a Virtue which approaches to 
divine (r^v (nreg ypois agsT^v, ygaJixriv two, kou fe/av), and a 
Vice which approaches to brutality (0i?g*oT>)s), one above, 
the other below human nature, these could not pro- 
perly be included in the consideration of the Moral 
Habits of man as man, and are therefore reserved to 
this opportunity. 

The principal part of this Book, then, is occupied in 
considering those Habits which have for their object- 

s2 



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260 



INTRODUCTION. 



matter the pleasures of Touch and Taste, which will be 
better understood by the following Table : 



Habits employed 
of Touch 



r 

Perfect habit, or perfect 

vice. 
The xJyt and %&t in- 
curably vitiated. 



upon the Pleasures 

and Taste. 

I 



JU^fim kvXZf, 



umrArt, Imperfect habit, not perfect 
Upon a dif- vice, 

ferent object- The xiyt right, but the 
matter from i^t disobedient, and therefore 
the other. causing pain even in the pur- 
See p. 380. suitof pleasure. A continuance 
in this habit will bring it to the 
previous one, though at pre- 
sent less vicious than it. 



3. 

fuiXmtcta, 
Rather upon the giving way to 
small pains. (lXXi/V*» «•£•* 4 

« CriJU) m) kvTITUMMt SUA 

tfNimu.) A continuance in 

this habit will bring it to the 

previous one, though at present 

less vicious than it. 



Perfect habit, or perfect 

virtue. 

Pleasure attending} the 

exercise of it ; both the 

Xiyt and #j sgv right 

2. 

Imperfect habit, not perfect 

virtue. 
The Xiyt right, and the jgig* 
obedient, but feeling pain in 
that obedience. The exercise 
of this habit, is consequently 
attended with pain. A conti- 
nuance in this habit will bring it 
to the previous one, though at 
present less virtuous than it. 

3. 

Resisting or rather enduring 
pain : inferior to the one above, 
because lyx^arum conquers in 
the end. (r) fJtXf ykf MM^n^ut 
Writ U rtf £»ri£ih 4 Viyx{*~ 
rum it r!f x^arut.) A continu- 
ance in this habit will bring it to 
the previous one, though at pre- 
sent less virtuous than it 



Anon. 



The earlier chapters also are devoted to the consi- 
deration of a very important question in the theory of 
Morals; Whether he who is incontinent does act con- 
trary to knowledge, or not; or whether, as Socrates 
supposed*, there can be no such thing as Incontinence. 



*(bt +bt Xiy*t if $ux dent t*{**fmf 
•I4itm ya^ inroXM/^/ieiforrm *£«rru9 



«*«(« ri fiiknrrot, mkXet 2t iynut*. 
p. 266. 



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INTRODUCTION. 261 

The peculiarities of his views of moral philosophy, and 
his desire, the very reverse one of his age, a phenomenon 
not unusual in the history of philosophy, of exalting the 
theory of Morals to the certainty and precision of un- 
erring mathematical science, has been briefly noticed in 
the Introduction to the Third Book of this Treatise. 
The following one may be looked upon as a resumption 
of that argument, which it may be worth while briefly to 
consider. 

According to Socrates b , all men possessed a natural 
tendency towards goodness, and consequently it was the 
chief object of his philosophy to farther this tendency by 
rendering man as much like the gods as possible, that is, 
to real and pure goodness c . But God was not the type 
merely of goodness but of pure reason, and consequently 
the study of goodness and pure reason, that is to say 
of virtue and wisdom, agtrrj and <rop/a, are the same d , and 
consequently whatever is not of that character is worth- 
less. And in this consists the intimate relationship of 
the Moral and Scientific energies, both being directed 
to and ending in the same object. From this view of 
the general tendency of man's nature, he considered 
that the man who fixed upon and pursued evil was 
an involuntary or an ignorant agent : for that it was 
impossible, if he knew what was really Good, not to 
prefer that Good. And consequently he who acted 
wickedly did so from an ignorance not merely of his 
own particular, but likewise of the Universal and Su- 
preme Good, for the one is necessarily united to and 
involved in the other. It might indeed be said, as 

b See Xen. Mem. iv. 3. $. 14. See iu»$ i2mm, rb K »* ix«xirr*w, lyyv- 

the passages quoted in this treatise, rar* w hUv, m) ri pit 4u$$ *{•*«- 

p. 8 1 # 82. em , ri K lyyvr&rm rev $%U» \yyurmr* 

c «*f£r#» fi\t ft «**{} 9uvt l«*iifir« r$v »£mrter«v. Id. i. 6. $. 10. 
**Qp*m.t *mui run ewitrag. Xen. d St0*farnf—£tT itnu riXcr r} yt- 

Mem. iv. 3. $. 2. f«f»ui> r*t Aprnw. Arist. Eud.Eth.i.5. 

?«»**, Z 'AwrifSf, rhf tttm/Mfmi tfn 2) *aA rtip ittuMrwtit tuu rnt AXXttt 

lUpitf Tftxpfit »*) vkurikuat ttvat, «£#«» April* nfU* iTmu. Xen. Mem. 

tym ft 90ftt£* r> p\f pnhdt luohu iii. 9. $. 5. 

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262 INTRODUCTION. 

Aristotle intimates, p. 266, that facts were contrary to 
his assertions. But if, as some have thought % Socrates 
took a transcendental view of human nature, on the 
outside of sensible representation, his doctrine would not 
be affected by mere experience and the observation of 
facts. We must take into consideration what he con- 
sidered human agency and human choice properly, sepa- 
rating from the varied phenomena we observe in the 
conduct of men those which are his as a rational being, 
and those which he shares in common with brutes. 

But by knowledge, also, Socrates understood another 
kind than what we term knowledge. According to 
him, true knowledge, which is the same as moral 
action, is a knowledge unknown to mortals, the per- 
fect knowledge of the Good. And as, in his doctrine, 
the Scientific and the Moral are coextensive and reci* 
procal, the will must have a tendency to knowledge, for 
no one is ignorant of his own will ; and knowledge, in 
its turn, must have a tendency to Good, for no one does 
wrong with his own option. The foundation of his doc* 
trine upon this subject consists in considering the know- 
ledge of the Good, not as a knowledge simply general, 
but as a knowledge which embraces at the same time the 
general and the particular. He thought that one could 
not know the Good without knowing his own particular 
good and his own interest, in the particular moments of 
his life ; and that with this pure view of the real Good 
he could not act contrary to his interests, by the same 
reason that by the possession of it he would possess 
universal Virtue* 

e See Bitter 'a Hist, of Philosophy in the account of the Socratic School* 



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ARISTOTELIS 
ETHICA NICOMACHEA. 

LIB. VII. 
CHAP. I. 

Of Intemperance— Incontinence --Brutality. And their opposite*, 
Temperance — Continence — Heroism. The notions of mankind 
respecting them. 

MET A 8e ravra Xcktcov, oXXtjv iroirjaafidpovf of the three 
dpxrjVj on rtap rrepi ra yjOr) (pevKroov rpia tatus dered in 
eHh], koucla, aKpaaia, Or/piOTTjs. Ta 8 ipavrla 9n d their' 

_ ~ \ * \ a~ x n % \ » % \ &> opposite*. 

tots pep ovai &r)Aa to p*v yap aptrrjv to 
biyfcpdrtiav koXov/jlep' irpos fie rrfv OrjpiOrrjTa 
fiaXioT op apfWTTOt Xeyetp rrjp vnlp rjpas aperr/p, 
TjpouKrjp two. kou Oelav, axnrep Ofirjpos 7repl 
"l&KTopos ireiroirjK€ \iyovra top Hplapov on 
cr(f)68pa i)v ayaOos, " ovSe icpKet dv8po$ ye 
IoOptjtov irais eppevai aXAa Beolo" coot el, KaOd- 

7T€p (fXKTLV, i£ aP0p<&7TG)P yiPOPTOU 0€OL 8l ap€T7)f 

xnr*p(5o\riVy rouvurq n$ av ett} ftrjXop otl ij rg 

OypccoSec avriTi0€fi€PT) e£i? kou yap axnrep ov8t 

Orjpiov earl tcascia ovtf aperr/, ovtods ovSe Oeov, 

lSaAA' v) fitv Tifiuorepov aperrjs, r) 8 erepop rt 

8. *E*r#(«<] II. n. y. 258. 

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964 ARISTOTELIS 

ycro? hokums, evei dc arcana* kcu to fetor avSpa 
curat, Koffawep ot Aaron*? tubOaai wpoaayopeveur, 
otclp aycur&mri <rif>6ipa rov (jreios curqp <f>ao-iv), 

OVTW KCU 6 &T}pU*&Tp lv T<H? a*0pmOiS OTTOVUK. 

paXurra X iv tw Bapfiapoif eorlv, yivercu 5*5 
tPta kcu Sia voo-ovs kcu mjpmreis* kcu tovs Sea 
kokiov H tv>v avOpantwv \nrtpf5aXXovras ovrw 
ejrtSvoxfHjpovper. aXXa wept piv rrp rovaxrrqs 
8tai0€O'€a>? varepov ironjreov rtva fureiavj wept Se 
kokIos ttprjreu frpoTCpov' irepl $€ oKpourlas kcu \o 
paXaKias kcu rpv<f>fJ9 Ac/crcw, kcu irepl iyxpa- 
rtlas kcu tcaprepui?' ovre yap coy wept r&v 
avrcov eijewv tt} apery kcu r{j puo^Or)pla eKarepav 
The Drio- ovt&v vTroXrprr4oVj ovff <b? erepov yevos. Aet 

/mm of Oj-toairep art raw aXAa>v, nuevras ra fpcuvopuevaib 

them ought n ~ * / <t * / ^ 

to be con- kcu TTpioTOv ounroprjer auras ovrco oeucvuvcu pjaXurra 
putv iravra ra evooga wept raura ra ircufy 9 ct 
Se fir], ra wXetara kcu Kvpu&rara 9 eav yap Xvtjtcu 
re ra Svoyeprj kcu KaTaXennjrcu ra cv8o£a y 8e- 
fciypAvov av etr/ iKavcos. 20 

TboMphe- AoK€l Srj fj T€ 4yKpaT€ia KOI Kaprcpia 7W2 
nomeoa ft/ s ~ , ~ * «*>» /' 

tuted. airovoauov Kai tcdv eiraiver&v curat, rj o OKpaxria 

2. re kcu paXaKiaTcov (fravXcov re kcu ^€/nw, /cat 

6 avros iyKpanjs kcu ififieveriKO? r^> Xoyio-fjup, 

3. /cat OKpaTTjs kcu tKOTariKos rov Xoyurfiov. Kai 25 

6 filv aKparqs eiSoo? on (f>avXa wparreL Sea 

iroudosj 6 8 iyKpaTT/s elSm on (pavXac at eVt- 

4.0v/jllcu ovk OKoXovdel Sia top Xoyov. Kat rov 



9. Zeript] See chap. y. and vi. words are used to denote one and the 

U. f4»X**i«f km» r^n$] These same habit. See chap. vii. p. 287, 2. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 8. 



865 



<ra><f)pova ptv iyKparrj #eeu Kaprepucov, rov 8e 
roiovrov ol fxev iravra aaxf)pova ol If ov, kcu 5. 
rov okoXolotov dtcparr} kcu rov oucparf} okoXootov 
<rvyKexvfi€V&9, ol $ erepov? uvai <f>acnv. Toj>6. 
5&e <f)povifiov ore fiev ov (fxwcv ev8e\ea6cu elvou 
oKparij, ore 8 eviovs <ppovipx>vs ovras kcu 8eivov$ 
oucparels eivcu. En axparels Xeyovrou kcu Ov/iovi. 

KCU TI/JLTJ9 KCU K€p8oV9. TO pkv oSv XeyOflCVCL TCLVT 

earriv. 



CHAP. II. 

The Questions stated in the last Chapter briefly examined. 

3 AIIOPH2EIE 8 av tis irw wroXafi/Bdvcov 
opOcos aucpareverai res. einarapLevov fiev oSv ov 
(petal rives o\6v re eivaC Seivov yap emorripLr)s 
ivovarjs, qjs <pero ^coKparr/s, aXXo n Kparelv kcu 



6. QptIfA$t>$ — ix^arut] As Calli- 
cles in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 491. 
£. sq. 

13. Smx^Artit] Compare Mag. Mor. 
p. 57. ?MX{drnf put »Zt i rprfrvrnt 
kffctt %Xmt xa) §v» tfti &x£**i*r u*eu, 
Xiyxtf Zrt •Witt til*f ret xmxk Xvt xmxd 
urn tXar Sir i Ti Axptrtit &•»«? tfi*s 
%rt pmukd ilgn al^urtat •putt, &yifttt»t 
v*} r$v *M»ut )*« ft rit rtuvrn Xiyev 
tux eftrt iltat axfariar, evx itfSf. See 
also Xenophon's Mem. Soc. iii. 9, 4. 
Socrates thought that it was impossi- 
ble, that a man who either knew or 
thought that to abstain from vicious 
pleasures was the best, should act 
contrary to what is best, and pursue 
vicious pleasures ; but that if he did so, 



he must do it by reason of his igno- 
rance. The argument, as given in the 
Protagoras, (p. 354. sq.) may be re- 
duced to this syllogistic form. 

He who pursues vicious pleasures 

pursues pain. 
No man knowingly <\*itra(ut*) 

pursues pain. 
No man knowingly pursues vicious 

pleasures. 
To this it is replied, that the assertion 
of the minor is at variance with the 
fact, for we see many pursuing vicious 
pleasures, knowing them to be such. 
Yet nothing is stronger than Irtrrtftti, 
for nothing could ever persuade a ma- 
thematician that 2x2 makes 3. In 
order therefore to remove the diffi- 



The 3rd 
notion con- 
sidered ; 
whether the 
incontinent 
acts con- 
trary to 
knowledge ; 
which So- 
crates de- 
nied. 



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ARISTOTELIS 



mpuXtxeiP cttrrop mnrtp ar&pawoSop. Sowc/xm^ 
pip yap okas ipAyero irpbe top Aoyojy <&? owe 
ovoip aKpaurias* ovOiva yap vwaXofifiopopra Trpar- 
tup irapa to /8c Xtuttop, aXXa Si aypouur. ovtos 
fiip oiv 6 Xoyo9 afufna-fifim roiV (fxztvopAvois ivap- & 
yw, kcu ttfop {tfreiv jrepi to iraffos, d hi ayroiav, 
Tt9 o rpawos ylperai ttj? ayvoias. trn yap ovk 
olerai yc 6 axparevopjepos irpiv ep r<p iradit 
yepecrOai, (fxmpop. Ecort Se rives o\ ra pip 

toM&iSnovyxwpovai ra 8 ov* rb pip yap hrurrrj prjs 10 
cUarof&»/iW?tj/ tlvOl Kp€lTTOP bpoXoyovaiP, rb 8e fJLTjdeva 

contrary to jrparr€ip irapa rb 8o£ai> fie \t lop ov\ 6/wXo- 
S^Jwtf- yovawy kcu 8ia rovro top oKparrj <f>aaip ovk 
must follow iTrurTTjfirjp €)(OPra Kparelcrdcu wrb t£>p f)8op£>v 
position. dXXa 8o£ap. aXXa p*)P aye 86£a kcu pr/U 
€7rurrrjfir) 9 firjtf ioyypa tnroXr/^nf y aprmivowa 



Or 



culty, and to reconcile truth with this 
assertion, they said that the incontinent 
man does not act contrary to know- 
ledge, but h%*. If it be so, then this 
3«g» must be either strong or weak; 
if strong and confirmed, a man cannot 
act contrary to this any more than 
Iwrnpn, for with many Hg« is as 
strong as U*rfa. (See p. 270, 19.) 
And if it be a weak opinion, then a 
person would not be subject to great 
censure for pursuing pleasures which 
lie was not certain were vicious; 
whereas a man is condemned for in- 
continence, and therefore the incon- 
tinent does not act contrary to a weak 
opinion* 

If, then, the incontinent man does 
not act contrary to Wtrrtpn, nor 1%*, 
strong or weak, does he act contrary 
to his tyfrffw 1 This supposition is 
still more absurd than the others, for 



it supposes that the same person may 
at once be «xg«rfc and fyiwptf, which 
is impossible. For even the Xyn^mvnt, 
inasmuch as he has strong and violent 
desires, has not yet attained to the per- 
fect I&f of 9*$f€\rm, and therefore 
does not, like the ^infitt. possess #w- 
fprvfn ; and in this not only does the 
temperate man differ from the conti- 
nent, but it is also clear that the in- 
continent cannot be fpvjptf. See 
p. 230, 9. 

1. «-i(iiX*u>] See note p. 275, 12. 

7. «v* oltrtu] For it is evident that 
before he is within the influence of 
temptation, he thinks he ought not to 
give way. It is strange that this simple 
and common expression should have 
been so much misunderstood. See p. 
270, 19. Michelet translates the words, 
" Non opinione distrahitur /'he does 
not think, he is not distracted in opinion* 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. «. «67 

oAA* r/pepala, KaOdirep ev T0I9 8iard(ftvcri> <rvy m 
yp&fir) r<p jjlt} p.eveiv ev avrcus irpos eiriBvplas 
ioyypds* ry 8e pjoy6i)pl(f, ov avyyv(opnj 9 ovde 
t&v aXAcov ovSevl r&v yj/eKTobi/. Q>povqcrea>s Or, (which 

v » / . « \ » > ,, is the 6th 

bapa avriTUvovtrqs avrrj yap layvporarov. aAA notion,) 

v . v n e » x tf . / x contrary to 

cltottov earou yap o avros apa (ppovipuos Kai^mns. 

» ' JL ' *> »tf * * Jl ' ' x Which in- 

0UCpaT7)9 9 <p7)(T€t€ O OVO av CIS (ppOVlfJLOV €UHU TO volves a 
/ « / \ , x / n *\ / still greater 

Trparreiv etcovra ra (pavAorara. irpos oe roimw absurdity. 
SeSeuctcu irporepov art irpaKTiKos ye 6 (f)p6ut/xo9 m 
10 7W ya/> kayara>v ns kou to® aXAar €X<w aperas. 
"Etc el puev ev ry eiriBvpias €X €tp loyypas kol The fourth 

#/ n «j / » y «/j » * motion, 

(pavAas o eyKpart]?, ovk earat o (raxppoDV eyKparrp Whether 

» *,* ( » \ /# . v n nv temperance 

01/0 o eyKparrjs <ra><ppa>v ovre yap to ayav and conti- 

/ j v n » /v v * xx \ n » ^nenceare 

aaxppovos ovre to (pavXas *X €lu * CL ^ a M v ° €L the same. 
15 ye* el p.ev yap yprjorai ai eiri6vpiax 9 <j>avXr) rj 
KtoKvovaa e£i9 pr/ aKoXov0eiv 9 waff tf ey/cpaTeta 
ov iraaa oirovSaia' el 8 aadevei? kou, fir] (f>avXcu 9 
ovdev <repvdv 9 oil? el (f>avXai koi a&devei$ 9 ovdlv 
fieya. "Era el irdar) So^rf eppeveTtKov irotel 17 The second 

» / a '\ * » > ~ I fc ~. n» notion, 

*20eyicpaT€ia 9 (pavXrjj oiov ei Kai ttj yevoec icat ei Whether 

/ a//- e > / » / v theconti- 

Trcurr}$ oogr/9 rj oKpaava eKoraTiKOv, ecrrou rwnentafcw. 
<nrov8aia axpaaia^ oiov 6 ^ZoQoicXeovs Nco7rro- abides by 

, « - N / . 3 \ \ 1 his resolu- 

Xep,o? ev Tcp <PiXoKTr)rr) eiraweTos yap ouiction, and 
efifieiHOP 01$ eirelaOrj viro tov 08v<ro m eG>s 8ta ronentthe 
ttXirirei<r0ou tyev86p.evo9. en 6 o-oQiotikos Xoyos 



14. ht y$] The continent man must sophistical syllogism called roentiens oe- 

have strong and bad desires; for if they cations a difficulty. Est autem ^sift- 

be bad and not strong, there is no (ung t sermo, cui quicquid respondeat, 

merit in resisting them ; and if they falsum reperietur. Habuit nomen a 

were strong and not bad, it would be menliente, quoniam exempli causa 

vicious to resist them. sumitur is qui mentitur. Hoc modo : 

25. r«f t*rs*lf Xvy*s \]/tulipt»*t] The an mentitur is qui mentiri se dicit? 

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ARISTOTELIS 



\jf€v86fJL€vos dwopia' Sia yap to TrapdSo^a /8oi/- 
XecrOcu eXey^cp, tpa Seipot axriv orav hriTvyaKriv, 
6 yevofievos <rvX\oyicrp6s drropia ylpercu* SeStrcu 
yap 7f Stavoia, orav pepcip p\p pit) /BovXrjrcu 8ta 
to pur/ dpecKetp to arvpm*pavQ4v> irpoUvai Se prfb 
Svptjtcu 8id to Xv<rai prf e\eip top Xoyop. <rvp- 
(Haivet $ ?k tipos Xoyov r) d(/>poovprj perd dtcpa- 
arlas dperff Tavavrla yap irpaTTti g>p inroXapfidvei 
8td ttjp oKpao-lap, inroXapfidvtL 8e rdyaOa kokgl 
elvat kolL ov Selv irpdrrcip, ©ot€ TayouBa kol ovio 

En 6 Tip TreirtiaOat irparrap 
lw&at tht Ka * dwKap tcl rjSea kou irpoaipovpepo? fieXTUjop 
inixmiTH ^ av 86£ei€P tov prj 8 id Xoyiapuop dXXa Si djcpaaiap* 
the 6 *!! 1 " cvutTOTepos yap Sid to peraircicrOrjpai dp. 6 8 



£r d i7 h wiil ™ *«*" "P<%« 



*t* 



Cui si respondeat mentiri, colligitur 
statim non mentiri, quod vera dixerit 
se mentiri. Menag. in Diog. Laert. ii. 
$. 108. See Cicero's Acad. ii. 29. 
The author of this fallacy, which occa- 
sioned much controversy, and upon 
which Theophrastus is said to have 
written three books (Diog. L. v. 49.), 
and Chrysippus twelve (Diog. L. vii. 
196), was Eubalides of Miletus, one 
of the Megaric school, who was also 
the inventor of several other captious 
questions of the same kind. See Ferd. 
Deycks de Megaricorum doctrina 
Bonne. 1827. p. 52. Hottroger ad 
Cic. de Divinat. ii. 4. p. 174. sq. 
Diog. Laert. ii. 108. 

'Aflrtgj*, entangles us in a toil from 
which we have no means of escaping, 
can neither advance nor recede : 3fti- 
rm h Mittm rp'i'tMU ft ph ivrrtrw. 
corresponding to the words of Cicero, 
" inexplicabilia esse dicitis." Acad, 
ii. 29. 



To explain then the argument. 
Aristotle is proving that continence 
cannot be the absolute adhering to any 
and every opinion. For the person 
who grants the premises in this sophis- 
tical syllogism, thinks that he grants 
what is true ; but when the conclusion 
is drawn, he finds them to be raise : if- 
then he obstinately abides by his former 
opinion, he is guilty of a vice in so 
doing, and he is a more consistent and 
honest man who will change his former 
concessions and opinion. But by so 
doing he incurs the charge of inconti- 
nence, if continence be an absolute 
abiding to an opinion once formed, and 
his incontinence in forsaking a conclu- 
sion which he knows to be false, occa- 
sioned by a folly in granting the pre- 
mises, is a virtue ; that is, two vices 
constitute a virtue, which is absurd. 

14. iusarUtpf] Hanc de incon- 
tinentia doctrinam, a sua mente plane 
abhorrentem, e Platonis Hippia de- 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 8. 



369 



oKparr)? evo\os ry irapocfiia ev r/ (fxifiev " orav 
to vScop irviyrj, ri 8el eirnrlveiv ;" el p,ev yap 
fir) hrejreiaro a Trparrei^ fieraireia-Oeh av eirav- 
xraro* vvv 8e ireireurnevos ovSev ffrrov aXka 
&7rpaTT€i. Etx el irepl iravra aKpaurla earl 

kolL eyKpareia, rU 6 olttXw OKpaTT/s ; ovdeis yap 
mraxras e\ei tcl$ a/cpao-la?, (frapep & elvai rivas 
airXco?. 

CHAP. III. 

In what way, and against what knowledge, the Incontinent acts. 



Seventh 
notion, 
Whether 
inconti- 
nence and 
continence 
are on 
every ob- 
ject-matter. 



4 AI fiev odv car op iou roiavrai rives avfifialvov- Three quei- 
10 atVy rovrcov 8e ra fiev avekelv Set ra 8e /cara-^JT*' 



duxisse videtur Aristoteles; atque ita 
ipsnm videas docentem in Metaph. iv. 
29. CARDWELL. 

Although this opinion, that the 
i.*i\m*TH is more easily curable than 
the «»g«rfc is not here directly refuted, 
yet it is so, in the further discussion of 
the subject. 

The k*to*Ltwt is one who has lost 
the faculty of distinguishing right from 
wrong, the light that is in him has 
become darkness ; and he has lost all 
feeling, all perception of goodness, 
(p. 285, 15.) consequently he is in- 
curable. Whereas the kx^arns has 
not yet arrived at this deplorable state, 
and is therefore curable, (p. 288, 12.) 
The supposition that if you could dis- 
suade the 3ut{%M*r§s from his vicious 
course, he would more readily reform 
than the incontinent, may be true if 
you grant the hypothesis; but then 
it is true that he cannot be dissuaded. 
And this is a fearful warning when it 
is remembered, that equally as the 
lyx{*rris may become **$&»> so may 



the &x(a<ni§ become AtuXmms, each 
by continuance in their several courses. 
This question is fully discussed in 
Chap. viii. 

2. ri iffiff{] This passage is gene- 
rally translated thus. " If water choke 
a man, why should he drink more ?" 
The application of which to this argu- 
ment is not very clear, nor does Uv- 
wirur, as I conceive, warrant such 
an interpretation: i«v«7fm means to 
•• drink next," or "to drink after- 
wards." " If water chokes a man, 
what is he to drink then V* or as we 
should say, " If water chokes a man, 
what is he to drink?" He has the 
simplest beverage, and yet chokes at 
h; you can do no more; his case is 
hopeless. Just so the incontinent 
man. He knows what vice is, he 
knows he is doing wrong ; he has all 
the advantages he possibly can have 
for obtaining virtue, and yet does not ; 
what more can you do for him ? what 
is to be done? you cannot improve 
his state ; his case is hopeless. 



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270 - ARISTOTELIS 

Two as to XtTTtZv* 7) yap \v<Tl$ TTfS OLTTOpLaS €Vp€(JL$ €OTlP. 
the know- * * 9 ' ' » «» / * v 

ledge, and TTp&TOP fl€P OVP <T#COT«OV 7TOT€pOP €100T& 7) OU 9 
the third as v ~ , * / 9 \ *» \ » ~ \ 

totheob- KOX 7TW €l0OT€S, €ITCL TTZpl 1TOUL TOP OKpOTTf KCU 
ject-matter, > f ~ A , N / ft \ / \ ~ 

ofconti- top eyKparq 0€T€ov 9 Acy© 0€ irorepop 7T€pi Traxrav 

nence and t * \ \ v / a / » # /■ 

mconU- rjooprjp kcu Avirqp rj irepi tlpos a<f>(Dpurfi6vas,b 
nence* %n> ~ \ n // < 

/cat rov eyKparq teat top KaprtptKov, irorepov o 
avros rj erepos iamv* bpjolxas 8* teal irepl t&p 
aXXcop oaa ovyyeprj ttjs Oecopla? earl Town}?, 
tcm 8 OLpXV TV* 07cei/f€G>£, woTtpop 6 kyKpart)? 
kolL 6 oKpaTqs eicrc r£ irep\ a r) tco irm exppreylO 
Ti)v 8iaif>opdp 9 \eya> 8c iroTepop t$ zrepl to81 
€lpou fwpop atcpaTTjs 6 aKparr)$, rj ov dXXa tco 
cop, 17 ov aAA €£ aftfpoip eiretT ei irepi ttclpt 
iartP rj ajepaxria kolL rj iyKpareta rj ov' ovre yap 
7T€pl irdpr iorlp 6 anrX&s aKparqs, dXXa irepllb 
Strep 6 aicokaoTOSy ovre r^ irpos ravra a,7r\cb$ 
eX* iP (ravTOP yap ap rjp rrj oucoXacrla), aXXa 
t§ g)8\ e\€ip. 6 fiep yap ayerai irpoaipovfxevos, 
vofjiifap auei Setp to irapop y8v Suokclp' 6 8 
Theincon- ovk oterai fl€P, 8lcok€l 8e. He pi alp oftp ro05 

tinentdoes x N , , ? , h 

not act oogap aXrjurj aAAa fir/ eirLOTrfpLrfP ewai Trap rjp 

contrary to, , i^ * i/ ^ ^ x ' . 

mereopi- axpaT€V0PTaL 9 ovq€p ouKpepet irpos top Aoyop 

knowledge. €P101 yap T&P 8oija{ftPTG)P, OV 8l(TTa(/)VO'lP, aAA* 

oloPTOi aicptficDS tiSepat. el odp 8ia to -qptfia 



2. r{£r«» ^*i» •«»] The six ques- II. Upon what pleasures the Ra- 
tions proposed in the above Chapters rns is employed, 
are here reduced to the three, the III. Whether it differs from the 
consideration of which will embrace other habits, of a similar nature, and 
the whole subject. from £«{«*/« in its object-matter, or 

I. Whether the. i*(m*kt acts con- the manner in which it is employed 

trary to knowledge or not, and if con- upon that matter, or in both, «>$ «^J 

trary to knowledge, what kind of know- », ft rf *£t, % l| ^«r». Upon this 

ledge that is. chapter sat De Animal. Mot. c. vii. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 3. 



871 



7nOT€U€lV Ol 8o£d{fiPT€9 flSXKoV T&P €7riOTOfl€VG>V 

irapa Tr/v urroXrpfnu 7rpa£ovcriv, ovOev Stoiaet 
eiriarTffiri 8o£rj$' Zvioi yap tnarevovcnv ovSev 
%ttop oh So^d^ovciv tf erepoc 019 eirloTavTaC 
b&rikoi 8 'HpcwcAceroy. 'AAA* eirei Siyw Ac"- in what 

yofiev to einaTaxrOau \k<u yap o €\&v p&v ov eou ^y to 
XpcofM€PO? 8e rjj €7noTrj/i,ri kou 6 ypwp*vo$ Aeyereui. Bypos- 
€7riaTa<r0cu) 9 Sioiprti to e\ovra fiev p,rj Oecopovvra science, and 
0€ a pjf Set wpaTTtiv rov €\ovra kcli vtiopovwra* 
10 tovto yap 8ok€i Seivov, aAA' ovk ei fir/ Oecopcov. 

"ETC €7T£t 8vO TpOTTOL TtOV 7rpOTd<T€G>V, t\OPTa ft€V 2. By the 



5. 'H£4»Aur«] This is another 
instance in which the Mag. Moral, is 
inconsistent with Aristotle, and fur- 
nishes an additional presumption that 
it was written some considerable time 
after the period of this treatise. See 
Mag. Mor. ii, 6. 

— AXX* \**) 1*%*$] A man who 
acts* contrary to knowledge must act 
contrary either to \*i*<rnp>n or Mg«. 
(See Plato's Repub. V. sub fin.) He 
does not act contrary to 3«£«, (see 
p. 266, 9. and p. 270.) therefore he 
must act contrary to Wtgvnpn. 

If then he acts contrary to irtrrnpn, 
in what way is it, and what kind of 
hrtrrnpn 1 

9. 7;g0fr* ««) hvpvtr*] Having 
knowledge, and not wing it. 

10. 2««i7 fa***] " For this appear* a 
strange thing, if we suppose a man pos- 
sessing science and using it acts con- 
trary to its dictates, but not if we 
suppose a man possessing science and not 
using it." 

11. 1v* rg««w] Of the two premises 
one is universal the other particular ; if 
therefore a man knows the universal 



he must either actually or virtually 
know the particular, since that is in- 
cluded in the universal. Now it is 
possible for a man having both these 
premises to err. In the first place 
then he may know the universal 
actually, and only the particular vir- 
tually, and as the particular is that 
upon which the entire action turns, 
he consequently falls into error when 
he comes to act Thus if a person 
knows the universal premise, " All 
hellebore is deadly," but is ignorant of 
the particular, that this or that par- 
ticular herb is hellebore, he may very 
easily fall into error : and this is the 
to xafieXov \*) rtS Trypans. But if 
the universal depend upon himself (t« 
zedikiu \tf \a»rtv), then of necessity 
he must actually know the particular. 
For instance, if he knows that " all 
dry food is good for man," he cannot 
help knowing the particular proposi- 
tion, " I am a man*" therefore it is 
good for me. 

Aristotle has illustrated his argu- 
ment by two syllogisms on the same 
subject. 



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J72 ARISTOTELIS 

actusl if no- OfJUJ>Or€paS OU0€J> *G>Au€i TTpOTTttP impa T7JP CITl- 
the minor. OTTjfXr)P> yjH&pjtPOP fUPTOt Tfj KoBokoV aAAflt flTf 

Ty Kara fUpoe' irpcucra yap ra Kaff eKacrra. 

8iCUJ>€p€l Sc KCU TO KoBokoV TO fl€P yap €<f) 

cavrov to $ eni tov it pay pans iarip" olop ori& 
iroarn av0pam<p ovpxf>ep€t to. (pjpa, kcu otl ovtos 
apOpanroe, rj otl fzqpov to TOtovSe* aAX' ei ToSe 
Toiovde, tf ovk €X€£ i) ovk ipcpyel. tcard re 8tj 

TOVTOV9 blOUrtl TOV9 T/MWTOW *p.T)yaVOV OCOPj GHJT€ 
8oK€tP OVTCD fUP A84pCU fl1J0€P CLTOTTOP, oXXc»9 $€ 10 
3. In pot- OaVfJUXOTOP. "Et* TO ^ip tt/p kinxrrqp^p 

•^f^^aXAoy TpoTTOP tS>p pvp pq06PT(*>p wrapxei T019 

violent de- $£ SuxXpepOVaaP opcbfiep TT)P t^LVj <OOT€ KOI €\€IV 

7T<D9 KCU /Iff €X €LP > °^° V T ° v KO0€v8oPTa KCU fJUUPO- 15 

p&vop kou olpoofiepop. dXXa firjp ovtco SiaTiOeprcu 
ol 4p Toh wadeo-ip opt€? 6vfio\ yap kou eiridv- 
fiicu d(f>po8caia)p /ecu €Pia tS>p toiovtcdv €7n87jX(09 
kou to acofia fieOiorao-iv, evlois 8e Kal pjavlas 
TTOLOvaiv. SrjXop ovv otl 6/xotW *X €LV Acicreoy 20 

The 6ist is the v» \tf \mvr»v. sc. unintentionally omits to use it, being 

All dry food is good for man ; carried away from himself and over- 

I am a man, &c. come by some masterless passion. 

Where we can scarcely go wrong. These produce the same effect upon 

The second, ri W) rtv *£*yft*rit t sc. the mind as violent commotions on the 

All dry food is good for man j body. For as a man in great agony 

This is dry food, &c. fixes his eyes upon various objects yet 

In which it is not strange that a man sees none of them, so great affections 

should go wrong. See Metaph. i. 1. of the body may operate on the men- 

p. 2. tal vision, producing the same effect 

11. Irs *l 1%ui) Though not appa- Though the visual faculty remains, its 

rently, this argument is really distinct energies are rendered ineffectual. He 

from the first. In the first instance the undergoes a change as from waking to 

man has knowledge, but purposely omits sleeping; his habits remain, but their 

to use it ; in this he has knowledge, but energies are locked up. 

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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. S. 



878 



row dtxparcis tovtoi?. to $€ Xeyciv tovs \6yov? 
row airo T7]9 eirioT7Jnr)f ovSev crqiidov* /ecu yap 
oi iv T0I9 7rd0€at rovtOL? owes awoSelljeis kou 
emj Xcyovaip 'E/tfreSoieAc'oi;* 1 , kou oi irp&rov par 
bOovrts ovveipovai fiev row \6yovs, iaaa-i & 
ov7ra>' Set yap avfMpvvou, rovrtf 8e \povov Set' 
wore Ka0a7T€p rovs inroKptvofievovs, ovt<o$ wro- 

Xr/7TT€OP \4y€lV KOU T0V9 aKpaT€VO/JL€VOVS. "Ert 4. By desire 



* * ft *l ~ v » /jx /j \ > t perverting 

Kat a>oe <pvo-ucm av ris empAeYeu rqv our tap. the proper 
10 f) fiev yap koBoXov $6£a, 7) $ kripa w€pl rcSvoFthe^SSor 

rt # / t t v a v» t tothemajor. 

Kaff eKGurra earn/, ow aurOrjais rj&q Kvpla' 



8. In »u) Sli) Aristotle proceeds to 
show in a fourth way how the incon- 
tinent may be said to act contrary to 
knowledge. In all actions a syllo- 
gistic process first takes place in the 
mind, however sudden and impercep- 
tible. The principle upon which we 
act is the major premiss or the uni- 
versal, the particular application of it 
forms the minor (3 nXturaU T^rewf), 
the last proposition, the final step in 
the process, before we proceed to act. 
This particular proposition, in all ac- 
tive syllogisms, is a judgment exercised 
upon some particular object of sense, 
and the chief cause of action, for with- 
out it no action would take place at 
all. But there is not the same need 
of the major and universal, for we 
can act, though not rationally without 
it, as brutes who have no knowledge 
of the universal, but only of the parti- 
cular, of which they retain a certain 
f*rr**ia and memory. As the mon- 
key who has burnt its mouth by drink- 
ing brandy remembers again when it 
sees brandy that it has so burnt its 
mouth, though it forms no universal 
-conclusion, has no knowledge of the 
principle, that all brandy burns. 



To examine then how the incon- 
tinent man acts in this particular case 
contrary to knowledge. Let us sup- 
pose, then, that he is aware of this 
universal principle, that no tweet thing 
ought to be tatted, and also of another, 
that every meet thing is pleasant, to 
whichever of these the particular pre- 
miss, this is a sweet thing, be applied, 
it will produce a different course of 
action. But desire or appetite shutting 
his eyes to the former, applies the par- 
ticular only to the second of the two, 
so that he is led away by his know- 
ledge of the universal, in a certain 
sense, and by this particular: and 
thus acts both knowingly and contrary 
to knowledge. 

9. twtxZt] Hoc loco physice Pla- 
tonis sententiam refutat. Physice in- 
quam : nam animum hominis hoc loco 
pertractat penitus, ej usque partes, ratio 
et cupiditas, quemadmodum in impo- 
tente confligant luculenter osteridit. 
Sic accipiendum puto verbum <pvrnt*{, 
quae confirmat verbum infra in fin. 
cap. t»p fMksyt, quicquid dicant 
alii. G1PH. 

11. »t *l*4n*tf~\ Compare Metaph. 
p. 3. %rt ft r£t airjfoiuv ov$tfti*v 



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574 AHISTOTELIS 

or** 8c ftJa yimjrtu c£ airmp, avay$nj to avp.- 
wcpavOcv cvOa yukv ifxzpai tt^v tyyfiVj cV 8c rats 
TroiijTUCcuf wparrcur cvOvs* otov y cl tcovtos yXwccot 
ycvco&ai 8ci, tovtI 8c yXvtw op cv rt reSv ko0 
CKcurrWy ovary**} top 8vvapucvov kcu /it) jcwAuo-5 

fUPOP OfMU TOVTO KCU TTpOTTClV. OTOV o8v 7) /ICP 

koBoXov try nooXvovara ycvcaOai, 77 8c, oti irav 
to yXuKv rfiv, tovti 8c yXvKV (curnj 8c cvcpyct), 
tvxB & arUhfiia cvowra, 77 /jlcp Xcyci <j>cvyciv 
tovto, -q $ €7ri0vfjua SycC KivcTv yap ckootop 10 
Bvvarai tS>v popLanr' wjtc ovpfiaivci inro Xoyov 
WW kcu Soijrp oKparcvcaOcu, ovk cvavrias 8\ 
Kaff avrrjVj aXXa koto, (rvfifiefirjKO?. tj yap hrir 
Ovfiia cpairta, aXX ov\ 17 8o£a, rtp 6p0<p Xoytf 

QKTTC KCU SiOL TOVTO Ta 07/pia OVK OKpaTTj, OTI 15 

ovk e)(€t t&v koBoXov vrroXrityiVy aXXa tg>v koJS 
Bat how ficaara (bavraaiav kcu /jwrjur/y* IIa>9 8c Xvctcu 

WIS hap* 

pens is the rj ayvoia kcu iraXiv yivcTOi ciriorrjfJUDV 6 aKparrj?, 



yi utn mSrmt *m§ n m tinm wrm yi m*ut % n m rm m ymfrms rev y*S*n ytienthu 

AkX' *if Xiyvtt rh Im rt «i{) «tttv£. r«3f rmt yXjmif, tovt** x^f 9 **■** 

«X» )m ri St^it ri r*( iXXm pAnm Zrt Imrrim « )•£» 4 f**?** *m) n nmih*: 

0ffth. See also of this treatise, p. ^ \***pim irrtv 4 rwws rmShw 

222.1. \m$rim. Schol. 

11. M }Jyw r«v] i7*i » ri *St 17. xbvm 4 Aynmt] Aristotle does 

7mi hfyf, Ut •»» kfti**t k*t*r%v%rm not pretend to inquire, how it is that 

M rtS Xiytu r*u mmiix*9 xmi rw this ignorance is dispersed and the 

ptftnt Wtyu, &XXm hk jA*m *** l*i- man regains knowledge, which is 

t&fu*f 4 Ifmtri* 99*u rev W£sv rev rather an enquiry lor the physiologist 

nmiJk§¥ mm) rev psg*««v. •*» Imivtm than the moral philosopher. Yet that 

U lm xmi *M n Mg« n ?*?*** n such is the fact a clear from the fol- 

iAyitfu, It/ rdi yXoxi Un, rjf kiyf lowing instance* For as the musician 

rf mmidXtu rtf xiypvi, «v)t»«f yXvuief so long as the vapors of wine affect 

k*»y%\i%9ttu tu. Wutt yk^ ItmfrUrnrm hiB brain is unable to exercise his art, 

fcw i ysmrat ti i*mtri* xmru tup. but after the dispersion of them ener- 

0i0**#f. Mr* y*{ tvpfr&n** rj Wt- gizes according to it \ so is it with the 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 3. 



*75 



6 auro? \6yo$ kcu vepl oiixofievov KCU KOL0€v8oVTO9 enquiry of 

KCU OVK iSlOS TOVTOV TOV TTClOoV?, $>V 5ci impk science. 

T&V (bvaiokoytOV OLKOV€tV. 'EtT€1 8* rj TcAcUTa/aThesum of 

/ ft/> »/i~n / ~ / tQ e whole: 

irporcuns oofa re axaur^rov kcu Kvpia t<ov 7Tpa-andhow 

S&CDV, TaVTTJP tj OVK €\€l 6 kv T<p 7Ta0€l ©Z/, ^interpret 

* v e. , , n v , , 4 , N the opinion 

OUTO? €X«t G)9 Ol/#C l)z/ TO €Y6tJ> emOTOXrQai aAAa of Socrates 
w * « • / x •» * x / v onthissub- 

Acyetv axrn-ep o otpoopevo? to, bjfi7redoKA€ov? y icatject 
Sia to fMT) koBoXov firjS eirurrqiiovucov ofioloo? 
elvai 8ok€li/ rip koOoXov top Zaxarov opov. KCU 
10 €<UK6Z/ b i{j/T€i IZxoKparri? avfifiatveiv' ov yap 
ttj9 Kvplco? erriarTr)p.ri$ that 8okov<tt]? Trapovorj? 
yiverai to ird0os, ovd' avrrj TrepteXKeTai 8ia to 
7ra0o$, aAAa tt}? cuc0r]TiK7}9. irepl pkv o$v tov 



incontinent man. He knows that 
adultery is a Wee, but being overcome 
by violent desires, his intellect is 
stupified, and he loses the use of his 
knowledge for the time, and does not 
regain it until his desires have sub- 
sided. But since the particular pro- 
position (4 vtXufrmU rg/r«*ff) is a 
knowledge of the object of sense, or 
of the individual (in the Logical use 
of the word), and this is the fyx* of 
actions, and is not scientific, (for in- 
dividuals are not the subjects of 
science,) it is not surprising that the 
incontinent person should transgress by 
wanting or misusing the knowledge 
of the minor. For since science is 
of universal*, and not of particulars, 
whereas actions turn upon particulars 
and not uoiversals, the kx^arht does 
not act contrary to knowledge, pro- 
perly so called. And in this sense 
Socrates was correct in saying, that a 
man cannot act contrary to \r**<rhftW> 
And when he acts contrary to ln- 
sr^ctii, it is not Imrr^tif in the cor- 



rect but the vulgar use of the term ; 
namely, the knowledge of the parti* 
cular, or that which has sensible 
things for its object. 

9# «•)> 7#x«r«f fyf] The particular 
proposition: * rtXtvrmU *£$rmetf. 

10, S»*t*vns ] See Introd.p.261 . and 
Plato's Protagoras, p. 352. B. sq. and 
the whole argument, which deserves 
to be well considered. 

1 1, riff «vg/»f Ixurrnfim] Here Aris- 
totle briefly sums up the argument. 
If Plato meant to say that the ixptrns 
cannot act contrary to knowledge, ac- 
tually energising, then he is correct. 
And so also, when he says that the 
&*{arhf cannot act contrary to know- 
ledge, properly so called. But he may 
act contrary to knowledge, not actually 
energising, and contrary to iTiernpn 
on' practical subjects. 

12, x't^iiXxittu] art%vZ( Iwoovftiw 
<ri{) rnt \*t*rnum. &**n *q} «»${«- 

kr&trtn. Plato's Protag. ib. 



T2 



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976 ARISTOTELIS 

€i96ra kcu ftq, kcu ims €i86ra eVA^cro* aKpa- 
T€VHrOati Toaavra eipqafo. 



CHAP. IV. 

That the proper object-matter of Intemperance and Incontinence are 
the pleasures of Touch and Taste. 

The second ITOTEPON 8 iari Tt9 CLTcX&S OKpaTTjS 7)6 

considered. 7TaPT€9 KOTO. fl*p09) KOU €1 €OTl 9 1T€pl TTOid €<7T£, 
3. \€KT€OV tfaiJTJS- OTl fUP 0$P 7T€pl 7)8bPOS KOU 6 

Xwra? eicriv oT r eyKparei? kcu Kaprepucol kcu 
ol oKparels kcu fiaXoKol, (fxipepop. hrel 5* carl 
tol pip avayKoua rS>v iroiovvrwv rjSoprjp, ra 8 
oupera pep Kcuff aura e\opra 8 vir€pf$oXr)v> av- 
ayxoua pep ra crcopariKd. Xeya> 8e ra roiavra, ra io 
re irep\ ttjv rpotfyqp kcu ttjp t£>v a(f>po8i(ruov 
Xpciav, kcu ra roiavra tg>p aapartK&p irepl a 
ttjp aKoXaeriav eOepjep kcu ttjp craxf>pooijprjp. 
ra 8 avayKoua pep ov, oupera 8e koJ? avrd. 
Xeyco 8 dlop piktjp, ripr)p, ttXovtop, kcu ra roiavrai5 

Those who TG>P ayouB&P KOU Tj8e(OP. TOW fl€V odp 7Tp09 TaVTO, 

sive in other ?ra/)a TOP 6p0oP XoyOP V7T€pfiaXXoPTa9 TOP €P 
than these , „ r „ y , , , 

corporeal CLVT0L9 OLTTXcdS ptP OV XeyOflCP OLKpOLTtLSy TTpOOTlr 
pleasures, , *\ \ / » n / * \ 

are called V€PT€$ 0€ TO yjyt]pXLT(OP a,KpaT€L$ KCU KepOOVS KOU 

only from Tl/ATJS KOU OvfXOV, OLTtX&S 8 OV, G>9 6T€pOV9 KOU 20 

Kaff ofioiorr/ra Xeyopepov^ (ooirep avOpcxmos 6 
ra 'OXvptna pepiKrjKa? eKelpco yap 6 koipo? Xoyo? 

22. i mum *h°t] The common de- is distinguished from the common noun 
finition, or common noun, man. As man by the addition of this epithet, so 
the* man who conquered at Olympia he who is incontinent on any other 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 4. «77 

TOV iStOV fUKpip &U(j)€p€Vy aXX* Oflto? €T€p09 J/V. 

oTffjLeiov Se' x] pkp yap ajcpacrla tyiyenu ov\ 
a>9 afiapria yjovov dXXa kcu w9 kokLcl rif, rj 
a7rAw oica rj Kara n ficpo?, rovroop 8 ovOeis. 
6Ta>i/ 5c irepl ray acopariKas afiroXavaetSj ircpl ay That the in. 

x / \ / , n » / x c \ ~ continent it 

Xeyofiev rop crocxppova kcu okoXootoPj o firj ryhewhopur- 
irpoaiptlaOai rcbp re rjSecop Suokcop ray trrrepfioXas ct* of 

/Cat T&V XvTTTfp&P <j)€VyCOV, TTtLVrjS teal SlyfrrjS KOI but not from 
, x z \ i ' v ' ~ v«.i* principle. 

aAta? icat yv\ov9 kol iravr&v roup irepi apTJj/Theintem- 

_^.\~ »xx * * * ' n * perate from 

10 /cat ycuo-tv, aAAa 7ra/>a r^v irpoaiptcriv kcu njp principle. 
Stdvoiap, cucparrjy Xeyerou, ov Kara 7rpocr0€crip 9 
on 7repl raSe, KaBairep opyrjs, aXX* airXcbs /xopop. 
<rr)p.eZov 8e* kcu yap okoXclotoi Xeyoprou irepi 
raura?, rrep\ ckhpodp S ovSe/xiav. kcu 8ia rovr 

15 ci? ravrop rop aKparrj kcu rop olkoXootop rldefiep 
kcu iyKparrj kcu crco<f)popa, aXX' ovk . €K€ipg>p 
ovSeva, Sea ro irepl ras cwrds 7ra>y rjSova? kgu 
Xvwas eipcu oi o euri /iep irepi ravra, aXX 



pleasure is distinguished from the gene- contribute much more than this, if it 

ral term incontinent, by the addition of can be said to contribute at all, to the 

the particular thing in which he is in- intellectual capacities of man. See 

continent. See p. 279. 12. Aristot de Anima iii. 12. §. 6. de 

9. *i{} k$h xa) yi!w»] These ha- Sensu cap. i. g*fpns nai kx*, xm) 

bits are conversant with the pleasures tyn *•** /A* *"t t%«m, furt^'ms 

of touch more than the pleasures of tnxa hr£tx«v*t9, %*»t 1*****1 r% «•{•- 

taste, properly so called, as far -as taste nt*4*iifAit» t*» rpffo xm) rk <potv\* 

is concerned in the distinguishing of »«) ri <pjet(nuk Qtvyw «■«> R »*1 

flavours. (See iii. 7.) And the fact Qptfotmt ruyx&nvrt, r»u %Z Inxa, 

that intemperance is thus engaged r»X.Xa$ yk^ tUxyyikXevrs itaf^kf i% 

with the pleasures of that sense which J» n « «■*» ntirSf lyyiurttt Qpmftt ' 

is the most common of all others in *«) A «■•»» v^axrSf. etxtr** % rturtt 

man, with brutes, is the reason why *■£$ fih rk kwyxalot xpirrvf A ty« 

this vice is of all others the most brutal xx) xeJ *Mf, *(ig & nv* *«« xura 

and degrading. The touch, like the rvpfalitixh h xxot. 
rest of the senses, is given to man and 13. Axo\ec*ru] paXaw. CardweU 

animals for self-preservation ; but they and Bekker. 



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118 ABISTOTKLIS 

ovg uWwjrar curiV, aAA* oi /icy wpo&upovprai 
oi 8 av wpoaipourruL. &o paXXop cucoAooroy 
«* caroip£P f ooTi? p*} hnBvpmp if '-qpipa Saoxei 
ras inrtpfiaXas scau <f>€vyei uerpims \vmxs y y tov- 
tqp ootis &* to enffvp&p <rtf>6$pa' ri yap curb 
€*€t*or Totrprcttp, €i wpoaycpocro htiBvpla peapuaj 
kcu W€pl tw tAp apceyKoimp ipfkias Xvmj io~xvpa; 
2****° *Ejr€i & tw ewiffvfuwr kcu t£p rfiop&p ax pip 



••J*"* 1 * «<ri t? ycW kclX&p kcu ottovScu&p' (raw yap 

which are rfiifOV €VUX OtttTCi CUpCTOy TO 5* €POPTia TOVTWP,10 
cither natav 

rally good ra & fUTOgV, KoffcOTCp <ktl\op£P ITpOTtpOP, OIQP 

ofiodiffer- / / % / % 

cm, arc wayjyqpara koi Kepoos kcu yuciy *<u rc/iipj 7iy>oy 



bat the/ axavra dr) teal ra rotavra kcu ra perajjv ov t$ 

tbemimroa-9rCU7X6iy *Oi €TTC&VfUUf KCU (fxXetP ijreyOPTCU, oXXo. 

for even in ry> *W V7T€ppaAA€lP* SlO OCOl p*P TTOpa TOP lb 

tares there XoyOP Tf KpaTOVPTCU fj SuOKOVat T&P <f>ViT€t Tl 
a a faulty v , ^ ^ , x x 

koaom' #cou ayaB&Vy oior ot irepi Tip-qp paKKop 
ff del <rirou8a£opT€f q irepl T€KPa kcu yopeis* (kcu 
yap Tavra t&p ayaff&p, kcu eircupovvrcu oi irep\ 

3. 1 4ffp«] For if he pursues virions vicious principle, or from being over- 

pleasufcs, when thoae pleaaores are come by the force of temptation; whe- 

but alight, or slight to him, then it is a ther, in short, he is AaiXamt • or only 

clear proof that he pursues them not <fc«(«nfe. See also p. 286. & 
because he is overcome by temptation, 13. W] £ Bekk. et ferri potest ft 

but purely from vicious principle* in apodosi. MICH. 
Thus according to the principle which 15. «£ Um\ Aspasius subaudit ^1- 

he lays down in his Rhetoric, L 14: Hi- yttrm. Alii Muretum secuti, non 

xtifdM ft (*>»%•*, ##f Af k*i /u%0Mt f audacius qnam verius, banc enun* 

iistumf fa **) rk Mx**** /4yirr». tiauonem, quum apodosi careat, per 

Little things, or rather things in them- anacoluthiam cum $. 8. conjungunt, 

selves of less value, show more dis- ita ut apodosis a p*x,$np* <ui> #J» 

tinctly the operation of the principle, incipiaL Abit in hanc sententiam 

the pure love of doing wrong. But Paraphrastes, qui verbis transpositis 

when a person has stolen that which is ex his duabus enuntiationibus unam 

considerable in value, it is impossible confecit. MICH. 
to tell whether he has done so from 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 5. 879 

tovto cnrovBafyvres)' oAA* o/aw eari ris irrrep- 
ftoXrj Kat cv tovtois, el tis wnrcp rj Niofiri par 
\oito K(u irpb* rovs 0€ov? 9 rj cocnrep Idrvpo? 6 
<f>i\o7r<xT(op hriKaXovpueyos mpl top iraTcpa* Xiov 
5 yap €$6*€i p&paivuv. ^\o\6r\pla pkv oiv Though not 

OVOtpia 7T€pi TOUT €OTl OlO TO €tp7]p€VOV y OTtperlyso 

it ~ c ~ * / » *• • f i ~ called, and 

ipucru raop oupercov ckootov eori ot avro, (pav-come- 

Xot St KCU (j)€VKTOU OVT&V *lo\v CU U7T€pfio\cU. inconti- 
«/ **»**» r . * \ » / % t nence: but 

opuovm oi ovo€ cucpaarm r/ yap wcpouria ov pbovov when thh 

* \ >\x* * ~ I ~ > r *» « ' term is used 

lQ<p€VKTOV aXXa KCU T(OV yeKTCOV €OTlV. Ol OpUOLO- to denote 

T^ra fie rov iraBovs irpoaemTtdivres ttjv cucpa- it has the 

/ \«/ x / « s » \ name of the 

<TtaV 7T6/)t CKOCTTOV AeyOVCTLP, OiOV KOKOV VOXpOV kind ofex- 

x \ e / * c x <* » a v cess added 

*Ot KOKOV UirOKptTTjVy OV CLTtXw OVK OV €L7T0l€V to it. 

kcucov. tuxrrrep oiv ov& ivravOa, 8td to pur) kclk'lclv 
iseivat €KaoTfjv avr&v, aXXd rco dvaXoyov opolav, 

OVTCO SfjXoV OTl KOK€l UTToXlftTTeOV pLOVTJV OKpCL- 

criav km eyKpdreiav elvai rfrvs urn irepl ravra 
rrj craxfrpocrvvri kcu tt} aKoXaxria, ircpl 8e Ovpbv 

KOjff OpLOlOTTJTa X4yopi€V' 8lO KCU irpOOTl0€VT€9 
ZOOLKpOLTT} OvpjOV CO(T7T€p TipiT]9 KCU K€p8oV9 $ap£v. 



CHAP. V. 

That brutal or unnatural pleasures are only the object-matter of Incon- 
tinence in the metaphorical use of that term. 

9 EIIEI 8' iorlv evta puev rjSea (bvcrei, kcu tov- Desire 

x *e.~ x *x x / v w of unnatural 

t&v to p.€V airXw ra «f Kara yew) Kat %<jpG>v pleasures 

Chap. V. the absolute use of the term (£«£«*/• 

Having explained in the last chapter i*\*t), and in its metaphorical or ana- 

the object- matter of incontinence, in logons use (kxpti* *»i), Aristotle 



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ffiO 



ARISTOTELIS 



and lit 



koi apupmmp, ra o ovk cotip aAAa ra p&v 
iwi Trqp&aw ra & St ZOr) yipereu, ra Se Sia 
poyOtjpas <f>vaci9 9 am Ktu ircpl tovtxop eKaarra 
TapccjrXrfcrias Vklp !£€*?. Aeyw & ras (hypuoSei?, 
olop rrfv SvQpamop rjp Xeyovai ro9 Kvovaas aj/a-5 
<rxi^ov<rav ra vcuSia kotcoDUip, rj 01019 ypiptiv 
tyaalv iviavs t5>p canjypu»p£pa>p wept top Uoptop, 
tow pip a>pot9 row #€ apdpantwp Kpecurip, tov? 
8e Ta irai&ia Savelfieip dXXrjXoi? €t? exxoylav, tj 
to irepl QaXapip Xeyoptpop. avrcu pip Orjpu&Seis. 10 

€U $€ Sia T€ POPOV? ytPOPTOl KCU pOVULP ePlOLSy 

cZowcp 6 ttjp prjrepa Kafficpevact? kou <f>aya>v, 
kcu 6 tov ovpSovXov to rprap. au 8e pocrqpar 



nam proceeds to show, that the latter 
is applicable to other pleasures besides 
those already mentioned. To this end 
he more distinctly considers the divi- 
sion of pleasures (mentioned in the last 
chapter) into natural and unnatural : 
under the nnnatnral mil the brutal, the 
object-matter of that habit (jh^irmi) 
mentioned in the beginning of this 
book, which Aristotle now, for the 
first time, identifies with the present 
investigation. Of this there are three 
causes, natural depravity (f^x^C' m **' 



f»*M*), habit (f/#f), disease or muti- 
lation. In the pursuit of these plea- 
sures there is no vice, and consequently 
no incontinence, inasmuch as he who 
pursues them is not a voluntary agent, 
and violates not his deliberate convic- 
tion, any more than a madman, or be 
who shakes under the influence of a 
palsy. Yet these habits are called in- 
continent, incontinent therefore from 
analogy, and under this division they 
are to be included. See the Table in 
the Introduction, p. 260. 



( 
Natural. 



r 1 

The object-matter of con- 
tinence and incontinence 
(kxXZt), p. 285, 10. 



Pleasures. 

i 



Unnatural diseased or brutal ; i. e. 
below human nature. 

, ! 

I i 

I. M nifwii. 2. Vih. 3. iUk p*xl*t»» finm. 

The object-matter of incontinence 

(•ft). 



1. rk 8* ou* ir-w] sc. fti* <p6*u. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 5. 881 

T<o8ecs rj ££ €0ovf, oiop rpi\&v TiXatis kcu opvy&p 
r/MD^eiy, en & avOpcuccov kcu yi}?, rrpbs 8e rov- 
tois rj t£>v a<f)po8icrlcop tois appcaip' roEr /up 
yap (f)ucr€i rot? & 4£ tOovs avpfialpovaiPy oiov 
5roiy vfipt^ofiepoi? £k 7rai8cop. ocots pJep odp 
(f)vcri? curia, tovtovs /icp ovSeh av elrreup aKpa- 

T€19, <SoTT€p OvS* TOLS yVPOLKaS, OTl OVK OTTVIOVCTIP 

oAA* oTroiovraC axravrcos fie kcu tois vcxrrj/JLaTcoSco? 
expvat 8i 20o?. To fiev oiv €X €il/ ^icaora toutcop But these 

„ ^ v*- ~ * » \ / /% f \ t can be the 

10€£O> TCOP OpCOV €OTl T^S KOLKia?, K(WaTT€p KCU rj object-mat- 

Orfpvorr)^ to & expura Kpardv rf Kparecadac ouxinconu- 

«« x ~> t ' \ \ ' * /IP c ' /% ' nence 

rj air at) oucpaaia aXX rj kov 0/JLOtoTrjTa, Ka0a7T€p (*%). 
kcu top irepl tovs Ov/iovs fyopra tovtop top 
rponop tov ttoBovS) aKparrj S ov Xcktcop. rcaaa 

lb yap VTrepfiaXAovaa kcu acfrpoovprj teal SeiXla kcu 
ccKoXaaia kol \aXejr0Tq9 at fiev OrjpicoSei? al 8c 
voarjfjLaTcoSei? elo'lp' 6 /jlcp yap <f>vcrei toiovtos • 
otoy SeSuuat iravra, kolp yfrotfyrjov) /ids, OijptcoSr) 
SeiXiap SeiXos, 6 8e ttjp yaXrjp eStSUi 81a pocop* ' 

20 /cat tS>v a<f>p6v<ov oi flip £k (f>va€G)9 aXoyioroi 
kgu pjovov rfj ato-Or/cei {fiprw drjpmSei?, coenrep 
tvia yemj t&p rroppco fiapfidpeov, oi 8e 81a pocov? 9 
oiov tgls imXrfnTLKaSy f/ puavias vocrrjfiaTcoSti?. 

TOVTCOP 8 €OTl /JLCP ^tP TIPOL €P10T€ fWPOP, fit) 

25 Kpartiadou fie, Xeya 8e olop el <t>dXapL? Kartfytv 
eTTtOv/JUop iraiSiov (f)ayelp tj irpos d(f)po8icrlcov 
otottop rj8oprfP' e&ri 8e kou KpaT€icr0ai, firj pJopop 

5. rut vfyfapiws] See p. 283, 6. ing of hit child) is the accusative cor- 

25. Xlytli #7<m>] I mean, for instance, responding to nfoin* K*rt7%it WtivpZf 

if Phalaris had repressed his desire for Q*yi49—xaru%tf Wtiupm Aim*. Un- 

devouring his child or for extravagant less it be considered a genitive after 

pleasure from vensry. Qayilt {the eat- fihvnt in both places. 



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288 ABI8TOTELI8 

<X* iV * wrxip obp km lioyfafpia r\ pjkv kox av- 
Qpanrop oarXw Xeyerai poyfrqpioLy ij 8e Kara 
irpofrO&riVy on (hjpi&Srp rj yocrty/unwdty?, airXms 
8 ov, top outop rponcov 8tjXop on kou oKpouria 
iariv rj pip 07)puo$7ff rj Si POOTjpaTcodr}?, cbrAwd 
8e rj Kara ttjp avOpwirurqv aKoXaaiap povrj. 



CHAP. VI. 

A comparison of Incontinence with Incontinence of anger. 

ioconti- OTI pip ovv ducpouria kou eyKpdreuz ion puovov 7 

desfc worse 9™/" OTT€p CLKoKoXtUl KOU <TC0(f)pOCrVVr), KOU OTI 7T6/H 
rin"nc7Sf TO, oXXtt ioTLP oXXo el8o? OLKpaaUXSy \cy6fl€POP 

Soger ; for **** pxTOjtyopav kou ou\ arrXm, SrjXap' on 5c 10 

listen* to \ e 9 \ » /< ~ /% *■» * « ^ 

reason, *«* ijTTOI' <U(T)(J>a OKpaXTia 7} TOV VVfJLOV 7j 7} TG>P 

l^eDtl^" €TTl$V/luiP 9 0€G>prjaO>pL€P. €01K€ yap 6 6vfW9 

txStl.™* oKoveip p£v n tov Xoyov, irapoKovup 8e 9 KaJdd- 
irep ol Tax*is tcop Suzkopwp, ot rrplp okovctcu 
ttop to Xeyopuepop iKOtovaiP, cfoa apaprdvov(TL\b 
rqs irpooToijem, kou ol tcvve?, 7rplp <TKv\raaOcu 
el (plXos, ap puovov fo^r/ayi, vXaxTOvaip* ovtcd? 
6 Ovpos dia Bepfwrrjra Kal Ta\vrrJTa rqs (frvatw 
CLKOvcras pAp y ovk hriTaypa r5\ aKovcras, oppJa 
7rpos ttjp ripxopLav. 6 p*p yap Xoyos rj rj <f>ap-2Q 
Tacla OTi vfipis rj oXtycopia edrjXcocrev, 6 fi* toowep 
auXXoytcrdpevo? on Set T<p tolovtc? rroXepelp 
\aXerralp€i 8rj €v0w m r\ 8 im0vpia, 4olp puovov 



Chap. VI. public, p. 440. See also p. 199, 

12. fofAf Ih9»m] See Plato's He- 10. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 6. 888 

thrtf ort tfSv 6 Xoyos 7} ri aurOtfaWy op/iy, irpbs 
tt/v aaroXmnriv. waff 6 fup Ov/ws oKoXovffel r<p 
Xoytp 7row, 7) If iwidvfita ov. OKxyjADv oiv' 6 
puev yap tov Bv/jlov dxparr/? tov Xoyov 71x09 
hr/rraraij 6 fie Trjs eirtBvfiias kcu ov tov Xoyov. 
*Eri rah (J)vctlkcu£ fwXXov avyyvwpLT) cucoXovBeiv Anger it 

^/J» » \ \ » /% / « / ~ x more natu- 

Op€£€(riV. 67TC4 KCU €1Tl0VfliaiS TOLLS TOUWTCUS fWAr ral than 

x & \ « \ ij» rt /, c * % desire. 

XOV OCCU KOIVCU TTOXTLy KCU €(f> OCTOP KOIVCU O &€ 

tfvfio? (frvaiKwrepov kcu i\ xakejron)? rmv eiri- 
10 Ov/uciv 7W ttjs vTrepfioXr}? teal t£v firj avayKalcov, 
aZcnrep 6 airoXoyovjievos on tov iraripa timtoi. 
" kcu yap ottos' €<fnj " tov eavrov kokcivos tov 
awo0€i>" kcu to ircuZiov $€i£as " kcu ohros e/tic ' 
&fnf, " orav avrjp yevffrat' ovyyeves yap rj/uv." 
15 kcu 6 iXjcofitvo? virb tov vtov iraveaBcu oce'Aeue 
irpos tcu9 Ovpeus' kcu yap airos iXKvacu tov 
irarepa fiexP 1 ? ivravOa* *Erz aduc&repoi 01 it not insi- 

tTTlfiouXoTepOl. 6 fJL€V OVV 6vfm8rj9 OVK €7T l fiovXo?, dZire. 

oud* 6 0v/ws, aAAa (fravepo?* rj 8* €7n0vfxia^ 

tQKaOowep Ttjv 9 A<f>po8iTriv (jyacri' " SoXottXokov 

yap KU7rpoy€vous*" kcu tov Ktxrrov tpavra "Opr/pos* 

" irap<f>aons 9 fj r eicAc^e voov ttvkcl irep <f>po- 

VtOVTQs" GKTT €tW€p aStKCOT€pa KCU CUXT\UoV 1? 

dxpatria avnj Trp irtpl tov Qvpjov iart 9 kcu 
2&atrX&9 axpcurla kcu Kcucia 7ra>s\ En ouScis Desire is 

contume- 
lious, anger 
1. i Xiyw] See note p. 273, 8. 21. "O/mpr] Iliad S. 214. 217. u DoU 

19. ft T WJwfum] But d«sirf is inri- t5. naxlm <«wr] *{*Ah»% A ri w*u 

dioM. Compare Plato de Legibus, 7m hify Sn <tm *{it rh» kxyutm* r\t 

p. 863. xtd fihf fdt>rit yt •» retbrh «"t^i to* tufiir fori rig ixpwia r%{ Wt' 

rtf tufAtf *pr*y*{tv«tiU9, II Itatrimt Hi tupUs arXstg ««£«#/« mm) xaxia nm) 

etvrtf (petfAi* ftpnt Itttawrii***** wtthi **9XP T *t* *"* i^tMtri^m irmt&vr*. 

fitrk m*mrm fimUu v^a<rrw I ri «-i{ Xr«» %l 0qh <rm krkmt kxff'm* mm 

Jit aurnt h fafatws W»Xi»r»». xm*i*9 rtfyxfmqifom n *i£ rh \*ttu- 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



184 AHISTOTELIS 

vfZpl&i Xuvovfi£P09 9 6 # opyjj ttoiAp iras ttoul 
Atnrovfupo?, 6 X vfipifap /ie(f TfSoprp. ci oSp 
oi9 opyifcaOcu paXurra Sikcuop, raura dSuctarepOy 
kcu rj dxpaaia 17 St ewi&vpuap" ov yap eariv iv 
Ovpucp vfipis. «w /up toiwp mayuov jj wept em- 5 
Ovpias axpaaia rrp v€pl top Ovpop, kcu oti 
toriv rj eyxpareui kcu 17 axpaaia irepl hnOvpias 

TV differ- KCU rjSoPOf OW/JUXTIKO?, SfjXoP. AvTCDP 8c TOV- 

,pe- new ras 8iacf>opas Xrprr4op. coovrep yap etprp-cu 
xar apxas, ax pkv dvOprnnxai elcri kcu (f}vaiKcu y lo 
kcu rif ytvei kcu T<p peyeBei, cu 8c Or/puoSei?, cu 
8e . Sta TrqpaKTtis kcu poan/jpara. tovtcdp Se ircpl 
ra? irpdrras aa^poavpq kcu cucoXcuria pjopop cWiV 
Sib kcu ra Or/pia ovre awf>popa ovr oKoXaara 
Xeyofup oAA' tf Kara perctffwpap kcu el rivi oXxasXh 
aXXo irphf aXXo SuKpepet yipo* tg>p £<£g>p vfipet 
kcu aipapmpia kcu r<p TrapxfxiXop elpcu" ov yap 
k\ei irpoalpecriv ovSe Xoyur/wv, aXX' ££eoTr)K€ 
ttjs (frvaew, (oairep ol pxuvop&voi t&p dpdpamcDP. 
eXarrop 8c OrfpiOTrjs Koucias, (frofiepcorepov Se' 01; 20 
yap 8i€<f>0apTcu to fieXTurrop, cocnvtp £p tg> dp- 
Opanrcp, aAA' ovk *X<ei. opuoiov oZv cocnrep otyvypv 
avpfiaXXciP irpbs €fi^tv\op 9 irorepov kokiop* daipe- 
aripa yap 77 (f>avXoTrj9 del 77 tov prj e\0PT09 
apxfjp, 6 8c P0O9 dp\rj. irapairXrio'iop odp to 26 
ovp/HaXXup dSiKiav rrpb? apQpamop ddiKOP' eari 
yap a>9 eKarepop kclkiop' pvpumXaxna yap dp 
KaKa iroir/<r€i€P avOpamos kolkos Orjplov. 

p/«» Sm^um {*t(i*h f x*i *«/ ipui- however the Rhetoric, ii. 2. 
rnr* KtypUti #M etwXiit nmxia J. 25. a^] See p. 232, 248, 9. 

1. ufyi{ti] Urn ftuxtto. Schol. See 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VI, 7. 386 



CHAP. VII. 

Of the difference of Intemperance, Incontinence, Effeminacy, 
Temperance, Continence, Patience. 

8 IIEPI 8c w 8i a<f>7)9 kou yevo-tm rj8ovas kou or the dif- 

-v/ n»/i/ n jl ' \*of ference of 

AV7TOS KCU €7TLVVfJLta9 KCll (pvyas, TTtpi OS 7) T€ these MYe- 

dKoXaaia kou i) aaxjypoovin) StxopicrOjj Trporcpoy, "ons^Ton! 

* \ of v f «"»/i \ * t each other. 

€OTl fl€P OVTC0S €\€IP <DOT€ r/TTOO'UOU KOLL G>V 01 

67T0AX0t KpUTTOVS, €OTl 8e KpOLTtlV KOU S>V ol 

TToXXol fJTTOVf' TOVTCOP 8 6 fl€V 7T€/M T)8oVOL$ 

aKparr/9 6 & iyKparrj?, 6 5c irepl \v7ras fiaXaKos 
. 6 8c KaprtpiKOs. neratjv & rj twv TrXciorrtov e^w, 

kolv €i peirovat ptaXXov irpos ras xeipow. 'E^iThe intem- 
10 o €vuu tcov ifOovcov avayKouai uaiv at o ov kcu 
fieypi rtP09 9 al 8 wrepfioXal ov 9 ovtf ax iXXcl- 
yj/eis, ofJLolco? 8e kou irepl iiriOvfdas ?x €L KC " Xirira?, 
6 fj,ev rd? trrrepfioXas Suokcop tS>v iJ5cW r/ Kaff 
inrepfioXas rj 8ia Trpoalpecriv, 8i aura? kou fir/8cv 
1&8i erepov dirofSaZvov, ajcoXacrros* avdyicrf yap 
tovtov firj elvou fUTa/JLeXr/TiKOV, a>or aviaro? 6 
yap d/JLerafieXr/ro^ aviaros. 6 8 9 iXXefaro&v 6 

aVTlK€lfl€VO? 9 6 8e fl€<T09 <T(0<pp(OV. OfJLOUO? 8e 



- Chap. VII. ployed upon the same, but because 

1. rig) % «fe] See the table in the their nature and effect is more clearly 

Introduction to this Book. seen in reference to pleasure. Com- 

7. <ri() Xvraf paXa*if] Aristotle pare Theages de Virtutibus ; fiaXenim 

says that effeminacy rather has pain (At U r$ Qtvyut r»bg witwu Jm^mrlm 

for its object-matter, not because con- ft U rtf ttnMcu M rS» &Un. p. 31. 

tinence and incontinence are not em- Frag. Pythag. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



AHISTOTELIS 



flat be it 

woo* than 
IbeiDOoo- 
tioent or 
effeminate. 



The differ- 
ence of the 



from the 



The effemi 
nate. 



KOU 6 <fy*Vyt*¥ TOT OWfJUXTlKm \V7TOS /IT/ 8l JfTTOV 

aXXa Sia wpoalpeatv. T&v 8e p.r) irpoaipov- 

p&vmt 6 puev ayerai &ta tt/v r)8oirqv, b 8e 8ta 
to <f)evyeiv tj)V XvTnjv rqv aaro rrp emOvfiias, 
wrre 8iaj\>epo\xnv dXXr/Xcov. iravri tf av Soijeiez 
\elp<ov elvcu, el tis fir/ etriBvpAv rj ypepa Trparrot 
n cutrxpovy ri ei <r(f>68pa ewUfofi&v, kou el firj 
bpryi^fuvos tutttoi if el opyiiftfievo?' rl yap av 
hroUi ev iraBet &v; 8u> 6 olkoXootos \eipa>v 
rov axparovs* t&v thf Xe\0eviwv to fiev pxtXaxla? io 
el8o? fiaXAop, 6 It axparqs. $ Avtik€itcu he 

T<p piv aKparei 6 eyKparrjfy t£ 8e fJuxXoucS 6 
KaprepiKOf* to pkv yap KapTepelv eariv ev tS 
avTe\eiv, rj 8 eyKpareia ev T<p Kparetv, erepov 
&e to avrexetv kou Kparelv, axnrep kou to /ujib 
r/TTourOax tov vikolv* 8io kolL cupejwrepov eyKpa- 
reia Kapreplas eortv. 'O fi* eXXehroDV irpbs a ol 



1. i tWyw] He who avoid* bodily 
paint not by reason of hit being too tceak 
to overcome them, but from deliberate 
choice, it intemperate. 

2. fee weuueeopLfmf] *>{Mugfr«* 
M t« OXm e)ieeM&M». Paraph. J akt 
Itk «•** nlenit. sc. the incontinent 
(inemrit). JMU^ xtfw the ef- 
feminate (paXamii). 

6. ftk XrJoftm* 4 n^ifut] See p. 
278, 3. n. 

11. kaearn^] kaeXdrres Bekk. I 
have not hesitated to adopt in this 
place the reading of the Paraph, and 
Aapaaius, authorities quite equal to 
many of Bekker's MSS. It is a great 
deficiency in Bekker's new edition of 
Aristotle, that he should have entirely 
omitted the readings of the early com- 



mentators and early printed copies of 
Aristotle. 

13. It rj eVrfxtif] Compare Meto- 
pus de Virtute : Smza put « Xeyte'Timot 
pips rat ^ox»s lya^mrf rS kxiym 
yinrm mm^r%em ami lym^drtm, Sou* ft 
r> met hynrat ret* t*nrm ami kateyirtfa 
eopQmru mXXdXus re rnnxmSra k^tri. 
k pit Zt MMfTqim, oat lyxfkrua yinrat 
fAirat Xfarmr aXX* k /tit xa^rt^im it ry 
krri%tf rin>, k T lym^krum i» rif 
kf*i%if nt«9*. k T k%tm.<ria ami futXa- 
nia It rtf ftn arri^vt a\n& x(*rif nai 
eu\ rear* eamfiaint fivyt* rkymSk *•* 
Me***t it* Xorrn*. knfimXXp e* etirk 
Itk ibm*. Frag. Pytoag. Ed. Gale, 
p. 27. Compare also Theages de y 
Virtutibus, p. 30. ibid. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 7. 28T 

ttoXXoI kou aiTirelpovcrt Koi Svpaprcu, otros fXCL- 
Xaxb? koi Tpv(f>cop' kcu yap rj Tpv<fffi fjuxXaKta 
Tis iarip' oy lAxci to I/jlotiop, tpa fxr) iroprjcry 
ttjp airo rod cupeiv Xvmjp, kcu fii/wv/ACPOs top 
bKOLfivovra ovk outoli 06X109 elpcu, &0Xup ofioio? 

COP. 6/XOLC09 & €J(Cl KCU 7T€/>2 iyKpOT€UlP KCU OJC/MZ* 

alap' ov yap et Tie ioryvp&p kcu xnrtpfSaXXovcrwv 
tjSop&p ryrraroL ^ Xvw&p, davpxxxrroVy aXXa ovy- 

yVCdflOVLKOVy €t GLPTlTeiPCOP, GHTTTep 6 QcoSeKTOV 

10 <&t\oKTr]Tr)9 vtto rov Z\€(0$ irerrXrjyucpo? r) 6 
KapKivov eV rrj 'AAottij KepwcoVy kou cocnrep oi 
Kar4x<uv 7T€tp(ofjL€V0L top yeXarra aBpoop €KKay- 
X<*£ovo-ip, olop avpeirea* 5$€P0<j)dpT(p, oXX* et tls 
irpos a? oi iroXXol Svpavrcu clpt€\€ip 9 tovtg>p 

l&TjTraTcu kcu /ir/ Svparai aprireiPtcp, fir} Sea (j)uaip 
rov yepov? rj Sea poaop, olop iv tow ^kvO&p 
fiaatXevap rj firiXcucia Sia to y4pos, kcu c»? to 
OtjXv 7r/>op to appep Suottjkcp. SoKet fie kcu 6 
ttcuSicoStj? OKoXaoTos eipou, eon 8c futXaxo? 17 

20 yap rrouSta apeak £otip> etirep apa7rav<ri9' t&p 
8e 7rpo9 TavTijp vTrepfiaXXoPTCop 6 7rcu8uoS7)9 ioriv. 
'AKpcurtas 8e to flip Trpoirereut to 8 dcrdepcia' Division of 

c \ \ n x / sj/ © inconti- 

Ol /JL€P yap povX€VO-a/JL€POL OVK €fl/l€POU<riP ofcnence. 

ifiovXevaaPTO Sea to irados, oi 8e Sia to firj 

25 fiovXevaaaOou ayoprai \mo tov iraQovs' evioi 

yap> coairep irpoyapya\lo'aPT€9 ov yapyaXifioprai, 

ovtg) kcu irpoaiadofJiGPOi kou irpoiSopres kcu irpoe- 



3. imk f*ii Towy] That he may not 7. wrt$**X$*wm fatZt] See p. 

be troubled with the pain of holding it 87, 11. 

up. The collocation of the words in 17. futXmtdm, fc» re yim] See He- 

this passage is remarkable. rod. i. 106. 



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288 AHISTOTELIS 

yeipavres iavrovs kou top Xoyicr/xop ou\ t)tt&ptcu 
xnro tov irdOovs, our av r)8v y ovt av Xxrmjpop. 
fiaXiara 8 ol 6£el$ kou fieXayxpXiKol ryU irpoirm\ 
oLKpaxriav elcriv axparei?' ol fiev yap 81a ttjp 
TayvrrfTa, ol 8e 81a ttjp a<f>o8p6nriTa ovk apa-b 
pevovcrt top Xoyop, 81a to okoXov0i)tuco\ etpou 
Tjj (pam-acrla. 



CHAP. VIII. 

The difference of the Intemperate and Incontinent more explicitly stated. 

The intern- E2TI 8 % 6 U€P OKoAoOTO?, SoW€p tX4\(fa, OV 9 

perateii / , / x ~ / t «* 

lacurabie, fieTaiuXrjTiKOs' €fi/i€V€i yap rg irpoaipecrei' o o 

theinconti- , x v ^ v , „ , 

nent 11 not. OKpaTTJS /JL€Ta/l€AT/TlK09 7Ta?. 6iO OV% <DOW€p TJ7TO- 10 

prjcrafiep, ovreo koi €X € h &XX? 6 fikv avLaros, 6 
8 laTO?' €olk€ yap r) pkv fioyOijpia t£>p pootj- 
fwrcov olop vSepco kou <f)0io'€i, rj 8 6lk pacta tois 
eTnXrpmKols' rj filv yap avpeyrj^y r) 8 ov avvtyr)? 
iroprjpla. Koi oXcos 8 erepov to yivos aKpaalaslb 
koi tca/clas' r) pip yap KaKia XavOavei, r) 8 



Of the in- oKpaxria ov XavOavet,. Avt&p 8e tovtcop fieX- 

the hasty TL0V9 Ol eKOTOTUCOl 7] Ol TOP XoyOP €\OPT€9 fl€P, 

Sic 1c8S \ s / fv / f > * / \ / s\ 

blameable. p.7) €fXfX€POPT€9 0€* V7T iXaTTOPOS yap 7Ta0OV? 



Chap. VIII. or wrong. But not so the incontinent, 

16. A fA* *««/«] For vice is hid from who feels and acknowledges that he 

the view of the vicious, but incontinence is doing wrong, and has not yet arrived 

is not. The completely vicious has at the same state of depravity with the 

lived so long in an evil course, and former. 

neglected so long the voice of con- 17. mbrSt & rtvrmf] Sc. the incon- 

science, that it ceases to offer opposi- tinent. 

tion, and he has no light within him 18 i»minxu] The hasty or vre- 

to discover whether he is acting right cipitate. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 8. 289 

TjTT&VTCUy KOI OVK OOTpofiovXeVTOl &07T€p CLTtpOC 

o/jLOiof yap 6 OKparqs eori rot? ra\v fieOvo-KOfie- 

POL9 KCU V7T 6XiyOV OLVOV KCU IXaTTOVOS fj ©ff 01 

7roXkoL On fiev oiv Koucia 17 dxpacria ot/#e inconti- 

_ v j / »\x' v . \ \ \ \nenceisnot 

5€crr4, (pavepov. aXXa Try ureas to fiev yap 7ra/>a a vice ab*o- 

/ \ a* % / t % > \ Intel j but 

irpoaipeaiv to oe Kara irpoaipeatv eariv. ov /impartially. 
aXX 9 opuoiov ye Kara to,? rcpai~€is Sowep to 
Ar/fioSoKOV el? MiXr/o-iovs " MtXr/cnoi aijvveroi 
fiev ovk eio-lv, Spcocn, & otdtrep oi aijvveroi" kou 

10 01 aKparels aSucoi fiev ovk eicrli>, dSiKOvac Be. 
'EttcI # 6 fiev T010VT09 0*0$ fir/ Scd to rreireUrOdi why the 
SuoKeiv tos Kajff {nrepfSoXrjV /cat irapa tov opdovn'mcunbit, 
Xoyov crcopxtTLKas r/dovas, o oe TreTreurrau, 01a to nent not. 
toiovtos eivai 0109 SuoKeiv avrds, eKeivos fiev oiv 

16 ev(i€Ta7r€ioTO$, 6 & ov' 17 yap apery koi r/ fiox- 
Or/pia ttjv dpyj\v J) fiev <j)0elpei 77 8e crcofet, ev he 
tws Trpaj-eai to o5 eveKa dpxrj, Sawep ev T019 
puadr)pjariKols at \moQe<reis % ovre 8r/ eKel 6 Xoyo? 
SiScutkoXikos tcov apx<ov ovre evravOa, aXX' aperr/ 

20 17 (fyvo-tKr/ rj ediarrj tov opffoSoijeiv irep\ ttjv dpyj)v. 



13. i¥t] sc. The intemperate. human means. No one can restore 

15. n ya^ aprfi] The intemperate to him this moral vision which he has 

having lost all moral and natural vir- destroyed by his folly and depravity, 

rue, has with them also lost the power or enable him to enter into a new 

of presenting to himself a good end as course of life, by representing to him 

the object of pursuit. For as the mathe- (who cannot understand the very first 

matician does not undertake to prove principles of such reasoning) the vice 

the first and necessary axioms of his and folly of his conduct, 

science, and to one who cannot intui- — f**xtotf*] See p. 231, 5. 

tively perceive them, all attempts of 18. ai hrttisus] The axioms and 

proving them would be fruitless and postulates. 

inconsistent; so the incontinent man, 20. *> Qtvixh * SArniJ See p. 

who has lost this first principle of 254, 15. 
morals, can never be recovered by 

U 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ARISTOTELIS 



Recapitu- 
lation. 



o-axfrp&v puev oiv 6 tolovtos, okoXolotos & 6 evav- 
riof. "Earn 8e n$ 8ia 7rd0o9 eKorarucb? irapa 
rov opdov Xoyov, ov ©ore fiev firj irpdrreiv Kara 
rov opOov Xoyov Kparet to tcojOos, wore fi* eivai 
toiovtov olov TreireurOcu SuoKetu aveSrjv Seiv ray 6 
Toiavras rjSova? ov Kparet* ohros eoriv 6 dxpa- 
rrjs, fZeXruov rov oKoXaorrov, ov8e <f>avXo9 cbrAw* 
crto&rou yap to fieXriorop, r/ apxy- aXXo? 8 
ivairiof, 6 efifieveriKOS Kal ovk eKorariKOS 8ia ye 
to iraJBo?. <j>avepov 8rj cVc tovt&v ort rj p*v owov- io 
8aia e£is, rf 8e <j>avXri. 



CHAP. IX. 

Whether the Continent is the same as he who adheres to his opinion. 

Three ways IIOTEPON olv eyKparrj? e<TTlV 6 o7roitpovv 10 

of viewing x , v « ^ . , ,/ *c~ 

thisques- Xoytp KOI O7TO10L0VV TTpOOlpeaei eflfieV(OV if O TTj 

tion. 



Chap. IX. 

Aristotle proceeds to discuss the 
second question proposed, p. 264, 24. 
whether the incontinent is the same 
as he who perseveres in his purpose, 
and the incontinent the same as he 
who departs from it. 

This question he observes may be 
considered in three ways : 

I. Whether you consider the con- 
tinent to be one who adheres to his 
purpose whether good or bad, and the 
incontinent who forsakes it whether 
good or bad : 

II. Whether you consider the con- 
tinent to be one who persists in a good 
purpose, and the incontinent to be one 
who departs from a bad purpose : and 



III. Whether the absolutely con- 
tinent be he who persists in a good pur- 
pose, the accidentally, he who persists 
in any ; and the incontinent the reverse. 

From the first two views of the 
question an absurdity must obviously 
result ; for if the forsaking of a bad 
purpose be a virtue, as it evidently 
is, then from these it would follow 
that incontinence would in some in- 
stances be a virtue, which is ridiculous. 
According to the third way no such 
absurdity results ; and we infer from 
it another distinction respecting con- 
tinence and incontinence, which has 
not yet been noticed, that there are 
two kinds of it; one proper the ab- 
solute persisting, the other improper the 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 9. 291 

6p0rj, Kal aKparrj? 8* 6 tmotaow fir/ i/ifitmop 
7rpoaip€(T€i Kal (mouoovv \6yco rf b rep yfrevSei 
Xoycp Kai rf} irpoaipccci rg /i^ opOrj, uxrvrtp rpro- 
pr)0y) Trporepov ; rj Kara ficv avp,fHef3r)KO$ ottololovu, 
6ko0' avro 8e r<p dXrjOei Xoycp kou rrj 6p0rj irpocu- 
peaei 6 p&v i/JL/iepet 6 & ovk kfipivti ; el yap tis 
ro8l Sid ro8l aipeirou rj Sudkgi, Kajff avro fiiv 
rovro SuoK€t kou alpurai, Kara trvfjifitfirjKO? 8c rb 
rrporspov. airXw 8e Xiyopuev rb Kajff avro, eScrrc 
10 eari fiev d)9 bnroiaovv 86^g 6 puev epifievei 6 & 

iijiorarou, a7rX&9 8e 6 rrj dXr/Oei. Eiol Se'Theobsti- 

TLV€S KOU €flfJL€V€TlKOl Trj 86fjr) 9 OVf KOlXoVCIV lO~)(y- greater re- 
, * a , n > » / femblance 

poyvoofJLOvas, oiov ovoireioroi Kai ovk ev/ierairei' totheincon- 

* * / v ~ » rs tt tinentthan 

OTOl OL OfWIOP fJL€V Tl t^OVCl TCp €yKpaT€l, (DOTT€p the cooti- 

15 o acorno? r<p eXcvdtpicp kou 6 Opaavs rep 0a/>pa- acting 

x / i \ ^ i^ \ x \ ' « * * a * under the 

Xe<p, eiai o erepoi Kara 7roXXa. o p,ev yap o*a i n fl ue nce of 

//» v»/|/ ' a '\\ « » ' pleasure. 

iraJOos Kai eiriavpuav ov fierapaAAei, o €yKparrj9 9 
eirei eifareioTos, orav rvyjQ, earai 6 eyKparq^ 6 8t 
ov\ V7rb Xoyovy eirel eiridvfiias ye Xapfidvovo-i, 
20 kou ayovrou iroXXol wro rS>v T)8ovS>v. eld 8e 
Icryypoyv&pLOves ol iSioyvcofwves Kai ol dfiadei? 
kou ol aypoiKoi, ol pXv iSioyvcofiopes 81 rjSovrjv Kal 
Xvirqv 9 yaipovai yap viKobvres, iav pjrj fiera7T€i- 
Bavrau, kou Xvirovvrcu, lav aKvpa rd avrtbv y 



accidentally persisting, in a good pur- c» ^m4«7 h%p, Ippipu h» «■> le/d^iif 

pose: the first acting from principle, the §n itymiU lent 8 etipirar fftt^u Yt, 

second from accidental circumstances. In Writ U airy rtv kytJ»v rt itpt&tU 

The Paraph, has some judicious re- Jfewf^J/ 8 1x lra * **» P* *(**( *p- 

marks upon this subject : i f*h yfy vj ai^irwg urn) *nt $ui8»vt lityit if tytis 

kyaty Yo\n iftpiwv xm) rj i{t$ *(»eu- %<tl kXnhvf. Wi) twv* ov 3<' \avrk 

(Iru avro ri ayeJlt al^urtu oUiri al^tircu & alpireu xa) *7t Ipt/tim, AkXa 

kyuiW tfrrt xmff etvro Xyn^etrtu Wm, %ik rl ayniiv, tl nttf etiri lyx£*rw 

i 7H Xfiftuut rv ftn itfn *p*i(\*%t *•) ir«», &XXa nark fvfifafanit . 

U 2 



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292 ARISTOTELIS 

axnrtp ^jn/^icfjutra' qhtt€ paXXov tg> oKparei eoi- 

Theywho KCUTIP T) T$ CyjC/MZTCt. EttTl 84 TIV€9 Ol TOIS 

by a bad 8o£aXTU> OVK i/JLfUVOVOnV OV Si OKpOUriaV, OlOV €V 
art neither ry ^iXoKTr/Tfl T$ So^OJcXcOU? 6 NcOTTToAc/IW. 
nor virions. JCOirOi Si rjSoWJV OVK £v€/l£IV€V 9 aXXa JCoXipJ'* TO 5 

yap dXrj0€U€iu curry koXov t)v, Itt^utBt) 8 wro rod 
9 08v<r<re<D9 yfrcvScaOcu. ov yap iras 6 Si TjSovrfV ri 
irpaiTfov our axoXaoTO? ourc (fxzuXo? ovr aucpa- 
rrJ9 9 aAA' 6 fit* al&xpdv. 



CHAP. X. 

Some concluding remarks for the better understanding of their 
Habits. 

Of the EITEI fi* ioTl Tlf KCU T010VT09 OtOff ^TTOV 7/ Sell! 



extreme of T oif aCOLLOLTlKOLS YatDCDV, KCU OVK €UU€lHOV TG> XoyCd 
continence 9 ^T , x ~ , , « 

on the side ^ TOtOVTOS, TOVTOV KCU TOV OKpOTOVS fl€(T09 
of defect* ^ 

iyKpaTTjs' 6 fiev yap aKparr/^ ovk ififievei t£ 
Xoycp Sia to fiaXXov tc 9 ovtos fie 8ia to ^ttov tl" 
6 fi* iyKpaTr/s ififievei kcu ovSe Si ertpov /*€Ta-i6 
fiaXXei. Sci fie, ttwep tj iyKpareia ovrovSaioi/, 
d/Kporepa? ras IvavrLas %1-eis (pavAa? elixzi, axnrep 
kolI <f>aivovraC aXXa Sua to ttjv erepav Iv oXiyois 
kcu oXiyoLKL? €ivai (ftavepav, Sowep t) (rco<f)pocrvvr) 
Tj) aKoXaaia 8ok€i kvavriov eivou fiovov, ovtoo kcu 20 
of h co e t? lion ^ *Y K P ( * T€l ' a TV oLKpaaia. 'E7T€t 8e Kajff 6/1016- 

nence to rrjra 7roXXa XeyeTaiy kcu r) lyKpareioL rf rod aco- 

Chai». X. fluenced too much by pleasure as the 

10. jmt J} h7] See p. 124, 1. incontinent, nor too little as the one in 

15. rift h Utpf] NeWurfrom one the defective habit. 
or the other. Neither from being in- 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 10. 298 

<j)pOl>09 Kllff OflOlOTTJTa 7)KoXov0r)K€V' O T€ yaptnce, and 

eyKparr)? oto? firjdev irapa tov Xoyov Ota ras nence to in- 
<r<DfixiTLKa$ rjSovas woluv teal 6 adxfrp&v, aXX' oance. 

fl€V €\(OV 6 & OVK €\(OV <f>CUu\aS €7Tl0VfliaS, KOU 6 

5/xev toiovtos otoy fifj rjSecrOac irapa tov Xoyov, 
6 8 6lo$ rjSea-Oou aXXa fir] ayecrOcu. ofioioi fie /cat 
6 aKparrjs Kal 6 okoXclotos, erepoi piv owes, 
<x/i(f)OT€pot 8c to, aco/xarcKa r/Sea Slcokovctiv, aXX 9 

6 fl€V KOU Ol6fl€V09 SeiV, 6 & OVK ol6fl€VOf. 

10 OW afia (frpovifiov Kal oKparrj ivSexerat etratTbathewho 

> » ' ' . * Nj' % *~ * '* incontU 

TOP OUTOV apUOL yap (ppOVl/WS KOL OWOVOaiOS TO Dent cannot 

r\6o$ dcSeiKToi av. ert ou T<p elSevai pdvov <f)po- ^m/ut. 

9w \ >~ '.«**» * , Because the 

vifios aXXa Kai T(p wpaKTiKOS o o oKparr}? ov^iu^'w 

/ ^^^^^ > fi»* % ' * ^ given to act 

TTpOLKTlKOS. TOV C€ 0€LVOV OVO€V K00XV€C aKpaTT) l^axrtKit) 

\belvaC Sco Kal SoKOvacv evioTe (f>povifiot fiev elvai to his l g 
tiv€9 oKpaTtls 5e, 5ta to ttjv SeivoTrjTa 8ta(f>ep€iv NcTso the' 

~ i / \ , / t i incontinent. 

TTj9 <ppovri(r€G>$ tov eipr/fievov Tpowov ev TOIS 
Trp&rois XoyoiSy kcu kutol fiev tov Xoyov iyyvs 
elvai, Siatpepeiv 8e Kara ttjv Trpoaipeatv. ovSe 
20 8% mo eiSoos Kal Oecopcov, aAA* m 6 ko0€v8<dv 
7) oiixopevo?. Kal ckoov fiev (rpoirov yap Tiva 
elScos Kal o 7rotet Kal ov eveKa), 7rovrjpo? & ov m 
7j yap TrpoaipeaLS eTrtGucrj? 9 <o&0 TjpLnrovrjpos. Kal 



11. ${Jnf9 »«) fV0*}dtf'] See p. 24. jyMt/m^f] As has already been 

-251, 11. stated, p. 288. n. Incontinence and 

16. tienpi(ut rib ${otn<rt*$] See continence differ from intemperance 

p. 252, 13. and temperance, as imperfect from 

19. m xiyfi] As to their definition, perfect habits; this will be seen by 

Both are habits employed upon means inspecting the table prefixed to this 

to an end. But in the ftfti/M* the book. The following passage from the 

<rp*lptft: is always good, proposing fragments of the Pythagoreans furnishes 

only those means which tend to a good an excellent comment upon this subject 

end, but in the Itnis indifferently. r$ J%l*p* r$o iihtt x arp*i(t<ns *tif*»»u. 



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294 ARISTOTELIS 

ovk oSlko?' ov yap cirifiovXos' 6 fieu yap avr&v 

OVK €flfJL€V€TUCOS oh OV fiovXcVOTJTCU, O &€ fl€- 

XayxpXucbf ov&€ fiovXevTuebs o\co?. kcu coticc Stj 
6 dxparr}? iroXei fj \}nj<f)tl€TCU fiev awavra ra 
hiovra #cat vopovs t%*i owovSaiovs, yjyqrai Seb 
ovbivj ooawep ' AvafjavSptSr)? to-jcan/rep 

6 fie Trowjpos yfi<op&v7) pkv roh vo/iois, irovqpois 
Se yjHO\iivr^. tam 8 atcpaaia kcu iytcpdrcia irep\ 
to vwepfiaXXop rrjs rS>v 7roXX(DV c^coy* 6 fiev 10 
yap ififievei fiaXXov 6 tf fjrrov rrjs tg>v 7t\€Iot(dv 
Sometpe- 8vvd(L€<0f. EuiaTorepa 8e T<OV OKpcuntQVy TfV oi 

continence (LtXayXpXlKol OKpaT€VOVTCU> 7W fiovX€VOfl€P(OP fl€P 



more CUim- y t t fr/ \ « ft » >/i ~ » 

blethtn (17) €fl/JL€POPT(OP 0€, ACat Oi Ol €Vl(TflOV OKpOTClS 

Ttov (f>v<TLKCDV' paop yap eOos fieroKLpfjaou <pvo-€G>s' 15 
&a yap rovro teal to €0o? xaXerrov, otl rjj (f>v<rei 
?oiK€v, woirep Kal Evtjpos Xeyci 

Taunjv etvtgooiroHn rsAfuraMTav Qwrw elvai. 
r/ /xty o3j/ carl? iyKpartta Kal tl oucpaaia jcat20 



)<} m} piri rw 0j«; pb i«7»£«rf»9 ; #irw/. »«A ft pi«£ /3/a* AXX* •*# 

i.*y$*(A4{ fopiv xm) WtivpUs lyx£*Tuat \xtwl*t rwr§ *£*rv§tTt, xmmuu Tty- 

xm) xm^n^imt \(*<ruu. ptrk films ft ^«mw. ft? yAf r«* Affray p.) fur* 

wmXif UfimwhU *»*U v** w *A«y»», Avra* JkXXm /urm nhtmf ra lUwra 

ax^mrtmt mat paXaxiat. at ft rtrnvrm Vfarftt. wmXn ft xmto f*U WtuptTU 

imUmt *a§ ^v^mt nptrtkut fth «f •- J ^»^f $tai Wtiopim rS X§yt*fui fmXm- 

ral nfiurtXitf ft xmztai rtfy%dnfrt. i *lm* nmi 4«f«rmv lnQipi<rm t mmwm 

f*\t y*{ X*yt<rfAf Sym/tu, ra T i\»ya riAt t^««w mm$i ft fura kv*f 

p&{t* rag $v%*f uetT. xa) %mfh /»}» x*(% nr " t re ** **Jtti9 t tftirtt in mp- 

fyXirmi xcA Zytreu i ivpU mm) Wtfopim *Xuxi(rx4tTt, r$ vyttg %fut r§ ipfiM rmf 

M vw'ktyntxnvt t* % t u < **< ^»X*t> V""X«f' rmSrm Ik •» mmmUu. Theages 

• \y*t*vu* xm\ & xm^rt^U apr*) rvy de Virtu t in Fragm. Pythag. p. 33. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 11. 805 

tl Kaprepia kou rl fiaXaicia, teal irm ex?v<riv ou 
eijtis avrcu irpbs aAA^Aa?, ctpqrai. 



CHAP. XI. 

The different opinions concerning Pleasure, and the grounds upon 
which they were founded, briefly stated. 

12 IIEPI 5c r/8oi>7)? kou Xvirr/s Oecoprjacu rov tt)v Reasons 

7ToXlTLK^P <j>lXoaO(j>OVPT09 9 OVTOS yap TOV TeXowJonsidera- 
. > / % a /jx / if \ \ tionofpfea* 

& apX<>T€KT(DV, 7TpO$ O pA€7TOVT€$ €KOLOTOV TO pkV lure j, ne- 

kclkov to & ayadbv airXG>$ Xeyopw. ere 8* iceu 0618 *^* 
t&v avayKalxov hriaKfyaaOou 7T€pl avrcbv' rrju 
r€ yap apeTTfV kou tt/v . kokUlv tt)v t)6uo}v irepl 
Xviras kcu T]8ova$ eOepev, kou ttjv evSaipovlav oi 
lOTrXcixrroi ficff rjSovrj? elval <f>curiv 9 810 kcu top 

puaKapiov (bvopjaKaaiv airo tov yaiptw. Toty Three opi- 

\ ? * ~ » * / « *» n ? * A f v nions con- 

vey OVV OOK€L OVO€fXia TjOOVT] €IVCU ayCUJOV, Ol/T€cerningit. 

Ka£t avTO ovtc Kara crvpfiefirjKos* ov yap elvai 
ravrov ayaObv kou r)8ovr)v* rols 8 Zviai pep 2. 
\b€ivcu y at 8e 7roXXal <f)avXai. Era 8e tovtcovz. 

rpcTOV 9 tl Kal iraaou aytxBoVj opxos pr) ev8e\eadou 
etveu to apiorov nSovnp. "OXco? pev oiv oiJ#r;Rea*>n»ro 

ayavov, oti iraxra rioovn ytveacs eoriv €i$ (bvaiv the i»t 

opinion. 



Chap. XI. w u$ rnt v**ex*w*' fvw. That is, 

5. fyxtrimr**] Compare p. 6, 7. a rapid (ifyieit) and sensible (#wV^n$f) 

9. Xfarm$ **) neeieU] Compare transition into a state of nature. Rapid, 

p. 59, 7. since otherwise there is no sensible 

18. ut juttf aUinrn] In his Rhe- exercise of sensation. Which is the 

toric (i. 11.) Aristotle has explained reason why starving people eat greedily, 

this at greater length : v*$x%U$* e* and those benumbed with cold thrust 

nfmi i7mm r$» #«£» »W» rim rn$ their fingers into the fire ; feeling no 

ypvxm *** **rm*r**tf Meimt »*} mirin- pleasure if they be fed or warmed 



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296 



ARISTOTELIS 



alar&qTr/, ovSefiia 8e ytvtais orvyytvrjs tois reXe- 
2.<ro/, olov ovSefiia olKoSofirjais oIklol. Ktl 6 

S-crartfcptov (j>€vy€t ras rj&ovas. Er* 6 <f>povifios 

4. to akvwov 8upK€l, ou to r)8v. Era €fl7To8lOV 

T<p <f)povelv cu rjdoval, kou oo-ep fiSX\ov xa/pet,5 

fiaXXov, olov TrfV t£>v a<ppo8urUw 9 ovSeva yap 
5.ai> bvvaxrOcu, vorjaai tl iv avTrj. Er* riyyq 

ovSefiia rtSovrj? tcalroi irav dyadov Tiyyr\s epyov. 



slowly and by slight degrees. For the 
same reason there is no pleasure if the 
transit be too rapid to be sensible. This 
definition was apparently derived from 
the Timeus of Plato, p. 64. «* ft ft 
rw ffcyftf *m) Xvtrnf *to is? lunturtm. 

mipn *m( hfi>7* *mfa kkyttti*, r§ 5* gig 
ftot **<>» rtXjt Ufa HU, «i to 
n^ifitu *mt mark tfutt^h kfmUiwi. 

1. •uSifuu yirttif] This statement 
of the argument of those who endea- 
voured to prove that pleasure was not 
a good because it is a generation, and 
no generation is congenerous with its 
end, is somewhat different from that 
given in the latter part of this treatise, 
where the subject is more philosophi- 
cally considered. There it is shown 
that pleasure is not a good because 
it is a generation, and every generation 
is imperfect ; here, on the contrary, the 
reasoning is that all goods are ends, 
no pleasure is an end but a generation 
to an end, and therefore no pleasure 
is a good. See x. 2. 

The best comment on this passage 
is the summary of Plato's reasoning 
upon this subject given by Olympio- 
dorus in his Scholia to the Philebus : 
ed. Stallbaum, p. 278. %rt <rv\X»yU 
£ir«j fjth titeu rh ht»thi aynJit dr* 
9*$. n nhtn, yinw n yittrif, tttx* 



r«ir <r« tn*a tm>, trip* m •& tnsut. 
ri •$ ??!*«, kym$ir h fotrn £g* fngw 
«*••> kym$&». 

That this doctrine though generally 
attributed to Plato did not originate 
with him, seems to be indicated by 
himself in these words : £(m «?g} tt»nff 
•b% atxnxi*/xn itf it) yinttf Urn, •Wm, 
ft th* trrt ri *•{*«•«» jfrnfe » xipW 
y*t 2* rmt aS r§Sr§9 rot xJytt 

%X Uf - Philebus, p. 53. Now by the 
term jm/w^m Plato means not only 
philosophers, as Stallbaum has ob- 
served, but also what has not been 
noticed, the Pythagoreans. (See Gorg. 
p. 493. with the notes of Hetndorf and 
Buttmann.) At all events, it is cer- 
tain that the notion that pleasure is an 
Atmwk^mns, from which the other was 
derived, (see x. 2.) originated with 
the Pythagoreans. Compare Jambli- 
chus in Vita Pythag. §. 205. *if) & 
rSf «Mfi«£«/Kiffff Ivitvfiumf TtmSrm 
Xiyut ifarat rwt «*}£«; Ui/m*, «ih> 
/»}» IrJvpiav iirjfjpfF Tit* tJtm rnt 
^»Xnt »•' iff*** *m) *(*&*, fa* vXit^- 
wtm rtnt $ rmparims rnSv alHfou* •} 
hmtwfts aleJnnxns. yinrftu to rm 
Itmvrimv WtfopUn n xit**t*t « *ai 
afvrlmt *»} rw fth m\0$in*0m rn£t. 
See Stallbaum *s note on the Philebus, 
p. 34—101. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 12. 897 

*En 7rou8ia kcu ffrjpla SuoKec ras r)8ovas. Tov inwpport 
fie firj iraxras <nrov8aia9 9 on eiai kcu alaxpcu **»**• 
kcu 6v€i8i{fifi€vai, kcu en fiXafiepal' uoacoSrj yap 
ffvta tcov rjSecov. 
>on ou tcXos aXXa 
crxeSov TOUT k<TTW. 



ffvta tg>v rjhitov. "On 8' ovk apurrov tj rjSovrj, in support 

- * * '\ »\v \ / \ \ t x f ofthetnird. 

5 on ou T€Aos aXXa yevcais. ra fiev ouv Xeyopeva 



CHAP. XII. 

The inconclusiveness of the arguments, upon which these opinions 
were founded, exposed. 

13 " OTI & ou aufifiaiuei 8ia raura fir) elvcu dyaJBovx. Ar$u- 

js\ > v » ~ * *~ N *> , mentinre- 

fJLTjOe TO aplOTOV, €K TCOl/0e OTjAOV. irpCOTOU fl€V 9 fetation of 

eVcl to aya£iov 8iyS>$ (to filv yap airXSts to 8e JLT ° pi " 

, _ /\ \ e j t \ < rfu »x/i/ That goods 

XOtlvlJj Kai at (puceis kcu at €f€iy aKOAoua^aouo'iP 9 utb^h 

« \ r / \ e / v « absolute 

€OOT€ Kai OU KlVrjaet? Kai at y€V€a€l$, Kai flUandrela- 

<f>auXac Sokouccu elvai at fiev airX&s <j)auXcu tlv\ 

8 ou aXX alperai rcpSe, evecu 8 ovSe repde aXXa 

7T0T€ Kai oXiyov yjpovov^ alperai 8 ou' al 8 ov& 

\Z>rj8ovai, aXXa (f>ouvovrcu 9 ocrcu fiera Xumfs kcu 

larpeias eve/cev, olov al Ttov Kafivovrtav. En 2. Argu- 

ment. That 



Cbap. XII. is of two kinds, absolute and relative, 

Aristotle now proceeds to refute the so are habits and generations either 

first and third opinions stated in the pre- absolutely and relatively good, or ab- 

vious chapter, as well as the arguments solutely and relatively evil. So that 

used in defence of the second, though if generation be an absolute evil, it 

not the opinion itself, which he himself follows not that it is not a good, for 

adopted, as will be seen hereafter, x.3. it may be a relative good; or if it 

9. rl kyafa ?4;g«r] Aristotle now be a relative it follows not that it may 

proceeds to refute the arguments of not be an absolute good. Therefore 

those who said that pleasure is not a the argument that pleasure is not a 

good, because it is a motion and a good, because it is a generation, is in- 

generation. For as good, he observes, conclusive. 



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298 



ARISTOTELIS 



ansinf nan 
repletion 
are only ac< 
ctdentally 



eVci tov dyaOov to /lev ipepyeta to & e£t9 9 Kara 
ov/ifkfkjKOS oil KaSurraacu ei? ttjv <f>vcrucr}v e£tv 
T)8*ial eiaiit. «m $ 17 ivepyeia kv tcus iirUhftLus 

T7/9 inroXoLTTOV *%€W KCU <j)V<T€<i)9, €7T€l KCU CLV€V 

Xvttt)? kcu iiriffv/iias ei<rii> ySovai, olop ai tov 5 
0€(opetu ivtpyeuu, rrjs (pvo-cco? ovk evStow ovotjs. 
orffielov 8 ort ov r$> avr$ yaipovavp rjSet apa- 
irkripovfiivrjs re Trjf (pvaem kcu KaOeoryKvia?, 
dXXa KO0€OTTjKvias fiep tois a7r\cos rjSecm/, ava- 
ir\flpovfi€inis 8* kcu Tots kvavriovs* Kai yap o^eai 10 

Kal ITlKpOl? X a ^P 0V<riV 9 a>P OvStV OVT€ (f)V(T€L 7J8v 

ovff oarX&s rjUv. axrr ov& rjflopai c&y yap to, 



I. fan) cm *?«*»] Good is either 
a habit or an energy: as in virtue 
or the energies of virtue. Which 
latter are only good accidentally, and 
accidentally pleasant as filling up a 
natural defect, not at all times. For 
unless pain or defect has preceded 
them, or when that pain is removed, 
they are no longer pleasant. Further 
there are many energies which cause 
pleasure, and yet cause no repletion, 
nor are consequent upon any defici- 
ency, snch as those of contemplation 
(m r*S ttmfu* lAfywu). Consequently 
all pleasures are not generations ; and 
therefore as far as this argument is 
concerned, it does not follow that 
pleasure is not a good. 

Eadem partitione usus est infra, 
x. 2. mat Xiy#«*' * **' *■***> I***" 1 ' 
•Tmm r«S> nmra fv*n t rnt ft tf«f«9 
JumvXnptnt. rmm ft impmrind Urs 
«Mn, ... 4 )«!• T mSm U»u yvyt- 
nrimt U rm *ttf rfr rpfk* ***** 
ami &m»* ifinjf yfy yifpLutt mmi 

nun J* lit TTt^i wmrmt wufiaifu rag 



fita) mm) rSn m»r« r*t mlrffrut **A 
If A Tm iffprutf **l impdjutr* ft 
xmi i^afjtmrm' wWeu ft »*) uniftm nm\ 
U«-«ft; . Is autem locus, cujus causa 
hsc attulimus, aperto contra locum 
aliquem in Philebo dirigitur, ut omnino 
in tota hac disputatione auctor noster 
Platonicam rationem refutare sibi pro- 
posuit Plato enim eo loco alterum 
voluptatum genus perfectum et abso- 
lutum, nulla molestia mixtum, agno- 
scere non videtur, sed voluptatum 
nomen tantum iis assignat, quae ex 
imperfecto et quasi mutilate ad plenum 
integrum et perfectum habitum nos 
perducunt. Haec ejus sunt ipsa verba 
(Phileb. p. 42.) vel potius Socratis 
quem loquentem inducit: tJ^nrmi *$u 
r»XX4/ut, to rm Qvruts Im&rrmt \m- 

mm) *Knp****i *•) jmmmtWi *m rt*n 
mflfrfi mi) Qi'ntrt, Xmrm r* *m) kXyn- 
tins suu Qvmu *ml ***f hritm vmmwr 
itifjutr %x u tyf*&**tt4 ytynfUHL . . . us 
ft y% rw» tLvrm fuftt Sm mmtUrtiTMi, 
rmvTfif *$ rjjiv fotrAttvmwn nUthf k**- 
tt£»ftdm **{ * nftm *brS». ZELL. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 12. 



889 



ijdta 717009 aXXrjXa <rvvi<m)K*v y o5ra> kou at rj&ovcu 



CU CL7TO TOVTQDV. 



En OVK avayKJ) ZrtpOV Tl That it does 

not follow 



2. •*» **dy*n trip* ri] This is a 
refutation of the argument which has 
been explained at length, p. 296, 1. 
that the end is different from and better 
than the generation to it : that good is 
an end, and pleasure a generation, 
and therefore pleasure is not a good. 
Now in many instances the end is the 
same as the operation (see p. 5, 8.) ; 
and secondly, pleasure is an end as 
well as an operation. 

Nunc refutat earn sententiam jam 
supra propositam, qua voluptates gene- 
rationes, ortus (yttirut) et quasi tran- 
sitioned in perfectum habitum, adeoque 
ipsa? imperfects et summi boni ex- 
pertes perhibebantur. Id autem, ut jam 
significatum est, Platonis erat decre- 
tum, quern etsi non nominatum h. 1. 
Aristoteles impugnat. Quapropter non 
alieoum erit, priusquam Aristotelem 
refellentem audiamus, Platonis de hoc 
re sententiam cognoscere quam tra- 
didit in Philebo, p. 54. unde potiora 
transscribam : ri pit 'In** r§u r£t 
nrmt trr k*i, ri ¥ •» X*W i»<f*«w* 
ri rittt Ifixm ytytipun *§) yiynrm. .. . 
3w In r*}t irt^a XAfbtfUt ....!» pit 
rs yfatn *&*r»* % rnt ft «M»» (quod 
vocabulum respondet Aristotelico Vfrt), 
fr«|tfv it, . . , trirtft tit rtyrm ?»#«# 
trtripv i rnt yinitt •itr'mt Ut** Qmymt. 
i} rnt cM*t $7t*t yttieutf In** i—Qnp) 
hi, . . . Immfrnt yittttt iXXnt AxXnt 
tmrimt rtt%t i»m*rnt tn»a yiyttrtm, 
\vpx***t ft yinrtt tvtlmt trtx* yiy- 
n*S*i %*p***ns.— ~»vM4vt nhtt y$, i?«{ 
yitwif font, hix* rttit §v/t*t Ig *t*y- 
*nt yiyt4tr Mt—ri yt pmt $3 lu*m ri 
tt%** r$» ytynpttn *$} ytytur at It rf 
rtS *y*4$v f***(f t**7ti irrv ri ii n*t 
tttx* ytytiptut ut £x\nt pt*^*» itrUn-*- 
i£ tit »J*m» yt d**{ yUtff/t U™, ut &k- 



Xnt n rht rtS *y*$tv p^tmt *vrnt nHf 
rts, fy£g Mft/ut i —•vxiitp ry pntwr*trt 
rnt fHitnt *i(i, ri yiturtt pit, tvri*t 2) 
pn¥ iitrntSt *brnt iTnm, x^V 9 ^*^X U9, 
tnXtt y*{ tn tZrtt rZt Q***itrmt Alt- 
tht *y*4it Ctm **r*ytXf, Cf. etiam 

imprimis eundem Dialogum, p. 31. 
Eandero opinionem refutat Aristoteles 
etiam in Mag. Mor. ii. 7. hunc in 
modum, ut primum, quod nostro quo- 
que loco fecit, ostendat, esse etiam 
tales voluptates, in quibus nulla sit 
\M*t *t*9Xn\**tt t nullaque antece- 
dens moles tia, unde ad meliorem per- 
fectumque habitum fiat transitio, adeo- 
que non esse easdem mtfout et yitUut, 
ut voluptates e rebus cognosceadis 
(U r»v iutptv) : deinde aliud novum 
argumentum addit, quo demonstret, 
ne illas quidem voluptates, qus im- 
plendis cupiditatibus contineantur et 
prscedentes habeant molestias, vere 
yiArut dici posse. Hoc autem alte- 
ram argumentum his verbis tradit : rt 
¥ #X#» §»» Xern •Vbip.i* fani yirtrtt* 
•Ml yk^ aSrmi at mw$ rw tyuyu* *m) 
wtui £?«m) »v% iiV) yititfuf *\Xm 2m- 
prnfTa'tivfit •! rmurat ffrx&trtt r*t 
#6fkt iTmm yttiruf. lUtrmt yk^ iTtitn 
rn$ *p*9»fit y%tftitn$ yinrms fart, 
)tm tmt§ yififn Jmw Urt T *S. l*u%n 
ya\ Un rnt ^vx*t rt (Apt f nXfui» 
ifut rn *^«r^fff it Uyiiv Ithttt, raw 
pip** rb rnt "4r*xnf Iragyu **i xtnSrmt* 
n )H *ltn*tt tunrw **) Ui^yum \trh 
Hlf* it* li ri **i*m rn org «rpig« LuTm 
ri f*if ri rnt ^vxnt Ittfyw, 4 
It* rh* *ifTMf W%tyu*9, farm yintt* 
•If *t rn* $»n*y rtf rnw 9T(§rp*^*t tnXn* 
•Thu, ri ft rnt $*X*it fUpt* iQnXit. 
%pt4i tlf %1 rtt rht tMftnfw •ttrrn unu 
rmftMs §rt r*vr§ pit Urn* *lf4nrJf, h 7H 
"tyvX* *&• ZELL. 



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800 ARISTOTELIS 

that fit*- €U*u fUXrtov rrp rfiovrp* Zoirep nw ifkuri to 
u cad TcXos Ttp yevtttrctt?* ov yap yev&rei? eloiv ovSe 
fiera yevttrca? iraxraiy oAX* kvipytuu kcu reXos* 
ovdi yivopAwv ovpfialpowrur, aXXa yjxopAvtdv' 
kcu tc\o9 ov iraawv erepov tx, aXXa tS>v €iy5 
TTfV TtXeaxriP ayofuvmr rip 0vo*ew. &o kcu ov 
kclX&s €\€i to oiaOrfrqv ytvtaiv {fxtvcu ctvcu rrjv 
rjSoinjy, aXXa paXXov Xttcrtov evepyetav rip Kara 
<j>vaiv €^€(09 y curri Si rov cuaOr/rriv avepfiroSurrov. 
8oK€t Si yivwis T19 elvcu, art KvpUos ayaBoifiO 
rrfv yap ivipyww yivtaiv olovrai elvcu, eari 8 

Refutation €T€p0V. To 8 clvCU (fxivXaf OTl VOKTCD&T] WW. 

of the 3d « ft/ \ % \ v tf * \ * j. ~x * 

opinion. 7}0€(l, TO OVTO KCU OTl Vyi€UHL tVUL (f>OvXa 7T/>0? 

accidental \pTJfJUlTUrpj6p. TOVTr/ 01>V <{>avXa apxfxo, oAX' OV 
evils ©f ■ #% x / -* > \ \ \ A * \ 

pleasure, it (pavXa KOTa y€ T0VT0 9 €7T€l KCU TO U€€0p€IV 7TOT€ 15 

follow that fSXwiTTtl 7Tp09 VyUuXV, ifl7To8l^Ei 8e OVT€ <f)pOirq(T£L 

rolitsdf an Ovff €^€t OvSefUOL 7) Off) tKCUTTT}? r/8ointj, oAA* CU 

aXXorpuUy eiret cu caro tov decopelv kcu puoLvOaveiv 
Refutation puaXXov iTovi](TOvcn Oetopeiv kcu puavdavtiv. To 

argument Si Te^ptf? firj eivou tpyov tjSovtjv firjSepIav evXoywZO 

opinion. 

5. rS» us *** ciXUri?] Because Urn A kwi «••» m>n Srrn M «* thms rns 

their end is the production of a state Tfymr l^ytm to tot Ur) ri 4pm», 

different from what existed before. 4 furk rh kUkm+n r*s 3gs»r, ur' 

Thus medicine produces in the dis- mkrh r*» rtXtUf $» lpi?ytm. Paraph, 

eased or defective a state of soundness 17. mi mXXirpm] See z. 

and health which existed not before, 19. «•• » rtxm] The reason of 

and which is distinct from the operation this objection is given by Aristotle at 

which produces it the very commencement of this trea- 

10. n^mt mymSJp] yinrif A 3*0 tise. um) (At tSk fa •*» Urn l&n 

**n Jmm h hht4, In fnr$ rh 3M* *ix*** •&Hu*t !*• rtSr§ fmiXsv' §Srm 

Jmm ri nm(mt kymih um) ri Zq*w , ri yfy At xmtm lA^yum fmSXw it jr. 

Hi »ifMrf kymih l^um Jnm. Ififytmr MtmSm ym^ Iti^ytmt rix^t Urh m*- 

11 »m) yinvn fuitof mkkfam Imifain. rix$*/*m kXXm rht pb Mm/at 4 A X ^ 

ri to tbx •**"* I** * y*e rmhrn i to *v*mfM$ rpAyu rnt Ittfyumt* $ put 

Urt ybmt h^yiif yiwtg (A* ym\ yk^ ri$ ret mw^mrmh ri X wn msrm 

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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 18. 301 

oTjfjifiefiTjKev' ovSk yap oXAi?? ipcpyeias ovScfiuis 
riyyq iorlp, aXXa rrjs SwdfieW kcutol kou ff 
fivpe^LKJ) rexinj kou tj 6^07rotrjTtKri 8ok€l rjSopfjs 
etpcu. To Se top <r<o<ppopa <f)cvy€ip kou top Refutation 

5(f>p6ptfWP 8uOK€lP TOP SkVTTOP fJlOP, KOU TO TOL 6. argu- 

ft. # % % .** # flk. # ** 5 '^ ^. / m^Qcs u9Gd 

TTOUOUL /Cat T0 UTJptd 8t(DK€lP, Ttp CLVT<p AVCTOU i n support 

/ »\n v . •* » /* \ « x ** \of the same 

Trapra. €7T€t yap ttprjTou irons aya&ou air Aa>s kou opinion. 
7ra>f oiic ayajdou irourcu al r/Sopal, to® TOiavras 
tol Orjpia kou tol 7racSia 8lcok€l, kou tt/p tovtoop 
UyaXviriav 6 <f>popt(to$, to? fi€T €7TL0vfxla$ kou Xvirr/s 
kou tols aaypuoLTLKOLs (rotaurou yap ahrou) kou tos 
tovtiop inrepfioXas, Kaff as 6 okoKouttos a#co- 
Xglotos. Stb 6 adxfrpcov <f>€vy€i rat/ray, en-el cioip 
rjSopal Kal <rco<j)povo$. 



CHAP. XIII. 

Whether some Pleasure may not be the Chief Good. 

14 A AAA firjp otl Kal y) \vwq kolkop, o/ioXoyetrcu, That piea- 

\j '•' * * « <v *■» ' ( a\ "> sore is a 

KOU <p€VKTOP 7) fl€P yap airX<D$ K0LK0P, 7) 0(E T^* good as 

7rr} ifi7ro8io-TiKrj. r^J 8e <p€VKT$ to ipapriop fled'topSn!" 

<f)€VKTOP T€ Kal KttKOP, dyoBoP. OLpdyKT] 0&P TTfP 

rjSopr/p dyaBop ti eipou. a>s yap TLirtvartwiros 



%*n m %&9m*$m *vfh{mr «■> & 3vms- the virtuous energies, whatever im- 

6tu xvfrtpa* drtii Xwvt rnt xmrk rsv pedes those energies must be an evil, 

xv&Htnri»hi\n£yti*t- Schol. Seevi.3. and whatever removes that impedi- 

5. *h &\tKctf fiUi] . See Plato's ment must be so far a good. If plea- 

Philebus, p. 55. sure then is the opposite of pain and 

removes it, and pain is an hindrance 

Chap. XIII. to our energies, pleasure is in this 

17. l/»«r«lim»fl Since happiness, sense a good, 

as has been shown, is an exercise of 19. Sn^rif] See x. 2. n. 



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SOS 



ARISTOTELIS 



That since 
it is an un- 
impeded 
energy, it 
may be the 
best of aU 



Jaently, 
Iappi 



t\V€V, OV €TV(lficUP€l 17 \VCIS, (OOlTtp TO fUl^OV 

t$ eXarrovt kcu t$ Ixrcp evavrlov m ov yap av 
<f>alr) airep kokov tl elvai Trfv ySovrjv. Aptcrrou 
r ovSev KCoXvec rjSovrjv Ttva elvai, ei eviou <f>avXcu 
r/8ovai, toowep kcu emoTTj/irjv rtva evixov <f>avXcov& 
ovcrwv. tow 8e kcu avayKCuov, ehrep eKOorrjs 
ejjetos elartu evepyeiai avtfnroburTOi, el£t 17 iraxr&v 
evepyeiA eoriv evScufiovia efoe tj twos clvt&v, av 
27 ave/nroSioros, axpeTcyrdrrfv elpcu* tovto & 

eOTlP 7)8opf). G>OT€ €LTf OV Tl$ rjSovrf TO apiXJTOP, 10 

T&v iroXX&p r/8ov(ov <f>avXa>p ovc&p, el ervyep, 
cbrAcfc. kcu 8ia tovto iravres top evSaifiopa tjSvp 

oioPTOJL /MoP elvai, KCU €fl7T\€KOVO-l T7)P rj8ovr)v 

eh Trfv evSaifioviav, evXoya*?' ovSefiia yap evep- 
yeta reXeio? £fi7ro8t£ofi€in), 17 5' evScu/iopia 7W15 



where this passage is explained at 
length. Compare Gellius, N. A. ix. 5. 
Speusippus vetusque omnia Academia 
voluplatem etdolorem duo mala dicunt 
ease oppoeita inter sese, bonum tamen 
esse quod utriusque medium foret- 

5. Wifrnpn* rnd] Swwt^ «&fti> 
**X.vu iTnm nwa Irtrrnftnf i^/Vm? foot 
tip QiXtfftmt, \%*t) tlv) rnlt Wtrrnfuu 
fmvXsu. Irirrnptms itrmZim. »crs^< 
trtnSt rmt Qmmfowt fA«0a». Schol. 

7. 4 *«*»» Ififyu*] If happiness 
be an unimpeded energy of the soul 
according to every virtue or the best 
of them, and if pleasure be an un- 
impeded energy {Uifyum *9i*\w*%m§) f 
(as we have shown where it was said 
that for the term «i*far* we ought to 
use iftfAvShrrtf, and for yinnt, ip«f> 
ytm, p. 300, 6.) then it follows that 
some pleasure must be happiness. 

A ristotle, however^dtstinguishes plea- 



sure from happiness, though the great- 
est pleasure must of necessity follow 
it (See x. 3.) But here he seems 
to take the objector on his own ground, 
after having corrected his terms, argu- 
ing as though pleasure was an un- 
impeded energy. Whereas in fact, as 
he afterwards states, it differs from the 
energy, being necessarily consequent 
upon it, as the bloom upon the ripe- 
ness of the plum, •ixuin^m ft t«T# 
In^yiimt mi It minrtug Abut) r£h ip£i*r 
at fiit ya( impfpiwu i/VJ xmi «•«<* 
Xffais **) r$ <pi*u. ml ft wwnyym 
«•# lu^ytitus nmi mhtprru •$▼«* Zrr 
*X U * mpQitfrftTnen it raMi U»w i 
Wtfytm rn tihni. •» f*n f tmmi y% n 
tilnk hmfma i7mm •&? mttimt' &*•*•* 
yk\- akka 3<« r} pti %»{l£irf** fmin- 
rmS rtwt raifrit. x. 3. 

This difference does not however 
materially affect the argument. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. IS. 



SOS 



reXtuov' 810 wpoarBtLTCu 6 evSaificov r&v kv oto- 
ftart ayaOtov kcu tcdv euros kcu tt}$ rvyr)$ 9 ottws 
fir] i(i7ro8i£rjTcu ravra. oi 8e top rpox^Ofievov kcu 
top 8voTvyicu$ fieyaXcu? irepiirlirropra evSalfiova 
b(f>acrKOVT€9 elpai,, iap y ayaOos, y €KOPT€S rj 
aicovT€9 ovSeu Xeyovap. Sta 8e to TrpoorSecadcu 
Trjs Tvyr)$ 8ok€l Ttai tolvtop elpcu rj evrvyia r# 
evSaiftovia, ovk odea, eirel kcu avrrj imepfSak- 
Xovaa ifi7r68t09 iorip, kcu *<r(D$ ovk€tc €\rnr)(iav 
01 KaXeZv Sckcuop' wpos yap tt)v evScufiovlav 6 opos 
avrrjs. Kai to Suokcip 5* airavra kcu frnpia That the 

/r factofplea- 



3. lp*A%tirmi] See p. 39, 22. note. 

— ret rf #^i^# j u«»#i»] Falluntur mag- 
nopere qui putant haec Aristotelem 
dixisse contra Stoicos qui state Aris- 
totelis nondum erant ; peccarunt igitur 
inscitia temporum; seroina sane exta- 
bant earum opinionum quas postea 
amplexi sunt illi, eruta e variis dis- 
sentientibusque inter se disputationi- 
bus Socratis. Sepe autem miratus 
sum quod M. Cicero dixit in Tuscul. 
V. §. 9. de Theophrasto : •• Vexatur 
autem ab omnibus, primum in eo libra 
quern scripsit de Vita beata, in quo 
multa disputat, quamobrem is qui tor- 
queatur, qui crucietur, beatus esse non 
poesit. In eo etiam putatur dicere, in 
rotam beatam vitam non escendere." 
Plane igitur hinc cognoscitur M. Tul- 
lium non valde versatum faisse in lec- 
tione borum de Moribus librorum ; 
neque enim oportuisse purgare Theo- 
phrastum, quod judicium auctoritatem- 
que sui doctoris et in sententiis ipsis 
et in verbis secutus esset. VICT. 

11. »«> rl h»xt»] See x. 2. n. 

— **} rl &*»«?] Aristotle here ob- 
serves, that the fact of all animals, 
both rational and jrrational, pursuing 



pleasure, is to a certain extent an in- 
dication of pleasure being the greatest 
good. That some indeed, from a de- 
praved nature and vicious habits, pur- 
sue improper pleasures argues nothing 
against this inference, nothing against 
the presumption that abstractedly plea- 
sure is a good. It only shows that such 
persons follow the wrong means to the 
attainment of this end. The right per- 
ception of pleasure is infinitely influ- 
enced by the moral habits, and as 
these do not exist the same or to the 
same perfection in all, the perception 
of pleasure and consequently the pur- 
suit of it will infinitely vary. Some 
will pursue virtuous some vicious plea- 
sure, but both pursue it as a good, 
neither as an evil. And this desire for 
pleasure is divinely implanted in us, 
and consequently with an intent to be 
gratified. As much as the organ sight 
was given us to be exercised. Not 
that it is intended that we should gratify 
ourselves in every particular instance, 
any more than that eyes were given 
us to be exercised alike on every 
object to which they can be extended, 
to such indeed as are destructive of 



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904 ARISTOTELIS 



*^Sf ^ foGpiwrovf ttjp t/Sopt/p arjfieiop tl tov elval 
~* nw ro dpurrop axrrqv. 



DfOfCft it, IB 

WM(U- 

free, to be $^"1 ^ " t/ ye Tapxaaf aroAXura*, ijv rnw Xao/ 

tht Chief % . * 

Good. WAA0I . • . 

oAA «ra oi>x 17 01/717 ovr€ (pvcns ovtf efty 17 5 
apioTT) out iariv oure 8oK€t, ov8 TjSoprjp Sim- 
Kovat ttjp avTTjV iravr€Sy tJSoptjp fieprot irapres. 
ura>? Se kcu buoKOvav ov\ V v oioptcu ovtf rjv 
av (fxu€Vy aAAa rrjv avrrjv' iravra yap <f>v<rei 

That if €£€1 Tl 0€IOP. 'AAA' €ikq^HKri TTJP TOV OPO- 10 

not a good, /JUITOS KXrjpOPOfliaP CU OXOfJUlTlKCU T)8oPCU Sta TO 

then pain is , a 'w » * \ ' 

not an evil, TTACiOTaiCW T€ 7rapapaAA€lV €1$ aVTCL? KO.I TraVTOS 



qnently the pATVfcW CLVTCOV' Sia TO (JLOPa? OVP yP&plflOVS 
nappy nan ? / t # * ji N a* 

might live a CUKU TOVTOS flOPO? OIOPTCU €IPCU. <p(LV€pOV 0€ 
life of pain, \ «/ t \ •+ \ » a* \ « » / > « . 

which u #c<u art, €i /417 rjdow) ay ad op kcu rj evepyeca, ouk\Z> 
€Otou $rjp r)8£to$ top evSalfiopa' tvpos yap lieeiea 
hioi olp avrfjs, ehrep pjj ayaJOop, aAAa kou Xwrrf- 
pm €p84\€tol £rjp\ ovt€ kokop yap ovr ayadop 
f) Xvmj, ehrep firjS rfSovfj* ©are Sia tl ap <f>evyoi ; 
ovSe 8rj rfSUop 6 j3/off o tov ovrovSalov, el fir} kcu20 
at €P€py€iat avrov. 

them. Since, therefore, in the pursuit irr*xut, •? Iwuft TprUrvts tih* avrit 

of pleasure we follow a divine impulse, Jtpfuw wfa ry toy 1mm UiXton 

pleasure is a good. Compare Butlers yk^ avvi/f imtnu U^vfrac Jmu yk^ 

Analogy, i. 2. x«) Itravt* 4uu$' *3r* **) r^og rriv 

3. ftp*] Hesiod. Op. 761. l&m*n «r«fi \n.a*rw rSt Ifrn rpetiim 

9. *&tr* yk{ Qvfu] In e a nde m %u /*ii }v***$v(itnf, *t If 2v*rtf Sir* 

sententiam omnibus naturalibus divioi Qvrt*$» ««) mmXtZ. ZELL. 

quiddam inesse, luculentus locus est 21. *l XA^ytuu] Either pleasure, be- 

Aristotelis alius de Partib. Animal, i. ing an energy, must be good, or the 

§. 5. p. 481. C. if *m*i yif rtlt life of the happy man is not pleasant; 

QvfiHtif Ivirri rt 4mypm*rh' *#i **tei- the latter is false, therefore the former 

n; 'HfdxXurii Xiytrai *£t r»U( is true. 

Z'tMt UVUt, TOVf &*uX4fUf4Uf U&Ttjf 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 14. 



805 



CHAP. XIV. 

Of Bodily Pleasures. 

ITEPI fie Sn T&V <T(OlKlTlK(OV TiioV&V iwUTKeiT- Objection, 

~ v/ « v / <« s • N anditi 

T€OU T019 A€YOV<riV OTl €VUU y€ TjOOVCU CUpeTCU answer. 

€T<f)68pa 9 olov al KaXaiy aAA* ot)j( al acofiariKal 
kcu wept as o okoXooto?. dca ri oSv al kvavr'uu. 
sXvwcu \wy(h)paL\ kokco yap ayajdov kvavriw. rj 
ovtcd? ayajdeu al avayicaiat, ore kcu to fir} kclkov 
ayadov ioriv; ij ^XP L TOV iyo^ou; rS>v pkv 



Chaf. XIV. 
After haying examined and refuted 
objections respecting pleasure, and 
shewn in what way it may be con- 
sidered the chief good, as necessarily 
emanating from the activity of the 
noblest energies, be now proceeds to 
speak concerning bodily pleasures, 
determining four questions about them. 

I. Whether and how far the plea- 
sures of the body may be said to be 
good. 

II. Why the pleasures of the body 
are more generally desired than those 
of the mind. 

III. Why the pleasures of the mind 
are superior to those of the body. 

IV. Why the same pleasures do not 
always delight us. 

In the beginning of this chapter he 
meets the following objection. If, as 
you assert, says the objector, some 
pleasures are good and eligible, such 
as those derived from the virtuous 
energies; but some are bad, such as 
excessive bodily pleasures, and those 
in which the intemperate delight; 
why are the pains, which are contrary 



to these pleasures, evil and to be 
avoided, for good is opposed to evil ? 
If therefore, the pleasures of the body 
are an evil, it follows that those which 
are contrary to them, bodily pains, 
are a good. 

To this Aristotle replies, that bodily 
pleasures are not evil, nor yet abso- 
lutely good, but good in so far as they 
are not evil and are necessary. 

2dly, That they are good to a cer- 
tain degree as far as mediocrity is 
observed in them. As in the case of 
the habits. Of those habits of which 
there can be no excess on the side of 
the good, (as in the case of the intel- 
lectual habits,) there can be no excess 
of the pleasures resulting from the 
exercise of those habits. The excess 
only of pleasure, therefore, is censura- 
ble; that is, these pleasures are only 
accidentally censurable and to be 
avoided. But it is not so with pain ; 
for all pain is an evil and to be 
avoided, whether it be more or less. 
That is, pain is not accidentally and in 
certain circumstances, but absolutely, 
an evil. 



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806 ARISTOTELIS 

yap €£ea>i> kcu Ktirq<r€(ov oatov /irj iart rov fieX- 
tlovo? v7r€p/3o\r/, ov8e rfjs TjSovrjs* oa&v 8 iort, 
kcu T7)$ rj8ovrj$ *otLv. t£>v 8e aco/xartKCov ayaOwv 
icrrlv xmepfioXr), teal 6 <f)avAo? t$ 8uok€iv ttjv 
{nrepfioXr/p icrriv, aAA' ov ray avayKaia? 7rdvr€9& 
yap yatpovar't ir<as kcu oyj/ots kcu oivois kcu dxf>po- 
Suriots, aAA' ov\ toy Set. kvavrlw? 8 itti tt}s 
Xwrr/s' ov yap ttjv vwepfioX^u (frevyet, aAA* oXtos' 
ov yap iort rfj wrepfioXfj Xwrrj ivavrui aAA 17 
r<p Suokopti TTjv vwepfSoXrjP. 10 

The error in 'Eft-*! 8 OV ILOVOV Set TaXr)0€9 eliretV aAAal5 
theobjec- N \ / L \ / 

lion more K ou TO atTtOP TOV favSoV?' TOVTO yap aVu/3o\- 
fully ex- ^ 

amined. XeTOU WpOS TTfP TTtOTtP* OTaP yap evXoyOP <f>apj} TO 

8ia ri <f>aiu€TCU dXrjOh ovk ov aXrfOe^y irtarevetp 
irotel t$ aXrjOet fiaXXop' wore Xzktcop 8ta rl\5 
<j)atPOPTCu ai acoftarcKal rjSoval alpercorepcu. 7r/w5- 
tov fikv oSp 8tj on ifCKpovet ttjp Xwrr/p' kcu 8ta 
tols wrepfioXas tt/s Xvwqs, cos ovcrqs iarpeias, 
tt/p 7)8ovr)v SuoKOvat ttjv imepfiaXXovcrav KCU 
oAa>y ttjp (TCQ/xaTLKr/i'. a<f>o8pal 5e ylpoprcu at 20 
larpeuu, 8to kol Su&KOprat, 8ta to irapa to epap- 
ii. Question, riov (balveaOcu. Kat ov owovSouov 8rj 8ok€l 

Tbatsuch r *\ v 

pleasures r) TJOOPTJ Ota OVO TOVTa, a>OVT€p €tpT)TGU, OTt Ot 

good, as fiev (pavArj? (pvat&s etat 7rpag€ts, 7) €*c yepenj^ 

necessary dOOWep Oljpiov, 7) 8t €00$ , OtOV CU TG>P (f)avX(OV25 



4. n«} • f*Sx»§ ] Compare p. GO. dolorum eo vehementius appetuntur, 

20. rp^c**] Because the opposition to quia non solas nee per se sentiuntur, 
the previous state of pain is greater and sed composite cum ipsis doloribus sibi 
more sensible. See the note p. 295, 18. contrariis, quo fit, ut eo clarius ap- 

21. r«^A t§ Ifmtritt] Praepositio pareant animosque vehementius move- 
wm^jk hie valet juxta, ad, in compara- ant. ZELL. 

tion*, hoc sensu : voluptates medicinae 23. tlpr**) See p. 280. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 14. 807 

dvOpcoTTCov. al 8 larpelcUj art ivSeow, ical €^€£v»d»^ure 
BeXriov 7) yiveaffcu. al 8e crvuBaivovo't reXeov- The more 

/ \ r> rs v <T^ v violenttbe 

fieucop' Kara crvfxpepTjKo? oiv cnrovoaicu. cripaio, the 

t* / «* \ * j«>\9 «v *»* more extra* 

ouokovtcu oia to rtpoopcu eivcu wro raw aAAat?"gantu 

n * / / » \ ~ « « «./ , thepleisure 

6/il) OVVapL€V(OV \€Up€lV' CLVTOl yOVV CLUTOIS Oiya? which u 

rtvay irapaxrK€vd{flvo m iv. orav fiev oiv a/SAo/Setr, remedy, it. 
ai/eiriTifirjTOi/, orav 8e fiXafiepd?, <f>avXov' ovrt 
yap e\ovaLv erepa iif) oh xodpw<nv J to t€ 
firj8erepov iroXXot? Xinrqpov 8ta ttjv <f>v<TLV m act 

10 yap novel to ftpov, coairtp kou ol <f)v<rtKol Xoyoi 
fiaprvpovcri, to bpav kou to oucoveiv <f>axrKOPT€9 
elvcu Xumjpov' aAX' rjSrj crvinjOci? iafiev, ©y (f>ouriv. 
6ftotW 8 iv fiev rg veoTr/Ti 8ta ttjv av^rfciv 
(ocnrep ol olv&fievoi 8uzk€ivtcu, kou t]8v rj veoTr/f 

15 ol 8e fieXayxpXiKol r^v <f)V<rii> del Seovrou iarpeia?' 
teal yap to croofia doucvofievov SiareXei Std ttjv 
KpaatPj kol del iv ope^et cr(f)oSpa elaiv. eijeXauvet 
Se rj8ovri Xv7rrjv rj t ivavrla kou t\ Tvxovaa, 
idv y i<rxypd m kcu 8ia tavra okoXclotoi koi (pavXoc 



1. J#i/» fiiXrMf] It is better to have him to drink more; the natural punish- 

than to acquire: it ig better never to ment of all self-indulgence, 

be hungry nor to want, than to be 18. r»£#5r«] Thus our old proverb; 

satisfied and filled. " exceeding sorrow is exceeding dry." 

8. ri « pttlirtpt] The slate of Men in great grief drown their sorrows 

neutrality. by drinking, although drinking is not 

13. «dgnr<t] The mflfatt of youth the opposite of their sorrow. And thus 

produces in them a natural Mum, in other instances, anger or revenge is 

which, besides their natural predis- mitigated in their breasts, though they 

position that way, makes them more do not meet with the peculiar pleasure 

intent on gratification. As the drunk- which they seek, but with the grati- 

ard, the more he drinks the more he fication of some other passion, such 

thirsts, the more does he lose the as malice, or the like. See the 

natural advantage of resisting drinking, exquisite chapter in the Rhetoric, 

nature cooperating, by producing an ii. 3. 
IfttU, with his predilection, in causing 

x2 



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808 



ARISTOTELIS 



Pleasures 
without 
pain do not 
admit of 
excess, mod 
such are the 
natural 

as those of 
eontempla- 



ylvowui. At # avev Xvttcov ovk expvatv irircp- 

/5o\r)i>. aSrcu 8c al tS>v <j>v<xet r/Secw /ecu pr} Kara 
(rvfJLfkftrjKO?. Ac/to 8e Kara ovfifiefhjKO? rj8ia ra 
tarpevopra' oti yap crvpfiaivti larpevecrBou tov 
wrofUvoPTO? vyiovs irparrovrbs ti, Sea tovto r)8v$ 
Sotcei elwu' <f>v<r€i if rjSea, a iroici irpa^tv rij? 

TOUtO-St (f)V<T€<D9. OVK 0€l if OV0€V 7j8v TO CLVTO 

Sea to p*) airXrjp rjpj&v tlvcu tt)v <f>vo-iu 9 oAA* 

ivclval Tl KCU €T€pOV, KOL0O (f)0apT(i, G>OT€ OJ>, Tl 

0aT€pov 7rpdrrg 9 tovto rg erepa (f)v<T€t rrapalO 
<f>v<rti>, trrav if lcra(rj y ovre Xinrrjpov 8oK€i ovff 
rj8v to irpaTTOfUvov* eirel €* tov tj <f>vcri? anrXr} 
€?i7, aei rj avrrf 7rpa^i9 7j8iarrq eorai. 8io 6 Oeo? 
aei fiiav kou airXijv yaipti 4)8ovi)v % ov yap puovov 



4. rtS iw/titnrH iyuiSs] Non 
sine fructu medicos foerat Aristoteles, 
cum dicat in aegro quidquid sanum 
atqne integrum subest operari ut vale- 
tndo redeat; et moritur animal, si 
sanss parti non satis virium est, ut 
89gritndinem atque adeo medicamen- 
tum superet. MICH. 

8. A*Xj»»] The energies of man 
are as various as there are different 
habits of the soul and of the body. 
But upon the exercise of these habits 
fellows .its own peculiar pleasure. 
Consequently our nature not being 
simple and uniform (Arxfjf, simplex 
dumtaxat et unum), neither can our 
pleasures be. And further, as the 
nature of the soul is so very different 
from that of the body, that which is 
naturally pleasant to the one will not 
be so to the other. But when equality 
takes place (see p. 222.) so that an 
undue influence be not given to either, 
then the energy of the soul (r* «*£«*- 



WpiMv) is neither pleasant nor painful 
to the body. Not pleasant, as not 
being sensible, not painful because the 
equality before mentioned is observed. 
iwirmp ft Itk riff «ig< r*» m^triit ptXi- 
Tiif rji 4">X? «* **p* «s«XMrf*Vp, 

*u% jfotrm fUt r# rSf»» xeJUtt tine 
ti*h Miftnrt, m iXytTX. Paraph. 

13. 0tif — JkwXnt] God having a 
single and uniform nature, has only 
a single and uniform energy, conse- 
quently a single and uniform pleasure. 
Not that God is in motion, or requires 
motion for his energies ; (•• Behold, I 
$U upon my throne, creating all things 
new") ; for it is wrong to suppose 
there can be no energy without mo- 
tion. (See Phys. Ausc.iii. l.sq.) For 
there is energy without motion, for 
motion requires both time and space. 
And further, every energy proceeding 
from the perfect habit, and especially 
from the most perfect habits ; (see x. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VII. 14. 



309 



KLin)<r€a>9 ioTiv €v4py€ia aXXa kcu aKivrfaljas, kcu 
-qSovr) fj&Wov 4v rfpepua iariv r/ h> Kivfjati. 
fierafioXr) Se ttolvtcov yXvKVTarov, Kara top irovq- 
tt)V) Sia irovr/plav riva' axrirep yap avOpconros 
&€VfJLerdf3o\o9 6 iroirqpo?, kcu t) <f>vcrt9 rj fkofiew) 
f£€ra/3o\rj? m ov yap airXrj ov& emeucqs. 

Uepl fiev oiv ey/cpareia? #cat dxpaxrlas kcu 7T€/jI conclusion. 
TjSovfjf kcu \v7nj9 eiprjTOUy kcu ri eKoorov kcu ttg>$ 
to. filv ayaOa avr£>v earl ra 8e Koucd' Xoiirbv &€ 
10 kcu irepl <f)i\ta? ipov/iev. 



3.) more resemble rest than motion, 
and so consequently will the pleasure 
resulting from them. But it maybe said, 
if change is the sweetest of all things, 
and God changes not, how can he 
enjoy the greatest pleasure 1 To which 
Aristotle replies, that change is only 
accidentally the most pleasant of all 
things, only inasmuch as we are im- 
perfect beings. 

3. *H*rnt] Euripid. Orest. 234. 

5. 4 ?«rif 4 tapim pir«0«A4f] 
Compare the Rhetoric i. 11. mm ri 
furafi&XAuf ftv* its Qvrn ya^ yiynrm 
furmfidXXitr ri yl{ »M at) fcri£/bX«i> 
wmu rns *m$i*r*9nt tfym. Sfa tt^nrm, 
furmfi^ it&trm yXimi. 

A state of excess is a state contrary 
to nature; for nature aims at the 
mean, the state of perfection, the 
natural being the perfect state. (See 
p. 68, 8.) But a continuance in the 
same thing produces an excess of it, 
and consequently a change from it, 
diminishing that excess, restores us to 
a stale of nature; and therefore, change 
is pleasant. 

I cannot help observing by the way, 
that if Aristotle's theory be correct, 
(tifarAfaX* i srogSf,) and there can 
be no doubt that it is, this observa- 



tion furnishes another solution, which 
I do not remember to have been ob- 
served, why the wicked man is upon 
inferior ground, ceteris paribus, with 
the good man, even for the mere ac- 
quisition of wisdom and literary emi- 
nence. This proneness to change in 
the immoral man is not merely the 
result of an uneasy conscience, but 
also of a physical deterioration pro- 
duced by his evil habits ; for over and 
above the natural uneasiness and 
restlessness of guilt, (see ix. 4.) it 
would seem that immorality itself, be- 
sides its influence on the moral feel- 
ings, not only increased our natural 
deficiencies, but produced certain de- 
teriorating effects upon our other fa- 
culties not directly moral, of which 
(from experience) we clearly perceive 
the effect, but cannot trace the cause. 
As Eve's moral guilt produced a phy- 
sical change in the universe. 

So saying, her rash hand in evil hour 

Forth reaching to the fruit, she 
plucked, she eat ! 

Earth felt the wound ; and Nature 
from her seat, 

Sighing through all her works, gave 
signs of woe. 

Paradise Lost, ix. 



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INTRODUCTION TO BOOK VIII. 



In the fourth chapter of the Tenth Book, Aristotle 
distinguishes the whole of this treatise into four principal 
divisions* First, into Happiness, which is the end of all 
Moral Philosophy ; secondly, Virtue, which is the effi- 
cient cause of Happiness ; thirdly, into Pleasure, which 
is inseparably united with it ; fourthly, into Friendship, 
which, although not a virtue itself, is closely allied to 
Virtue, and is especially necessary to a life of Happiness. 
The first book is devoted to the consideration of the first 
division; the second, third, fourth, and fifth, to the 
investigation of Moral, as the sixth to that of Intellectual 
Virtue ; the seventh to that of Pleasure. This, then, 
and the ninth book, are reserved for the discussion of 
the fourth division; and in pursuing this subject, Aristotle 
follows the same method which he has observed through- 
out this treatise ; first, investigating the definition of 
Friendship, then dividing it into its separate species; 
thirdly, comparing those species with each other, and 
examining what are their peculiarities, and what are 
natural to different forms of government; and, lastly, 
the causes of its decay and destruction. 

To us, indeed, who are not accustomed to regard 
Friendship as of so much weight in a system of Morals, 
Aristotle may seem to have given an undue importance 
to this part of his subject. Not so to the Greeks. 
They had been accustomed to see the friendships of indi- 
viduals, and the kraigelai which existed in different forms 
among them, as the organs not only of great political 
changes and revulsions in the state, but as influencing the 
minds and morals of the people to an almost inconceivable 



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312 INTRODUCTION. 

extent The same influence which the press exerts among 
us, did these political and individual unions amongst 
them. To make them therefore serviceable to the state, 
and to promote its objects, seems early to have attracted 
the attention not only of politicians, but also of philo- 
sophers. Hence discussions upon this subject form a very 
prominent part in the Socratic dialogues and in the poli- 
tical investigations of Plato. We see Socrates eminently 
trusting to such an instrument for furthering those moral 
views of which he was the strenuous advocate ; drawing 
around himself as a centre those congenial tempers, 
whose minds were framed not only for receiving the 
precepts he wished to convey, but also for uniting with 
himself and each other in the firmest bonds of friendship, 
and thus carrying his principles out into action with 
greater efficiency. 

The political character of all moral philosophy among 
the Greeks, the subserviency of individual to public 
good, the direction of their energies to the one great 
end of the state, the desire of promoting this to the 
greatest extent by making the end of each identical* with 
the end of all, the necessity of individual esteem to fur- 
nish motives for virtue and goodness which a diviner 
teaching supplies to us, indicate the reason, why so great 
a political engine as Friendship, arising, no doubt, ori- 
ginally from the defective education of the female classes 
amongst the Greeks, and supplying the deficiencies of 
domestic sympathies and domestic friendships, occupies 
so much the attention of philosophers. 

Indeed, though so considerable a portion of this work 
is devoted to this subject, the reader must still have re- 
course to the Politics to see it entirely developed and 
applied in all its bearings. 



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ARISTOTELIS 
ETHICA NICOMACHEA. 

LIB. VII. 

CHAP. I. 

Of Friendship— its use both publicly and privately — and why the con- 
sideration of it is proper for a Moral Philosopher. 

META Se toSto. icepl (ptAia? eiroir av SteXfelv* The con- 

# \ 3 / a » > ** v «p > f nezion of 

eari yap apcnj tis rj /i£T aperrj^ en o avayKcuo- Friendship 

» v a' , * ^ jl '\ »* ^ «N »whh Virtue, 

rarov eis top piov avev yap <piA&p ovoets Zaoit and its ne- 

* >~ v \x \ j /i\ '. \ \ cewityto 

av iV v 9 *X a>p Ta Aowra ayaffa irama kcu yap different 

. x ~ \ » n \ » / / sutesand 

birKovTovcri Kai apyas kcu dvvaareias jce/mp/ifi'otffages. 
8oK€t <f)l\<DV /jLaXurr elvcu Xr 96 "*' TL Y*P o(f>e\o* 
rf)9 toiovtt/s everqpias axfHupeOciovjf evepyealas, 
rf ylyp€TOi fiaXiora kcu eircuveran-aTTj irpo? (fylXovs; 
rj 7tw av rrjprjdeir) kcu aw{pvr avev <f)i\a>v ; oarp 
10 yap 7t\€udv, TOo-ovr(p e7rta'(f>aX€aT€pa. iv irwuf. 
re kcu reus XolttoLs 8voTV\icus puoprfu olovrcu 
Karaxf>vyrju elvcu tow 0/Xow. jcoj veois Se irpibs 
to avapuaprrjTov kcu irpajf&vrepoi? irpo* Oepwrrtiav 



2. i^m Tit ] Amicitia autem est exhibet proportionale ut infra dicetur $ 

qucdam virtus, in quantum scilicet est vel saltern est cum virtute in quantum 

habitus electionis ut infra dicetur, et scilicet virtus est causa versa amicitie. 

reducitur ad genus justiti* in quantum Aquin. 



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S14 ARISTOTELIS 

kcu ri> iXXnwov rip ir/>a£a»r it oaBivtiav fiorffel, 

TOt9 T iv OKfKQ TTpW T&S KoXoS Wpa£etS* " OVV 

n 8v 9 ipyppivuT kcu yap vaijacu kcu TrpaJ-ou 

< ^*» > »&raflrrfl»rg/HH. QhMret r iwirapyptv eouce irpos 

pp*^* to yeytwqpAvov Tip ytwqaavTi kcu irpos to 5 

*** ycwfjaav t$ yewrfOevri, ov povov iv avOpwroi? 

aXXa kcu iv opvuri kcu roiV itX&uttois tAv Cqxov, 

kcu T019 opocOvim irpo? aXXjjXa, kou pjaXiara 

roiV avOpmrotf) o6*v tovs ijnXavOpamov^ iirai- 

vov/uv. foot 8 &v T& kcu iv tcus irXavais wio 

oikhov ottos avOpomos apffpmnp kcu <f)iXov. 

Presemnr *Eo(JC€ 8$) KCU TOS TToAciff <TVV€y*lV J) <f>t\la, KCU 

ol vofwOercu paXXov ircpl oarrqv oTrovSdfav ^ 
Trfv Succuocrvmjv' rj yap opovoia opoiov ti rg 
<f>t\la eoiK€v elvcu, Tavrip 8e paXiar i<f>Uvrcui5 
kcu tt/v araxnv eydpav oiaav paXurra ii-eXau- 

doing away VOVCIV. Koi <f>iXfDV p&V OVTfQV OvSeP 8cl 

pecessityof SlKCUOOUVrf^ SiKCUOt 8 OVT€9 WpoaSioVTCU (f)l\la?, 

being other- /col T&V SlKOUDV TO fJUaXlCTTa (f>iXuCOV €tVCU 8oK€l. 
wise com- % f m» » **/» »\\ / 

mendable. OV pOVOV O CLPCLyKCUOV €OTlV aXXa KCU KoAov* 20 

tovs yap 0tXo0/Aow iircuvovpeVy rj T€ iroXv<f>iXia 

SOKCI T&V KOiX&V €V Tl €lVai 9 KCU tvtOl TOV9 a&TOVf 

oiovrai avbpas ayafiovs elvat iccu 0/Aot/?. 



2. rvf ri W] See Homer's U. K. x w *** f'**»» *"* M $ep t §rnrm **) r«- 

224. fprvnit »«2 tauufonr*. 

12. Uixt tt *eu\ See Polit ii. 1. 19. ri /UXtrrk] The highest of the 

— wiXus rmix$t»} Compare Plato's JtW» appear to belong to friendship, 

Gorgias, p. 607. E. for) T ti **f»i t J See chap. vi. p. 327. sq. 

KmXXUxut, nmi tipiri* %m\ yn* "^ 23. kyai&t *m) ^iX«av] See ix. 4. 

htbf mm! Mynfvt rftf svufmun rvti- 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VIII. 2. 315 



CHAP. II. 

Some doubts stated respecting its nature and its origin. 

2 AIAM4>I2BHTEITAI Se irepl aunrjs <w#c TB ,t.ome 

» x/ e\ \ t r ' >»/ think it to 

oXiya. oi fitv yap ofioiOTT/ra riva rtcfeairti'beasimiia- 

»\ \ \</ ./v tf /% \ tf f rity, others 

avrrfv teat tovs o/ioiov? (piAov?, o&€P rov ofiocov noU 

(JXWLV G>S TOP OfLOLOV, KOU KoXoLOV 1TOTI KoXoiOV, 

5kou o<ra Toiavra' oi & eij ivavrlas Ktpa/uw 
iravras row toiovtov? oAAi/Acw <f)aoiv elvcu. 

Kat 7T€p\ OLVTtoV TOVTWP ai/WrepOV iwiforOVO't Some again 

\ i f t? ' '* * *l ' » ** sought for 

KOLl (pVCTlKODTepOV, hdVpanOTJ? fl€V (pOCTKCOV €paU the reason 

\ v a ** >• /i ~ » ~ * \ \ of it in na- 

ft€iv o/ippov yaiav gr/pav&eurav, epav 0€ aepvov tore. 

AQovpavov ir\r)povpi€VOV opfipov irtatZv 4? youav, 
kou 'HpaucXeiTO? to avrUjovv <rvp(f)epov kou €#e 
tg>v 8ia(f)€p6vT<DV KaXklarrqv ap/xoi/iau kou iravra 
kclt tpiv yiveaOaC c£ kvavrvas Se tovtols aXXoi 
re Kai 'E/oredoieA^?* to yap o/xoiov tov 6/xoiov 

\bt<f)U<r6aL. Ta fieu odu (j)vcriKa t£>v airopn^pA" But such a 

»i//i /"» \ f« ~ / considers* 

rcoj/ apcurcta) (^ou ya/t> oitceia rqs 7rapov<rrf 9 tionb&h. 

/1 \. & & » \ »/i \ \t/^ missed, as 

(TKeyecos) oaa earn/ avUpamiKa Kat ainjKti not being 
cas* ra ^17 /cat to. TraOrj, ravr €7rLCTK€\j/cop€0ay fhStreatise. 
dlov 7TOT€pov iv iraxri yiverai (f)i\[a rj ov^ o\6v 
20 T€ p.o\6r]pov9 ovras <f>L\ovs eivai, kou iroTepov 



Chap. II. At ah) r»t tfMin Ayu hit mt riw 

2. •/ plf ya*(\ Platonem intelli- 3/t*«>. 

gere videtur in Lyside ita statuentem. 5. *i^«/Mi7f] See the Rhetoric, ii. 4. 

Vid. ibid. $. 25. p. 30. ed. Heind. 8. E^«ril w ] See Euripides, vol. ii. 

ZELL. p. 972. Ed. Oxon. 1833. 

4. r» o/Mtn'] Cf. Horn. Odys. P. 1 1 . 'H^mXut^ ] Diog. Laert. ix. 7. 

218. Menag. See Plato's Sympos. p. 187. 



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sie 



ARISTOTBUS 



\v ttSof rip <fk\tas iariP tj irXcw. ol pjev yap 
ew oio/upoi, vri eridexenu to paXXov kcu to 
fyrrovy oi\ uuwtp irewurreuKCuri arjfuup* beyercu 
yap to fiSXXov kcu to f/rrov kcu to. erepa t$ 
elite. ctprjTcu 8 irrrep axrrwv epnepotrdev. 6 



chap. in. 

The definition of Friendship investigated generally. 
Tie object TAXA X OP yivOlTO 7T€p\ OVT&P ifkUTCpoV 

yvmpurdepTW tov <f>tXrp-ov' Sofcei yap ov ttop 
<f>iXeui$cu dXXa to (foikr/rov, tovto 8 clvcu ayafiav 
rj tjSv 7} xprjaifiov. Sof-eie X cut ypf)<ripxnr elvcu 
8v ov y literal ayaOov ti rj rj8ovrj 9 wore (ptArp-alO 
m> etff rayajQov t€ kcu to rj8v m Tekq. irorepov 
o$p TayaBov <f>t\ov<rw q to airrois ayaOov; 8ta- 
ifxovet yap ivlore tovto. bpuouos 8e kcu irepi to 
q8u. Sohci 8e to axmp ayaBov (fxXelv eKcurros, 



which is 
threefold; 



ti !» */^w] 8ome considered it a 
sufficient proof that friendship was not 
equivocal from its admitting of more 
and less ; for things which admit of 
more and less, are under the same ge- 
nus and uni vocal. Aristotle replies 
that this proof is not valid ; for things 
which differ in species admit of more 
and less ; as substance (•6r<«) and ac- 
cident (Mp0i0*tffc). differing in spe- 
cies, admit of more and less ; for acci- 
dent is less substantial (JWs) than 
substance. That- is to say, some per- 
sons imagined that because friendship 
differed in quantity, as, for instance, 
the friendship of the bad is less than 



that of the good, that friendship there- 
fore could not differ in quality or 
species : whereas Aristotle shows that 
difference in quantity will constitute 
different species, as in the instance 
above given. 

4. rk trt{* rf ittu] Things dif- 
ferent in species. 

mirth f/M«^«rlm, i«»i ft i/{*Vfa If wTf 
\*w%wrm*Ui rm N<*#/M*;gi««f. Schol. 



Chap. III. 
12. Tmymtn fiUvrn] See iii. 4. 
14. M] See p. 308. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VIII. 3. 817 

teal clpcu curAco? ficp rdyaObu ^tXrjTOPy ckoot<p 
8c to iicaoTcp. <f>tXci & ckootos ov to op avrcp 
dyaObp dXXa to (f>oup6fJLCPOP. Siotaci 5* ov8cp m 

COTCU yap TO (f>iXr}TOP <f)aip6fJL€POP, Tpl&P 8 whence it is 

bovTw 8i a <f)i\ov<riVy eni ficp rg t£>p ctyi;j(Gn/ that there 
(piXr/aa ov XcycTat (btXia' ov yap cotip aPTt-Wndsof. 

a f » » \ / 9 » /% « *■» friendship* 

(pi\r)(ri9 9 ov8c fiovXjjo-L? ckclpwp ayauov' ycXoiop 
yap taw? T(p ofpep fiovXcaOai Taya&aC aXA* ct7rcp 9 
aco^eadat fiovAerai avrop 9 ?pa avro? eyji. t§ 

10 de (f)t\q> <j)aoi 8clp fiovXcarOcu rayaOa ckcipov 
epetca. tow 8c fiovXoficpov? ovtco Tayada cvpovs 
XeyovaiPy cap ftrj ravrb Kal Trap ckcipov yiyprjTaC 
cvpoiav yap ip apruirerropdoai, <f>iXiap clpcu. tj 
irpoaOcrcop firj XavOdvovaav' iroKKoi yap ciaip 

lbevpoi ols ov\ iatpaKaaip, v7roXafi/3apov(ri 8c ctnci- 
kcis clpai r) xprjaifiovs* tovto 8c tovtop /cap 
ckcipcop tl9 irdOoi irpbs tovtop. cipoi ficp o$p 
ohrot (fraipoprai aXXr/Xois* (piXov? 8c irS>$ Sv Tts 
cviroi Xapdapopra? cor c\ovatP cavrois ; 8ci apa 

20evpo€?p dXXr/XoL? Kal fiovXecrOai Tayada pit) Xap- 
Qapopras 8i cv tl tg>p ciprj/jLCPcop. 



6. awQiXnrts] For which reason tone, ii. 4. f Ai#r T IrrU I p\»f *«} 

the notion of there being a friendship ifrtpXiuptng. Joitm Ti $fk*t Cnn 

on the part of man towards the gods, «< »3r*t %x*n oUptw *(« ixxfaivg. 
is repudiated in the Mag. Mor. 11. tSrws] See ix. 5. 

— Arrifiknns] Compare the Rhe- 



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818 ARISTOTELIS 



CHAP. IV. 

Of the three species of Friendship. 

And these AIA4EPEI 8c Tavra aXXrjXanr elSei' KCU cu3 
io species. faXr/cei? apa kcu cu <j)t\uu. rpta 8rj ra rrj? 
<f>tXia? €?&;, l<rapi0/ia rots (fHXrjroif' Kajff Sea- 
otov yap kariv airrK^iXrfa-is ov Xavdavovaa. oi 
8e <f>iXovvT€9 aXXrjXov? fZovXovrcu rayada aX-5 

But friend. XrjXotS TOUTQ <f)lXoV<Tll>. Oi /16V 0$V 8lOL 

formed for TO YpVO'lUOP (blX0VVT€? aXXnXoV? OV KOjff CLVTOV9 

thesakeof *C' >~ £ * , / , „ , 

gain or (f)lAOV<TlV, aAA yiyV€Tdl Tl CLVT019 Trap OAr 

areonly'ac-AttAGM' aya0OV. OflOUOS 8k KCU 01 8l 7)8oV7)V m OV 

cidental; , , , 

yap rip ttoiqvs nvas eivou ayawctxri tovs evrpa-\o 
7re\ov9, aAA* ort r/Sei? avrois. ot t€ 8tj 8ia to 
yj>r](TL\Juov (fyiXovure? 8ia to avrols ayaBov orep- 
yovai 9 kcu oi 81 ^Soprjv 8ia to avrois r)8v y kcu 
°^X V ° fa^ovfievo? €OTiv 9 aXX % tj ^prjaifio^ r/ 
7}8vs. koto, crvfifieffyKos re 8rj al <f)tXlai avral\& 
eiaip' ov yap 17 iariv oowep icrrlp 6 <f)iXovfievo? 9 
Tavrg 0tAetrat 9 aAA* rj Tropi^pvarw ol fikv ayoSov 

and as such Tl 01 & 7)8oVT)V. EvdiaXvTOl 8t) OL TOiaVTal elcri, 

are easily x , »-«,.,%% 

destroyed. flTJ Oiaft€VOVT<DV aVTCOP OftOKDV €OLV yap /JL7fK€Tl 

rjSeis rj xpr/aifioi toci, iravoirrcu <f>iXovvre$. to 20 



Chap. IV. which are formed for the sake of gain 

1. rrnvrti] sc. rk QiXnrt. or pleasure are merely accidental, for 

2. <pi*.fout—$t\Ut] Aristotle him- the parties love each other merely 
self distinguishes these words afterwards, accidentally, as far as they possess 
(see chap. vi. p. 326, 14.) the first being those accidentia of wealth or fortune, 
passions, the other habits. which are the objects desired. 

15. xmvk rt//*/3i/3»«$f] Friendships 



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ETHICORUM LIB, VIII. 4. 319 

8e xprj<ri/iov ov Sta/ievei, oAA' aXAoT€ aXXo 
yiyverai. airoXvOivros oiv 8t a (f>iXoi rjarav, 
SiaXverou /cat r\ <f)tXla 9 ay? ovarfs rfj9 0tAtas , irpos 
itceiva. MaXiora & kv rols irpetrfivTous 17 of these, 

STOiavrr} 8ok€l <f)iXla yipeaOou (ov yap to ?)£i; useful is 

01 TqXlKOVTOl SltoKOVCTLV aXXa TO aXfyeXlflOv), KOU rated by old 

t<ov tv cuc/iT) kou veow oaoi to avpxpepov buoy 
kov&lv. ov irdw 8 oi tolovtoi ovSe ovtfacrt. /act 
aXXr/Xcov' ivior* yap ovS €ia\v ^ficty* ov8e 8rj 

\07rpoo-8eovTou tt}? touwtt)? 6fuXla? 9 iav fir/ <o0€- 
Xtfiot axriv* hfi too-ovtov yap eiatv r/Seis £<f) 
oarov eXiri8as fyovrnv ayadov. €i? TavTas 8e kolL 
ttjv ijevucrjv TiBiaxriv. *H 8\ t£>v vicov (j>iXia That for 

81 rjSovrjv elvcu do/cet* Kara iraOos yap ourot young men. 

IS^oxrt, kou ftaXtara SuoKOvai to rj8v avrols kou 
to irapov m TTfs rjXiKLas 8e fi€Tairi7rrov<rr/? koi tol 
r/Sea ylvcTcu erepa. 810 to)(4<os yiyvovrax (piXot 
Kai iravovrau' afia yap t§ rjSei -q <f>iXia fieTairl- 
7rr€t, TTff 8e TOiavTTjS tjSoptJ^, Ta^tta rj fierafioXr}. 

20 /cat epcoTLKoi 8 oi vioC Kara iraJOos yap kou 81 
rj8ovr)v to iroXv ttjs ipom/cr}?' 8io7T€p (f)cXovat 
kou rax«os k icavovrau, 7roX\aKi? ttjs avrrj? r/fiepa? 
litTaTriirrovT*?. ovvrj/xepeveiv 8e Kai avttfv oSroi 
fiovXovraC yivercu yap avrois to Kara <f)iXiav 

25 ovtgds. 
4 TcAc/a & iorlv 17 tS>v ayaOav <f)tXla koi /car That for the 

* \ * t . * \ »/!>«/ a * sakeofgood 

aperrjv ofiouov ovtoi yap Tayaua ojxouos pov- or virtue 



5. ov y*{ to $»} Compare the given to hope. 
Rhetoric U. 13. 14. xark *<Uo f y£j] Compare the 

11. #i7f— ix«n* ( ] And that of Rhetoric, ii. 12. 
course is . very little, as they are not 



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MO AMSTOTELIS 

(whxh* Xovrat aXArjXoit, fl ayaBoi ayaBoi 8 curt Kaff 

mHfeod- OUTOVf. Ol $€ fiovXo/UIHH TayaBa W <f>iXot9 

ship ) it col- a , m ,^ j #v m * > « \ \ 

tivaiedby hcdvvv eveKa paXurra <piXoC 01 mrrovr yap 
Aa<f£t otW cx<mrt, kcu ov Kara crv/ifkfhfKO? Stapevei 

Bestially i» ofo lj TOim»V ^lA/a €«* OP oyaBoi CMTtP, 7) 8 b 
itself aft • % / \ * « ' * -v ~ » /i % 

that is de- apery povipov. kcu eariu eKarcpos crarAtw ayaVo? 

tUotlm. kcu r$ (ptXcp* ol yap ayaBoi kcu inrXm ayaBoi 
kcu aXXr/Xoit axf^Xipoi. ofiouo? Se kcu Tjtieis 9 Kal 
yap carXm ol ayaBoi r)8ei$ kcu aXXrjXoi9 m eKcurnp 
yap ko0 rjSovrjp elcrtp cu oIkcuu Trpa£eis kcu olio 
rocavraiy r&v ayaBAv 81 ax avrat i) o/wuu. r) 
roiauTT) 8e (piXia povtpjos euXoya* cTrrtV avv- 
caret yap iv curry iravff oaa rot? (plXoc? Set 
vnapytiv. iraxra yap (ptXla Si ayaBov krrriv rj 
8t r}8oprjp, r) cnrXco? r) t$ <f>t\ovvTi, kcu Kaff U 
Ofiocorrjra riva* ravrr} 8e iravff xnrapr^i ra elpr}- 
p£va Kaff at/row* raurg yap opjoia kcu ra Xonra, 



4. *m*k rttfA&i&n**] The friend- friendship of the good, as much as ac- 

ihip of the good only is perfect, for it cident differs from essence. 

possesses every thing which is included 10. m •l»um «?«&« ] See p. 316, 12. 

in the definition of friendship. And 11. mlmbvmi} Michelet reads r$mS- 

the good love each other, and wish rm. Cum omnium bonorum actiones 

good to each other as far as they are sint tales (cartas cujusdam,Le.ejusdem 

in themselves good. Others indeed nature) aut omnium maxime similes 

wish good for their friends, but not for inter se (r*» kymim ft remunu I 

the sake of their friends but their own 3/huu) unicuique autem actiones sue 

sakes. Others also love each other, similes aut pares sint jucunda? (Uirry 

not as far as they are lovely in them- yA* »*t #•»«» ■'"» mi ehsum *&ut 

selves, but merely accidentally. For **) mi rwaSrmt): bonis bonorum actio- 

not even as far as a person is pleasant nes sunt jucundae (•/ mymtii y*t m 

or rich is he loved, but as far only as mrxSt &7f »«1 ixxfow* ). 

his pleasantness and riches are plea- 17. rmfar, y£{[ For the other friend- 

sant or useful to the person by whom ships resemble this, and the absolutely 

he is beloved. These friendships are good is also absolutely pleasant. Re- 

therefore merely accidental, and con- semble merely, are net friendships in 

sequently differ essentially from the the proper sense of the term. 



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ETHTCORUM LIB, VIII. 5. 881 

to re a7r\&9 dyaBov kcu rj8v dirXm early, fid' 
Xtcrra 8e ravra 0tAi/ra, kcu to <f>iXeiv 8e kcu 
tj (f>iXia kv tovtois fxaXioTa kou apiary. ILiravias But tuch 

*? » \ \ / ? . »% ' > «. *» friendship 

O €LKO? T0L9 TOLdVTOL? eiVCU OAiyOl yap Ol rOlOVrOl. is rare and 

Sen 8e irpo(r8eiTCU \povov kcu avvrjOtias' #caratime. 
TTfv irapoi/xlav yap ovk Zotw eiStjaai dXXr/Xovs 
irplv tow Xeyo/ievow aXa$ crvvavaXcocrai' ovtf 
mro8ll^aor6ai Stj Trporepop ov& uvai <j}iXov$ 9 trplv 
av €Kar€po9 ifcarepcp <j>avrj (frtXr/Tos Kai 7rior€V0fj. 
loot 8c to)(£g>$ to. <f)cXtKa irpos aXXr/Xovs ttolovvtcs 
{SovXovrai p.ev (ptXoc elvai, ovk eial 8e, el firj 
kcu faXr/Toi, kol tovt Xo-curtv* fiovXrjcns p&v yap 
ra\€la <f)iXtas y/i/crat, (f)iXia & ov. 



CHAP. V. 

Of their resemblance to each other, and which only can be 
considered as real Friendship. 

5 AYTH p.€v oiv kcu Kara top yjpovov kcu Kara The points 
15 ra Xoiira reXua tori, Kai Kara iravra rairabiancebe- 

, s # c / 9 t / tf tween the 

yiverai Kai op.oia eKarepcp Trap eKarepov, owep friendships 

8el TOW <f)iXoi? VTrdpX*LV % 7) 8e 8ld TO rj8v 6/iOtCD/Aa pleasure or 

ravrrjs ex.€i* Kai yap oi ayaOol rjSei? dXXrjXois. with real 

«, ^y \«a\N / . \ % ~ friendship. 

o/jloloo? oe Kai rj oca to ypijo-Lfiov Kat 7 a P toiov- 
20 rot aXXrjXoLf ol ayaOoL ptaXiaTa 8c Kai iv tov- 

7. Skat] Verumque illud est quod stitute friendship. Which being a 

dicitur multos modios salis simul habit requires time and a correspond- 

edendos esse ut amicitie munus ex- ing disposition in both parties, 
pletum sit. Cic in LbL c. 19. See 15. tea) xm.ro. vdfru] And in all 

Eth. Eud. vii. 2. respects, the same and similar favours 

10. *» QiXtzA] The interchange of and kindnesses are reciprocated from 

friendly offices is not sufficient to con- one to the other, 

Y 



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82S ARISTOTELIS 

rots cu <f>i\icu dutfuvovcriv, orav to axrro yiyvryrax 
wop 9 aXXr/Xcov, olov rjSovrj, kcu fir) puovov ovtcd? 
dXXa kcu goto tov clvtov, olov rot? evrponreXoi?, 
kcu fJLT) <u? epaoTTJ kcu ipa>fi€P& m ov yap exrt toZ$ 
auToh rjSourou ovtoi, oAX' 6 /iev opwv €K€tvov,5 
6 H 0€pmr€v6fjL€VO9 thro tov ipcurrov' Xrjyovovj? 
8e T7j9 &pas iviore kcu ij <f)i\la Xr/yei* r£ /iev 
yap ovk eoriv rjSeia 1} ctyr*?, t$ & ov yiverai 
7] Oepanrela. iroXXoi & av Stafievovaiv, iav 4k 
T7j9 ovvrjdtias to. rjffrj orep^oaiPy ofiorjdei? ovres. 10 
ol Se firj to 7}8v avTiKaraXkaTTOfUvoi aXXa to 
Xpr)<rifioi> iv T0I9 ipcoriKoh kou elalv ffirov <f>lXoi 
kcu Siafxevovo-LV. oi 8e 81a to yjyqatpuov opt€? 
(f)l\oi afia tg> avpxf>€povTL SiaXvovrou' ov yap 
in what aXXr/Xcov tfaav <f)l\oi aXXa tov XvaiTeXovs. Ac 15 
friendship t/Sovtjv fi€v obv Kou 81a to yprfatfiov kcu (f>avXov9 

of the good , ^, ,, 9 , x / x , 

differs from €PO€X^TCU (piXoV? €LUOU aXXrjXot? KCU €7Tl€lK€L? 

above men- <f>avXoi$ KOU fJL7)8eT€pOl> OTTOUDOVVj St aVTOV? 8e 

SrjXou on pjovov? tovs ayadovs' ol yap kolkoI ov 
yalpovaiv iavrols, ei firj ti? axfreXtta ylyvoiTO.vo 
kou pjovr) 8e J] t5>v ayaO&v (pcXia aSidfiXr/TOS 
eoriu' ov yap pa&iov ovSevl Tnorevaai irepi tov 



3. kwe r»S nhrw] From the same «v* trrtr mivrursr tie* yk^ el revg fut 

kind of pleasure. vpwvg ketfUm ItrnXtyiptw % Mai 

9. Impiuoftf] Sc. jrrw. <pi\**«p»Ztrtt urn) r$ lut$i ring iTmu. 

18. /uttfrfftt] QtXu y*t kou Qm$X§g rnt kXnttimg xmT*rr$%mZ§fU9« nmi rev 

ipmSXts hk ravra, km) favXeg Wtu*n t kymiev, tmjf mvimius niug yittrrm' u 

*mi iwiuxhf <pav\*t, *«) flirts ng Ink- pU $Sr t!trm Qsk&ufuw »h V lavrwt 

<rtp* ahrm' l*rt yk{ **} rSf Wiumu $iX$v*rm, kkkk n itk rht niitit n hk 

t»u Qavkiv x(tl* *$kkeixtf Itrtartt ya{ ri %{Wf*»t. Paraph. 

9*v*(XbrtutkymJ9*r,*Tt*Tnyifk£t*T9f 22. ov yeu* ffiut] For they cannot 

fjin. ***v r$vf 9{f*«vs kytJn u*tu, readily credit the report of any one 

Mt £("'•» 1%*** T '» m&mn •iiSif against a friend, who has been long 

xmXvu %*) Hhfttu ft <r<r#i^«T#f Qaukotg tried and approved by them. 



tioned. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ETHICORUM LIB. VIII. 5. 



kv 7toXA© XP° VC ? v* avr&v SeSoKifiaxr/ievov. kou 

TO 7TlOT€V€lV kv TOVTOIS, KOU TO /XrjSeTTOT OLV 

aSucrjaaiy kou oaa aXXa kv Ttj coy aXrjOco? (f>tXia 
a£iovrou. kv 8e tcus eTepou? ovSev KcoXvec to. 
&TOiavTOL ylveaOou. cVei yap ol avOpamot Xkyovat 
<f>i\ov9 kou tovs 8ia to xprjatfiop, axnrep al woXei? 
(SoKovai yap cu <jv\x\jjiyiai tous woXeat ylveadai 
eueKa tov avfi^kpovroi) , Ka\ roi/y 8l' r/Sovrjv 
aXXrjXovs crrkpyovrasj ODOirep oi 7rai8es 9 taa>9 

toXeyetv fiev Set koi rj/ias (plXovs tovs toiovtov?, 
ctdrj 8e ttjs (j)iXias wXeuoy kou irpdyrcos fiev kou 
KvpUo? T7)v tcdv ayaOSyv y ayadol, tols 8e Xotwas 
Kajff ofJLOiOTTjTa' y yap ayaOov tl kou o/jloiov, 
TavTTj 0/Xot* kou yap to r)8v ayaOov toIs <f>iXr)- 

\b84<riv. oi wdvv 8 a$TOU a-vvairrovaiVy ovSe ylvov- 
tou ol avTol <j)iXoL 8ia to xPV ac l Ji0V * a * &® T0 
t)8v % ov yap irain) avvSvd^ETou tol Kara avpr 
ftefHriKOf. 



5. Irti y*t •! Mp*«] According to 
Giphanius Aristotle alludes to Plato's 
Clitopho, p. 409. See also Eud. Eth. 
viL 2. 

8. tux* rw rvp.<pi{*tros] See the 
Rhetoric, i. 3. 

15. w vinv T mZrai] But these are 
not frequently united, nor do the same 
persons become friends both for the use- 
ful and agreeable, for things which are 
accidental are not generally united. The 
friendship formed for pleasure is not 
generally united with that which is 
formed for interest, for accidents do 



not unite. 3«gu 21 r$ur$ §vx k\n$U, • 
y*t abret tin At xa) ktuxet xa) /uy- 
ftxlt xa) aft^irt^a xara evftfbtfaxis . 
ukX* luxit $1 rek rotaura Xtyut, «XX 
Srat *t***t pit ri Xiyxrai xa) ftcf'** , 
&ir* \xuuv T$ &XXa. *iZrc$ ftXt i &t- 
4pnt§t sar^txit, xara eupf&if&fixes 3i re 
ȣyat0t xa) ri Qa^ftaxn. ol ya*> rw- 
2v*%treu ra rotaura rSt fvft&tf&tiucrw. 
xa) \trav4a ftXM pit xvficts •/ ayaht, 
xara rvfifii&nxof Is km) ari rn$ Tt^mrnt 
<piki*f at Xuxttt, Zfov oi paiivs fvtmir- 
r$*r*4 t Schol. 



Y 2 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



384 ARISTOTELIS 



CHAP. VI. 

That Friendship it a habit, and, as such, cannot exist long without the 
exertion of its proper energies of different kinds of Friendship. 

Of the ne- £12 ravra 8e ra eiSr/ ttjs <frt\ia? vepefir/fievri? 6 

converts- * t ^p (f)av\oi €<TOVTCU <f>l\oi 8l TqSoVT/P tf TO 

to friend- yprjaipuov, ravrjj ofioioi owes, ol & ayadoi 8i 
avTOv? <f)i\ot' y yap ayadoi otrroi fiep odv 
<nrAa>? <f)l\oi, €K€iuoi 8e Kara crvfifiefirjicbf /ecu 6 
t£ G)fioico<r0ou tovtols. axnrep 8 hr\ rS>v aper&v 
oi pkv Kaff e£iv ol 8e kolt evepyeuzv ayadoi 
XeyoPTcu, ovrco kcu iwl ttjs <j)i\ias m ol fiev yap 
ov{fi!)PT€9 \aipovatp dXkrjXois Kal Tropi^ovai ra- 
yaffd, ol 8e ko0€v8ovt€s rj Kexcopicrfxepoc rot? 10 

T07T019 OVK tVtpyOVGl fl€P 9 OVTG) 8 €\OVatP WOT 

kvepyziv (f)c\iKC09' ol yap roirot ov SiaXvovai ttjp 
<f)i\[av aTrXa?, dXXa rrju ivepyeiav. iav 8e ypovtos 
rj awovaia yivqraiy kcu ttjs (ptXla? SoKti Xr/dr)P 
ttouZp" o0€i> etprjrai " woXXas 8r/ (ptXla? anrpoa-Xb 
Bat this is rjyopia SieXvaep. Ov (fraivovrat 8 ovff ol 

not possible v ^ f jxjxnS r% * 

without WpeO-pVTOt OVU Ol OTpVtyPOl (ptXlKOL €LPOt' RP a X V 
mutual ^ f , v ^ «ij « »«> \ »\ jj/ 

pleasure, yap €P avrois to Tqs rjoopr)?, ovdet? de OVPaTOl 
o-vvrjfiepeveiv rep Xxnrqpcp ov8e rep fir/ rjSe? pja- 



3. ravry Iptta •«••#] Although their friendship exist, 
men may be in themselves dissimilar, 14. hxt7] %Z X% tprrUnxi* \trmMm 

nothing prevents them from forming a ri }•*«». iwi) yk^ §S 3/ tiinhf <pt*M, 

degree of friendship, so long as an ft ha, r* %{tofM9, *&w XmpfMntm rnt 

accidental similarity exist between QtkUt, &* %(Jvio{ 4 kwuria. yiymrm, 

them ; for as far as they mutually h*u rtts wXX§7$ ruwm n $t*.ia Jiww 

contribute to each other's pleasure or MaXurct **i kfuutpbpnn wri rnt 

advantage, so far do they bear a mwvtims, Zr*t xv mt f- '" P" y * *** 

similarity, and so far and so long does bymtm* rtutvm. Schol. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VIII. 6. S85 

Xiora yap rj (fivcrc? <f>aiv€Tou to fiev Xvmjpop 
(f)evy€ti>, tyieadcu fie rod i/fieoy. ol & arrobeyp^ 
fievot dXXr/Xov?, fir/ ov{fibpT€? fie', evvoi? eoUacn 
fiSXXov rj <f>l\oi9. ovSev yap ovrm earl (plXcov 
6w to av^qv* axpeXela? filv yap ol eVfieet? bpi- 
yovraiy orvmjfi€p€veip fie kcu ol yjiKapioC fiovdyrcus 
fi€v yap curat tovtois rJKurra 7rpoarrjK€i. avvhiayziv 
8e per dXXr/Xeov ovk eori firj rjSeis ovTas p,r)8e 
yalpovras toi? avToie, orrep rj eTaipucrj Sotcei 
loexeu/. fiaXiora fikv oiu earl <f)tXla rj tS>v dyaOcov, 
KaBairep itoXXokc? ciprjTai' fiofeet yap <f>iXr)TOP 
fACU Kal alp€Tou to cbrAaiy ayaOov r\ rj8v, iiccurnp 
fie to airnp toiovtov' 6 $ dyaBos r<p dyaOtp 81 
apxbco TavTa. Eotice fi* rj p,ev (btXijo't? rrdOei, The differ- 

..«** Jl\ '"£.«* Jl'\ ' Si y enceoi>'- 

Ibr/ be (ptXia e£ei rj yap (piXr/ai? ov\ ryrrov irpos >.**« from 
Ta ofyvxa £otip 9 avrifyCXovai fie /i€Ta 7rpoatp€o-€G)?y 
rj fie 7rpoalp€(rc? d(j> e^e©?. Kal TayaOa fiouXovrai 
T0I9 <f)iXovftevots efcelvcov eWica, ov Kara irado? 
dXXa naff eijtv. kou (frtXovvre? tov <j>iXov to 

tOavTOi? ayaOov (f)iXovo'iP % 6 yap dyaOo? (f)iXo? 
yivop&vos ayaOov ylverai <p (plXos. e#care/>o? odv 
(f)tXel re to aura ayaOov, kcu to taov avrarroBL*- 



15. h Ji QtXi* l%ti] Cum supra, il 4. potest. Propter banc duplicem amicitias 

p. 64. <pi)J*t inter «eJn numeraverit, naturam Zellius etiam ?«*i dictum 

ei iv. 6. p. 153. virtutem mediam inter putat. Prasclare Aspasius: " Amicitia 

kfaxcvt et )u<rxix**t nominatam <pt>Sat in animae parte rationis participe, et in 

ab amicitia ita distinxerit, ut sit &n» ea qua? caret ratione existit ; cum enhn 

otCS«* juri <r*v eri^yiif tJf ifttXi*: hoc judicarit quispiam et elegerit amicum 

loco amicitiam ducit habitum cum aliquem sibi conciliare, quod est ra- 

affectu con junc turn ; nam etsi amicitia tionis, erga ipsum afficitur, quod irra- 

affectu non definiatur, tamen sine af- tionalis partis est. Atque ita habitus 

fectu (<r«fo) et amore (rrifyut) et in utrisque anime partibus consistit." 

amatione (fiXtwt) esse nullo modo MICH. 



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3S6 ARISTOTEL1S 

dcoai r]7 $ov\rj<T€t, kcu rep ij&t* Xeyercu yap 
tf>tXarrj9 r) tcror^y. paXiara St/ ry t£>v dyaOcov 
ravO 9 inrdpxei. iv 8e rols arpvtyvois kcu Trpeo-fiv- 
TUC019 t)ttou yivtTcu r) <f)t\la, oa<p SvcrKoXarrepol 
ciai kcu t)ttov tcus bptXtcus \alpov(riv' ravrah 
yap SoK€t paXurr elvcu <f)iAiKa kcu wonjTtKa 
(fnXiaf. 810 veot, pkv yivovrai (j>iXoi ra\v 9 irpea- 
fivrat & ov' ov yap yiyvovrcu <f>iXoi oh op pr) 
Xcupaxrtv' opoUo? & ov& oi orpvfyvoL aXX* oi 
TOiovrot evvot pAv wriv dXXrjXoi? /HovXoptcu yap 10 
rdyaOa kcu airavrSxriv els ras yjptlas' (piXoi 8 
ov iravv eiai Sea to pr) cruinjpepevetv ptjSe yaipeiv 
aXXrjXoify a 87) paXicrr elvcu SoKel <f>tXiKa. 
That the IIoAAois $ elvat (biXov Kara rriv reXelap (btXlav 

friendship ,,, rt » *» > «/ v 

of the good OVK €u8eX€TOU 9 (DOWep OVO tpOLV TToXX&V apxC €OLK€l& 

is generally *» \ ~ n \ \ <r 

tingle. yap V7T€pfioXjly TO TOtOVTO 0€ TTpOS €Va 7T€(f)VK€ 

ofothen. yipcaOcu, 7roXXov$ & apa Tip airrcp dpicTKtiv <r<f>6- 
8pa ov paSiov, Ixrtos 8 ovS dyaOov? elvcu. Set 
fie kcu epweiplav Xaficiv kcu kv avvrjdela y€V€<r0cu, 
b TrayyaXeirov. Sid to yfti)aipx>v fie kcu to ijfii/20 
woXXoi? dpecTK€Li> evSeyeTau* 7roAAot yap oi toiov- 

Of the TOly KOt lv bXiytp yfiOWj? OU V7T7lp€<rlcU. ToVT(DV 

othen, the ^\ « xx v jl \ ' « * ^ N '*' * » t 

friendship 0€ paXXoV €01K€ (ptXta 7] Ota TO 7)OV 9 OTUP TOVTa 
formed for « > > • ~ / \ / »% x'x * 

pleasure V7r ap<poiv yiym/TOt Kai yaipaxriv aXXr/Xois r) 
greater toIs avrols, ouu Tcbv j/eW eialv ax <f>iXiat m poXXov 25 

similarity to \ » / ^ »x /i ' f ^^^^^ / 

true friend- yap €V TOUTCUS TO eA€l/0€/HOJ>. 7} 0€ Ota TO XPV~ 

aipov dyopalcov. koll oi poucdpioi 8e \prjatpxov 
pep ovSev Siovraiy r)8*(ov 8e* ovijjv pev yap 



16. styi/xt] It is not natural for 22. i» ixiyf X^ 9 *] In contradistinc- 
one person to be superlatively eminent tion to that of the good, 
in many things. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VIII. 6. 327 

ftovXovrai rtcri, to 8e XvTrrfpov oXiyov piv \povov 
<f>€povau/ 9 avve^m 8 ovOtls av wrofieivai, ov8 
avrb to aya6ov 9 ei Xxnrqpbv airnp etrj* 8u> tov$ 
(ftiXovs ijfietir %QTOv<nv. 8eZ 8 laces #cat aya&ovs 
bTOiovrovs ovra?, kcu en avrols' outg> yap wrdp^ei 
avrois oaa Set tois <f>iXoi?. Oi 8 kv tolls c^oiz-ofthe 
Vitus Siyprjfievois (fraivovrcu yfiTivdai toZs 0/A<Hf° formed by 
aXXoi yap avrols eial xprjai/iot teal erepoc rjSeZs, power. 
afUJxo 8 oi avrol ov ttolvv' ovt€ yap ySets per 

10 apcTrjs £qTOvaiv ovre \prf(rlfwvs eis ra KaXd 9 
aXXa tov? pkv evTpawkXovs tov r/Seos k(j)ikp£voi 9 
tow 8e Secvovs irpa^ai to hnTayQiv* raOra 8 
ov irdvv yiverai kv tc$ airy, ydvs 8e kcu XPV~ 
at/to? a/ia etprjTou oti 6 <nrov8aZos' aXX! inrepk- 

15 \ovtl ov yivercu 6 toiovtos 0/Aoff, av pnj kcu 
ttj apery vrrepkyriTcu' €i 8e px) 9 ovk laafa avar 
Xoyov v7T€p€x6p£vos. ov wdw 8 dcoOaai toiovtoi 
yiveadat. 

8 Etcri 8 oiv ai elprjpkvou (fxXiat kv XawTqrC ra That these 

" % » \ / » * » i ~ \ Q /%, friendships 

20 yap avra yiyverai air apxpoiv /cat povXovrcu are in 

»\x'n *</ » a c / » w ' equality. 

aAA7jAOl9 9 . fj €T€pOl> avtf €T€pOV OVTlKaToXXaT- 

TOVTCUy oloV 7j8oVr}v OLVT GXfreXelaf. OTi 8 fjTTOV 

cloiv a^Tcu at (ptXiai Kal pevovo-tv, tipiyrai. 

SoKovai 8e kcu 8i opoiorrfTa kcu avopoLorqra 

^bravTOv eival re icat ovk elvai (j>tXiat' Kaff opoio- 

Tryra yap tt}$ icar aperqv (f>aivovTai <f)iXlcu (jj 



1 . rill kiMript] Friendship formed in the exercise of virtue do not require 

for the sake of pleasure more resembles the latter, but they do the former, 

the friendship of the good, than that For even the good is intolerable, at 

formed from motives of interest, be- least for a continuance, unless with 

cause the good whose energies consist some admixture of pleasure. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



388 



ARISTOTELIS 



flip yap to tjSv fyei rj 8c to XPV cri t JLOU > ravra 
If xmapyti Kcuceivrf), r£ Se ttjp pkp aSiafiXrjrop 
kcu fjiopifiov ctpat, Tcujra? Si tolx&os fUTairhrniiP 
aWois T€ 8ioxf)€p€iv 7roXXoi9 9 ou <f>aipoPTCu <f)t\uu 

From which St aPOfJLOtOTTJTa €K€LV7)$. "Et€/HW 8 60TI <f>l\los5 

different €iSo9 TO KOjff V7T€pO)(^Py OLOP TTOTfli 7T/>Of VIOP 
friendship; KOI o\(09 Wp€afiVT€p<p ITpOS P*H&T€pOP, OvSpt T€ 



where there irpbf yVPCUKU KCU TtaPTl ap\OPTl Wpbs dp\6fl€POP. 

equality in 8iad)€0OV(ri 8 (LVTCU KCU aXKnXtOP* OV yap n OVTTJ 
thepereooi. ~*V , , x v * . , 

yovtvai irpos tskvol kcu ap\ov<TL wpos apxofievov?, 10 
dXX ovSe warpi rrpos vlop kcu via* irpos iraT^pa^ 
ovtf avSpi 7rpo9 yvvaiKa kcu yvpauci irpos avSpa. 
irepa yap tKaorcp toutodp aperq kcu to cpyop, 
eTepa 8c kcu Si a (f)i\ovcnv' erepou ovv kcu ou 

And how <f)t\r/<T€L9 KCU CU <f)t\lCU. ToVTOL fl€P 8r/ OVT€ 15 



if to be ob- yiyP€TOU €KdT€p<0 TTapCL 0CLT€pOV OVT€ Set {fJT€lP* 
served be- 
tween them. 



2. titxfiXnrt] See p. 322. 

13. Wi ( a y^-^inJJ cv <pm*) M 
rtnt &XXnt iprtii iTnu *m*£t **) 
IXXmt viov, o&i iXXat ££{«*, ymmxit 
ft iri{«r. igcfxu ft W i,*\i( xxl yv- 
totals X^kriaa* cif kiytr ra yog avrk 
xai Tt() var(if ptiriot xai vl$v. X^ttrUrt 
ft rit r^irrn t»ut99, xai ftaktrra ol 
2*»{*ris«*. (See Plato's Republic, 
particularly the 5th book.) £{« rip u\\t 
£ff}g« %{n Ytxatct i/mm, rilt ft yutatxa 
Stsast t »v %nra. ri ft i rit /ub 4f3g« r«- 
fytta, riit ft yvtaTxa axJXarrtti' «vft 
retire. *Zr* 3* xaf \xfornt \rrtotrn i^t - 
re» *«) Xmp&dtcfTis, irt^u*mi rn «f4^« 
*«} r«ff yvNMM 2^ii» r^f ^ir«r «•«#•»#, 
*vp**emtWTtu crt h *M Mp t xai 
ytnmixit kprt. ri out fnrict wpt ra 
rctcii/rai A k^xrut &*o rev i^x ofT ** 
xrni *£%ofiiutt ; ii y«f r«v pit tygtrr* 



fft&MV it ry itxteim xmXZt, §u» at tin 
e «vrn &{x»*ru xmt i^^^Atcy xprn. 
xmi ya{ xmxiet fAt m^xopittv Aw r* r§S 
&£%*tr*s T^arrjp, xmxia 3i fytynri &* 
ra r«u *{%of*it»t/. it xui xufi^tnrtx 
pit m^irn At ra r$v xvfit^tnrtv wm, 
xmi fyx«*T9t rmf tavrSt, taurm K it 
4f^«f«'M ore rev xu&tpnrmv. u 7H rUt 
avriis inernpnt ri &^x Uf **£ fyx**** 4 , 
tSitt rcurt IfAToilt ry >Jytp. r*%a ult 
yk{ ami **}( rcurct Irrrain it rtg, ttt 
Ixattu rttct lr»fiit»v &{%i*0m4 t f*h w&t- 
rm )H fyxut. ci yk{ tUurftitt vwammhn 
r£t *\{xitr*t &tw$m4 /*iv at )mMNV 
xmf U»t t &{x M •• *** trmrtt. t/.M xal 
hid*., ri* aurot Wirrariat &pQm t JtXX* 
j u\t &^x u **•*■* *t*rn, f ft %£««" 
trt^et. Schol. See also Aristot. Pol. 
i. 5. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VIII. 7. 



329 



arav 8e yopevat fiep reicva aaropifirf a Set roif 
yepinqaaxn, yopels Se vleaip a Set T019 t€kpois, 
fion/io? 17 t£>v tolovtodp kcu emencr/? earou <f>i\la. 
avaXoyop 8 ep iraxrais reus KaJf inrepoyr)P ovacus 
6<f>i\lai9 kou rrfv <f>l\r)(riv Set yipeadai, dlop top 
afielvco ftSWop <f)i\ei<rdai r/ <f>i\eip, kcu top <&0€- 
XifuorepoPy kou t&p aXXcop Zkolotov o/umW* otop 
yap /car oJ^Ulp tf <f)l\r]cri? yiyvqrcu, Tore yiyperai 
ireos iaorrfSy o 87] rfjf <f>i\ias eipou Sokci. 



CHAP. VII. 

Of the chief requisites for Friendship. 



9 OYX ofiouos Se to taop ep re toc? diKaiot? As frfend- 

\ > ~ ^ \ ' ji ' * .y' * * * shipisgene- 

kcll ep tji (piAta qxupercu eyeip iari yap ep fiep rally and 

TOLS SlKatOL? X<TOP 7Tp(0T(O9 TO KaT aljiaP, TO Scbetweei 



ween 



8. mmr ti>iat] A species of geo- 
metrical proportion is to be observed 
in friendships of this kind. For the 
inferior is to compensate to the superior 
for the greater benefits which he re- 
ceives from him, a return not in kind, 
but in proportion of love and respect, 
»«<r* ty*t. (See p. 180.) Differing, 
however, from the proportion observed 
in distributive justice in certain points, 
which he now proceeds to state. 

According to the Scholiast, another 
question is also raised as to this class 
of friendships, whether they ought to 
be included in any of the previous 
species, or form a distinct one by 
themselves. Eudsmus and Theo- 
phrastus distributed them among the 
previous ones. For both father and 
son, husband and wife, and so on, 



may be virtuous, and consequently the 
highest degree of friendship exist be- 
tween them. But if not, then the 
motives of their friendship must be 
sought in that of interest or pleasure* 
and consequently such friendships be 
included in the other species. 

10. obx i(**ift\ In justice, geome- 
trical proportion, or rather the dignity 
of the different persons, is primarily 
considered ; in friendship, an equal 
compensation (r) *•*#•#») between 
equals. For friendship correctly and 
properly speaking is among equals. 
Which is plain from the fact, that 
when a great distance exists between 
the relative state of the parties, friend- 
ship can scarcely ever take place be- 
tween them. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



860 ARISTOTELIS 

equals, KOTCL ITOOOV 8cVT€p<09, cV 8* T0 <f>lXia TO fJL€P 
cal it mora ***** 1TO(TOV irpWT&f, TO 0€ KOT O^ULV 6€VT€p<09. 

tbao'Geo- 8rjXov X 9 iav noXv SiaoTTjfia yiypvyrai dperijs 

proportion ? KOKUL9 T) €V7T0piaf 7) TWOS dXXoV' OV ydp €Tl 

them?*" <j>iXoi eUriv, oXX* ovtf a^iovaiv. kpfywianraTOvb 
8\ tovt eni tS>v 6i£>v* irXetarop yap ovroc iraxrt 
T019 ayaOols inrep€\ovaiP. SrjXop 8e kou eni rtbv 
fkuriXeoop* ov8e yap Tovrots aj^iovcnv elvcu (f)tXoc 
ol iroXv KaTaStearepoi, ovde toi? apiorois rj 

Whence b <TO(fX0TaTOl9 o\ fl7}8cPOS a£lOl. 'AKpifirj? fl€P 10 

aquation, , , , , 

whether one 00 V €1/ TOl? TOtOVTOiS OVIC €OTM> O/HO/iO?, €G>9 

friend can , t , N , , v 

wish to raw oi piAoi 7roAAft)j/ yap oucfxupovfievcov en 

goodto an./itW, 7T0At> $6 \(OpUT$€VTO? 9 oloP T0V 0€OV, 0VK€TI. 
other, so at „- y , „ , , , a , c . 

entirely to O0€P KOI OTTOpeiTOl, fit/ 7TOT OV pOVAOVTOU 01 
destroy thU „ , y , , ^ 

equality, (ptAOi TOtf (piXot? Ta fie/LOTd T(OP ayafl&P, 0101/15 
and conte- /. \ -? . * »> \ > v jl >\ v »~ 

quently WOW €U>Ot Ot>0€ yap €TL (pLAOl tCTOVTai aVTOlf, 

ship. o£8e 8rj ayadd' ol yap <f)tXot dyaOd. el 8r/ koAcw 
etprjTcu otl 6 (j)iXos r<p <f)tXq> fiovXerai rayaOa 
itceivov eve/ca, fieveiv av Seot olo? iror ioriv 
iiceivos' avOpGYircp 8e opti fiovXrjaeTcu ra piyioraVto 
ayadd. tcrcoy 8 ov iravra 9 aur^J yap pjaXio'ff 

That more €KOOT0S fiovXeTOL TayoBd. Ol 7ToXXoi 8l 

loved than SoKOVCTC Std (piXoTL/JLtaU fiovXecrdat (f)LX€L<T0OU /ioA- 
(andVhy.) XoP T) (frlXtiv, 8 10 <f>lXoKoXoK€S 01 IToXXot V7T€p€)(0- 

p,€V09 yap 0/Aoy 6 KoXa£, rj TrpooiroL^lrcu toiovtosM 
elvai Kal paXXov (friXeiv rj (piXelaOai. to 8e (friXei- 
aOai iyyvs eivou Sotcet tov TLfiacrOai, 08 8rj ol 7roX- 
Xol i(f)L€vrai. ov 81 avTO 8 koiKaaiv alpeiadai ttjv 
Tiiir/v, aXXa tcaTa avfifiefiriKo?' yalpovai yap ol 



24. «ir^i^fl>iwf] See p. 74. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ETHICORUM LIB. VIII. 7. 881 

fl€V TToXXol V7TO T&V €V TCU? i£oV<rtCU9 TlfJUOfUVOi 

Sid ttjv iXrriSa* otovrou yap rev^eadou irap 
avTcbv, av rov Secovrcu' ©y 8rj arrjfietcp rrjs tinrar 
Oeias \aipovai rjj rc/ifi. ol & vwo t£>v iwiciKobv 
6 /cat elSorcov opeyofievoi TLfirjS fitfiaicocrai ttjv 
oiKtiap 86£av tyievrai wept avT&v' xaipovai 8rj 
oti €ialv dyaOoi, Tnorevovrt? ry Ttov Xeyovreov 
/cptcrei. r$> (friXeicrdai 8e Kajff avro ypipovatv" 
8to 86{;€i€v av KpctTTOv elvat rod TipjaxrdaL, /cat 
10 17 (bcXla Kajff avrrjv atperrj eivai. Aok€l & But yet 

~ A\ ~ ~\\ * » ~ Jl \ ~ zi * friendship 

€P TCp (btXetV fiaXXov if) €V TG> <piA€l<TVai 61V0U. consist! 

*» e / ~ J x ~ / V m0re iD lhe 

ar/fietou 6 ou fir/repes ry (piXetv \aipova€u' eviai utter than 
yap otooacri ra eavrav rptipeo-aaL, teat (ptXovai 
fA€u elSvtai, avrKfeiXeiadai 8 ov ^qrovo-iv, idv 
IbdfKporepa firj ivSeyryrat^ dXX* tKavbv aureus toiKtv 
€ivcu, idv bpSxiiv eS irpaTTOvras^ /cal avral 04- 
Xouaiv avrovr, Kav e'jeeii/ot fitjSev S>v firjrpl Trpocr- 

l0 7fK€l a7TOV€fJLGXrc 8td TTJV dyvOlOV. MaAAoj/ Three re- 

ft* \ ~ j. w v » ^^x« * ~ Quiiitei for 

oe rr)$ q>ikui$ ovarj? ev ry (piAeiv, kcu t&v lasting 
20 <f>iXo(j>iX(ov iircuvovfiiv<ov, (j)iX(ov apery to (friXeiv 

€01K€V, GHJT €V ol? TOVTO yiVCTat KaT d£lav, 

ovtol fiopifiot (f>lXoi teal rj tovtoov (frtXla. ovtod 
# av kcu ol avHTOi ftaXurr ehv (plXoi* ladfioivro 
yap av. 77 8 Io-ottjs Kal bfioiorqs (J>iXot7J9 9 kou 
25fuiXio'Ta /JL€V r) rtov icar dperr/v op.OLOTr)^' pjovipjoi 
yap ovre? Kajff avrovf Kal wpb? dXXr/Xovs fievovai, 
Kal ovt€ Seovrat ipavXcov ovff vTrr/peTOVo'L roiavTa y 



3. rnt tu*»0tict(] Compare the pivM ripatimt) by the good and pru- 
Khetoric, i. 5. dent, aim at honor in order to have 

4. uwb rm IrtUK**] But they who a confirmation of their own self-opinion, 
are desirous of being honored (fayi- Compare p. 13. See also the Rhet. i. 9. 



friendship. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



38ft ARISTOTELIS 

aAX' w elireip kcu tkaxeoXvoiHTiP 9 twp ayaBwv 
yap firjr avrow afiapraveip fir/re rots <f)l\ois 
einTpejreiP. oi &€ fiox&rjpoi to flip fiefkuop ovk 
fypvauf ovde yap avrot? Siafiepovaip opuoiot 
optcs* eif oklyop hi ypovov yiypoprcu <f>i\oi,5 
XpupoirT€$ Tg dWr)\a>v pjoy^plcf oi xprjatfwt Se 
kcu Tj&cfc eni irkeiov Sia/iepovmp* etas yap op 

The faend-7T0pifa<riV TjboPOS V aXfeXtiaS oAAljAotT. *E£ 

ship of per- , / »* '% * ****** N ' 

sons in CPOPTUDP 0€ flOAJXTTa fl€P 00*61 if Ota TO XPV <rc / JLOU 

sttttos, yiyP€£T0ai <f)i\ia, olop irepqs irkovaup, o/juxBtjs 10 

formed ge- , « / m * \ * » * \ * / 

nerally from €U>OTl OV yap 7Vy\OV€l TIS €PO€TJS &P> TOVTOV 
motives of » . / * », « v x x * **/i *• v 

interest. etpufiepo? aPTto&peiTcu oAAo. epravffa O OP T19 
eAxot kcu ipaoTT/v kcu ip&fiepop, kcu kclXop kcu 
oucrxpov. 8u> tyaivovrai kcu oi ipcurrcu yeXolot 
€vloT€, ajjcovirre? {fnXeurdcu G)9 {fnXovatp' 6fioia>9i5 
^ <f>t\jjT0v$ ovras urcos a£uoT€OP, firjSep Se toiov- 
tov €\optos ytkolov. tcray? 8e ov8 ecpUrai to 
epaprlop tov kvavriov KOdff avro, dXXa Kara ovpr 
fkfhjKOS. tj 8 opeijis tov fieaov cotip* tovto 
yap ayouOov, olop Tip i~rip(p ov\ vypq> yepeaOouZO 
a\\' cVl to piaov ikdeip, kcu t<£ Oeppxp kcu 
toIs aWots ofiolco?. ravra fiep ovv a(f)eicrdco' kcu 
yap iorip aWoTpiarrepa. 



4. *br«t tapSwMrit] Compare the See particularly Plato's Republic, 

advice of Polouius to Laertes : Book ix. near the beginning. 

To thine own self be true ; 20. ln& §1% vytf] Alluding to the 

Anditmustfollowasthenighttheday; words of Euripides. See above, p. 

Thou can'at not then be false to any 315. 
man. Hamlet, Act i. 3. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ETHICORUM LIB- VIII. 8. 383 



CHAP. VIII. 

That there are different Friendships according to the different 
communities. 

11 EOIKE 8e, KaBairep kv apxfi dtpi/rcn, ttc/h That there 

»\ \» ~ »«9 «r jv/ N % is a friend- 

ravra kcu ev tol? aurois etvcu i] re (pcAta kou to ship pecu- 

SlKOUOV' kv awdari yap KOIVCOVLOL 8oK€l Tl SlKOUOV community. 

eivcu, kcu (jxXia 8e' rrpoaayopevovari, yovv m 
b(f)i\ov? tovs avfiirXov? kou tow (TVOTpaTiarras, 
ofioico? 8e teal tovs kv tolls aXXou? kocvcdvlou?. koJS 
ocrov 8\ koivcovovciv, kwl tocovtov kari <j>i\ia m kcu 
yap to SUatov. kou rj wapoifila " kolvol tol (j)i\a>v" 
opdeos* kv KOtvcovla yap rj <f>i\la. ecrrt tf a&A^ot? 

10/iev kou kTcupoi? rravra koivol, tois 8 aWots a0<a- 
piafieva, kcu tois fiev wXeuo tols 8 kXarra)' kou 
yap t&v (frtkicov al fiev fiaXXov ai & fjrrov. 81a- 
(pepei 8e kou to. SUata' ov yap Tavra yovevcrt 
wpos T€Kva kcu a8e\<f>ois rrpos aXkrfkovs, ovS 

IbtTaipoi? kou 7ro\iTcu?, bfxouos 8e kou kirl t&v aX- 
\<ov (f)tXicov. erepa 8r/ kcu tol aSiKa irpos eKaarovs 
tovtcovj kou av^rjatv Xafifidvei r£ fiaXkov rrpos 
<j)l\ovs elvou, olov xPVf JU3Lra dwooTepfjo-ou eroupov 
8eivoT€pov rj rroXirqVj kou fir] fior/Ofjaou a8e\(f)$ rj 

ZOoQveup, kou iraTojgai iraTtpa rj ovrivovv aXAov. 



Chap. VIII. and consequently there will be as 

In this Chapter Aristotle proceeds many kinds of friendships as of poli- 

to show, that all friendship consists in tical communions, 
society, all society is part of that chief 8. aw* rk <p'iX*t] Erasm. Adag. 

society which- is called the political, i. 1. 1. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



SS4 ARISTOTELIS 

avijcaDcu 8e irtyvKtv apa rg <f>i\ia kcu to Sucaiov, 
<»? iv T019 auToi? ovra kcu eif urov SirJKOirra. 

Tint all AI 8* KOOKDvUu VCUTCU flOptOlS koiKOXTl T7)9 7TO\l- 
commooi- , \ 9 , ., s 

lies are part TUCVJ9 OV/HTOpeVOPTCU yap €7Tl TtVt OV/JUpcpOVTl, KCU, 
of the Poli- y , , * , x t x 

lical. 7T0pi£0fJL€V0l Tt T&V €19 TOI> ptOJ/ JCtti 7) TTOAtTLKT) 5 

£c KOivwvia rod ovputyipovros yaptv SokcI kcu e£ 
apXr}? ovv€\0€iv kcu Staficveiv 9 rovrov yap kcu oi 
pofio6erai OTO)(a{pvTmy kcu Sikcuou <f>curtv ttvat 
to KOtvr) arv/tfftepov. cu p*v obv aXXcu kolvcoviou 
koto, p*pr) rod ovfjtfftepowo? i<f>t€%rrau, olov 7r\co- 10 
Trjpes pkv rod koto, top ttXovv irpos epycuriav 
yjprqp&TC&v r} Tt TOtovrov^ ODOTpart&rcu 8e rod 
Kara top ircikepjov, etre ypnt)p£r<ov etre vtKqs r) 
iro\e<os opeyopevot, opouos 8e kcu (ftvXerat kcu 
drjfwrcu. tvtat 81 t&v koiikdvuov Si r)8ovr)v SoKovatis 
yiyveadat, Otcurcrriov kcu ipcunor&v' avrcu yap 
Ovaias ev€Ka kcu ovvovalas. iraxrat $ avrat imo 

TTjV TTOklTlKTjV iotKOUTtV €tVCU' OV yap TOV TTttpOVTOS 

ovfi<f>€povTos r) 7toXitlk7J tyierat, aAA' cts 1 airavra 
tov f3loi>, Ovaias t€ irotovvrts kcu wepl rat/ray 20 
<rvvo8ov$, Ttpuas dwovepoirre? rot? deols, kcu avrots 
dvairavatis iropifywes peff r)8ovr)$. ax yap dp- 
\alat dvalat kcu avvoSoi <f>alvovrat yiveaOat ptra 
ray t5>v Kapir&v avyKOfuSas olov airapxai pd- 



6. <rup<pi{»fT*] Compare the Poli- eonim qui statis diebus in honorem ali- 

tics, iii. 4. <putu pi* Iron &*4pi*»s cujus del congregati peracto sacrificio 

%*4t ToXtnxir hi xa) pti&t hiptvu una epulantur et genio indulgent. Cf. 

rnt xm£ &X\*\*9 fronfalat chtt ikarrw prater alios locos Xenophon. Mem. ii. 

tyyrrai rw <rv&*. cv pht aXXa xm) 1. §. 31. Plutarch, iii. p. 204. Ed. 

ri urn*? *vp<pipf tvt&yu, »*? fan Wt- Hutten. Casaubon ad Theophrast 

(M\\ti n'tft Xxiffrtf rw X>n* **>■"(• Charact xv. p. 168. Ed. Fischer. 

See also note p. 1 92. Z ELL. 

16. hag»rZi\ Mates est sodalitas 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VIII. 9. 886 

Xiara yap cV tovtois ioypXatpv rofc Kcupoir. 
TroUrcu St/ tyaivovrax at koiv<oviou pjopia rrj? woXl- 
Tuaj? elvai' oKoXovd^aovat 8e aX roiavrcu (f>iXiai 
tous rovavraxs Kotwovlas. 



CHAP. IX. 

Of the three forms of Political Communities, and their perversions. 

12 IIOAITEIA2 & ioriv etSr/ rpla, taai 8e koli That there 

7rap€Kfid(T€LS, OlOV (pdopal TOVTGW. elo\ 8 al fl€U forms of 

7roXiT€iai fJaxriXela re koL aptoTOKparia, Tpirrf 5'communi- 
i) awo Tifirj/Aarcov, rjv TifiOKpaTUcr/v Atyetv oucetovi. King- 
(pcuvercu, woXiTeiav o avrrjv eicouaatv oi 7rAe«rrotitap«rver- 

10 KaXeiv. Tovtoov 8e fieXriarrj fiev 7) /?acnAe/a, Tyranny. 

Xetptarri & rj rifiOKpaTia. TrapSKfiaQ-is 8e fHaxri- 
Xeias p*v rvpavvls' oifKJHo yap \xovapyiai, 8ia- 
(pepovat 8e irXeiarov* 6 /lev yap rvpavvos to 
iairnp ovp/fyipov a/coire!, 6 8e fiaaiXev? to tcdv 

Ibapypfitvwv. ov yap iort fiaaiXev? 6 /xrj avTap/crj? 
kolL iraa-t toIs ayaOots imepex&v' 6 8e toiovto? 
ovSevbs TrpoaSelTai' tol axfrtXipja ohv avr(p fiev 
ovk av o-Kovrolr), toIs S apxopevoif 6 yap fir/ 
toiovtos kXt)P<oto$ av TL9 €i7j fiaacXev?. -q 8e 



Chap. IX. of the ancient tyrannies as described by 

On this Chapter see the third and Thucydides, i. c. 17 . See the Rhet 

fourth Books of the Politics, and the i. 8. 

last four Books of Plato's Republic, 19. xktj^rif] A king merely by 

and Sir Walter Ralegh's Maxims of good luck or chance. Aristotle appears 

State. to have had in view the method of 

6. «-«f««/3«ru*] See Goettling's choosing magistrates in Athens. The 

Pref. to the Politics, p. xviii. reader will remember the caustic jest 

13. rl Uvrj r»pf if«t] See the state of Socrates on this subject. 



Digitized by CjOOQIC 



986 ARISTOTELIS 

TVpcunrif t£ ivaPTias ravrg' to yap eavrw ayaBop 
8u&K€i. kcu tftapcpm-epop hri ravnp art \€tpiarri' 
kokuttop 8c to cpoptLop t$ f&cXrUrnp- fieraficupci 
X €K /OaaiXela? eh TVpcunriSa* (pauXonj? yap 
ion yuopopylas rj Tvpawis* 6 8r) fiox&qpb? fkuri-s 

2. Ami*- Xew Tvpapvo? yipercu. *E£ aptxTTOKpaTias 8e 
itopenr«w € fc oXiyap\iap Kcucio. t&v ap\0PT(0P, o\ pcfiovai 
garehy. Ta Tqs ttoX&d? irapa ttjp agiap, kcu ircurra rj Ta 

irXcurra t&p ayaBStp eavroc?, kcu tos apyas ael 
Tots avroif, irepl irXcurrov iroiovptvoi to 7rXov-\0 
tcip" oXiyoi 8r) ap\ov<ri kcu fio\Btipoi avri tcop 

3. Tim©- €7rL€tK€<TrdT(OP. *E#C 8c 8r) TipjOKpaTVUS Cl$ 

iupwrer- 8rjpx>KpaTiap' ovpopot yap eiatp aSrou' 7rXrj0ow 
" 4,n ' De -. \ o '\ * * ' * x * 

mocraey. yap pOVXCTCU KCU 7} Tl/lOKpOTUl €CPOU> Kat l(TOl 

iravres ol €P r<£ ripr/fiari. f/Kiora 8c fioxOrjpopls 
cotlp rj 8rfpj0KpaTia m an fiiKpop yap irapcK^aipci 
to TtJ9 ttoXitcIos ci8os. fUTafHaXXovai pucp ovv 
paXiaff ovtgx al rroXiTCuu" cXa\torop yap ovrco 
That the kcu paora fUTafiaipovaip. 'Ofiouo/iaTa 8 

types ol » ** \ o ft i f a 

them are aVTCDV Kat OIOP TrapOJOCiyuXLTa Xafiot TL9 OLV KCU 20 

found in t f / ^^^ % % 

the domes- eP Ttttff 01KUU9. 7) fl€P yap WaTpO? 7Tp09 VIC19 

•hips; Kotpcopia {SaaiXcias c\ct oyripxC r<ov tckpgdp yap 
T(p iraTpi fieXei. cptcvOcp 8c kcu "O/irjpos top 
Ala iraripa rrpofjayopcvcC iraTpLKT) yap dpxf/ 
fiovXcTcu r) fiaacXela elpcu. ip Wcpo-at? 8 r) rou 25 
iraTpo? TvpapptKTj* yfi&prai yap m SovXoi? tols 

Ai th»t of vleaip. TvpapptKTf 8c kcu r) Scottotov irpos 

son to the SovXoVS* TO yap T0V ScOWOTOV O-Vfl(j)€p0P ip avTtj 



13. f7p«*{«W«r] This in the Rhe- popular tenn iXty^x ia - Rhet. i. 8. 
toric is called by the more vague and, 24. Tar^ixrt] See the Politics, i. 5. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ETHICORUM LIB. VIII. 10. 887 

Trpdrrerai. avnj pkv oiv opOrj <f>aiv€Tcu 9 r/ IIe/>- 
aiKTj & rjpjaprqpkvr)' r&v 8ia(f>€p6vra>v yap ai 
apxpu 8ia<f>opoi. 'AvSpo? 5c teal yvvaiKos a/u-ofhui- 

%*/ . »»>/ %€>% band and 

aTOKpariKT} tyaiverai tear agiav yap o avrjp wife to the 

_ v \ \ ~ a * *% n v ft tf ft > second. 

&apx€t, Kat irepi ravra a Set rov avopa oca ok 
yvvcuKi ap/JLofa, ctce'ivy diroSlS&o-iv. drravrcov 8c 
KvpLevcov 6 avrjp €i9 oXiyap\iav pjediarrja-Lv* itapa 
Tqv d£lav yap avro iroiet, teal ov\ y apeivow. 
ivlore 8e apypvav al yvvcutees kiritcXripoi od<r<u m 
10 ov 8rj ylvovrai tear dpcrr/v al ap\ai, dXXa 8ia 
rrXovrov teal Svvapiv, KoBdrrtp kv rofis oXiyapxtai?. 
TipotepariKrj §* eoitcev rj .r&v dSeXipcov' foot yap, Of brethren 

x % »j> «» *» e x/ ftxx^ to the third. 

ttKtiv €(p oaov rat? rjALKcai? oiaAXarrovariv' 
8co7T€p av iroXv rat? rjXudcu? duKpepcoo-tv, ovkctl 
lb d8e\(f)LKr) yivercu rj (f>tXta. SrjfJLOKparla 8e pud" 
Xiara pev kv rofis dSeairoroi? r&v olktjo-^cov 
(Jvravda yap iravrc? k£ i<rov)> kcu kv ah do-devrj? 
6 dpywv kcu eKaarco k£ov<rta. 



CHAP. X. 

Of the peculiar Friendships in peculiar forms of Government. 

13 KA0* eKacrrrfv 8e r&v TroXirei&v <f>iXia <f>aive- Of friend- 
» i. «/ n % «, x ~ > n &hi P s which 

20 Taiy €<p 0(TOV Kai TO OLKOUOV, paaiXet p€V 7Tp09 are accord- 

tovs pacnXevoptvovs ev vjrepoyri evepytatas emmgiygo- 

n \ a x / v » /i* vernments. 

yap 7roi€i rovs pao-tXevopevov?, enrtp ayaaos 
cov €7ripeX€LTai avrcov, tv ev TrpaTTGxriv, coowep 

Chap. X. species of friendship in the same 

After having distinguished the seve- manner, showing what relation each 

ral forms of political communities, bears to each. 
Aristotle now divides the several 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ARISTOTELIS 

uofi€V9 w/M>0a^eM> , o0*v kcu "O/ti/po? top 'Ayaftc- 
pvova iroipAva Xaa>v tlrrtv. touwtj) 81 kcu 7) 
irarpiKT)) 8icuf>€p€i 8i t$ luytOei t&v cwpyenp- 
fiariov' curio? yap rov €ivcu y Sokovvto? fieyiarov, 
kcu rp<xf)T}9 kcu ircuStlas* kcu rdis irpoyovois 8*& 
ravra chrovcfiercu m (f)vaei re dpxucov varr/p vu&v 
kcu Trpoyovoi tKyop&v kcu fiacrtXew fiacriXevo- 

fUP&P. Iv VTT^pOXff & CU (f>lXi€U OVTCUy 8to KCU 

rtfjuovTcu ol yovels. kcu to 81kouov 8t} kv tovtois 
ov tclvto aXXa to kclt a£ta*> ovtg> yap kou rjio 
ToAristo- fyiXia. Rat av8po9 8% 7rpo9 yvvauK* -q avrrj 

<f>tXla kcu iv apurroKparia' kot aperrjv yap, 
kcu T<p aputivovi irXtov ayadov, kcu to appuo^ov 

To Tim©- eKOOTCp' OVTCO 8c KCU TO 8lKOUOV. *H 8e TtoV 

aSeXipcov rg ereuptfey coikw* taoi yap #eeu tjXlkio)- 15 

TCU 9 01 TOlOVTOt 8 6fW7ra0€L5' KCU OfWrjOtlS Q>9 €7R 

to iroXv. coikc 8r) touttj kcu tj Kara tt/v Ttpo- 
KpaTucqv" Ixrot yap ol woXitcu (SovXovtou kou 

€7ri€LK€L9 CIVCU' lv /£€/>€* 8/7] TO apytlVy KOU i£ 

In their IxTOV* OVTG) 8t/ KOU Tj <f)iXla. 'Ej> 8e TOLLS 20 

friendship 7rap€Kfid<T€aLV, CJ<T7T€p KCU TO StKCUOP €7n fUKpOV 
is seldom , „ N c , , , x „ , 

found: and€0"m>, 0VT<D Kat 7} (plXut €OTL, KCU r/KlOTa €V TQ 

in a tyran- ytipivTtf €P TVpawlSl yap OvStV 7f fUKpOV <f)lXiaS. 

ny, equally , 9 \ * y , , ~ v \ 

as there is €J> 0i$ yap fl7)0€V KOLVOV €OTl TCp ap\0VTI. Kat T<p 

dpxo(M€i/cp, ov8c <f>tXla' ovSe yap Slkcuov* aAA'25 



no justice. 



3. . &«f ((« ¥t] But excels the kingly rmvrm m*erif*irm «-«£« rmt *«riptt 

(sc. $iki*t) in the magnitude of ,it$ nftXn ri myayut mvriug ut r« uhu, 

benefactions. Schol. 

6. ravrm] Htpi evy%%x,^nr$u «*£ 9. rifuttrmi] According to the 

nftvt ri ky*yui %ls ri tJteu nftag xat rule before given, p. 328. 

r« XuTd, i/ **) pn «f*U* s , aXka h* 25. «v» 7^ llxmn] See p. 193. 
ftiem rSt wmrlpn. n *«) rut *pyi*w 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VIII. 11. 889 

olov T€\virij 7rpo9 opyavov ko! ^vxq irpibs a<o/xa 
real 8€(nrorTj irpbs SovXov' etyeXeirat fiev yap 
7raura ravra wro rwv xpojfiev&v, <f>tXla & ovk 
ecrri irpb? ra a\^v\a ovSc SUatov. aXX 9 ovSe irpbs 
blwirov rj fiovv, ovSi irpb? SovXov jj SovXos. ovSev 
yap koivov iariv* 6 yap BovXo? tptyvyov opyavov, 
to & opyavov ctyvxof SovXos. y /lev oiv 8ovXo$ y 
otnc e<m (fnXla irpbs avrov> 17 S avOpoyn-o?' Sokci 
yap €ivai rt Slkcuov iravrl avOpanrtp irpbs iravra 
lOTQV Svvafuvov KOUKovrjaai vo/wv koL <tvvOt)ki)$' 
km (fuXca? Srj 9 Kajff oaov avdpanros. iirl fu/cpov 
Srj teal iv rah Tvpavviatv at <f>cXlai tcai to 
Slkcuov, iv $€ rah Sri/WKpaTiai? iirl irXeiorov' 
iroXXa yap ra KOtva uroi? oiaiv: 



CHAP. XL 

Of Friendship formed by communities and by nature. 

14 EN KOLvcovia uev odv iraxra d>tXia i<rriv 9 KaOa- Friendships 

v .>!'**' * formed by 

irep eiprjrcu acpopta-eie o av ti? rqv re avyyevucrfv commum- 



2. forfrii *(it *9»k»9] See Pol. Ch^p. XI. 

pi 6. and Eth. p. 194. In this chapter, Aristotle considers 

6. %f*4'vx$* ?(y«w] Compare Pol. two divisions of friendship generally, 

i. 2. *m y ipydtip, ra uh fy'X* «"* derived from a consideration of their 

3* ty^X*' »fa «"* tvfltpiry I (A* «ft£ efficient causes, society and nature, 

fy^X 99 • ^ *t»(i}f IfA^vx**' I y*{ (xtimU, puttf.) Not but what all 

ftrngirifr \t cfy*'*t> ittw r**t ri%9*v friendship depends upon society, but 

Urn. dr* km) <rb nrnpuc S^ymut *$t some entirely, others not so. These 

£w Im mm) h *rnrtt «\nht tyytwt he again subdivides ; the first into 

Irr/, km) i huktg xrnuA rt 7/*^tfg«i>, **\tri**l (used in its strict sense), 

km) Srwt( i^yaut w$ i^ytitMt wmt • fvXtvtxMi, *vftirXe7*m, and the like; 

Sntn^wnt. these depend upon certain conditions 

Digitized by LjOOQIC 



340 ARISTOTELIS 

tact divided KCU TTfP €TCUpUCT)P. OU &€ IToXtTtKCU KCU <f>vXertKOU 
formed by KCU OVfUrXotKCU, KCU 0<TCU TOtCLVTCU, KOtPCMtKGUS 

iouccurt paXXop' olov yap KaJff bpuoXoyiav rtva 
ffraivovrai etvcu. eis toutos Se ra^euep av ris Kat 

Tho* form- TTJV £tVUCqV. Kat T) 01>yy€VUCrj $€ <f)CUV€TGU& 

ed by nature ^ - » *» >» ^x *» > ** 

ofvanou iroXvetdij? €tpcu 9 JiprqtrOau oe iraxra €K t^s irarpir 
l. Of pa- tap* 0l yovw puev yap orepyovac ra rtKva w 

rents and 



# 



children. €OUT<OP Tt OVTOy TO. &€ T€Kl>a TOW yOP€t? G>S OUT 

€K€ip<op Tt ovra. fiaXXop &' uraxrtv ol yovels to. 
cf axrr&v ^ ra ytwrjOivra ort eVc tovt&v, /ecu 10 
puiXXov <rvv<pK€L(DTCU to atff oS Tq> yevvqdevTt r) 
to ytvoftevop t$ irocriaavTC to yap i£ airrov 

OtKttOV Tip Off) OV, olov 680V? 7/ 0pl£ 1) OTtOVV 
T$ eXpVTt" €K€lP<p & OvOlv TO Off) o5, 1) TjTTOV. 

teal t$ ir\rj0€i Se tov \povov' ol fiev yap evOvs\b 
yevofuva orepyovaiv, to. 8k TtpoeXOovra toZs XP°~ 
vols tov? yov€L9 9 avveo'tv r/ aurOrjatv Xafioirra* etc 
tovtcov 8e SrjXov kcu St a (f)iXov<ri fiaXXov at 
2. Of br©- firjTtpe?. rouets p.lv o$v TCKva (f>tXovcrtp a>? eav- 

tov? [ra yap €£ avrcov otov erepoc avrot r^>20_ 
KtycopiaOat), T€Kva Se yoveis coy air eKeivtov 
irc^u/tora, dSeXQol fi^ aXAr/Xovs r§> 4k tg>v avr&v 



entered into by the communicating children; II. brothers; III. cousins 

parties, and for which such commu- and kindred ; IV. husband and wife; 

nities are formed. But in natural or from the ties of companionship 

friendships no such conditions are (taugiMi.) 

made; nature herself is the tacit organ, 13. PtxiTot] Proprium, proper to. 

engendering them in the minds of Aristotle seems to use this word in the 

both parties, who in the formation same way as in the argument at the 

of these friendships are as it were commencement of the Politics; that 

guided by a natural instinct. These the part is proper to the whole, be- 

are of two kinds; one arising from longs to the whole, not the whole to 

the ties of blood (rvyyttuuii), of which the part, 
there are four kinds, 1. parents and 19. fwript ] See ix. 7. 



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ETHICOHUM LIB. VIII. 11. 341 

7T€<f>VK€P0u % r) yap irpbs itceipa TavroTrjs aXXr/Xoi? 
TavTOiroiei' oQtv (fxwl ravrov al/ia Kai pi^av kcu 
ra Toutvra. elai 8r/ ravro way? teal kv 8irjprjp,kvois. 
Meya 8c irpo? <f)iXiav kcu to arvvrpo<f>ov kcu to 3. Of com- 

rt « v / «*% >- \ tf-x \ « / /i panions. 

$Ka(f r/XiKiav* V™€ Y a P yXiKa, Kai OL ovvr/aetf 
krolpoi 8io kcu r) aSeXlpucr/ tt} iraipiKfj ofioiovrou. 
'Aveyjnol 8c kcu 61 Xoiirol mryyevei? 4k tovto>v4. Of kith 

/ ** \ > \ ~ > *s i t and kin. 

<TVV<OK€UOVTCU Tip yap aitO TCDV OUTCOV CIVai. yi- 

yvovrcu 8 oi fiev oiKuorepot oi 8 aXXorpuorcpoi 
10T<£ ovveyyvs r) iroppoo top apyrjybv civcu. ^EoriThepecu- 
o rj fiev 7rpo? yoveif <f>iXia tckvois, Kai avopayiroisthetntnd- 
Trpo? oeovfy a>y irpos aya&ov Kai v7repe)(ov €1/ parent*; 
yap TreirovrjKaxri tol fikyiara' tov yap eivai kcu 
Tpa(f>rjvai atrial, Kai ycvopivois tov iraiSevdrjvai. 
\&e)(€i 8c Kai to r)8v Kai to xprjaifiov r) TOiavrq 
<f)t\ia fiSXXov tS>v oOvcicov, oacp kcu KoivoTcpog 

6 filO? aUTOlS COTIV. EoTl 8c Kai CV Tt} Of brothers; 

dSe\(f>iKrj aircp kcu kv rg CTcupiKrj, kcu fiSXXov 
kv tol? kiriciKcai, kcu oXcq? kv tois ofioloi?, oacp 

20 OIKClOTCpOl KOI CK yCVCTTj9 Virdp^OVO'l OTCpyOVTCS 

dXXrjXov?, Kai o<ra> ofior/dcorcpoi oi ck t£>v avrobv 

KOI OVVTp0(f>0l KCU 7TOl8cV0CVT€9 OfJLOLCO?' KOI 7) 

Kara tov \povov SoKi/xacrta TrXciorr) kcu ficfiaio- 
Tarr/. dvaXoyov Sc Kai kv toi? Xonroi? Ttov avy- 
25ycvcov ra (piXiKci. *Av8pl 8c kcu yvvaiKi <f)iXia of husband 

cokci Kara (pvaiv V7rap\civ avu pantos yap rg 
<f>v<r€i arvv8vaamK0V pJxXXov r) ttoXitikov> o<r<p 
irpaT€pov kcu dvayKOiOTCpov oiKia TroXeco?) Kai 

5. fog] See the Rhetoric, i. 1 1 . See note, 
also p. 315. 28. fr(«ri{«»] Compare the Polit. 

12. ^ tut,] See p. 317. and i. 1. 



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84S ARISTOTELIS 

TtKPawoua tcoivorepov rot? (jtpois. rots fiev ovv 
aXXotf ewi Toaovrov q koiv&vul eoriv, oi 8 av- 
Opmroi ov pJovov rrjs T€KVOiroiias yapw otvvoikov- 
<rip, aXXa kcu t&v el? tov filov' ev&vs yap Scypyrac 
ra epya 9 teal eortv erepa avSpos kcu yvveuKos'Z 
evapKOvaiv oiv aWrjXoi?, eh to koivov TtOevre? ra 
iSta. 8ia ravra 8e kcu to xprjaifwv eivcu 8ok€l 
kcu to T}8v ev Tcarnj rg <f)t\ia. eit/ & av kcu St 
aperyv, el eirietKei? eiev" eort yap eKarepov apery, 
kcu \aipoiev av r<p TOiovr<p. avvBeapjos Se raio 
TeKva 8ok€l eivcu* 8th Oarrov oi areKvoi SiaXv- 
optcu* ra yap TeKva koivov dyaOov dpxftoiv, 
arvvexei 8e to koivov. to 8e ir&$ irvfifkarreov 
avSpl irpbs yvvcuKa Kal 0X009 (f)l\(p 7rpo? </>l\ov> 
ov8ev erepov ifxuvercu ^ryreurOcu r) ircbs 81kouov'1& 
ov yap tovtov (fxiivtrcu r<p (plXcp 7rpo9 tov (j)iXov 
kcu tov, oOvelov kcu tov eTcupov kcu tov orvpr 
<f>oiTryrr)v. 



CHAP. XII. 

Of offences which arise in Friendship between equals, and how they 
are to be avoided. 

lute far TPITTQN S ovarwv <f>iXicov, KaBdnrep ev apxjjllb 

requiting „ v /* « > ~ " \ * » / 

friends. eiplJTCU, KCU KCtff €KOOTr)V. TCDV fieV €V laOTTfTlW) 



1 . rtMwtm] See the first and second the causes of the corruption of friend- 
chapters of the Politics, first Book. ship, which subject is continued into 

the next Book, first premising a 
general rule for avoiding offences, 
Ciiav. XII. which cause the dissolution of friend- 

Aristotle now proceeds to speak of ship. Towards those who are equal 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VIII. 12. 343 

(f>iXa>p optqw tg>p 8k Kajff inrepoyfip {koi yap 
opouo? ayafioi (plXoi yivovrai kqli dpeivcov yelpovt^ 
bpuouwBk kcu rfSei?, kcu Sio. to xprjatpop iaa^opres 
rats GXpeXeLoug kcu Staxfrkpoprcs), tow urovs pep 
6kot ia-OTifTa Set r£ (frtXetP teal tois Xotiroh 
io-dfietp, tov9 8 dpiaovs t$ apaXoyop tolls inrep- 
o\cus ottoSlSopcu. TLyverai 8k tol cy/cA^/iara Complaint* 

kcu at pepyets ep rg KaTa to xprjatpop (ptXta entirely 

* / * / x > N / f % \ *» > \ confined to 

t) pjovrj 7] (jLoAiara evXoyco?. oi pep yap oi aperqp friendships 
10 (piXot ovtc? ei Spoip dXXrjXov? irpo0vpavPTCu"mt*natd 

\ » ^ jl 'x ' ^ ~ t>> motives. 

tovto yap apeTTjs Kat iptXtas. irpos tovto o 
apiXXoopepcop ovk eortp kyKXrjpaTa ovSe puayaC • 

tov yap iptXovpra koi ed irotovpra ovSels 8vo\€^ 
paipei, aXX kap tj \apiet9 9 apvverai ev 8p&v. 

15 8 inrepfiaXAcop, Tvyyavtov oh tyUrm, ovk av 
iyKaXoirj r£ (piXcp* eKanpos yap tov ayaBov 
k<f)ieTai. ov iravv 8 ovS ep toi? 8t rj8opr)p* apa 
yap dfi<f)oiv ytpeTai o5 bpeyoprat, ei t$ avvhidyeiv 
yaipovatv. yeXolo? 8 av (Jhupoito kcu b kyKaXcip 

20 Tip fiTj Ttpiroim, k£pp firj trvpStr/pepeveiP. 17 8e 
8ia to XPV°' l t JLOV iyKXrffjLaTiKr)' kit axfoeXeta yap 
yjxbpepot dXXrjXoi? del tov irXeiopos 8eoprcu 9 Kat 
eXarrop e\eip otopreu tov irpo<rf)KOVTO? y Kat pepr 
(fiovrat oti ovx o<ra>p Seoprat to<tovt<op Tvyxapov- 

tt<rtp aijtot opt€9' oi fi^ ed irotovpres ov Svpavrat 
kirapKeiP Toaavra ocg>p oi irdoyppres Seoprat. 
*E(H#ee dc, KaBairep to Sikcuop karri Sittop, to On what 

\vj \*\ \/ n~ \ account 

pep aypaxpop to oe Kara popop, Kat ttjs Kara such com- 
plaints 

arise. 

-the Arithmetical ratio of return is to not, the Geometrical proportion. 

be observed, towards those who are 28. iy^$t] Seethe Rhetoric, i. 13. 



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344 ARISTOTELIS 

to xprjatfiov <f>tXias y p&v rfiuaf r/ fie vofUKtj 
elpai. yiyverai oiv ra eyxAi^cara pLaXiaff otqlv 
fir) Kara tt)p avrrjv avpaXXd^axrt kcu SiolXvwptcu. 
coti Si/ vofUKq pip rj cVt frqroisy r) puep irdfnrav 
ayopaia 4k x (t P^ €L * X € W a > V &* iXtvOepuorepaS 
€ty yjpbpop, Ka£t ofioXoyiap 8e rl atrri rives* 
SijXop 8 iv ravrg to ofeiXrjfia kovk dfMJ>iXoyop, 
<f>iXiKOP 8c rqp avafioXrfp ej(€i* 8u> wop' £pioi9 
ovk tlol rovrtop Sliccuy oAA* otovToi 8eip arepyetp 
tovs Kara rriartp ovpaXXaijavras. r) tf r)0ucfflO 
ovk em prjTols, aAA* <w <f>lXcp 8cop€trcu r) brtBr^ 
« 7T0T€ aXXo. KOfii^eaOcu &€ aijiot to taop r) irXtoPy 

<u? ov 8e8a>KW dXXa xPW a ?- °^X bfvola>$ 8e 
ovvaXXaija? kcu StaXvofievos eytcaXeaei. tovto 
8c ovpfiaipct 8ia to fSovXeadai pep irapras r)\$ 
tovs wXciorovf to. KaXa> rrpoatpeurOai 8e to, 
artpeXifta. kolXop 8e to ev irotelv fir) Iva aprardih), 

How inch aXpcXl/lOP 8e TO £V€py€T€lC0CU. AwafJL€P(p 8r/ 

maybe aPTa7To8oT€OP TT)P aPioLP (OP e7TO0€P 9 KCU CKOPTl' 
avoided* 

aKOPra yap <f)iXop ov iroirfrcop. <h$ Srj ScafiapropraW 
ip rg OLPXU Ka * € ^ iraQopra v(f> o5 ovk eSei' ov 
yap wro <f)lXov, ov8e 8t avro tovto 8p£>pro? 
Kofidirep oip irrl prjrol? cvcpyerrjOePTa SiaXvreop. 
kolI ofioXoyrjaai & ap Svpdfiepos airoScoaetp' a8v- 
parovpra & ovl? 6 Sovs yljltoo-ep ap' coot 6C25 
SvpaTOS, airoSoTtop. ep dpxfl & imo-Kenreop v(f> 

20. Amcrrm yij\ The Paraphrast trt fx*6t tZ «-«AWsf ty* »S tl* Xiu, w 

appears to me to have correctly in- yk^ v*b QiXf», nm) \nn7t o*»s fours* 

terpreted this passage, although much kicw^mrm rig ml*xt** lin^ywimt, 

diversity of opinion exisls concerning & t ixtfrtt Ul|cvr« ry myieuw r$v t»if- 

it th yht Usuf h7(tif r^ rht iXt^n y%r*hr*. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. VIII. 18. 346 

o5 €VCpy€T€LTOU KCU C7TI TlPl 9 O7TC09 cVl TOVTOtS 

v7rofi€inj t) firj. 'Apxftiafjr/rrjo'ip & ?\€i Trorepa who is to 

» ~ ~ ~ /,< ii, / - \ ^ nxthevalue 

dec rg rov iraffovros axpeXeia puerpeip kcu 7r/>o?ofthebe. 
Tavrqv TTOieuTVcu ttjp apraitoooavPy rj rg rov 
zSpaaapTOs empyema, oi fiep yap iraBopres rcw- 
avrd <f)a(ri Xafielp irapa t£>p evepyer&p a fiucpa 
rjp itceivois kcu e^rjp Trap irepow Xafielp, Kara- 
<rfUKpi{pvT€9* oi & avdiraXiv ra pAyiara tAp 
Trap avrovS) kcu a trap aXAcov ovk t)p, kcu 4p 

10 kipSvpoi? rj TOiavTCur xpeixu?. ap oiv Sea pkp 
to xpr/aifiop T7)9 (ptXtaf ovarfs r) rov woOoptos 
axfreXeta fiirpop iorlp; o5ro9 yap 6 Seofiepor, 
kcu eirapKel avrip an KO/uovfiepo? tt)p tarjp' 
Toaavrrj o$p yeyepr/Tcu r) hriKOvpia ocrop ovro? 

15 uxfyeXTjTdL, kcu ottoSotcop St) avr$ oktop imjvparo, 
r) kcu irXeop' koXXiop yap. ip fie reus Kar ape-njp 
eyKXr/fiara fiep ovk Zotip, fterpy & eoiKtv rj rod 
SpaaaPTOf Trpoaipeo-is' ttj? aperies yap kcu tov 
rfOovs €P rrj 7rpoaipecr€L to Kvpiop. 



CHAP. XIII. 

Of offences which arise in Friendships, where one party is superior to 

the other. 

16 AIA4>EPONTAI 8e Kal ip toi? ko# vTrepovypHowmd 
tpiXtats agioi yap €Karepo$ irXeop *X (ELV > oraiMtyof return 

20. maf far*(0%4t] This particular of recriminations. (See p. 343.) And 

friendship is more subject to com- because the good man very rarely 

plaints and dissensions than any others contracts friendship with one in a 

being generally formed, as has been more exalted station than himself, on 

already stated for the sake of mutual account of the difficulty of making an 

interests, and such are generally full adequate return of favours. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



S46 ARISTOTELIS 

u to be ob- 8* rwro yiyvrjraiy dtaXverai y <f>iAia. oUrai yap 

where oae O T€ fkXTWP 7TpO<T7fK€lP OVTtp TtXcOP €)(€ir 9 Tto 

^TZSL'yoip aya&cp ptfucOm irXeop* ofioiw 8* kcu 6 
artftcXipu&rcpos' ayptiop yap ovra ov (fxtcri Selp 
loop exctp* XciTOVpylap re yap yipcaOau mi <w5 
tfkXiap, el pai kcct a£tav t&p €pya>p eorui ra 4k 
ttj9 (fxXias' oiovrai yap, KaBchrtp iv yjrqpucLTow 
Koaxovia irXciop Xapfiapovaip ol avpficuAXofievoi 
TrXetoPy ovtw 8cip kcu eu rrj (fxXia. 6 8 ipSerjs 
kcu 6 y±ip<AV apcnraXip* <f>iXou yap ayaBov elvcuio 
to 4irapK€iP rots evSttciv' rt yap, (fxuriv, otfteXos 
<rrrou8cucp tj Svpaarrg <f>lAov elpai, prjOev ye /oieX- 
Xopra caroXavup ; coace 8e ejearepo? 6p$w o£iovp> 

KCU &€tP €KaT€pfp vXeOP P€fl€lP €K TT)$ <f>lXvOS, OV 

rov avrov 84, dXXa T(p p£p inrepe)(0VTi TtfiiJ9 9 lb 
ry 8 ipSeci Ktp8ov$ m rrjs flip yap aperrjs kcu 
rrjs evcpyeala? tj rifirj yepas, rrj? 8 evSeia? 
which u errucovpia to K€p8oe. Ovrm 8 tyup tovto 

aboobienr- x , ^ , , , . » \ 

edinthe KOI €P T0U9 TTOAiT€UUS <pCUP€TCU OV yap TlfJUXTOl 

distribution « ft \ , ^\ ~ ,y \ % 

of state re- O fl7)0€V ayaffOP T(p KOlVCp 7TOpl£a>P TO KOLVOV 20 

wards. \ ev/«* « \ \ % * * % 

yap olootcu T<p to koivov evepyerovpri, i) Tip*) 
8c kolvov. ov yap cotip apa xprjpaTl^ecrOai airo 
t&p Kotp&v kcu TifiourOai' cp vcun yap to eXarrop 
ovSel? wrofiepct. Tip 8tj ttcpi xPV/ JLara *XaTrov~ 
pAvq> Ttfir/v airovipjovcri kcu r$> 8a>po8oK<p XPV'%5 
fiara' to kolt a£iap yap iiravurol kcu crcofiei ttjp 

Theinfa- <f)l\iav, KO0a7T€p eLpTjTai. OvTG) 8tj KCU TOLS 

rior there* f / x «, / 9 . x 

fore is to OLVLCTOtS OfJuXrjT€OV y KCU T(p €19 XPVt AaTa G><pcXoV- 

turntotha U€VCp Tj tl? <Xp€TT)V Tl/JLTJV aPTa7To8oT€OP> OVTaTVoSlr 

best of his T 

24. vwpiiui) No tMn can endure to have Uts than he ought on all occasions. 

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ETHICORUM LIB. VIII. 18. 847 

SoVTCL TO ep8e\6pueP0P. TO SvPaTOP yap 1) 0tAia ability; and 
> > ~ > \ » »w . »*\ \ * » though it 

€7ri£r)T€i, ov to tear attav ovoe yap eorip ep be not an 
iraxriy Kaffairep ep tojls irpos tovs aeovs Tipjous it should be 

N \ 3* x x v _ * »/-/ received as 

kcu T0V9 yopei? ovoei? yap av iroTe ttjp a^iav **<&>•* the 
5a7ro8oiTj y els Svpapup 8e 6 Oepairev&p €7n€ucrjs <******* 

1 * ~ *\ a */> •,«.« «~ / duty of a 

€twu core*, dto Aca*> oogeiep ovk egeipai vup 7raTepa*>n. 
aTrevrraxrOat,, iraTpX 8 viop" 6<f>el\opra yap wiro- 
horeop> ovOep 8e irovf}<ras a£iop tS>v VTrrjpypepcop- 
SeSpcucep, &<jt del 6<f>el\ei. oh & ofalXercu, 

lOeijovala axf>elvaC kcu tS iraTpl 8rj. apua & ?<ra>? 
ovSeis 7tot av airoorrjvai Sokci prj xnrepfiaXkovTOs 
paX^VPuf X^pis y*P TV* <f>v<nK7}9 (ptXla? ttjp 
hriKOvplav apOpamucov prj SuoOeitrOat. rep Be 
<J)€Vktov rj ov oirovSaoTOP to eirapKetPy po\6rjpcp 

XbovrC eS irixryeiv yap oi 7roXkol fiovXoprat, to 
8e iroielv ipevyovap ©$• dXvaiTeXes. irepl pep 
ohp tovt&p enrl toktovtop elpqada). 



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INTRODUCTION TO BOOK IX. 



In the concluding part of the last Book, Aristotle has 
shown what are the causes which lead to the dissolution 
of Friendship, and the means of preventing such effects, 
which brought him to the consideration of the offices of 
Friendship, and the returns which ought to be made by 
friends, more particularly when the parties are unequal. 
The same subject is also pursued in this book, in which, 
after showing that in dissimilar Friendship, of all others, 
dissensions are likely to arise, and that in Friendship, 
which is a kind of Justice, where the parties are unequal 
a geometrical proportion must be observed, he proceeds 
to determine the point who should estimate the value of 
the benefit, the giver or receiver, in order to the making 
of a just return. This point being determined, he then 
lays down some general precepts for the guidance of our 
conduct in the returning of favors, examining whether 
every kind of return is justifiable or not, and how far, 
and in what kinds ; and whether, when from alteration 
of circumstances or changes in individuals one of the 
essentials of Friendship is lost, so that no adequate 
return can be made, the dissolution of Friendship is 
justifiable; and thus concludes that part of his subject. 

But the examination of this last question naturally 
engages him in the consideration of another springing 
out of it ; What is the origin, and what are the essen- 
tials for the existence of Friendship ? Considering it then 
in its most simple and primitive state, the love of a man 
towards himself, (for a friend is a second self, and how 
can he love another as a second self who loves not his own 



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350 INTRODUCTION. 

self?) Aristotle is led to a consideration of self-love, and 
whether it is possible for one to love another who loves 
not himself. And if this be not possible, and the love of 
one's self must be the first of all friendships, and the good 
man only can love himself, and the good man is the 
canon of all moral truth, we must seek for the essentials 
of friendship in the love of the good man towards him- 
self: but this consists of three things; benevolence 
(fSyoMt), unanimity (ojtlyoia), and beneficence (euegyto-ia). 
To each of these then he devotes a separate chapter, and 
concludes the book with a consideration of certain 
questions arising out of this subject. 

As to the. need of friends, their number, and society. 



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ARISTOTELIS 
ETHICA NICOMACHEA. 

LIB. IX. 



CHAP. I. 

Of the causes of quarrels in Friendship — and of the right estimate of 
benefits in order to preserve Friendship. 

EN TrixTws Se rats avofwiO€i8(<n <f>i\tau9 to The dissi- 
avakoyov iadfa kou aco^ec ttjv <f>ikiav> KaOairep friendship 

ttprjTCU) oloP KOU iv rg 7TO\lTUCg Ty (TKVTOTOpXf preserved, 
» \ ~ « * / »iO x ' »>>/ lfapropor- 

avTi t<dv v7ro07}fjLaT<op a/jLoiprj yivtrax tear agiav, tionateiy 

e * ~ *a. ' n ~ x ~ » ~/i * return of 

&kcu rtp v(f>avTriy Kai tois Aoiwoi?. euravaa /nc? benefits be 

« / \ / \ / * observed. 

ovv 7r€iropi<rrai kqivov /xerpov to vofwrfia, /ecu 
7rpb? tovto Srj iravra ava<f)€p€Tcu, kcu rovrtp fie- 
rpeircu' kv h\ rij epcoTL/cj} ivlore fiev 6 epao"n)s 



l. iupunsttrt] Of different tpecies. 
That is, when friendship is formed 
between two or more, but each person 
has a different motive. As the poor 
loves the rich for the sake of money 
or reward; the rich the poor for the 
sake of his services or respect, and 
so on. In such friendships, of course, 
a return in kind is indeed no return, 
since it is not a return of the object 
for which the connexion was formed. 
As has been already shown in the case 
of commutative justice. (See p. 187. 



sq. Compare also p. 344.) If 
one party, therefore, has received a 
certain gratification in the particular 
object which he had in view, he must 
make a return in proportion of the 
particular object which the other party 
had in view. But in friendships formed 
from motives of virtue, of course a re- 
turn in kind is equivalent, since the 
object of both parties is the same. 

3. 0mv »«* U tiJ *«Ajri»£] See v. 7. 

6. m$tfit pirp9] See P* 187 » 
23. sq. 



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862 ARISTOTELIS 

£yKOLk€l OTl V7T€p(f)L\CDV OVK aVTt<f)L\€lTOU, OV0€V 

ex<ov (f>iXrjr6v 9 €i ovr<D9 erv\ev 9 7roX\aici9 & 6 
4p<Dfi€vo? otl irporepov eirayyeXkopjevos iravra vvv 
ovdlv £7riT€\€u crvpfiaivei 8e tol TQiavTa 9 iweiSav 
6 fM€v 8i rjSovqv tov ep&fievov <f)i\r}, 6 8e 8ia6 
to xPV crL f l0J/ ™ v tpaorrjV) Tavra 8e firj. dfi(f>ocv 
v7rapX0* 8ia TavTa yap ttjs (pcXia? ov<rr)9 StaXvo-is 
yiveraij eirei8av firj- yivrjTcu (ov eveKa £(f>{Xovv* 
ov yap avrovf corcpyov aXXa tol v7rapxovra> ov 
fiavifia ovra* 8io TOtavTat Kal al <f)t\lai. rj 5c 10 
tcov r)0(bv Kaffavrrjv oicra fievei, nadairep eXprjTOu. 
8ta<f>€poirrai 8e Kal orav erepa yiyvrjTou avrols 
kcu firj (ov bpiyovraC ofioiov yap r£ firjdkv yly- 
vecrdat, orav o5 £(f>L€TCU firj Tvy\ainjj olov kcu 
t$ Ki0ap<p$<p o iirayyeXkofievos, KctX ocrcp a/xeivovU 
acre Lev j rocrovrcp irXeico* €l? Ua> & airaurovvri ray 
imoayicrsvs avff r/Sovrj? r/Sovr/v anro8e8(OKevai ecprj. 
€i fiev oiv eKarepo? tovto efiovXeTO, Ikco/co? av 
€tX€V el 8 9 6 fiev repyfnv 6 8e KtpSo?, Kal 6 fiev 
ex*i k> 8e fir) 9 ovk av euq to Kara rrjv Kotv(oviav20 
KaXcb? 9 (ov yap Seo/xevos Tvy\avei 9 tovtois kcu 

In whoM TTpO<re)(€L, KOLK€LPOV y€ \OLpLV TOVTa 8cO(T€L. Trjv 

power the ,w *> / /£ . , ~ .. / * 

determina- agiav 0€ TTOTepOV TagOU €(TTly TOV TTpOtefievOV 7) 

tionofthe , e x .., , 

value of the TOV irpOAOpOVTOS ; O yap 7TpOl6fjL€VO? 60LK €7Tl- 

return 

ought to be. 

10. e ft **» ffln) But virtuous them to fix his reward. And in such 

frUndthip — . cases, the person who confers the ser- 

24. +p7tf*trt ] He who commences vices ought to be satisfied with the 

with conferring a favour upon another, reward which is given him. And 

seems to leave to the person upon although by the persons gratified an 

whom the favour is conferred the fix- equivalent return is not always made, 

ing the estimate of the return. As yet such persons escape censure 

Protagoras who conferred the favour because they violate no stipulation, 

first, by teaching his disciples, and left But when a stipulation is made, and 



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ETHICORUM LIB, IX. 1. 353 

rp€7T€iv cKtivcp. oirep (f)aai kcu Upcorayopav iroielv' 
are yap SiSd^eiev aSrproTe, Ttfirjaou tov ftaOovra 
eKeXevev ocrov 8ok€i a£ta eiricrTaaOcu, kcu iXa/ifiave 

TOCTOVTOV. €V TOIS TOLOVTOLS 8 €VLOL9 OLp€(TK€L TO 

6 " fitcrOos 8 avSpi." oi 8e irpoXafiovref to apyv- 
piov, €iTa firjOlv TTOtovvres cov fyacrav, 8ia ras 
wrepfioXas rtov eirayyeXuov, eiKOTcos iv cyicX^- 
fiacrt yivovrcW ov yap eirtTeXovcriv a (h/xoXoyrjarav. 
tovto 8 tcrcD? irovfiv ol cro<f)urral avayKatpvrai 
10 8ia to fir/Oeva av Sovvat dpyvpiov cov iirloravrai. 
oSroi fiev oiv cov iXafiov top fiiaOov, fir/ iroiovvres 
€lk6t<d9 ev lyKK-qpaxrlv elcriv. *Ei/ oh 8e /z?) in cases of 

yiyverai ocofioAoyLa tt)9 vTrovpyias, oi fiev ol ship. 

OUTOV9 TTpOUfJitVOl €ip7)Tai OTl dveyKXijTOi' TOl- 

Xbavvq yap rj KaT dperr/v <j)tXla. ttjv dftoifirfv T€ 
7roi7jT€OP Kara ttjv irpoaipeatv' avrrj yap tov 

(plXoV KOL TT)9 apeTTjS. OVTCO 8 €0CK€ KCU TOLf 

(fyiXocrocfrlas KOivcovrjaacrcv' ov yap irpbs yprjiiajff 

7] d£la fl€Tp€LT0U y TL/JLT) T l<T0pp07T0? OVK dv ytVOlTO, 

20aAA' Xcrcos LKavov, Kaddirtp kcu irpos Oeovs kcu 
irpos yovets, to iv8e)(o/JL€vov. M^ TOia vrqs i n cases 

•^v* «»/ *\\* ' ' '\ * where 

o ovarfs Tqs oocrecos aAX em tivi, fuxAiora fiev friendship u 

v ^ ^ v > /«» / /)&>"' formed from 

icrcos oei ttjv avTairooocnv yiyvecrvcu ooKovaav mo tives of 

> i ~ » 9 yi * > ** *» x mutual in- 

afJLCpOLV KaT agiav eivai, ei be tovto puf] avp.- terest or 

„/ >/ > *'f~ * \ / pleasure. 

25pouvoi, ov /jlovov avayKaiov oogeiev av tov irpoe- r 

he who has received a benefit upon 5. futiU] Compare Hesiod. Op. 

certain conditions makes no equiva- et Dier. v. 368. furtif J* afy) fix* 

lent return, and breaks his promise, as i/^im* £(»<« Urm. 
was the case with the Sophists, he is 22. Wt rtwi] Sc. j &« x?*"P» A *'* 

exposed to very great censure. $$#w. 

1 . Tlptrayit**] Of Protagoras, see 25. or{«i;g«»r«] This word seems to 

Diog.Laert.ix.$.52.andMenag.ib. See be used as equivalent to «r{«x«0ii>r«. 

also Geel's Hist. Sophist, in v. Protag. See line 5. 



A a 



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354 



ARISTOTELIS 



\ovra Tarr€iv 9 dXXa kou Sikouov' oaov yap ovros 
axfrcXr/OT) § avff oaov ttjv r/Sovijv etXer av, rocroS- 
tov avTikafioov ef;€i ttjv irapa tovtov a£lav' kou 
yap iv rols caviois ovtg> (f>aiv€Tou yivofievov, 
ivta\ov r eial vo/iot t<ov eKovaioov avfifioXauov& 
Sitca? fir) elvou w 8eov 9 <p hriaT€vae 9 SiaXvOrjvou 
irplos tovtov KaOdirep iKOivtoinjaev. co yap ewe- 
Tpd(f)07jj tovtov ot€Tai SiKouoTepov elvai Ta£cu 
tov eiriTptyavTOs. Ta iroXXa yap ov tov taov 
TipjSxriv ol expire? kou ol fiovXofievoi Xafieiv* Ta 10 
yap oitcela kou a SiSoourtv €Kaarois <f>aiv€Tau 
noXXov a£ia. dXX oftco? r] apuoifirf yiverat wpos 
toctovtov oaov av Tarraxriv ol Xafiovres. Sel 8 
ura>9 ov too-ovtov TLfiav oaov expvrt (f>aivercu 
a£iov> oAA* oaov irp\v e\ei.v eTifia. 15 



4. U T§4f «M«f] • y*l MMV/ttfMf 

rtrru riit rift$i9 **) (***{** r V s*s*i« 

iTmu Xiyu ri {nrtuptftp «»#». Paraph. 
12. A *p*&h yinTtu] Ex iis omnibus 
patet quod is debet etatuere remunera- 
tionem qui accepit beneficia non is qui 
contulit. Et hoc videtur probasse 
philosophus supra per totum tarn in 
amicitiis et societatibus quae fiant cum 
pactione quam in Us quae sponte fiunt 
Sin vero accident ut animus conferen- 



tis responderet judicio recipients tunc 
remuneratio esset utrisque accomroo- 
data, et id est quod dicit philosophus, 
oportet forsitan remunerationem fieri 
judicio utrorumque; sed si id noa 
accidat ut concurrant in judicia et 
conveniant, tunc ez parte recipients 
repensio statuenda videtur qui novit 
etanimadvertere debet quanti sit bene- 
ficium susceptum et quantum sibi pro- 
fuerit et quanti aestimabat anteqaam 
susciperet. Acciaj. See p. 345. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 2. 365 



CHAP. II. 

Of the offices and return which ought to be made to friends. 

2 AIIOPIAN 3* e)(€i Kal ra rotdde, olov irorepa Three ques- 
oei iravra rtp irarpi a7rove/JL€tv kcu ircutecr&cu, r/ posed 

/ > » / \ ^\ touching 

Kafivovra jmv lot pep ireurreov, arparrjyov oe the return 

/ \ x / . c / ftX i /x of benefits. 

\eiporovryreov rov iroXepuKov 0/1010*9 oe </nA<a 
bfiaXXov ^ awovSaup VTrqperqreov y kcu evepyerr) 
avrairo8or4ov X^piv M«XXoi/ 17 eralpcp Sorcov, iav 
apafyotv fJir) €v$4yrjTai. ap oiv iravra ra roiavra 
aKpif&os fikv Stopiaai ov paSiov ; 7roAActy yap 
kcu iravrotm *X €L 8ia*f>opa$ kcu fieyeffei kcu 

10 fUKpOT7)Tl Kal T<p KaXcp KCU OVayKaUp. "Or* General so- 

ft* » * *»»*»»*/ 1 y« v lutionofthe 

o ov iravra rep avrtp airooortov, ovk aorjXov. questions. 
kcu ra? ficv evepyeala? avranro8oreov w eiri to 
iroXv /mSXXov rj yapLOT€Ov iraipot?, koi coenrep 
ddvetov, <p ocpetXec airodoreov fiaXXov 77 kraiptp 
15 florcW. urea? 5* ovdc rovr aei y olov r<p Xvrpa>- 
Oevrt irapa XyoTobv irorepov rov Xvcrdfievov avrt- 
\vrpa>T€0v, Kav bcrncrovv 17, rj Kal fir/ iaXcoKort 



Chap. II. To these he replies, that exact rules 

In the first part of this chapter, Aris- cannot be given for our conduct on 

totle proposes three questions touching these occasions. But as a general 

the return of benefits. First, whether maxim, favours conferred ought to be 

obedience is to be yielded by a son to returned, but not every kind to our 

his rather in all things ; secondly, whe- benefactors in all cases, but we ought 

ther is our duty, to assist a good man to be guided by what is suitable to 

or our friend when both are not pos* each person : &*m*n kit *u{«r'uv r§ 

Bible ; and lastly, whether if both be •1*m* &**viput, *«} *vy»(tntr v« i*«- 

not in our power, are we to return «*••** far&t%nr* ««r' •swimr* x*) 

a favour to him who has conferred kpvh n Xt**"- 
one upon us, or upon our companion. 

Aa2 



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356 ARISTOTELIS 

OTTCUTOVPTt &€ airoSoreop, 7) top irarepa Xvrpto- 
nop; 8o£*i€ yap ap kcu iavrov /jlSXXop top 

More parti- TTOTtpa. "OlT€p 0$P tlpTJTCU, KaBoXoV fl€P TO 

lion of the oibciXnua 07To8oT€OP, €CLP 8 VTTtpTtivT) r) 86<TIS 
tecDDdaod \> „ + „ 9 , x \ t , , 

third ques- TCO KoXtp 7) Tip OPayKOUp, ITpOS TOUT CC7TOkXiT€OP' 5 

cpiotc yap ova eortp urov to ttjp irpovirapyrjp 
afteiyJHUTOai, eretSav 6 pip airovdcuop elSw ed 
iroirjoij, t$ 8e r) avrcnrohoats yiypt/Tcu 9 op oterai 
paxOrjpop etpcu. ovSe yap t© SaveUrcum ivlore 
otPTthcuHtoTCov' 6 pJev yap oiopcpos Kopu€ia-0cu\o 
khavzujtv 4irt€iK€i opti, 6 8 ovk cAtt/^ci ico/uct- 
aOai irapa irovrjpov. €?r€ toipvp rg aXr/Oeia ovrco? 
€\6i, ovk utop to a^Uofia' clr e\ei pip pj) ovtco? 
oIoptcu 8e, ovk ap 86£cucp aro7ra irotelp. vrrep 
oiv itoXAoki? elpqrcu, ol irepi to, Troth) kcu ra? 15 
7rpd^€L9 Xoyoi bpjov&s ifcovm to wpwrpApop toi? 

More ptrti- 7T6/H <Z clcriP. Chi pL€P oSp OV TaifTOL ITaCTLP 

two of the airoSoreop, ovSe T(p iraTpi irdpra, KaOdirep ovSe 

firnt que*- „ x , » v«j x . » \ ^ * 

tioo. T<p All UV€TCU 9 OVK OOTjXOP €7T€l €T€pd yOPCVat 

kcu aStXQoi? kcu kraipois kcu evepyeTous, €Kacrroi? 20 
to. olKeia Kal tol dppjOTTOpra diropept/Teop* ovtco 
$€ kcu 7roi€iP <j>aipoprcu m eh ydfiov? pJep yap 



13. w% Un r$ i^jm/ui] The charac- Am. xtrtof yrn^ zas Sput mm) «XX* Arret 

Ur of the good and bad are not equal. vroXXm. iifUtot ftixu iuriuf vgM-f f£«» 

Consequently if the good man make rijf Au r»rf>) **f "exx**** S*rt «»}(«* 

the same return of favour to the bad « itSt n. oSrmf cvTt rf **rfZ «-«»r« 

as he receives from him, he breaks Aovbrfot. Schol. 
that rule of proportion which friendship 21 . •trm ft *«/] Aristotle illustrates 

ought to observe. his argument, that what is fitting ought 

15. *o\\«xif tl^nreu] See particu- to be returned to each, by the conduct 

larly p. 7, 6. of men to their different relatives. We 

19. r!f At) tvirtu] jr*t ya^ ntec A invite our relatives to marriage feasts, 

•h itfurU Xlixu roTf *£XX«jr/ fivuv rZ &c. we think this a befitting return 



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ETHICOKUM LIB. IX. % 357 

kclXovot tovs crvyyevels' tovtois yap kolvov to 
yivos Kal cu 7T€pl tovto 8r/ irpaf^w' /ecu €«• tol 
ktJStj 8e fJuxXurr 9 otovrcu 8eiv tov9 crvyytvtis 
airavrav 8ia tovto. 8of;€i€ & av Tpo(f)f)? fxtv 
byovevat Sew fiaXior eirapiceZv, coy ofaiXovras, 

KCU TOLS CUTLOL9 TOV tlvOLl KOlXXlOV OV 7) idVTOL? 

cl? tolvt €7rapK€iv. Kal Tifirjv 8e yovevai KadaTTtp 
foots, ov iracrav 84* ov8e yap ttjv avrrjv iraTpl 

KCU fJLTfTpl' OV& ad TTjV TOV <TO(f)OV TJ TOV OTpaTT]- 

10 yov, dXXa ttjv iraTpiKqv^ o/jlolcd? 8e teal tt)v 
fjLTjTpucrjv. kcu iravrl 8c Tip 7rp€orfivr€pcp Tifirjv 
rrjp Kajff r/XiKiav, xmavaxTTOucTci kcu KaTaKXicrei 

Kal TOIS TOIOVTOIS. 7T/)Off €TdlpOV? 8* ad KCU aSeX- 

(f>ovs > irapprfcriav kol airavr&v KOii/orrfTa. Kal 
15 axryyevecri 8r/ Kal <j>vX€Tais Kal iroXiTais Kal tois 
Xonroi? aircuriv del ireipaTtov to oiKelov dirovi- 
fietVy kcu avyKpiveiv Ta eKaorots vTrdp\ovTa KaT 
oiK€iOTT)Ta Kal dperrjv tj xpijcriv. tg>v fiev oiv 
oftoyevcov patov r] KpicriS) tG>v 8e StafapovTcov 



to those having a common interest Nam pneterquam quod non est du- 
with us. But to our parents we do bium, quin »ri1»s quoque valeat bus- 
more than this, as being greater turn et obitum : (unde i*i*nfaf ftf*** 
debtors to them, not only inviting them vocatus est fletus, lamentatioque qua 
to feasts, but providing them with propinqui lugent fato functum quern- 
sustenance, a return particularly ap- piam ipsorum; nam Statius quoque 
propriate to those from whom we have carmen funebre Graeco hoc nomine 
received it. indicavit,) admonere ipsos debuit, mo- 
2. r* «*$«] Miror Argyropylum rem esse institututnque mortalium non 
Grscum hominem et ilium quidem minus quam in nupttis, hoc tempore 
valde doctum non vidisse quid hie adesse propinquos, ac pio hoc officio 
valeret %U rk *fhti. Reddidit enim, fungi, atque illos quidem non invitatos, 
ut ad sponsalia ; secutus autem ille in ab ostendere etiam videtur philoso- 
eo est Eustratium, quod non debebat, phus, qui ait eos solere «*•«?«•«* ad 
non magna? auctoritatis interpretem. hoc munus obeundum. VICTOR. 
A re tin us tamen in hoc lapsus non est. 



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358 



ARISTOTELIS 



cpya>8coT€pa~ ov pj)v 8ia yc touto chroarareov, 
aAA* w olv kvbvxjfrai) ovra> 8iopiar4ov. 



CHAP. III. 

Upon what occasions Friendships may be dissolved, and what conduct 
ought to be observed in such cases. 

A question EXEI 8 OLTTOpULV KOU 7T6/H TOV 8ia\v€<T0CU TOS 3 

dissolution tyXlOS 1/ flTJ TTpOS TOV9 fir/ 8tOfl4vOVTfXS '. T) TTpOS 
of friend- * ^ » \ \ / * * ** N jl*v v 

ship formed ft€V TOW Ota TO XprfaifAOP 7) TO 7)0U <f>lA0W OsTay, o 
for interest * . ~ i * t^\ v s> x' 

or pleasure, OTOP flTJKCTl TOUT €\OHriPy OVO€V OTOTTOV OlOAV- 

pmrty is €<rffai ; tKtiixov yap rjaav <f)iAoi' cop airo\nr6vT€ov 
tvXoyov to firj (friXtiv. tyKaAeaete 8 9 av to, €i Sea 
to XPV {ri / WP V ™ ^^ aywrwy irpoaerroulro 8ta 
to rjOos' oircp yap iv apXD *hrot**v, irXelarrailo 
8icuf>opcu yiyvovrat tois <f>i\ots 9 orav fir/ 6/xoUos 
ouoptoi kcu cocrt 0/Aoe. otov pkv obv &ta\ff€V(T0rj 



Chap. III. 
Having discussed in the preceding 
chapters what returns of kind offices 
ought to be observed towards friends, 
and the offences which cause the dis- 
solution of friendship, Aristotle now pro- 
ceeds to consider upon what grounds 
friendship may be justly dissolved. 
In such cases where the intimacy 
has been formed for the sake of 
pleasure or utility, the object ceas- 
ing with either party, it is reasonable 
that the friendship between them 
should cease likewise. But in such 
cases where friendship has been formed 
from virtuous motives, if one party 
prove vicious, or so far, in course of 
time, excel the other in virtue as to 
leave an extreme disparity between 



them, then it is likewise reasonable 
that their friendship should be de- 
stroyed, since no similarity exists be- 
tween them, (r* vmmi rtf •/*** ffo**)* 
and no congeniality of sentiment : etm 
at %Stt S)i\u ptf mfmifUMt re*s mirsh 
ttfat %wp9Ttt mm) Xevrstsuiei ; eiSe ykf 
*i{) aXA&fiv T*vt ierslgu mpr»7f> 
Sknv it ntrtn •** if $)iX*o$ tlnmt. 

3. ertet rev ItmXuseisu] As to the dt*» 
solution or non-dissolution of friendship 
with those who do not continue the 



11. U«t pi ipems] When they men) 
not he friends for the same motives of 
they were thought to be. Or according 
to some interpreters : " quando non 
eadem pacto, ut ipsi expectaverint, ills 
fuerint amici." 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 8. 859 

tl$ kcu inrokaffy (piXelaOcu 8td to fj0O9> fiirfiev 

TOIOVTOP €K€lVOV irpdlTOVTO?, 4aVT0P CUTUpT &V* 
OTCLV 8 V7TO T7J9 €K€lVOV 7rpO<T7rOl7)<r€(D9 dlTaTTjO^y 

8lkcuov eyKaAeiv r§> airarqa-avriy kcu fiaXXov rj 
&T0T9 to vo/JLur/M KifSSr/Xevova-iP , ocr<p irepl tl/jluo- 
Ttpov 7) KOKOVpyia. 'Eay 8 diroSexqTai WAitothe 

dyaffov, yem/Tcu 8e fioxOypo? kcu 8oterj, dp ^ofTundw 
(J>l\t)t4ov ; rj ov Svvcltov, etirep fir} Tap fa^VTOVtimftvfciT- 
dXXd TayaBov ; ovt€ 8e <f>i\rjT4ov irovqpov o#tc ^j* 1 * 1 "**. 

10 Set" <f>i\oTovr)pov yap ov XPV eipcu, ov8 6/ioiov- ** from vir * 
crdai <f)av\<p' etpijTCU 8 otl to ofiotop t$ 6/io/a) tives * 
<f)l\op. ap oiv evdvs SiaXvreop ; t) ov toUtip, 
aXKa tol9 dvtdroi? KaTa rqp fio\6r)piap ; errav~ 
opOaxriP 8 expvai /jloWop QorjOrjnop els to rfdoi 

15$ rrjp ova Lav, oacf /3*\tiop kcu tt}s (frihias oiK€i6- 
Tepov. 86f~€i€ 8 dv 6 SiaXvofievof ov8ep aTonrov 
toicip' ov yap t^J toiovt<p <f>i\os rjp* dWotcoOevra 
ovp dSvvarcov dvacrcocrai dfooraTai. el 8 6 fiev 
8iapivoi 6 8 eirieiKtorepos yivovro kcu toXv 8ia\- 

2oAarrot 777 a/oerg, apa xPV aT * 0V <j>i\<p 9 f/ ovk 



11. rilfMtn] Seep. 341, 5. o. alienus? minime. Nam quemadmo- 
13. rtHig ***r*t—i**"ti"*t* 1* dum plus amicis quam alienis ita et 
lives'] This is a truly Christian prin- huic propter pristinae memoriam ami- 
ciple, though frequently neglected by citiae aliquid erit tribuendum, quibus- 
those who have been led to see the dam in rebus interdum gratificandum, 
folly of their conduct, who not only ezceptis illis plane perditis et profligatis 
desert their previous companions, but seu insigniter improbis. Qua de re ex- 
even regard them with a degree of tat et elegans locus m Laelio Ciceronis : 
acrimony, when by no means utterly cap. 21. Quamobrem primum danda 
reprobate ; kt'mrm »«r« <rh fuxfat™- opera est, nequa amicorum dissidia 
" Quid ergo, inquit Aristoteles, ami- fiant : sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut 
ckia itane dissolvetur funditus ut nul- extinctae potius amicitiae, quam op- 
ium prorsus vestigium superesse de- pressas esse videantur." GIPH. 
beat 1 et eo loco vetus ille amicus sit 18. tatmuu] To save and recover. 
habendus, quo quivis eztraneus aut 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



360 ARISTOTELIS 



4p8e)(€Tou ; iv fieyaXy 8e Siaaraxret fiaXtara 8rjXov 
yiv€Tcu 9 olop ep reus ttoliBikcus (ptXiat?' el yap 6 

fl€P 8tafl€VOl TTjP huXVOldV 7T0U9 6 & &W)P €**? 010$ 
KpCLTlOTOSy 1T&S OP ei€P <f)l\oi fl7)T apeaKOfievOl 
TOLS aVTOlS fA7)T€ \alpOPT€9 KCU \V7TOVfJL€POl ; OvStb 

yap ircpl akXrjXov? ravff inrapi^ei avroZs, cu/ev 
8e tovt&p ovk T]v <f)lXov9 eipaC <rvfi/3iovp yap ov\ 
olop re. eipr/Tai 8e Tep\ tovtcop. ap oiv ovdev 
dXXoiorepop 7rpbf avrbp eKreop r) el fir) eyeyovei \ 

$1X09 pr)8eiroTe ; rj 8el fipelap e\eip ttjs yepofiepr/s 10 
crvprjOelas, koll Kadairep (piXois fiSXXop rj bOvelois 
olofieOa 8eip xaplfiecrdai, ovr<o not rots yepofiepois 
d7TOP€fjL7)T€OP ri 8ta T7/p 7rpoyeyepTj/JLep7jP (f)iXlav, 
trap /JLtf 81 VTrepfioXr/p fioxOr/pla? r/ SiaXvais 
yeprjrat. 15 



CHAP. IV. 

Of the offices of Friendship and their origin — that no one can be a 
friend to another unless he be a friend. 

What are TA (f>tXlKa 8e TO. 7Tp09 TOVS (f)iXov?, KCU offf4 

tionsaod (£ (htXiai OplfoPTat, €OLK€P Ik T(0P 7TOOff eaVTOP 

offices of 

friendship. 

5. rift ym<1 For neither will these observe towards themselves. For a 

feelings exist in them with respect to friend is a second self . Not indeed, that 

each other. we are to judge of these offices from the 

8. t1(nrm~\ See viii. c. 6. conduct of any one, but in this, as in 

all other instances involving our moral 

nature, the good man is to be the rule 

Chap. IV. and measure, by which to guide our 

Aristotle now proceeds to show, that actions and affections. 

the offices which are to be observed The notions then of mankind con- 

towards friends, derive their origin from cerning friendship and its offices may 

the feelings and conduct which men be brought under three heads ; bene- 



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ETHICOKUM LIB. IX. 4. 



361 



iXrfXvOevou. nOeouri yap (f>i\ov rov /3ov\o/jl€i/ov kou 
irparrovra rayaOa ?/ ra <f>aiv6fi€va iiceivov eveica, 

7} TOP fSov\6fJL€VOV elvdl KOU (jjV TOP <f)t\0V OLVTOV 

yapiv* oirep al p.rjrepes' irpos ra reiera ireirovOao'i) 

&KOU T&V <f>l\<OV Ol TrpO<JK€KpOVKOT€9. OL 8* TOP 

avvhiayovra kou ravra aipovpuevov, r/ rov avvaX- 
yovvra teal avyxalpovra r§ <f)l\(p' fiaXtara Se 

Kal TOVTO 7T€pl W fjL7]T€pa? <rVfJif$alv€l. TOVTOW $€ 

TWl KOU TTjV (j>lXiaP OplfyvTai. YlpOS iaVTOV How the 

-^ *> / tr ~ » ~ c / - ~> good man 

10 0€ TOVTCOV €Ka<7TOP TG> €7Tl€lK€L \rjrap\€L y TOL9 0€ observes 
x ~ ' ? ^ * \ n ' ? * these to- 

A0t7T0l9, fj TOIOVTOI V7rOAafipaVOV<riV €IVGU. €OLK€ wards him. 
/ /i/ V / e / «>\v self. 

yap, Kauairep etp-qrai, fierpov €Kaorq> 77 apery Kat 

6 airovSouos elvai. oSros yap ofwyvayfiovei eavra, 

Kal tG>v avr£>v opeyerat Kara iraaav rqv tyvxi v > 

l&Kal {iovAerai Sr/ iavrtp rayaBa kou ra (f>ouuo/i€va 



ficence (rw fitukipunt »ai Vf&mtra 
rityati) t benevolence (ri» (ZeuXoptw 
ureu xcu gnt r«v f /*•»), and concord 
(rw«Xy#t/w* xa) fvyx«tipirm, ry 
?/&?). The good man only enter- 
tains these feelings, for the vicious 
cannot as far as he is vicious, towards 
himself, and consequently can only 
feel them towards others. The good 
man therefore only can feel real 
friendship. 

Upon this subject, the reader may 
consult a similar passage in the Re- 
public of Plato, and Butler's Analogy, 
i. 3. See above p. 332. 

In this beautiful chapter, Aristotle 
seems to have been carried away, 
though not beyond the limits of strict 
philosophical language, by the elo- 
quence of his feelings, so as fully to 
justify what Cicero says of him. 

1. w (hvXipiM *«} *{£rr$tr*] 



sc. rtf Qikf, quod jam Paraphrastes 
addidit. Quae hie exponuntur in uni- 
versum amicitias officia, suum singula 
nanciscuntur caput in hoc secundo 
Hbri ix. tractatu : Benevolentia (c. 5), 
beneficentia (c. 7), concordia (c. 6). 
MICH. 

5. •! « , {«r»f«£«v«/rif] Who have 
fallen out, or clashed. It is a proof 
that a friend wishes another friend to 
live and that for his own sake, because 
even those who have quarrelled and 
expect no advantage from each other, 
still entertain such wishes. 

12. pfrgff— • #wt£«r«f] See p. 
102, 2. n. 

13. ifMyfttfMHt] For he aloce acts 
reasonably, his appetite is in complete 
subjection to his reason. Not dis- 
tracted as the incontinent, at one time 
guided by reason, another time by 
appetite. 



Digitized by LjOOQ IC 



S6S 



ARIST0TEL1S 



kcu Trparrei (rod yap ayaOov rayaBov fkanrovtiv) 
kcu eavrov &€*«* rov yap Siavorjrucov \apiv y 

OTTtp €KO0TO9 €IVCU 60KU. KCU ^T)V $€ /SouAcTOt 

iavrov kcu o-wfaaffaiy kcu fiaXurra rovro <» tfrpovet' 
ayaBov yap r<p airovSaup to eivcu. araoro? #5 
eaurcp fiovXercu rayaffoy ycvopcvo? & aWos ovSeh 
cupclrcu iravr *X*w €khpo to yevopevov' €\€i 
yap kcu vvv 6 Oeos TayaBoVj oAX* a>v o Tt iror 



2. nm \mvrtv Xnmm\ Compare the 
Rhetoric, i. II. I«t) ft *> Ipm* mm) 
cJ tvyyttit Uto Imerf £or«t, ftdXttrm 
T mb*H *pt lawk c#5r# «*i«W«», 
*9my»i wmrrmt €)t\Mvr§9f iTnu 4 ftrnXXw 
4 farnr wiWa ykf rk rtmmrm tatygu 
*gtf wf)f ftJtXt^rm* In) ft QlXmvrm 
wdrrtf, mm) rk mirSt iemynn &t* iTnu 
Ww?, «&f f{y» m) *iyn> 

6. r« iTmu] Compare ix. 4. and z. 3. 

6. ytfifuf* t iXXtl The great man 
is something divine (JuU r«), since man 
is properly the intellectual soul, and 
that which is properly and peculiarly 
adapted to his nature, is for him the 
greatest happiness, and consequently 
a life of intelligence, (««) rf Mpl*? 
Vl I «*vA r$t ttvv flit, rfeif «■••*•• 
fUXtrr* &f4{»*H. z. 5. ad fin.) If 
then, as it has been stated, each one 
wishes good for himself (see iii. 4.), 
and he only, properly speaking, is a 
man who is a good man, (for he only 
lives according to the dictates of this 
divine principle within him), the good 
man only can wish for himself what is 
really good. For he who desires 
wealth, or pleasure, or luxury, only 
wishes^what is good for the irrational, 
and not the real part of himself, whose 
desires and wants are ever varying, 
tormenting and racking him, and 
like an. imperious and wrong-headed 
master driving him to various tasks 



at one and the same moment. Thus 
wasting his time and labour in sub- 
servience to his animal passions, man 
becomes transformed from a rational 
to an irrational being. Transformed 
then into another species (yt*ifu- 
Mf T £XA*), how can he any longer 
desire the good of that essence which 
he has lost, since every thing desires 
that which is good to itself? Conse- 
quently the good man only can wish 
that which is good to himself, and 
therefore he only can be a true friend. 
i ft twnUuH firiXirm utvrif £5». my»- 
At ym{ rSf rvtafc/f re tSuu. rfct yk^ 
hm{tiTt*n$ h*ttu £*»iif. It y*{ riy nut 
n ittturreu •vfiu. fw'tfrmrm, *} it revrf 
pdXjera. 1$ ft rtf kXiyf QevXirm ri 
■7mm »*) *m%urim, xat \*u<r$ fkuXHrms, 
rk kymik rw elndev iTmm ruptrfawirTt, 
•1% hurry (ItuXtTtu rk mymJrn, kX\ % 
Uury tl§ i furtfiknfn' *m) Xxmwr* ft 
Usvry (buktreu yintitu rk mymim, 
•iipitf pitut **t( hrrir u ft #»»/fti 
Utvrit Akin yttipum, wx &t iXtnr* 
ravra rk kymik %xu* Ui7m to yttifunt, 
«vftv yk( ha$i(U <XX« Tin (IsuXirJeu rk 
myati, * Utvrtf (urafiXniirri. Paraph. 
8. ikX' ti 1 ri r«r* urrb] But onto 
by being what he is. sc. 9r« • hit »*. 
ti V &XX« rt yif§tr» U rns fvewt *t 
Urn, §vf T£u ?Tt( i%u w* kym$n % i 
$1 *•) ^mh r)s tfat, ovx m kymih mhrif 
r*t'i*Tmt. Schol. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 4. 368 

iorip. 86£eie 8 9 ap to poovp eKcurros elvcu, rj 
fjbdXicrra. avp8vayeip re 6 toiovto9 eavrtp /9atJ- 
\€tcu' r/detDf yap avro noiei' t&p re yap ireirpay- 
fiep<op tiriT€p7r€i? al fiprjfiai, kcu t&p fieXXoprmr 
biXiriSe? ayoBai ai towlvtcu S rfSeiai. kcu Oetoprf- 
ftaroav S exmopei tq 8iavoia 9 crvpaXyei re kcu 
ovprfSeTai fiaXicrff eavrtp* irdtrrore yap karri to 
auro XvTn/pop T€ teal r/Sv, teal ovk oXXot aXXo' 
afieTCL/xeXrjTOs yap w elireip. Tip 8r) irpos avrov 

\Qfiep e/caora tovtcop VTrdp\eip r^> iirieucel, irpo? 
8e top <f>iXop e\eip atenrep 7rpo9 iavrop (eon 
yap 6 <f>iXo9 aXXo? avTOs), kou r) (f>iXia tovtcop 
elpai ti 8oK€i, teal <f>lXoi oh Tavff virdp\ei. irpos 
airop 81 iroTepop eorip rj ovk eon <j>iXia 9 acpei- 

\h<r6<o ewl tov irapopro?' 86£eie 8' ap Tavrrf elpai 
(fytXia, y eori 8vo r) irXtixo 4k t&p eiprjfiep&p, 
kcu on 17 imepfSoXrj ttj? (friXla? Trj wpos owtop 

0f£0lOVT€U, &CUPCTOI 8e TO. eiprj/HePa KCU TO*? The tad 

NX ~e/ / * .jl '% * * 9 cannot pos- 

ttoKAols wrapx^iPy Kanrep ovoi (pavXoif. ap ovp sets these 

AA ? * / * ~ ^''vn / * feelings. 

20 fj apeoKOvoiP eavroi? Kai wroXa/xpapovoip ewiei- 

K€L9 eiPaiy TaVTT) fL€T€\OVCnP OVT&P ; €7T€l T&P 

ye KO/iiSrj (pavXcou kcu apooiovpyant ovdepX Tavff 

inrapxei, aX\' ov8e <j)alpeTcu. o\e8op 8e ovSe 

tois <f)avXoL$' 8ia(f)epoPTou yap eavTol?, Kal eTep&p 

25/i.ei; eiridvpLovcriP aKXa 8e fiovXoprat, olop oi 



I. ri wf] See x. c. 5. ad fin. taining towards himself the feelings of 

II. Ur% y»{ i tpik«t] For a friend is benevolence, beneficence, and con- 
another self. A friend is another self; cord, other men only as far as they 
consequently what feelings we enter- are good, consequently the good only 
tain towards ourselves, we must enter- can be friends. 

tain towards others. But the good 25. favXotrxi] See p. 201. and 

man only is a friend to himself, enter- p. 213. n. Aristotle appears from 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



364 ARISTOTELIS 

aKparel? aipovvrai yap curl tg>v 8okovvt(ov 
€€lvtoi9 ayoBwv tlvcu to, ySea fiXafiepa ovra' 
oi 8 aft 8ta SetXlav kcu apyuur cuftiorawrcu rov 
Trparreiu a oioptcu eavroi? fieXrurra elvaC oh 
8c iroXXa kcu Seiva ireirpaKTCU 8ia rqv pLO\0rfpiav 9 b 
futrovai re kcu fftcvyovai to £ijv kcu avaipovatv 
cavTOVf. tflTOval re ol pjo\&qpo\ pjeff a>v <rvv8irj- 
fUpevaovaiVj iaurovs 5c (f>€uyovcrtP* avapup.irq- 
ckovtcu yap woXXcdp kcu 8vcr\€pSp 9 kcu rotavff 
trepa iXiri^owi) Kajff eavrovs ovrts, fuff ereptovlO 
8 owe? emXavdavovrai. ovQiv re (frtXr/rbv exptrre^ 
ovOkv <f>iXiKOV iraaxovcri irpos eavrovs. ov8e 8r) 
crvyyaipovciv ov8\ crvvaXyovcriv ol rotovrot cau- 
roi9* OTOuruzfa yap avrSw ij fax*!* Ka * ™ l^ v 
8ia pjo\Or)plav aXyei axrexppjevov ripcbv, to 5' l& 
rjSerai, koi to p&v 8evpo to 8 iKeiae eXxct 
coowep 8uxxnrSnna. el 8e fir/ oiov T€ afia Xv7rei- 
adcu kcu rfSeaOai, aXXa /jlctcl fUKpov ye XvirelTou 
ore tJctOtj, Kal ovk av efiovXeTO r)8ea raOra yeve- 
aOcu avT€p* p,eTap,eXeias yap ol (f>avXoi yefiovatv. 20 
ov 8tf (f>aiv€TCu 6 <f)avXo9 ov8e wpb? eavrbv <f>i\i- 
kw SicuceiaOcu 8ta to firjSeu ^X €lv <pt>Xi)TOv. el 
8r) to ovt(D9 €X€ti/ Xiav eariv adXiov, (pevKTeov 
ttjv \Jioy&r)plav 8iaT€Ta/i€ua>9 koi ireipaTeov eirieucq 
eivaC ovrco yap kcu 7rp09 eavrbv <()i\ik(ds av 25 
e\oi Kal €T€pq> <f>lXo9 yevoiTO. 



this passage to have made the same good or evil. 

distinction as Socrates, that the will 20. pmyu Ai/w] Compare p. 363, 

can be only of good, the desire of 9. See also p. 309. 



Digitized by LjOOQIC 



ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 5. 365 



CHAP. V. 

Of Benevolence (i8nm) t and what relution it bears to Friendship. 

5 H S tvvoia (biXia uev eoucev. ov uriv kari ye*h** Offers 
(ptALa ywtrai yap evvoca Kai irpos ayvwras Kai * n <i w*m . 
Xavdavovcra, <f)t\ia 8' ov. teal irporepov 8k ravr 
eiprjrai. aXX! ovfie (plXr/ark ecrnv' ov yap e\€i 
b8iaraariv ovS ope^iv, rfj (f>tX^cr€i 8e ravr aico- 
XovdeZ. koll rj /jl€v <j>iXr)0'i$ fierce avvrjdeias, rj 
8* evvoia koL 4k irpooiraiov, olov Kai wepl tow 
ay&viaras crvp.$aiv*C edvoi yap avrols ylvovrai 
Kai avvdeXovaiv, a-vfiirpa^aiev 8 av ovOev' oirep 

10 yap €L7rofj.€v, Trpooirauos evvoi ylvovrai Kai eiri- 

iroXaUos orepyovaiv. Eot/ce 8-q ap\V <f>iXtas But is the 

eivou, woirep rod epav r\ 8ia rqs o^€(09 rjSovrj' fh? n dship. 
fir/ yap Trporjadeis rrj I8ea ovOei? 4pa 9 6 8e \aip(ov 
t§ et8ei ovdev fiaXXov ipa, . aAA' orav koll airovra 

I&7ro0rj Ka\ ttjs irapovaia? iirUfo/irj. ovtco St/ kcu 
(piXovs ov\ olov t elvai firj evvov? yevofievovs, 
oi & evvoi ov0kv /mclXXov <f>iXovo-Lv' fiovXovrai 
yap puovov rayaffa oh elaiv edvoi, (rvpnrpa^aiev 



3. flr(OT-i{0v] See viii. c. 3. p. 317. aperit Demosth. 275, 8. \m^»fMU 

5. imratn] )iar**t{ non est intentio *«) ittruttifAtit §u***) *$*}{*{. ZELL. 

multoque minus quod Lambinus putat, But Muretus evidently followed the 

contentio, sed continuatio qusdam ac interpretation of Eustratius, who thus 

tractut temporu. Haec Muretus. Nos observes upon this word : oi> yk^ t%u 

autem cum Paraph, vet., Eustrat., hxretftp, raMt Wn ry. §1 y£^ irar 

Giphan., Lambino, aliis, animi inten- t*r**n xeu Sbt *&** +«T, St 4 X*v**9*tf. 

iionem interpretamur ; ipse enim Arist. 10. *p9*mi*t ] Suddenly. 

adverbium imrtrmplutt (ix. 4. et x. 2.) 17. »Mi» pSXAu] Are vot the more 

hoc sensu usurpat. Optime vocab. friends. See p. 137. 



Digitized by CjOOQ IC 



866 ARISTOTELIS 

8* op ovOcp, ovS* o^Xrjd^up inrep airrcop. Sio 
(UTCtffKp&v (fxuTj Ti? ap atrnjp apyr/p eipou <f>iXiap y 
ypopi£oputpr)p b\ kou ei? crvinjfeiav a<f)iKPOVfi€Pr}P 
yipeaOou (f)iXiap, ou ttjp Sia to xprjcrifiap ovSe 
rrjp Sia to rjSv* ovSe yap evpoia eiri TOVTOish 
yipcrcu. 6 /up yap tvtpyerTjdeis avff top ireirovdev 
airov€/t€i tt)v evpoiap, tol SUeua Sp&v* o 8e 
fZovXofUPoe tip cvirpaytip, tXiriSa €\(ov €U7ropia? 
Si 4k€ipov 9 ovk €Olk evpovs £k€ii>cq elpai, dXXa 
/jlSXXop iournp, KaBdirep ovSk <f>iXos 9 el Oepaireveiio 
avrov Sua ripa xprio-tv. oAw 8 17 evpoia Si 
apenjp kou eiriuMiap Tiva yipeTai, otop t<? <f>apjj 

KOlXo? T19 fj dv8p€L09 7) Tl TOIOVTOP, KO0dlT€p KOU 

cVl t&p aym>urr$>v unrop&v. 



CHAP. VI. 

Of Concord. 

The object- <M AIKON S\ KOI lj OfWPOia <j>OlP€T0U m 8l07T€p 6 

matter of » v «&/*'• ~ x * v ' 

ipinm. ovk earip ofiooogia tovto p*v yap KOU ayPOOVCTlP 

dXXr/Xovs wrdp^eiep av. ovSe tow wept otovovp 

ofioypob/jLOPOvpras ofwpotip (f)curip, olop tovs wept 

t&p ovpavicov (ou yap <j)iXtKQP to irep\ tovt<dp 

6fiopo€Lp), aXXa tols iroXeis o/iopoeip <f)aatp 9 otop 20 

7T€pl t&v crvpxfrepovT&p 6fioypG>fiopAa'i Kal Tavra 



2* furufip*] That is to say; as 11. uhtmtt Ap***] See above p. 

benevolence (•&«•) may be termed 317, 15. and the Rhetoric, ii. 1. 
an inoperative friendship, so friendship 16* turn Urn l/UiJ&m\ For ipfam, 

may be termed an operative' benevo- as he afterwards shows, is confined to 

lence, using the rule for metaphor things practical («t«»««i) ; but &£« is 

mentioned in the Rhetoric, iH. 10. speculative. See p. 95. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 6. 



867 



irpoaip&vrat teal irpaTTGxrt ra Kotvfj 8oi~avra, 
7T6/H ra ir patera 8rj 6ftovoov(nv 9 teal tovtgdv 7T€/h 
ra kv fieyeOet teal ra kv8e\6fjueva a/jL<f)oiv imapxew 
i\ iraxriv, dlov at 7roA€ty, orav rraxri 8otcrj tot 

5ap\a9 alperas eivcu, rj avfLpjaysiv AoKeSaifiovloiSy 
rj ap\eiv HirraKov, are teal avros rfdeXev. orav 
8 itedrepo? kavrov fiov&rjrai, aowep oi kv rafis 
<f>oivl(r<rai9, ora<ria£ovo'iv' ov yap kaff ofiovoelv 
ro avro €Kar€pov kvvoetv 68^7ror€ 9 aXAa ro kv 

10 r^ avr<p, olov orav kcu 6 8fjfW9 teal 61 cVict/cci? 
rovs apiarov? ap\€iv' ovreo yap ttoxti yiyverai 
oS k(f>Uvrat. . ttoXltikt) Se (f>iXla <j>aiverat 17 o/w- 
vota, KaOdnrep Kat Acyereu" wept ra ovpfykpovra 
yap kcrri teal ra ety rov filov dvrjieovra. Ecrrunwhom 

150 rj roixwvf) o/iovota tv rots eiri€iK€<riv ourot is to be 

\ >« ~ e ~ \ >\x 'x » \ m found. 

yap Kat tavrois ofwvoovai Kat aAA^Aoty, €7rt r<ov 
avr&v ovres &>9 threw* r&v roiovrtov yap pAvsi 
ra fiovXri/iara teal ov /lerappel oocnrtp Eu/U7ro?, 



6. Tlprrmt] Pittacus communi 
reipublicae consensu, et suo (nam et 
hoc requiritur ad plenam concordiam) 
princeps in patria constitutus fuit ad 
decennium, quo elapso, cum amplius 
eum imperare vellet civitas recusavit, 
quo allusit Aristoteles his verbis fai 
*«) «Mt HhXtt. G1PH. See Diog. 
L. i. §. 75. 

8. <b«d*9oui\ Aristotle alludes to 
the quarrel of Etoocles and Polynices 
as represented in the Phoenisse of 
Euripides. To constitute concord, it 
is not sufficient that two should agree 
;n wishing the same thing (ri «M 
InSnpv fowsff Atari) as Eteocles 
and Polynices, who both wished to 



reign alone., but they must also agree 
as to the same person (if ry airy). 

9. it rtf ttvrcf) Ttoriwn «ri{) t»u 
ahrou. Schol. 

18. ov ptrmtfu] Is not subject to ebb 
and flow a$ a Euriput. Vocare solitos 
Graecos hoc nomine loca quasdam 
maris in quibus fierent hujuscemodi 
contrarii inter se motus fluctuum, et 
ut inferioris etatis ipsos vocant, fluxus 
et refluxus, notum est. VICTOR. 
Isaiah uses a somewhat similar illus- 
tration. " The wicked are like the 
troubled sea, when it cannot rest, 
whose waters cast up mire and dirt." 
cap. lvii. 20. Compare with this the 
fourth chapter, p. 364. 



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868 ARISTOTELIS 

fSovXovrai re ra SUcua kcu ra avpjffUpovray tovtg>v 

$€ KCU KOlVtj 4(f)l€VTCU. TOVf &€ <f)avXoV9 OU\ OlOV 

re ofiouoetu wXtjv eiri puKpov, KaOawep kcu <f>i\ovs 
elvcu, irXeovel-ias £<f>t€/jL€vov9 iv rols axfreXijioL?, 
iv 8c toIs novois kcu tcus Xeirovpyicus eXXti-5 
irovras* iavrS 8 ckootos jiovXofievos ravra tov 
ir4Xa$ iljcrdfiEi kcu kcoXvcl' firf yap Tqpovvrtov 
to koivov airoXXvrcu. crvpfialvet oiv avroi? ara- 
criafav, aXXrjXov? puev eiravayKa^pvraSy avrov? 
8e fir) fiovXofi€Pov9 ra SUoua ttolcIv. io 



CHAP. VII. 

Of Beneficence. 

The reasons OI S €V€py€Tcu tovs evepyerndeirra? SoKOV(Tl7 

stated why „ „ ' A , x -. , 

it was sup- uaXXov (biXeu/ 7) oi ev iraBovres tov? opacravTas* 

posed that y , ^ y ', , , c : 

there w #C<U (OS TTapOL XoyOV yiVOflCVOV €7Tl£rjT€lTOU. TOIS 

the bene- fl€V 0$V TrXeiOTOlS (f)alv€TCU, OTl 01 fJL€V 6<t>€lXovai 

factor than ft x , . . , » » \ *» * 

the bene- TOIS 0€ O0€lAeT<U' Kauawep OVV €7Tt T(DV OOLV€L(OV 15 

ol fxep 6(f>€tXopT€9 fiovXovrai fir} tivai oh 60e/- 
Xovariv, ol 8e Baveiaavrcs kcu eiripLeXovrai ttjs 
t&v 6<f)€iX6vT(DV o-Gyrqpias, ovtco kol tow evep- 
yeTrjcravras fiovXeaOat, elvai tovs iraBovras w 



9. iff'MMyxljtwir] SC. ra %ixmm kvfQtiXtn &p&Xvrtpt. tft+t »vx U 

1 1 . ol ¥ tU^yirat] Compare Thucyd. it*******. There can be little doubt 

ii. 40. *«) Tik U i(*riif vwriMfttt* but that Aristotle tacitly alludes to this 

r«T$ *»X\i7f •» ym^ v&xevrtf %Z Axxet passage. 

ifStrtf %r»p%4m rm f/X«t*. (ZtfbuS- 13. l*i&ruT«,t] And the return of 

rtfcf 31 i 1(£e*( eft» xty*, £*** tyuks- this is required, as though it were 

ftUnt h* tvnUf S )tt»xt rt%ur i 3* something strange and paradoxical. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 7. 869 

K0fU0VfieV0V9 TCL9 X^P lTa ^9 TO & & °^ K € * P€U ^"*" 

fteXes to avrairo8ovvai. 'JLirvxapiu>$ p*v odv which re*. 

/ t * i / ~ N / » \ > ~ soning is 

ra^ a " y^V ravra Aeyeiv avrovs eK trovqpov objected to 

0€(OfJL£VOV9, €OLK€ & avOpWITlKKf afJLVr)/JLOV€9 yap cl annus. 

„e w > > ~\\ J ' * ~ Neverthe- 

6 01 7T0AA01, KOLL fJULAAOV €V TTOCT^IV 7] 7T0i€LV less it is 

tyUvTOU. 8o£eie & OV (f>V(TLKCOT€pOP elvCU TO CUTIOV, benefactors 

\»«f ~ \ * * / .» l°ve more 

KOU 0V\ O/JLOIOV T€p 7T€/H TOV? OaveiGaVTaS OV than they 

/»• i \ \ » / » x \ * ** /do who are 

ya/> €OTl (piATJdl? 7T€pi eK€lV0V9 9 OAAa TOU 0"G>- benefited. 

(eaOou fiovXrjo-t? tt}s ko/xi8t}s eveKa' ol 8 ed t ^ reasons 

10 ir€7T0L7lK0T€9 (f)l\oV<Tl KCU ayairSxTL TOW 7T67TOI/- The reasons 
a / A /i \ * / &> » tt for this in- 

votoS) kolv firjuev (ocn yj>y\<nyuoi firjo ei9 ^ore/joy V estigated. 
yevoivr av. 07rep Kal em t&v t€\vltS>v avfi- 
fiefhjKev* irSs yap to oiKelov epyov ayoara fxdXXov 
17 aya7rrj0eir) av biro tov epyov e/ju^vxov yevo/ievov. 

U/iaXiara & ura? tovto irepl tow woir/ras arv/x^ 
fiaivei' xmepayanr&cri yap ovroi tol oitceia irovq- 
fiara, orepyovres Gxnrep TeKva. TOiovry 817 eotKe 
Kal to t£>v evepyeToiv' to yap ei ireirovOos epyov 
eorlv avr&v' tovto 8rj ayanrGxn pJaXKov 17 to 

20 epyov tov woirjaavTa. tovtov & avriov ore to 
elvou ttSxtiv alpeTov teal (friXrjToVj ecr/xev 8 evep- 
yeia' r<p tfjv yap Kal irpaireiv. evepyetq. 8t) 6 



2. 'E*fx«0Mr p}» *Zt] Epicharmus work in energy (Iptfytif, that is, ac- 

would, perhaps, say, that this view of tually, not virtually itntpu) as pre- 

the question was derived merely from vious to production. The argument 

considering an insufficient portion of appears to be this, 
mankind, from vitiated specimens, and Existence is desirable («<(ir«» »«2 

not from a correct view of them. But, $t\*rit) by all. 'But we can pro- 

indeed, this appears to be the fault of perly be said to exist, only when we 

man generally, a natural infirmity not are in energy ; (for life is not the 

confined merely to the wont and de- capacity of living, but the actually 

fective part of them. living), and we are in energy when 

22. Infyt'f ft ' wufamt] For the we live and act. But he who acts 

producer is in a sense («£* ) his own is actually (Iff^ytU trr/») in his work 

ib 

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370 



ARISTOTELIS 



Totr/aa? to tpyov itrri aW arepyet 8rj to Zpyov, 
Store kcu to €tpcu. tovto 8$) (f>varuc6v 9 b yap 



(U *$ l{yv ). For the art of building, 
which is the method of constructing 
a house (• xiyt rnt tixAtmlms), is 
actually (In^ytim) in the house, or 
the house would not have been built. 
And the house itself, therefore, is part 
of the builder, or the builder actually 
(Ittfytim), as for as his art is con- 
cerned, his art being actually in the 
building. Consequently every pro- 
duction is part actually (iMgyuf ) °* a 
man's self: or, in the words of Aris- 
totle, every producer is in a sense 
dm own work in energy. But every 
one loves himself, and consequently 
his own work as part of himself, and 
therefore every benefactor loves the 
person whom he has benefited, stand- 
ing in the same relation to him as the 
artist to his i(y»f. 

The following is the comment of 
Eustratius on this passage : 

rtu Qoctxmt ftXstp ffirt* Xxmortp re 

tixstn ifytt mlrtip \ortP % Srt «£#» mlp> 

r#> xm) fsXnrit \ert v4 utmt xm) ^S?». 

UftSP e% tb ry IwtxHmt yitirtxt, iXXk 

Tf fin Itifytif iTmm. m% yk^ tb Xiytpsp 

firt^m ri fyifts, kXXk rip i%*prm riit 

ri%tnt xm) eotm/utti Its^yttp, xm) kte^t- 

dtrm tb ret m*Xm %x\»Jr, kXXk rit 

io%9f*mr**(*i*tp r«f rtv kpS^tmprts *%n- 

ftmrt, ttrm xm) St, Mrtt Mptwtp Strm n 

Xitprm Sprm v 1***9 Sprm XtytptP, tb 

rit prir* Strm Ivtxfttnf Vt ysp%e$ms % 

kXXk rit fin Strm xm) %£trm xm) Ips^- 

y§vtrm t 4 itnAfutot Ittfyvrut. siwttn ft, 

If put en Uifytiet, *mQnt*£mt ri irrt ri 

Inpyiim, irnymys, rSf p»f xm) ^drrup, 

iutauu Srmt Xiyt/ut, Srt tot £*i xm) 

hi^ytl n iutmrat iupynruv. xa) %*rtt i 

ovXXtytruit ruturtt. Srat Xiym/MP it- 

tprtft rit {iitrm xm) In^ytStrm tj i»if- 

yup ivtmpittt, i g»r xm) Itt^yH* lufyum 



Writ. 2>t £g« In^yuf lor it. u en *m*tt 
miprep xm) ftXnrOp ri slmu \tt^y*im. 
Urn e% ffff urut ri rtZ "2**{mru* 
S(ytt tve*SP iXXs n Utfytim mi/rig • 
Imx^mmt, QtXmrip 4g* rif 2»»{*rif 
ri l{y*f mbrw % Srt ri Jmm rtv *tm*mp~ 
rtt Ittx^mrttH mbri Irrt ri *§tnftm 
mbreS. Srt ft re t(y»* mhrh irrn i 
ittfyuf *vnr*4 »v rdprti minXip Urn. 
n yk{ tlxstt mSm \ptfytif ierh i ^«r 
yftpf n y*{ **%** bnmfiu irrt rm 
rt%*****- « y*t •tx§S»fuxn $v$ip xXX§ 
\*rb n •imlm sire X&rnp, xm\ ft$ 2pt 
n tixim n tlxXfuxn \rrt ptrm xMmt, 
mm) Xtrtt \p avrip r* tixim 4 0tx*}*fuxtt, 
Art i •t aM f t p g f SixMM+s, mXX sv% 
y tLfffWot. ii tZt tlxAofttxn tixim Irr) 
furk Xs0*tt, 4 li *ix(&*fuxn ti xm) •*»•- 
lifMt rmvrip, h tixim &^a xm) i tixtSiptt 
rmbrip, xm) imp h tixim rn^m tptgyti* 
mvrif i tixtttptt. Compare also the 
Paraph. 

1. ri Ifytp \*ri VMf] ri tfytp %*n 
<r*t. Bekk. The reading of the text 
was first adopted by Michelet, with 
this explanation, ri fyytp est nomina- 
tivus et sensus alius esse non potest 
nisi quern expressit Argyropylus secu- 
tus Eustratium, Paraphrastane Thorn. 
Aquinatem: Qui igitur fecit , est aetu 
tuum quodammodo opus; quod et se- 
quentia confirmant ; S ym\ Wrt iwmfui, 
rwrt Iptfytia. ri i{y*p ftmtvu. Eodem 
modo ut Aristoteles dixit Hegelhis, 
Rechts-ptelopophie, §. 124. Was das 
Subject ist, ut d'tt Reihe seiner Hand- 
lungen. Et convenit inter utrumque 
philosophum, operationem et actum 
demum esse veram rerum substantiam. 
2. ; yk{ Urt Iwtkfiu] For of that 
which existed merely potentially before, 
the tfytp shows the actual existence. The 
house shows the actual existence of 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 7. 



371 



eari 8vvdfi€i 9 rouTO evepyeia to tpyov firfvvei. 
"A/ia Se koI r<p fiev evepykrg koXou to Kara ttjv 
irpa^LVj acre yaipttv kv <p tovto, T<p 8e iraOovri 
ovOlv koXov kv r£ Bpacramiy aAA* evTrep, au/i- 

&<f)CpOV' TOVTO & fjTTOV 7}Sv KCU (/)l\t)TOV. 'HficM* 

8 korl tov fiev irapovros tj kvkpytia, tov Se 
fieXXovros r) iXiriSy tov 8c ytyeinjfievov t) fiur/fir). 
fjStorov Se to KOLTa TJ]v kvcpyetav, KOU fytXrjTOV 



That a 
pood deed 
is honorable 
to him who 
confers it. 

The actual 
is more 
pleasant 
than hope 
or memory. 



that which existed only potentially 
before. For when the art exists its 
productions exist potentially, but ac- 
tually only by production. As Eustra- 
tius expresses in the above quotation : 
4 yk^ ri%ni Ivrapu Ur\ rk rt%Htrr£. 
2. ri xmrk rev «•{*£»] At the same 
time to the benefactor his action {ri 
xmrk<rh9 *{*&' *c. W quod egit) is 
beautiful. He who has conferred a 
favour upon another has performed a 
beautiful action, and this beautiful 
work or action is, as was shown 
above, the person who has been bene- 
fited as far as he has received the 
benefit, and he is a standing memorial 
of the l{y*f of his benefactor. But in 
the benefactor there is no beautiful 
fgyo which has been produced by the 
benefited, in which he can take plea- 
sure, contemplating it as his own work. 
But if there be any thing in the con- 
templation of his benefactor in which 
he can take pleasure, it must be the. 
contemplation of his own advantage 
and profit ( ri sspf if ») . But this is less 
pleasant to him, as being merely the 
means to an end, than is his own work 
to the benefactor ; for that which is use- 
ful is as a mean to some end, whereas 
the tfyt of the benefactor is that end 
already produced'. As therefore the ends 
are more desirable than the means, and 

Bb 



the means desirable only in relation 
to the end ; it follows, that in reference 
to benefits, the pleasure of the bene- 
factor is great, whilst that of the bene- 
fited is inconsiderable. 

in e% ma) Irt i fAv sbseyirnt \awrsv 
yinrm fisXrisn sfafytrSf, m) kymAt 
mirSf leri ri *ut(ytrut, ttmi )<£ rwr§ 
X»/(U rtf tZ <rd*%*9rt, Zrt \t aurSf 
4tȣU ri laurtv kyaiot. iHttl 9rd*%*9 
§i yinrm fitXrun \mvrsv rtf *rdr%u9, 
»v2i l» r«f sls^yirif i%u rt kymin, 
fiiXrimf yt%» rts iwmrm y%t%*$*t \\ £9 
mhrb$ ertu, \t rif In^ytSt ya\ \rr$ ri 
M^iwtuf kymiit. £r*i( It rug tfi- 
erprtst tfpirsu. 3j« rtvr* si ri lent $v 
rtf su ***x»fri errn^k rif tineyiry, sum 
kymiit lertt rn.hr w, kXXk rvpfipr ri 
ft evpjtfavt *ii% sZrmt tilv »«) QtXnrit 
Xrrtt m r% kymiit. ri ykf kymiit 
riXss ler) rsv evpfiftrtf, »*} ha. ri 
kymiit mm) ri evmfipt QiXnrit Wrt 
**) tfv pmXXst £g« pXtT tlnfyirnt 
rb tZ *k*x»9rm e W Ixtittu ftXtTrui. 
Paraph. 

5. wJi/« 3* Uri] Compare the Rhe- 
toric, i. 11. 

8. ro x*rk rht Ui^ytuif] But that 
which is in act, or which actually is, is 
most pleasant. AH pleasure is conse- 
quent upon the exercise of some en- 
ergy, but all energies are of the past, 
the present, or the future. But of 

2 



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378 



ARISTOTELIS 



ofiouo?. r<p fi€v oiv iretrovqKOTL fitvet to tpyov 
(to tcaXov yap iroXvypoviov), r<p 8e iradovri to 
XpTjcifiQv Trapoi\eraL. fj T€ \*>v*l\to) TtDV fjuev KOLktQV 



these, the energy of the present, that 
is the actual energy, is more vivid and 
more real than either of the others, 
and consequently the pleasure attend- 
ing upon such energies is greater than 
that upon the others. For the plea- 
sures arising from memory or hope, 
proceed from imagination picturing as 
present what is past or future, and 
consequently must be less pleasant 
than that which is actually present. 

But to him who has conferred a 
favor, his work is ever present in the 
person of him upon whom he has con- 
ferred the favor, and consequently his 
energies are actual. Whereas in the 
case of the person benefited , it is merely 
the expectation of the future, or me- 
mory of the past, which brings plea- 
sure. 

To this it may be urged, that the 
expectation is often more pleasant than 
the reality ; that in the words of Pope, 

" Hope springs eternal in the human 
breast, 

Man never is, but always to be 
blest" 
But this is only a seeming objection ; 
for the good, when really present, is 
not the same good which our hope 
pictured. Whether he who has re- 
ceived only a slight favour, but ex- 
pects a very great one from his bene- 
factor, may not receive more pleasure 
than his benefactor does from him, 
may reasonably be doubted. But this 
is another question. 

3. n rt pfnft"] There are two ways 
of considering this passage, either as a 
further explanation of the previous 
sentence, or as an answer to an objec- 



tor. If the first, then Aristotle says ; the 
memory of past *m\k is more pleasant 
than that of past xt**'!** » Dut » on ^ e 
contrary, the hope of future X{n*ip* 
is more pleasant than that of future 
%*x£. For since the »«X* are ends 
but the xt**'t** means, and the end 
cannot exist without the means, the 
ends as being more distant less affect 
our minds, and are to us less desirable 
than the means, as happiness than 
money. But where the end has al- 
ready happened, the eligibility of the 
means, and the reason for which only 
they are desirable, has passed away, 
and consequently cannot afford us the 
same pleasure as the end, if any at all. 
This is one way of considering the 
passage. 

Or it may be an answer to an ob- 
jection. " How can the benefactor 
who has conferred a favour be said 
actually to energize, since when he 
has conferred the favor his energy has 
ceased 1 Let it be granted. Never- 
theless the benefactor feels more love 
than the benefited. For if the me- 
mory of the *«A« is more pleasant 
than that of the xtnetp*, and the 
benefactor has conferred the xt*"?** 
from which follow the mX*, and if 
he remembers the x*Xm, and so much 
the more vividly as having them before 
his eyes, but the debtor only the x&~ 
ttpm, and that but feebly since they 
are passed away, therefore the bene- 
factor has more pleasure than the bene- 
fited, and therefore naturally loves 
more than the benefited. 

Michelet gives a different interpre- 
tation : Pulchre facta, antequam acta 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 1. 



373 



rjSeia, t&v 8e yprfaifjucov ov iraw r/ fjirov* r] 
7rpoa8oKta & avdirakiv e\etv eoitcev. Kal ij And in con- 

filv (j>i\r)cris iroi-qa^L eoiKev, to (fyiXetadat Se r^nefiu there 
TTaoytiv. rots inrcpcxovai. or/ irepi rrjv Trpa£iv**%pxfi. 
SeirtTai to (J)l\€iv kou to, (f)i\ucd. En 8e tol As alio 

* / / / ~ N N / • greater 

eirnrovcDs yevo/xeva wai/Te? fioAAov ,<rTepyovcriv y labor. 
olov Kal tol yj>r\pj(LTa ol KTrfadfievoi T&v irapaXa- 
fiovrayv' 8oK€i 8r/ to fiw €tJ irdxr^iv Snrovov elvcu, 
to & €& iroulv ipycbde?. 8ia ravra 8e Kal al 
10/irjTepes (frikoreKVOTtpaC itrmovGyripa yap rj yiv- 
vrjais, Kal fiaXAov Xcraxriv on avreSj/. 86{jei€ & 



av tovto Kal rot? evepy^Tai? oikgiop uvax. 



sint plus laboris habere quam jucundi- 
tatis videntur, externa autem bona siye 
utilia quae speramus majorem expecta- 
tionem movent, quam possunt explere, 
cum non sint vere bonum ; unde patet 
ante bencficium collatum eum, qui 
accepturus est, daturum majore am- 
plecti amore, post autem contra. 

4. rut farsgix«i»r'] But to thou 
Wio excel in any action, there follow* a 
delight upon that actum. Thus, as he 
says in the Rhetoric i. 11. r* m*5» 
n$v, $i> fUf9 TUj fiXnUug iXXm ftmtir 
Qarrmslm. fanpxnf yiynrai, »Z **trt( 
lx,9v*tr WtftftUr H n^ifA* n ftZXX»t. 
And again in the same chapter, in refer- 
ence to the particular subject before 
us : **) ri %Z xrtut ma) ri tZ *a*%tn 
r*t hVutt' r» flit y*t iZ *df%t» rvy~ 
X*ntf lrr)t Zt l«vS«pMuri, r% ft tS 
«uut %%U9 *o) vrtpxut, St Apfori- 

The feeling of superiority is pleasant 
to us, because it is the contemplation 
of an actual good which we possess, 
the love of superiority being a natural 
feeling, as Aristotle appears to consi- 
der it in his Rhetoric ; or because, to 



reduce it to a primary principle, in the 
possession of superiority we possess a 
greater degree of power over, our en- 
ergies ; the greater our superiority, the 
less are our energies impeded. The 
reverse of superiority must therefore, 
as far as this is concerned, be painful. 
Since therefore he who confers a favor 
exercises a superiority, but he who 
receives is placed in a degree of infe- 
riority, the benefactor, as far as he 
excels, is not a natural object of de- 
light to him whom he has benefited. 
Whilst the reverse holds good with the 
benefactor. 

6. l*nrit*f yttifutm] See the Rhe- 
toric i. 7. 

7. «/ mr^iw] Compare Plato's 
Repub. p. 330. »Z ru but* ntffw, *' 
T \ym, Zrt (Mi ft«g«r »h ffdp kym*5n 
ret xt*P MT *- «••«*•• ft tnuSett mt ro 
wXv #7 Af fin «vr«) mrnvmtrw •* ft 
MTttftipttu ItwXtji 4 •/ &XXh k**4£nr*4 
mur*. it *n ya^ «l xunrm rk mbrm 
**np*** »«) •! **rips rtivt *wl*s 
*y a****, rmvrn «"• in *«) •< xpifun-i- 
**{ui$t *i{j rk xpiftMrm mt&d%»tm9 
m$ t^y§9 UtvrSv, 



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374 ARISTOTELIS 



CHAP. VIII. 

Of Self-love. 

Reasons for AIIOPEITAI $€ KOI TrintpOV 8el (f>tXeiP eOLVTOvS 
tad against , ^ ^ , , - \ « e \ 

•elf-love paXiora 7] aXXov tvwC eiriTipjaxri yap tols eavrovs 

stated. , , „ v « , , ~ , . , 

fjuxAiora aya7rco<ri, kco. <o$ tv aioypcp (piAavrovs 
ottokolXovcti, 8ok€l re 6 pep (f>avXos iavrov \dpip 
Travra irparreLV, seal ocrcp av po\0rjpoTepo9 tj,5 
Toaovrcp paXXop' eyKaXovai 8r/ avrcp on ovOev 
a(f> iavrov irpdrru' 6 8 % eirieiKT)? 8ia to kolXov, 
kcu , ocrcp ap fSekruov r/ y pxiXXop 8ia to koXop, 
kolL (f>iXov tvetca' to & avTOv iraplrfaiv. tols 
Xoyoi? 8e TOVT019 to, tpya 8ia(f)coP€i, ovk aXoycos. 10 
<f>acri yap 8elp (f)tXeip fiaXiora top pjaXiora <f)iXop, 
(f)lXos 8e pdXiora 6 fiovXopevos a> fiovXerai 
TayaBa tKtivov eveica, seal el prjdeh eUreTau 
TavTa 8* u7rdp\€L fiaXior avTcp 7r/>o? ovtop, kol 
to, Xoiwa 8rj irapff oh 6 (f>lXos opl^eTai' eiprjTailb 
yap oti car avrov iravTa to. <f)tXuca kol 7rpbs 
tov9 aXXovs 8i7]K€i. kcu al irapotplai 81 Tracrai 
opoypcopopovcrip, chop to " pia tyvyf)* teal " koivol 
to. (f>iX(op* kol " laoTqs (friXoTrjs" kol " yopv 
Kirrjprj? tyyiov"" iravra yap Tavra wpbs avroPZO 
paXiaff xmdpyeC paXitrra yap $1X0? ai>Tcp 9 kcu 



6. sMit «f>* laurto] Does nothing 14. *Acy «*(«* mvrh] See chap. 4. 

oj himself: mero motu : witliout self' p. 361 . 

interested motives. XynuXilTot Itkvvr; 15. ilpirw yAj] See above, p. 363. 

fa suit* rS* d/»» «rXb» Induct?, sb£ 21. p&\*T« ye^ f/X#f] If to love 

Utfrw xfyt *airm wu%7. Paraph. one's self be reprehensible, then to love 



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ETHICORUM LIB- IX- 8. 375 

(f)tX7)T€0V 8r] fldXiaff iaVTOV. 'A7TOp€LTCU 5'Thatself- 

»/ / \ tf /i » , ~ » / love is of 

UKOTCD? 7TOT€pOL9 yfitCOV €7T€<rVaL, afMpOlP €)(pVTOlV two kinds ; 
\ / y • \ / * ~ ~ x / ralionaland 

TO 1TIOTOV. LCT(09 OVV TOV9 T010VT0V9 0€l T(OV XoyODV irrational. 

* ~ \ * /y » j » or e / \ ~ But from 

OlCUptlV KOU OlOpifrlP 60 OCTOP €KCLT€poi Kdl ITTf the latter 

5 dXrjdevovo-ti/. el 8rj Xd/3oifjL€v to <f>lXavrov irm common, 

r/ N • /»* / ft ~ N c \ the notion 

€KdT€pOl AeyOV<rU/ 9 TO% av ytVOVrO OrjkoV. 01 flCV has arisen 

? » v * v » > jl \ ' n- that all self- 

OVV €19 0P€l009 ayOPT€9 aVTO (piAaVTOVf KaAOVCl love is cen- 
\e~*/ % N ~ * / surable. 

tov9 tavroif anrovepjovras to ttMlov ev xPVf JLa(TL 

KOU TLfJLal? KOU r)8oVOU9 T0U9 COD/KIT LK€U9* TOVTODV 

10 yap ol ttoXAo), bpeyovrai 9 koc iowovSaKaxri irepl 
avrd w apiara ovra, 8io kou Trepipjdyiiyrd ioru/. 

ol 8rf 7T€pt TCLVTa 7r\€OV€KT<U \dpl^OVT€U TOLLS 

eirtfivp.ifus kou oXcd? tol9 irddeai kou T(p dXoyco 

rfJ9 tyvyrj9* Toiovroi & eicriv ol iroXXoi Sib koll 

15 ?/ Trpocrrjyopta yeyivtyrai dwb tov ttoXXov (pavXov 

ovros. St/calm 8r/ tow ovtod <f)iXavTot9 oveiSlfieTcu. 

OTl 8c T0V9 TO, TOiavff 0LVT019 a7TOV€fJLOVTa9 €UO0CUn 

Xeyeiv ol woXXol <f)tXavTOV9 9 ovk ddrjXov' el yap 
Tt9 del <nrov8a(fii tol Sitcaia irpaTreiv avro9 fid' 
ZQXiora wavroDV i) r« acbfypova rf biroiaovv dXXa 
tS>v Kara tol9 apeTas 9 kou oX<D9 del to kolXov 
eavTco irepiiroioiTOy ov0€t9 epei tovtov (f>tXavTov 
ov8e \freijei. Aotjeie 8 av b toiovto9 pSXXov whereas 

9 * z N . » / « \ / x N the former 

eivai (piXavT09 atrovefiei yovv eavrcp Ta KaXXiara appears in 



one's friend as another self is also circle, proceeding next to those who 
reprehensible. And conversely, if to are part of ourselves, thence to those 
love one's friend as one's self be praise- further removed. This is most truly 
worthy, then the loving one's self must and beautifully illustrated in the 
also be so. Such is the force of the Epistles of St. John, 
proverbs which Aristotle cites, all rest- 23. Kgus T it] Compare the argu- 
ing on the principle that we must first ment generally in Plato's Gorgias, p. 
love ourselves before we can love 609. sq. 
another. Self-love being the inmost 



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S76 ARISTOTELIS 

reality K CU paXuTT OyoBcL, KCU \apl^€TCU €<ZVTOV TQ> 

bfeUUm.mptarrcnTp, kcu irdvra rovm ireiBercu' wnrep 8e 

tiocc it ie» 

•enrtttW mu JToAi? TO KV0U0TOTOV UoXuTT €iVCU 8oK€l 

greatest / 

good lor juu iroy aXAo <rvon)piL, ovra> kcu avOpmro? kcu 
Bat*** <plXavro9 8% paXurra 6 rovro aycar&v kcu roxmph 
cu ooJ; xapt£6fUP09. kcu iyKpan/s 8c kcu axpaTrp Xeyercu 

exist with m s ^*/, , * / 

wine. And TO KpOTCtV TOV VOW 7} filTJ, CO? TOVTOV €KCLOTOV 

mesi ikere- % / , x % . 

fore be OVTOS KCU ireTTpCtyCVCU OOKOWIV OVTOl KCU €KOV- 



ebic. <rta>? r<z /tcra Aayou /iaXurra. art pkv o8v rovff 

CKaoTOS iariv rj paXiOTa, ot/ic aSrjXov, kcu art 10 
6 eiruiKTfi paXurra rovr aycnra- 8u> <f>iXavro? 
paXiar av eft;, icadf erepov elSos rod 6v€i8i(flp&vov, 
kcu Sicufrepow tocovtov oaov to Kara Xoyov £rjv 
tov Kara iraffo9 y kcu opeyeaOcu tov kclXov rj tov 
8okovvto? ovpxfteptiv. tow p*v odv irepi Taslb 
KaXa? irpaijeis Suufxpovrco? oTrovSa^oprw ttolvtcs 
carodexpirrcu kcu eircuvovaiv' ttolvtcdv 8e apiXXco- 

P&1H0V 7Tp09 TO KoXoV KCU 8uiT€lV0p,€VG>V TO, KoX- 

Xiara irpaTrctv KOivrj t av iravr clrj to, 84ovra 
kcu I8ia eKaoTcp to, piyurra t£>v ayaB&v, ehrepzo 
rj apery toiovtov ioriv. gkttc tov pcv ayaffov 
8*i (JylXavrov elvcu' kcu yap auros oirqaerou to, 
tcaXa irpaTTCdv kcu tovs aXXov? drtfreXr/o'ei' tov 
8e px>\0ripov ov 8ei' fiXasfrci yap kcu iavrov kcu 
tov? ireXas, (f>avXois traBcaiv knop&vos. t^>25 
H^X^VPV M^ p °^ v 8iaxf}cov€l a Set irpdrreiv kcu 



2. Jr*i{ R umi] And just at that sportively the words c# nwftmrewee 

which ha* the chief tway in a city pmXieV Jmu h»u ought to be sap- 

apptan par ucelUnce to b$ the city, plied. 

and that which hat the chief tway in 7. «* re&rw Uime] See above, 

any syttem, the tyttem, to it it with p. 363, 1. 
man. After rtrrnpm and MytWH re- 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 8. 877 

a irparreC 6 fi* ejrieucrjs, a 8ei 9 ravra kolL irparr^C 
was yap vovs oupelrou to fiiXnoTOv eavrcp, 6 8 

€iri€lKT)9 7T€tdapX€l Tip V<p. * *AXtJ0€9 8c 7T6/H That this 

tov airovocuov scat to tow (piX&v tvetca TroAAaseif-iovem 

./ \ ~ /* * » / e /% / the good 

&7TpaTT€lV KOU T7J9 TTaTpiOOfy KO.V 0€1J VTTtpaTTOUVr)- ma n U 

/ \ \ / \ \ shown by 

€tk€ip irporjcrerai yap koli yjri)\uvra koll ti\ws hisreserv- 

\ *v \ / » /% ' r ing for him- 

kou oXa>9 Ta TrepipjayrjTa ayocffa, 7T€pnroiovfi€POS w if the ex- 

« ~ \ x ' . »% / * ' « /i~ cessofvir- 

eavrcp to kolaov oAiyov yap ypovov rjararjvaitwvkd 

*/» ~x N «* N * * * x \ » / \ honor, and 

<T<pOOpa fJUOLAAOV 6A04T av 7) ITOAw T]p€fAa 9 K<Mnotofabso- 

+ ^ t% ** \ « » %* f w* * ' lute goods. 

10 piGKTOl KOA(09 CVULVTOV 7} TTOAA eTTJ TVXOVTCDfy 

kou fiiav irpa^iv kolXt)p tcai fieyaXrjv rj woXXa? 
Kal /jutcpd?. tol? 5* u7r€pa7ro0prjaKOv<ri tout t<ra>9 
avpfiaiveC oupovvrou 8r) ficya koXov eavrols. kou 
-XprjfiaTa irpoolvr av 4(f) q> wXeiova Xrpfrovrou oi 
\&<f)iXoi' ylyverou yap ry p&v (ptXco y$r\\ULTa 9 avr<p 
Se to kolXov* to 8rj ful^ov ayajQov eairry airovi/ui. 

KOU 7T€pl TIIUL9 $€ KOU ap\OL9 6 aVTOf Tp07T09' 

iravra yap r^> 0/Aa> Tavra TrporjaeTou' kolXov 
yap avT<p tovto kou iiraiverov. €Ikotg>9 8tj Sokci 
20 <rrrov8alo9 elvou, avri iravroav aipov/xevos to koXov. 
€v8e\€Tou 8e kou irpa£e& r<£ (f>lXco irpoUcrOaL, kou 
elvcu kolXXlov tov avTov wpaijou to dvrtov r^> 
(f>iX(p yevecrOcu. iv uaai 8r) tol? eiraiveTOts 6 



2. «£; yit^ nut] See above, p. 23. iv w**t H] In tota hac dis- 
362, 6. n. putatione Platonis sententiam scriptor 

3. iXnUt A rig/] Besides showing noster respezisse videtur amorem sui 
in this place in what way the good non accurathis distinguentis, sed nni- 
man displays his self-love, Aristotle verse damnantis. De Legib.V. p. 731. 
indirectly gives direction as to the x&trm % f*iytrv»t x*x$t M^mvt$ rut 
offices of virtuous friendship. *»X\»7( IpQvm I* vmt ^w^mt Unr 

8. ikiytf yk{ %&*] Aristotle seems »Z w*< Uutrtf tvyyuipn* i%m kxipv- 

to refer to Homer's II. A. 418. See ynt duttpimt ^n^«»«T<w. rtlSrt T ttm 

the note of the Schol. on that passage. S X&yvrn i* flUt **r* «*t M^ntt 



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378 ARISTOTELIS 

(TWovScuo? <f>aii>€Tcu eWnp rov kclKov irXeop vkpxov. 
OVT& ykv olv (f>i\avrop €tvai Set, tcaOdirep elprjTcu' 
w & ol iroXXoi, ov \PV- 



CHAP. IX. 

Whether Friendship is necessary to Happiness or not. 

TTuatbe^ AM4>I2BHTEITAI 8e kou wepl rov evSalfio^g 
iogali-suf- € l Ser/aerac (f)l\coi> rj puff, ovdtp yap (fxurc Sell/ 5 

themselves, (j)tX(OP TOL9 ftOKaploif KCU avrdpK€<riV' V7Tap)(€lP 

likely to re- yap avrols rayajQa' avrapKtts ofip opras ovSepo? 

quire the * ' \ \ *J if > \ 

aid of TrpoaScurOcu, top 8c (f)i\op> erepop avrov ovra^ 
iropifav a 8i avrov aSvvarei' oOev ro " orav 

^m%lt ° ^ at t JUCOP € ^ ^V> Tl *** <l>fow" *EoiK€ ^10 

surd if we arowtp to irdvr awovepLOvras rayajQa rep evSatpLOPi 

thathewho^/XoW flT/ a7To8l86vCU 9 O 8oK€l T(OV €KT09 ayoB&V 

all good fieyiorov uvea. €* re (f>lXov paXXov iart ro e§ 

possess the 7TOL€ll> Tf TtavytlV, KOI €OTl TOV ayaOoV K<U T7)f 

Especially dperm to evepyereiv, koXXlov 8 ei iroulv (blAovsis 

iffriendship * m , f ▼_ 

consists in ouveuov, tg>v ev irtuTop&v&v dewcrerai o ovrovoaios. 

conferring x , ^ , , 

rather than 010 Kai €7riCT)T£LTai 7TOT€pOV £P eVTT/YMWff fiaAAOP 

in receiving ^ ^ , , , ^ , 

favors; and det (DlAOOV 1) €P aTVyiOUSj (Of Kai rOV aTV\OVPTOS 

[ tii,n ?? * / ~ > > v ~ > 

honorable 0€Ofl€POV TG)P €V*py6T7)(rOPT(DP KCU TCOP €VTV\OVVT<OV 

to bestow 

them on 

friends than 

strangers. ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^~ f |^ f# T % >f -, $ y fM other ^ ints of ^ Book> ^ Dio ^ 

TfvvnUc. in fine his verbis additis : Laert vii. §. 23. $. 123. sq. viii. 

)*} tarrm. Myntn x& 9**7*** «* $. 10. ■ 

#?£{« QtXut l *Mr rlt Tf lavr$* 0iX- 9. U*t i 1*ifim\ Euripid. Orestes, 

rim 2t»Kut h7. ZELL. v. 667. 

Chap. IX. 13. rl %Z *attf] See the seventh 

Upon this Chapter, as for some Chapter of this Book. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 9. 



879 



ovs 



ۤ irouqcrovaw. "Atottov 

pjovarrqv iroulv top pjaxapiov' 



Ixrtos 



KOLl 



av naff avrov ra iravr *X €LV ^7°^^' 



yap 



TO Or that the 
mv \ «y x , happy man 

OVVtl? yap 6AO£Tcanbea 
* solitary 
iroklTIKOV being. 

6 avOpamos Kal crvtfjv ttcQvko?. #cai r^ that His 
bevSalfiopi 8tj rovff ihrdpxei' tol yap rg <f>v<ret live with 

» /l^ * *~\ *> « * ^l'x * » the virtuous 

ayaffa €X^t. O^AOJ/ (09 fl€Ta (ptAOOV KOI €7Tl€t- and friendly 

* * »/\ ' \ ~ / than with 

K(DV Kp€LTTOV fj fl€T OUV€LCDV Kai T(DV TV\OVT(OV strangers. 

avvrjfiepeveiu' fie? apa r<p ev8aifiovi (f)lA(Dv. T/ That the 

* %/ e ~ * ~ >\ a ' * negative of 

ovv Aeyovaip ot irptoroi^ teat Try dArjdevovariv ; lythisques- 

10 OTl 01 7T0AA0L (f>lAOV9 OlOVTai TOV9 XPV (rt l J ' 0W €lP0Li; to be as- 
/ \ 9 i/i\ * t c / serted from 

TttiV TOIOVTODV fl€l> OVV OVUtV 0€7)<T€Tai O fia/CapiO?, the good 

c7T€i8r} rayaBa wrapxei airr<p. ovSe 8rj r&v fizzing friends 

\cfe/*»> / . f^N \ « •»/ * »/i\ for pleasure 

TO TjOV, 7) €7TL /JLUCpOV 7/OV9 yap O piOS (OV OVVtV or profit. 

Seirai €7r€iaaKrov r/8ovrj4. ov 8e6fi€vo$ fie r&v 

IbTOLOVTtOV (blkCDV OV 8oK€L Setadat (blAcDV. ToNeverthe- 

r r less they 

require vir- 



1. &r»<rot 3' U*$] The supposition 
that a man can be happy without 
friends contravenes not only the gene* 
ral notions of mankind, but likewise 
the undoubted truth that man is a 
social animal, and can only be happy 
in a state of society, that being the 
state for which nature intended him, 
and for which she has endowed him 
with capacities and desires. As else- 
where he expresses it: i ft fib linm/ant 
KUftntif n pnftv 2iiputf V «vr^(»fi«» 
$vftt pips WAmv * An n ht(tot n h»t> 
he is either above or below human na- 
ture. (Pol. i. 1. p. 4.) If, therefore, 
the happy man were a solitary being, 
he would be cut off from the exercise 
of his noblest energies, and conse- 
quently of the greatest part of his 
happiness, and a solitary he must be 
if he have not a friend. For how can 
he with pleasure spend his life with 
those who are totally dissimilar to 
himself? 



— fa*;] This term appears to me 
to be used only to qualify the harsh- ' 
ness of the word preceding it, although 
the Scholiast thinks that Aristotle uses 
it in reference to the subject of the 
tenth Book, where he shows that the 
life of the happy man consists chiefly 
in contemplation (Si«g/«). 

2. i*n*mt] Seep.22.andp.31J6. 

3. *»XwM*f yfy] See p. 192. n. 

14. Wuemmv faint] Qf adventi- 
tious pleasure. Compare p. 30. lert Ht 
teat) i &it murSf temf abrlt ftvf.—tvRf 
2h irpwlurm rnt faints I fat *ut£p 

15. ri J* ov» Urn] Having shown 
that people inferred erroneously that 
because the happy man did not re- 
quire friends either for pleasure or for 
profit, therefore he did not require 
them at all, Aristotle now proceeds to 
show, that though he does not stand in 
need of these which are but accidental 
friendships, he does of that which is 



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880 



ARISTOTELIS 



friends, 



then they 
contem- 
plate two 
things 
which are 
the sources 
of the 
greatest 
pleasure. 



And friends 
are neces- 
sary to him 
not only for 
the full de- 



5* ovk €otiv laws dXrj0€9 9 iv apyy} Y*P cipyrai 
art rj evSaifiovia evepyeid re? 4otlv, rj 8 evepyeia 
SjjXop art yiverai kcu ov\ irrrdpyei oiairep /crrjpa 
tC €4 h\ to evScufiovelv iarXv iv r<p £r}v kcu 
ivepyeiv, tov 5" ayadov 17 ivcpyeta cnrovSaia #eai6 
rjbeia ko0 avTTfVj KaBairtp iv <*PXV ctprjTou, t<rn 
Se kcu to oiKtlov tS>v r/Secov, Oecoptlv 8e fiaXXov 
tow ircXa? Svvdpeda rj eavrov? kcu tog tKelvcov 
irpa{*€L9 ri to oiKtlas, al t&v <nrov8aixov drj 
irpajjus <f>tXeou ovtg>v r/Selou toi? dyaOol?' ap,(f)G)\o 
yap €\ovai to. tq <f)v<r€i r/Sea. 6 fuiKaptos 8tj 

(f)LX(Ol> TOiOVTtOV $€7Jcr€TCU 9 667T6/9 0€(Opelv 7TpOCU- 

peircu irpd^u? hntiKei? kcu oIks'ios* touivtou # 
al tov ayadov (f>lXov ovros. Olovrai re Sew 

7/8e(D9 £r}p tov evSatfWPa* fwpayrg fiev 081/ )(a\€- 15 
W09 6 &L09' ov yap pa8iov ko& avrov iuepyelv 



real friendship, the friendship of the 
good. And this argument will be 
more intelligible if it be simplified as 
Muretus has simplified it, by com- 
mencing with the concluding syllo- 
gism. 

Happiness is an energy, but the 
energies of happiness consist not only 
in action but contemplation, and con- 
sequently in a contemplation of those 
things which are pleasant. But these 
things the happy man must contem- 
plate either in himself or in others. 
But in himself he cannot contemplate 
them so well as in others. He must, 
therefore, contemplate them in his 
friends or in strangers. If in strangers, 
though they be virtuous they will not 
be •luuu. But if in others they will 
possess both these qualities, (ty$* 

tx 9Vtrt r * T V 9"*** **•*) y tirey "ill be 
•Uumt since a friend is a second self; 



virtuous (fanusiif ) since he is a good 
man. 

The friend therefore of the good 
man, is the mirror in which he sees 
himself and his own actions reflected. 
The same simile is beautifully applied 
in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, in the 
celebrated dialogue of Brutus and 
Cassius. Act i. sc. 2. 

1. U*czi] See p. 26, 1. 

3. %rt yinrai] i< ft Iripyua Xftj? 
it slm twrn »X«t ri mmi tyirnj*#f , ** 
•\%m * SfUritt * ly» n rv, aXXm 
yinrm «r<ri( mm) n xttn*t(. ««ft ya^ n 
»itn*if l*rt9 ifUS gv/MrS**, mXXa rt 
pit ttvrng yiyn. ro ft Ur«, re ft 
ftikku yifi*4ar tint \trn tZv h tvhu- 
putt* ix»t ri. Schol. See also i. 7. 

6. l» Jtfxv] See note above, p. 30, 
and p. 363. 

7. rt ituutt] That which is appro- 
priate to, or part of one's self, is pleasant. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 9. 



881 



<n)V€X&S) fl€& eT€fKOV 8t KOU TrpOS aX\0V$ paOV. velopement 



but also 



€otou ovv rj evepyeta ovve)(€OT*pa 9 rjoeia ovcra pleasurable 



exercise of 



/p « ' * *. «» \> ' ? . « * exercise ot 

Kaff avTTjv, o Oct wept rov /xaxapiop sivojl o yap hisenergies. 

cnrovSaio?, fj <nrovSouo9 9 tcus tear apenjv irpa^eat 

&\alp€i 9 reus 8 oltto Katcia? Svirxepaivcly tcaOaircp 

6 (JLOvaucbf roi9 KaXoh fJL€\c<riv fj8er<u, etri 8e 

TO® <f)av\0l9 \V7T€ITCU. yiVOlTO 8 OLV KOU a(TK7}(TL9 
TIS T7J9 ap€T7J9 €K TOV CTvfflP TOlf ayO0Ol9, KO0- 

wirtp kou Qioyvls (jyqenv. tfrvo-iKwrepop 8 which is' 

> « y c fc~j*v *» farther 

10 €m<rK07TOVCriV €OlK€V O OTTOVOOUOS <f)lA09 T(p CT7TOU- proved from 

Saup rr} (f)vcr€i oupero? elvcu' to yap rfj (f>var€t tion of life 
ayaBov tiprjTcu on r<p cnrovSalco ayaBov Kal r)8v being plea- 



Mot and 



€OTt Katf OVTO. TO 0€ £r)V OpL^OVrat T019 ($019 natural to 



9. efoywr] The verses to which 
Aristotle here refers axe quoted at 
length with some others of the same 
writer by Plato, Meno, p. 95. D. 

mm) «*«{£ runt Tin mm) ietit, mm) 
fAtrk ruvn 

Iff, xo) aMmtt T»7f St ptyiXn Itnmfug. 

U$\m f*lf y*< W Mkk Utgior h 

fvpftUyipf iweXtTg umi r%9 lira ►/•». 

— fiwMM&rtgffj The previous ar- 
guments were derived from the nature 
of the happy man, as far as he is 
happy, which is not a consideration 
derived from his natural state, because 
virtue is the efficient cause of happi- 
ness, and this is not given us by na- 
ture (see ii. 1.) But the following 
view jof the subject is derived from the 
consideration of life generally, not 
such as is peculiar to the happy man, 
but such as nature gives to all ; and 
hence Aristotle uses the term «»r»«- 
rsgM in application to it 9%%^*fA%t* 
yk{ •&» «r» nrZt tiif wpeiw** rif ift- 
ims/im *XX* «*r# rm *4ttn **n. Pa- 
raph. 



12. •%*«*] See p. 30, 14. 

13. r# % $if] Aristotle commences 
his argument drawn from a consider- 
ation of the natural life, by first defin- 
ing what life is. That of plants con- 
sists in vegetation and reproduction ; 
that of animals in vegetation, repro- 
duction, and sensation ; that of man in 
vegetation, reproduction, sensation, and 
perception (hV'O* Not in the mere 
power of vegetation &c. but in the 
actual vegetating (In^yttf), for it is 
the actual employment not the dor- 
mant possession merely of their dif- 
ferentia which distinguishes man from 
animal, and animal from plant. For 
the energy is the perfection (ri »fytf) 
of the power, and the power is always 
referred to the energy ; therefore, the 
life of man should be defined by the 
actual, rather than the power of feeling 
and perceiving. Having premised thus 
much, he then proceeds to the main ar- 
gument, which appears involved from 
his mixing up with it the proofs of the 
different propositions. To make it 
therefore more clear, we shall omit the 



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882 



ARISTOTELIS 



8vi/dfi€t cu<r6r)<T€m> avQfxmois 8 alaOr/aew y 
vorjorem, r\ 8e 8vvafu$ w rrfv hipyeiav avdyerau, 
to 8e KVptov iv rrj evepyela, eouce 8rj to ifiv 
elvcu Kvpta>9 to ouarOaveaOai rj voelv. to 81 ^qv 
t5>v KaJff avro ayafi&v kcu rjSecov' (aypiarfievov yap, 5 
to & wpicrpAvov ttjs TayaOov <j>vae<os) to 8e 



prosyllogisms, as they are termed, re- 
presenting merely the principal argu- 
ment. 
Since that which is absolutely and 

naturally good is pleasant to the 

good man, and life is such a 

good; (l)then, 
Life is pleasant to the good man ; 
But life is feeling and perception ; 

therefore, 
Feeling and perception is pleasant 

to the good man. 
But he who feels, feels that he feels, 

and he who perceives, perceives 

that he perceives ; therefore, 
The feeling that he feels, and the 

perceiving that he perceives is 

pleasant to the good man. 
But the feeling that a man feels and 

the perceiving that he perceives is 

nothing else than the perceiving 

that he lives, or the perceiving of 

a good in one's self, (for life is 

such a good), 
And the perceiving of a good in one's 

self is pleasant ; therefore, 
The feeling that he lives is pleasant 

to a good man. 
But as a good man feels to himself, 

so does he towards his friend; 

therefore. 
The feeling and perceiving the life of 

his friend is pleasant to a good 

man. 
But these are not possible without a 

friend and without his presence ; 

therefore, 



A friend and his presence (rtt£*b) is 
pleasant and good to the good 
man. 

2. t) ft iwmfitt] rkt ivfmfut l%t*i 
2m» ro Itt^yut, r§ ykf xu£t§t It rn inj- 
yttef Xiyu ft xu^ittt ri rtX$t, xtu ri 
§S Ittxet' rnt yct{ i*i£yi'utf utxm h Qvttf 
rkt St*«/ui/f fiftTt Uimtft, xa) rauntt 
Xnxa *t{tiv(Ait xa) A***%i(M$m rau- 
rx(. Paraph. 

4. ri ft ft,] See x. 3. ad 6n. ■ 

5. *£tM>f*im ya.(\ See the *uwru%i* 
of the Pythagoreans, p. 17. See also x. 
2. fffttf ft Sri §1 Tln4*yi{U»t ii§ 9V9- 
rti%4Vt Wsisvt, x*i rk ftkt dymik 
%*xtrx Irarm uvb rnt fumt, rk ft 
xaxk M rht X§t*n* xx) lx*X»vt U j». 
b*ny* rk x*Xk «gwpt*«i>. It f ft rk 
xxxk ii^wm, xx) xtrttr^ut tXtyst 
rk xxXk xa) ixu€fMtx, — if**t*f xa) rk 
xxxk eU^rec. — Sn ft rb tutr ttftriit 
ixH0fA%ttt \t wXX»7t rtf 'ApertriXu 
xx) UXdrtttt ftbuxrat. i put yk^ 0*»- 
Xf hk rkg dxiyvt «£i£uf «7f tfirxt 
mm rhv dx*%^xrft WtSttputt r£t QmuXmt 
nfttSt dqlermt ££. **etrrMt yk% yni- 
fAttot pnftt) Zt v^drru d(wxip$t0f, xx) 
}tk rtivro d<ri &XX*t i«r* &XXm fttra- 
Wfibeit, It tltftfuf m^ef, Wt rsttt rw ctvr$i 
Itrdpttf — • ft mvSmtos* /3Xt«r« yk^ 
•tfx, rk Strut dy*4k xa) Strut «^*» 
luvxMt xa.) %*t<krr*t rnvrtitg XpuAtu. 
Schol. 

6. MfM/6iMt] This passage, as the 
next, 3j*ri£ Utxt wmeit—-, is used to 
prove the minor of the second syllo- 
gism, (1) that life is naturally good. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 9. 383 

rg <j>vaei ayaOov kou T<p eirveiKel* Sioirep eouce 
iraaiv rjSv etvou. (ov Set 8e Xafifiavtiv puoyOripdv 
^mjv teal SieQOapfievrjVy oir& ev \xmajs m doptoro? 
yap rj rotavxy, KaBdirep ra VTrdp\ovra carry, ev 

5 to?? e\ofievot9 8e wepl rrjs \v7rr19 earau <f>avep&- 
Tepov)' et & avro to £r}v dyaObv kou r\8v (eouce 
8e kol 4k tov irdvras opeyeadou avrov, kou pud* 
Xtora tov$ emeuteis kou fioucaplovs' tovtois yap 
6 ($io$ aipeTorraTOf, kou y tovtcdv fiaKaptayraTrj 

10(0)17)* 6 5' opebv on opa ouaOdveTou kou 6 olkovcov 
on aKovei kou 6 (iaSlfav on fia8l£ei, kol eVt 
tcov dXXcov ofiouD? eon n to ouaOavofievov on 
evepyov/iev, axrre aiaOavoifieff av on ouaOavo- 
fieOa kou vootfiev on voodfiev, to & on ouardavo- 

ib/xeOa r) voov/iev, on eafiev* (to yap elvat tjv 
alaOdveadac 17 voeiv)' to & ouaOdveaOat on ($, 
t£>v r)8ea>v Kaff avro' ((f>vaet yap dyaObv {fiyrj, 
to ft dyaJBbv wrdpxov ev eavT<p ouaOdveadou rjSv)' 
olpeTOV 8e to ^qv kou puaktGTa toZs dyaOols, on 

2. ev h7 ft XttftfiAtut] Aristotle minata : exeraplo sint materia et 
here meets an objection, that we must forma." GIPH. Of the word vr«£- 
except a life of vice and depravity, X****, see above p. 28. 3. 
of course, from the natural goods, as 5. «••#* l^^iwf] The ^Scholiast 
not falling under the genus of *#*- refers to the discussion concerng plea- 
ds, sure in the next Book. 

4. *«At«?t rk v**tx trr *] J*"* a * ?• «•«&"'«* fyyirt**] See x. 3, 

the things which belong to it ; the vices — fi*Xt*r* ret* Watuus} See 

which attend it. As the vices and above, p. 362, 5. 

pains of a profligate life are multi- 13. «*VS«m//»i/ At trt aiftenfut*] 

farious and innumerable, so is the pro- Explicatur a Physicis initio libri tertii 

fligate life itself. de Anima. GIPH. 

" Cur autem vita finita sit h«c est 14. ri 3* Zrt\ But the fact of our 

ratio, quia est M^ytm seu actio quae- feeling and perceiving is a Jact that 

dam; nam ut potestas (ibrnpif) est toe exist. 

interminata et quae ad multa deduci et 15. h] Was said to be. In p. 

explicari potest, ita Ui^yu* est ter- 382, 4. 

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384 ARISTOTELIS 

to elpot ayaBov tart* avroi? kcu rjSv* (ovvcu- 
atiapofieroi yap tov ko0 auro ayaBov TJSovrai)' 

W Si *p09 (OUTOV €\€l 6 OWOvScUOS, KCU 7T/90? 

tov <f>iXov* (ercpos yap auro? o ff)lXo? eariv)' 
KO0aw€p oiv to avrov elvcu cuperov iariv €#ccwrrG>,5 
ovrto kcu to top <f>i\ov y tj irapcnrXr/o'lGK. to 5* 
tlvcu t)v cuperov Sua to aurdaveoBcu avrov ayaBov 
ovros. t) Si touwtt) aurOrfais rjSeia KaJff iavrrjv. 
ovvcuoBavcoBcu apa 8ei kcu tov <f)iXov ore eoriv, 
touto Si yivovr av iv t$ ov^rjv kcu koivg>v€iv\o 
Xoytov kcu Suwoias* ovtcd yap av So^eie to ovijjv 
eiri t&v avOparmov XeycoBcu, kcu ov\ mnrep im 
t&v fioatajpjaTtop to iv r<p avr<o vepjeaBcu. el 
Srj Tip pjaxapUp to etvcu cuperov iart Ka£t airro, 
ayaBov Ttj (f>v<r€i op kcu rj8v y wapcarXqaiov Seib 
kcu to tov (f>iXov iariv, Kcu 6 <f>iXo? t&v cuper&v 
av eir/. b & iariv avrtp cuperov, tovto Set inrap- 
\eiv avrcp, rf Tavry ivSerjs eorou. Seqaei apa r<p 
evScufiovrjaovTi <f)lXcov anrovSauDv. 



CHAP. X. 

Of the number of Friends. 

The quel- AP* oSv G>$ wXeiOTOVf (filXoVf TTOtrjTeOV, tj\Q 

solved in KO0aiT€p €7Tl T7}9 £evioS iflfieXw ^ipffadcu SoK€L 

reference cc , ,- f 9 v «. „ x , 

first to fl7]T€ iroXvg€lV09 flTJT ag€lV09 y KflU €7Tl T7J9 

friendships / / » *jl n 9 ' > % \ ' 

of interest. tpiAuKS apflOCei flTJT CUpiXoV €IVCU flTJT OV 7T0AV- 

10. It ri *>«$»] See above viii. 5. — it «*Xi<Vr«iv] See viii. 6. 

20. if rXiimi*] See what Diog. 21. i/gfrfo] By Heskxl. Oper. et 

Laert. says of the followers of Zeno. D. v. 713. 
vii. 124. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 10. 38S 

(plXoV Kaff V7T€pf5o\T)V ; T0L9 fJL€V 8t] TTpOS XPV "^ 

kol iravv 8oijei€v av apfiofecv to \e\6ev* woXXois 
yap av0v7n)p€T€iv eirwrovov, kcu ov\ 'ucavbf 6 fito? 
avTols tovto 7rparTeu/. 61 7r\elovf 8r/ t£>v 7rpb$ 
5 top oiKtlov fitov iKovm irepUpyoi kcu efiwoSioi 
irpos to kol\w {j}v* ovOev odv Set ovtcov. kcu 
oi irpos rjSovfjv 8* apKOvatv oXiyoi, KaOairep iv 
ttj Tpo(f>y to ijSvo-jia. Tow 8e <nrov8aiovs in virtuous 

/ x / » » /, / a v / friendships. 

7T0T€pOP 7TA€IOTOVS KOLT api&flOV, 7) €(TTt TL fl€TpOV 

10 kou (piXtKOv 7r\r)0ov9, a>oirep iroXecos ; ovt€ yap 
€K StKa avOpanrcov yevoiT av 7roXty, ovt 4k Se/ca 

fJLVpLCtScOV €Tl 7ToXl9 icTTlV. TO 8e TTOOTOV OVK ZvTlV 

Ixrcos €P riy aXXa wav to fieTa^v tlv&v apurfievcov. 
Kal (f>iXcov 8rj iarc irXrjOos a>piap.evov 9 kcu tcra? 

\hol wXeioroL, fieff 5>v av hvvavro tis av^rjv' tovto 
yap i8oK€L (f>iXiK<DTaTOv etvaij otl 8 ov\ olov re 
7roXXoL9 av^qv Kal Siavefieiv avTOv, ovk aSr/Xov. 
€tl 8e KOLKeivov? 8ei aXXrjXow (filXovs eivat, el 
fieXXovai iravT€9 fi€T oXXtjXcov avvrjfiepeveiv' 

20 tovto 8 ipy codes iv 7roXXot9 vwapxeiv. \aXeirov 
8e yiveTcu kcu to avyyaipttv kcu. to (rwaXyeiv 
olk€lco$ 7roX\olf % cl/coy yap trvpnr'nrTtiv apx. r£ 
fiev arvin/SeaOaL Tip 8e crvvayOtaQai. taw oSv 
ed e\€i firj £rjT€iv <fc iroXvcfiiXcoTaTOv elvai, aXXa 



3. ovx ix*t*( i filet] Quod quidam ex multis unus roget ad coenam, alius 

hie vertunt fiUt facilitates et rem fami- ad funus, alius ut in foro sibi sis advo- 

liarem errant. Argumento sit quod catus, alius ad nuptias, alius ad iter, 

ait, *04g •<*•/•» fiiet, et quod hie fiiet in alius denique alio, alius pecuniam ro- 

magnis dicitur Qwn, id est, vitam et get mutuam, alius vestem," &c.omnes 

naturam nostram esse imparem ad eodem tempore, quis par his omnibus 

omnia amiconim obsequia plurimo- esse posset? GIPH. 
rum. Exemplum affert elegans Plu- 11. Vtx* (Avytiui] See Polit. vii. 

tarchus in libel lo de rtXufiXif : " Si 4. 



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866 ARISTOTELIS 

tocovtov? oaroi ei? to avfiqv ucavoi ovSc yap 

ivB4\€€F0€U 86{*€l€V OP IToXXoi? €IPCU (f}iXop <T<f>68pa. 

Sioirep ov& ipap irXetop&p 9 inrepfiokq yap n? 
ctvai fiovXcrcu <f>t\la?, tovto fie irpb? cpa* kcu 
to anf>68pa 8r} irpo? oXiyov?. outod & *X €LV eouteb 
kcu eiri top TrpaypjOLTtov" ov yiyvovrai yap <f>iXoi 
iroXXoi jcara tt/p ercupucrjp <f)iXiav, cu & vppov- 
/upcu ei> 8voi Xeyovrcu. ol 8e iroXv<f)iXoi kcu 
ircUriP oIk€Ud? iprvy\apopr€? ovSeui 8oKov<rii> elpcu 
<t>t\oi> irXrjp ttoXitucw?, ov? kcu kclXov<tip ape-\0 

CTKOV?. TToXlTUCG*? ft€P o8v €OTl WoXXoT? €IPCU 

<f>iXop kcu p.r) ap€<T9cov oura, oAX* <*>? aXrjdcb? 
€7Ti€iK7]' 81 aperqv 8t kol 8t avrov? ovk eort 
irpb? iroXXov?, ayenrrjrov fie kcu oXiyov? evpelv 

TOWVTOV?. 15 



CHAP. XL 

Whether there is greater need of Friends in adversity or prosperity. 

IIOTEPON fi> 4p €vtv X Icu? paXXop <f>iXa>p Set 11 
Thtt r €I di^ * v ^""uxiW; * v «M0 ^ yap ^m^qrovvraC 

both in ad- % r \ yap OTV\0VPT€? SeOPTai ilTlKOVpia?, Ol T 
prosperity. eVTV\OVVTe? OVpfiuDV KCU OV? 6$ irOVr)(TOV<TlV % 



3. Ut&cXh yt(\ See above p. 326, party. But this feeling differs from 

16. friendship, properly so called, because 

8. It )w<] As Pyladesand Orestes, he does not entertain this affection to- 

Damon and Pythias, and the like. wards individuals on account of their 

10. <rXfh> wiXiriuSt] Aristotle says individual virtue, but as parts of a 

it is not possible for a good man to whole, and with a view to the benefit 

have many friends, for the reason stated of that whole ; as of happiness to his 

above. Nevertheless he may be a country or victory to his party, 

friend to many at once in a certain 14. *<yct*nr6t] It it enough. 
sense, as to his country or his own 



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ETHICORUM LIB. IX. 11. 387 

fiovXovrat yap eS bpav. dvay/ccuorepov fiev Sr/ 
iv rats arvyiais, fito r&v xprj<ripxov kvravOa See, 

KaXXlOU 8 €1/ TOLLS €VTU\ioL9 9 8tO KOU TOVS €7TL€LK€C9 

^qrova-iv* tovtov? yap aiperwrepov €V€py€reiv 
5 teal //.era rovrtov Sidyew. ttm yap kolL rj rrapovcrla 
avrrj t&v <j>iXcov t/Seta Kal iv rats Svotvxwu? 
Koix/)i{fij/Tai yap ol \v7rovfievoi avvaXyovvrfov r<bv 
(f)tXcoj/. 8io Kav a7roprj<r€i€v ris rroTcpov cocrrrep 
fiapovs fieraAafifidvovo-iv, rj tovto /lev ov y ij 

10 rrapovaia 8 aur&v rjSeca odea Kal r) Zvvoia rod 
avvaXyelv iXarra) ttjv Xvrrqv rroiel. el p&v odv 
Scd ravra r/ 8i aXXo ri KOV(f)l£ovTai, dcpeicrOco' 
av/ifiaiveiv 8 dbv (baiverat to A€y0€j/. *Eo«t€ But the 
o rj rrapovena futcrn ri9 avra>v etvat,. avro /xei/medfrom 

15 yap to opav tov? (biXov? rjov. aXXco? re /cat of friends m 

* ' lAWAn «■ 



sorrow is 



aTv\ovprij tcai yiverai tis emKovpia rrpos to prj mixed with 
Av7r€i<r0ai' rrapapvdrjTiKOv yap 6 (f)lXo9 Kal rypteMure 
oxfrei Kal T<p Xoy<p 9 eav rj imStijio?' oi8e yap mere sight 

TO r)0O$ Kal €(f> oh rjSeTOl KOU Xv7T€lT0U. TO 8e pain from 

-20 Xxnrovpuevov alaOdveaOat eirl tois avrov aTvylcus grieving for 
Xvmjpov* was yap (frevyei Xvmjs curios elvcu tols 
(friXoif. 8io7T€p ol fiev dvSp&Setf Trfv tyvcriv cvXa- 
fiovvrat auXXwretv tow (f>iXov9 avTots, Kav purj 
vrrepTelvrj rrj dXxnria, ttjv £k€ivois yivofieirrfv Xvrrqp 

25ovx v7Top,€V€i 9 0X009 T€ avvOprjVOvs ov irpoarleTai 

' 4. ml^irmrs^n tvt^ytriTf] See above (from his own troubles) ; and secondly, 

chap. 9. and in short, he does not readily admit 

22. 3</ri£ »l ph J»fJ^«f] Where- commiserators, from himself not being 

fore the brave are cautious of having given to weeping and lamentation, 

their friends to condole with them, for Such seems to me to be the simplest 

unless he (the brave) he very insensible and most grammatical way of con- 

(&rt(ru'i»i rf tXwrif) he will not en- structing the passage, though great di- 

dure to see grief coming vpon them versity of opinion exists respecting it. 

C c2 

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388 ARISTOTELIS 

8ta to iitjS avros elvax OprjvriTiKOs' yvvcua 8e 

kcu ol TOtovroi av8p€f T019 ovoTtvovo'i \aipovai 9 

kcu <f)i\ov<rii> ©9 (f)i\ov9 kcu avvaXyovvras. fu/jLei- 

Butinjoy adoi 8 iv airaai Set SrjAov oti tov BeXrlco. *H 

we receive, J 

ontbe coo. ff € 'j, ra k €\rrv\iax9 tg>v <f)lAcov irapovaia T7JV re 5 
F ,ea,< hL ; ^ £a y G, y 1 7 , ' ^ccay £x €L Ka * TV 1 * ^ VVOiav 5™ rfiovrai 
pr ?f 0Ce ' € '^ T0 ^ wvtov ayafiols. 810 Sotjeiev av SeZv ei? 

MM&gtbem^l/ T0L9 €UTl^(UIf KoXcLP TOV$ <f)l\0V? 7TpO0V/KO9' 
oarowa €V€py€TrjTLKOV yap €WCU KCiKoV* eh 8e T0L9 OTV" 

wh"' W 0,9 OKVOvvra* /leraStSopat yap <o? rJKiara Selio 

we should T &V KOKtoV* 0$€V TO " o\l9 iyCJ 8vOTV\£>v" ilOr 

court their % , « , * , 

society in Xiora oe wapaKXijTeov , oTav fieXAaxru/ oAiya 
nty t bm not o\Xri0€PT€9 pjeyaX avrov a^eA^cretz/. ieucu 8 

them iu ad- aVOLTraXiV WTO? apiW&El TTp09 U€P TOV9 aTlTVOVPTaS 

™sity, ex. x r , , , N ^ 

cept mcer-a/cAl7TOJ/ /cat TTpOUVpXOS {JptAOV yap €V TTOl€lVy\b 

But when* kcu fiaXiara tow h> yfi^ta Ka * ™ PV aJzwcavras 9 

they are in , ^ x , x ' ^ , x x 

prosperity auJbOlV yap KOAAtOU KaL 7)0L0V), €1$ 0€ Ta$ €VTV- 
oradver. , ^ ' r „ , , f v 

sitywe j^w ovvepyovvra fiev irpouvpms \jcai yap eis 
just the ravra XP €ict </>lX(ov), irpos evwaOeiav fie oyoXaJxo?' 
ov yap koXov to irpoOvfieurOai axfreAeZaOai. Sofjav 20 
tf arjSlas iv ry SuoOcZadcu lacos evAafirfTtov' 

2. *•) •/ riwrti Mpt] sc. a»<2 tragoedia unde hie versus desumptas 
*xwiams/i men. est. periit Similis autem valde loco 

3. ptfturteu—h*] This is said in huic est veteris tragici, quod ad senten- 
reference to the words preceding. We tiam facit, locus itidem Sophoclis e 
ought not, like effeminate persons, to fabula, cujus index est (Edipus Ty- 
give way to sorrow and be ready to rannus (v. 1061.) ita enim* loquitur 
communicate it to oar friends, but bear Jocasta, XXjs twtvf \y*. VICTOR 
it like the brave. and GIPH. 

i\. &\i$\y*] Paraphrastes : i r^a- 15. ixXnrs*] Aristotle appears to 

yulig <f>n<rtf. Interpretes putant locum allude in this passage to Homer's de- 

significari Euripidis in Oreste v. 239 : scription of Menelaus visiting Agamem- 

\ilttf ti xwdt ; xtlfil* •?^^4»^ii#' non in his troubles. See Iliad B. 408. 

tl X U /3X*fln» Tit\ ZXif %x,m r»u *vt»/**t§s it ol M fisnt kymAt 

Iwruxur. MtAkxtf, 

Quapropter alius locus indicandus ptt yk^ ttmrk fa/tit mhxpot if 

erat, nisi, quod verisimilius videtur, Wsiiir: 

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reverse. 



ETHICORUM LIB, IX. 11. 389 

ivioTe yap avfifiaivei. if wapovaria Srj t&v (f>iXcov 
iv airaxrtv aiperrf <f>aiveTcu. 
12 9 Ap* odv* uxrirtp rots epaxri to opav ayonrn- Some con- 

, / , k -^ . - / ' eluding^. 

TOTOLTOV eOTL KCLI fJUlXXoV OLipOVVTOU TaVTTJV TTJV marks,tend- 

y /, a % v / x / /x ingtoshew 

5ai<r0r)<riv r/ ras Xonras, ov icara ravrrjp fuaXtara why the 

- v v v / * n Presence of 

tov epayros ovros kgli yivojievov, ovra> Kai tow fnends » 

,, r / / , n j- , x delightful 

(piAot? aiperayrcLTOV eari to ovQqv; kolvcovlol yap mail 

f , vr \e\v * v \ friendships. 

7) (ptAia. kcu a>s irpos eavrov ^X e h ovtg> kou wpos . 
top </)iXov. wepl avrov 8 r\ cua'Orjo'if ore Zotlv 
10 alperr}' kcu irepl tov (J)lXov 8rj. r\ 8 ivipyem 
yiveTou avTOts iv t£ o"v£rjv, odgt €Ik6to>9 tovtov 

€<f>l€VTOU. KOI O TL 7T0T ioTLP €KaOTOlS TO €iVai 

rj ov x^P LV oupovvrac to {j}v 9 iv tovt<p pueTa 
tg>v (f>iX(ov /3ov\ovt(u Sidyecv' Sioirep ol p.ev 

\h<rvpmivov<TiV) ol 8e avytcvfievovo-iv, aXXoi 5c 
<rvyyvfivd{fiVT<u kou avyKVvrjyovo'CP tj <rvp(f)iXoao- 
(powriVy etcaoroi iv tovt<p <rvvr)p.epevovT€$ o tl 
irep /JtaXtcrra ayawtoiri t£>v iv t<£ /3tV avtfjv yap 
fiovXopevoi pi€Ta tS>v (frlXoov, Tavra tocovci koi 

ZOtovtcdv Koivcovovaiv oh OLOVTOU avtfjV. yiV€TOl 
odv rj p,ev tG>v (f>avX<ov (f)iXia p,o\67]pa' koivcdvovctl 
yap (j>avXcov afiefiaiot, ovres, tcai fxoydrjpoX Be 
ylvovrai ofiotovpievoi dXXrjXotf' y\ Be tg>v imeiKcov 
iirLeiKr/s, avvavijavopbevrj tous 6fitXlai? % 8oKOv<ri 

25 8e teal fteXTiov? yiveardat ivepyovvres kou Stop- 
' dovvres dXXrjXovs* diropjOLTTOVTau yap Trap 9 aA- 



6. ?£«*••* •**•$] See above ix. 5 ; 10. Wt^yua—U *$ rt/gnr] Compare 

and compare the Rhetoric, i. 11. p. 384, 10. note. 

8. *(h Utvrif l%u] Compare p. 12. ri iTmm] Compare p. 383. 
384. 22. Jfiifimst Strtg ] See p. 364. 

9. h atrtfins «ri %*r» cupr*] See 26. aVfAxrrotrai] ToXu^nfrsr 
above p. 382. fnfiet ri porea*, l\ ov xotra **£a,yuyit9 



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590 AR1ST ETHIC. LIB. XI. 11. 

XrjXcoy oh aptaKOvrai, odev " wOXmv pkv yap 
Sac eadXci** wept /up oiv <f>tXias en roaourov 
clprj<r0a>' hroiupov If ap ^hj SuX0€iv ircpl rjSoiri}?. 

kwmmVrtn fi» rw kmXm k«**ryyi- m r tr ir mm m , eff m yt t , urn**. Easta- 

{«*. kmmtm* ))rJ{Mi «tm7* rmn thins, p. 1867. 

«s^) MfaJuft. Upirru? ft m) U^mCt 1. Ufe£»pb yvg] These are part of 

#t#fo m2 re &ww0yy%ut mi*, mm- the verses of Theogrit, quoted above 

X*rm ft re f« rnn ***** mjftn mm ix. 9. p. 381. 

Uw mm) X mmm yt l m mmrm rmn wmXMmm 



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INTRODUCTION TO BOOK X. 



At the conclusion of the Seventh Book (p. 295 sq.) Aris- 
totle took occasion to glance from the discussion of Tem- 
perance and Intemperance and their kindred habits, to the 
consideration of their particular object-matter, the more 
immediate pleasures derived from sensual gratification; 
and although some of the remarks there introduced apply 
to the nature of pleasure in general, yet it is easily seen, 
that they are made more especially with reference to 
corporeal pleasures. That discussion is left unfinished, 
Aristotle contenting himself with exposing the weakness 
of the arguments brought for and against it, not entering 
very deeply or explicitly into an explanation or refutation 
of the theories of Eudoxus and Plato, which he reserves 
for the present Book. Both because such a refutation 
serves for a natural introduction of his own system, which 
strikes the midway between the other two, and because 
the further and more intricate prosecution of this sub- 
ject is coincident with a more complete and conclusive 
explanation of the true nature of Happiness. In the same 
way Plato also, in his dialogue of the Philebus, proceeds 
from a consideration of the nature of Pleasure to that of 
the chief and perfect Good. 

The opinion that Pleasure is the Chief Good had been 
much advanced by the efforts of Democritus, the Sophists, 
Aristippus, and others, and . was entertained by many of 
the contemporaries of Aristotle and Plato. The dialogues 
of the latter are full of objections to this popular theory : 
but in none are they refuted with more care and labor than 
in the Philebus ; to which dialogue and its reasonings and 
representations of the nature of Pleasure particularly, 
constant reference is made in the following Book. 



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392 



INTRODUCTION. 



According to Plato's theory', as there set forth, all 
things are either of the finite (o-gga$), or infinite (£*-«gov), 
or formed from the union of these two, the mixed (to £t//x- 
/uffyopevov), and, lastly, the cause of this union which regu- 
lates and directs it (to airiov). The indefinite is that which 
admits of more or less, without the destruction of its 
essence, in which there is a constant vicissitude of qua- 
lities (ft-oiorifroov), possessing in itself neither beginning, 
middle, nor end b . The finite is that which has the power 
of bounding and restraining the infinite. But since nei- 
ther of these, separated and disunited, are desirable by 



•2X1 ataXafrmfttt Arra r£t wt )n 
Xiymt. IIP XI. r«« : 2X1. r« $wt iXs- 
y/tif «••», ri fut aru^ot 3t*$«j rUt St- 
rmt. ri ft rifas ; nPXl. a'dtv fttt out 
XXI. rtvrm it) r£t tti£t rk iw rtioifttia, 
ri ft r^irrtt. 1% dftfaTt rtvrttt Xt rt %vft- 
(uryifuwt. — rtrd^r»u /mi yitevt av 
v^rhip Qalttra* ITPX1. Xtyi rifts, 
2X1. rnt £vfjkfii%utg rtvrat **{•* &X- 
knka rn» alrtat «£«, xai riiu (Mt *•{•* 
r^tgit ixutttt rira^rtt r«vr«— Philcb. 
p. 23. «-{**-«» pit rutut Art/ft Xiya, 
hvrtpt ft *i{at, trur Ix rwrmt T{ir$r 
fttxrh* x*) ytyitnftitn* •tfiar rn* ft 
rnt f*l£t*t alrtat xai yttt*%*t rtrd^rnt 
kiy* ib. p. 27. 

b 2X1. htfAtvipv xai $o%(ori£4v 
«*i^4 *(*r»9 7g«, x'tiat it <r»ri rt ffoatt. 
ft ri fiakXJf ri nut tirm it abr»7t #/• 
xtlSt rtitt yittrtt, X**xi£ At ittxnm % 
riX«f tux At Wtr^f^airnt yfyttrJar 
ytffutns y*£ rtXtvrnt aai avr* rtn~ 
Xtvrnxart .— - dti ft yi fa/At it ri r£ 
'4' v /CC* T *t9 *«^ r y ' i £/ M *'i£9 r« ^«XAJy 
vt *«2 «rr«r Jfw. — £ij r*/i>m> i A.«y«f 
«/*7» fnfuuttt tout* fin rtXtt 1%h*, 
inXn T Strt fttV«ir *x*ra<raeti awtipt 
ytyttvfat. IIPX1. »«) *$&{* yt, £ 
2«»g«rif 2X1. aXX' iv yi, J p<Xi 
U^^rm^x 1 »***•»&*$ xai kt'tfttnvat , in 
xa) ri cffya tovto, S ru w» ifltyg*, 
xai r4 yt npfta rnt avrnt iuta/uut *%trot 
rtf ftM\K$9 t% xai jrrtt' Xwcu yk{ £» 



Inirtt obx Vkrn Cvcu writ Xxmem cXX* 
itt) r^«^«rf^«r Mv^euripv jmb) r«iw»t- 
r/«v ixirrawf «*f«|iri» ifAVfvrt ri 
*X.iot xxi ri IXMrrtv an^ya^ir4»9 t ri 
ft rn)ii M$a9i£tr»t. i yk^ ixi%tn 
tvv in, ph xQavirxtrt ri writ. xkX' 
XtLfxtrt %uri re xm ri ftfxr^in i* rn 
rov fiaXXn xai 9rr§9 xai ffffyx xai 
n^ifita Tt{a iyyuiata* avra, 1((U ravra 
Ix rnt xvtZv %*{at if f ittit. »it ya^ In 
h^fAtn^ot «&ft "^vxprit* Uraf &f Xa- 
fcitrt ri ir«r«f. *r{*X»p* ya^ xai »v 
ftint rn r% tt^irt^tf at) xai ro $»%£•- 
rtpf *eavr»s ri ft «r«rir Istm xai 
«*^07iv Wavear: xark in rwrtf rit 
X.iy»t AfTtspf ytyttir* at ri itytirtpf 
xai reitatrUf £fta.-—fOf fiitru SJ^u, 
rm rw xtrttpv tyuwuts t\ rtvrt it%ifttfa 
rnfitZtf i — I1PX1. ri x»l»t ftt Xtyut \ 
2X1. #r#/ ** nptf Qaimrai pmXXit rt 
xai tirrtf yiyfifttta, xai ri ap/ifa xa) 
n^ifta ft^f/MiMt xai ri kiaf, xai tea 
ruavr 2 rat* a, ut ri rw awtipv yvt* 
it *U Xt if? watra ravra rtHtat. — tvxwt 
rk ph 3i;g0fMN» ravra, rwrtt ft rk 
itatria *a\ra }t%Ofitta, «£*r»» ftXt ri 
Iwwt xai Irirnra, ptrk ft ri trvt ri 
itrkaewt, xai wat « ri «•«• At r^i* 
a\t$fMt apt/At % [Atrpt J *-(0f pirpt, 
ravra \vpxatra ut ro a-i^at droXtyi- 
&pif*, xakSt At o*tx»7fMt fyat rwr: 
Phileb. p. 24. 



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INTRODUCTION. 



393 



themselves, and nothing generated (fj yeyevqp'vi} ovtria) can 
be produced, except by operation of the finite upon the 
infinite, hence arises the necessity of their union (to £ujei- 
jxioyo/xfvov), by which the opponent qualities of the infi- 
nite are reduced to harmony and concord 6 . And by 
this union all that is excellent in nature or art is pro- 
duced. (Tim. p. 27. c.) But since the Chief Good is that 
which is perfect and symmetrical (to (xergw or to £v/ijxergov 
xai xaAov xa) reXfioy), it is evident that if Pleasure be in- 
definite it cannot be the Chief Good; but that such is 
Pleasure is evident from the fact admitted by its greatest 
admirers, that it may be infinitely increased or diminished 
without its essence being destroyed d . And such is the 
nature of the infinite ; thus you may add to a heap of 
earth or subtract from it ad infinitum, and still it remains 



c 2 A. fsfuirtatt \<phyy4fAii«, tut on 
Wov rt xa) $o%{irspt.—*r* t *r1ts 3* 

£(f£#rf£«» xa) uyprtpt avr»t<, xa) trXitt 
xa) iXarw, xa) farm tea,) fyaZurtpt, 
xa) fu7{*t xa) epsxt&ript , xa) i*'o*a it 
rt} trprftt rns ri aaXXdt rs xa) jrcM 
hatpins irifs/tst tit tt Qv*ut$. IIP A. 
rnt rtv a*fti{*tt Xiyut ; 2ft. tai. gipt- 
utytv 32 yt tit ahrnt re utra raura 
riit aS rtu ai^artf yittat. — IIP XI. 
•rtiat ami *•*# Xiyut ; XA. rht red 
faov ami otTXaritv, ami Wi*n trauu a**it 
a'XXnXa ratatria haQqmf i%etra, \va~ 
utrta ot **) \vpQ*>ta itfura dfifpif 
mtneydZtrai. IIPA. part aim* *)aittt 
ya{ u*i Xiyut, fuytus raura yttumt 
mas ty' Umtm avrSt Zaft&atntt.—- 
XA. if tux it pit pi fen « rturttt fyfn 
xtttmtla rht uyttiae (purs* lyittntit \ — 
it o\ a%tt xa) QattT xa) ra%t7 no) f&taoti 
artist tint, if tu raura iyyiytiptta 
ra aura 3. pa <rif«* rt it u^y afet.ro, xal 
poufixht \(tp*aaat rtXttirara \utt*r%- 
car* ; — »a) ph* h yt x**/**** 1 *** 
*rtiyt*i9 iyytttpitn re pit Xiat xa) 
&rti(»t aQuXsr; ri el ipptrpt xal 
Sua \ipp%r»et dwutyArart ;—#£**«> ix 
rturat £tai r» xa.) Ilea xaXa tratra 



hplt yiyttt, rSt n d*rtt{*t am rat 
«*»f »f i%itrt*t %ttftfu%4lfr*f ,—xa) MxXa 
yt oh pvfia IxrtXutr* Xiyat, tttt ptf 
uyttiat xaXXtf xa) ir%v*, xa) it ypu%a7$ 
aZ 9rdp«rtXXa Xrum xa) vrayxaXa. Phi- 
leb. p. 25. Then a little after, p. 26, he 
defines this third form of existence (ro 
\uppi*yiptttt in these words: rttrtt 
Qatt pt Xiyut U rture rtfitfa ri rsurav 
Ixynot &*at, y'itfn $}$ ctwiav Ix rat 
utra rw a^art a*U£ya*uU*i u-irp/t, 
a generation into essence, or an essence 
generated from measures, or things ren- 
dered definite (pir***) by means of the 
finite (tri^ares). The infinite and 
chaotic mass is rendered fixed by the 
finite, and the essence produced by 
this action is the ri \vs%ai9ya\*n. 

* XA. hhth xa) Xu\rn «*({«; ?*;*t#», 
n rat ri uaXXit n xa) Hrrtt o*tx»pit»v 
la-rot \ 4>I. tai, rat re uaXXtt, Z 
H*x{artf. oh ya^ At Hoeth vat ayati* 
fa, %l ah fattest \rvy%an •tsfvxit xa) 
m-Xitu xa) rtf uaXXit. Phil. p. 28. 
fiiovh ivu^if rt aurh xa) r§v »$rs «^t»» 
ftnrt u\*a ftnrt riXet *<p* laureH it 
\aurif i%$tr*t, pnet Vgsvrif rtrt, yitevg. 
lb. p. 31. 



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394 INTRODUCTION. 

a heap of earth : but if you form a foot-measure you can 
neither add to nor subtract from it without destroying its 
essence. Pleasure therefore cannot be the Chief Goods nor 
yet desirable at all without the admixture of the finite 
wisdom (the Qginp* of Aristotle p. 402.) to govern and 
direct it. And as in the universe the Supreme Intelligence 
(voOf fict(nXsv$y rules over all, directing and uniting the finite 
and the infinite, so in man it attempers the union of plea- 
sure and wisdom, directing all things according to the 
Ideal Good, which alone can render life completely happy. 
In the contemplation therefore of the' Ideal Good, and 
not in pleasure, consists the real happiness of man ; but of 
its full and perfect contemplation none are capable except 
God, and those who resemble him; consequently, the great 
object and happiness of this life is to direct our efforts to 
the imitation of God, to return to that bright and pure 
state in which we were placed before our union with the 
body. In this Aristotle joins issue with Plato, arriving at 
a similar result, although by a different process. For 
having shown that the greatest pleasure results from the 
most perfect energies, and the most perfect energies from 
the exercise of the noblest faculties on the noblest object- 
matter, that that noblest faculty is voti$, and the noblest 
object-matter the particular object of vov$> it follows that 
from its energies we must derive the greatest pleasures* 
And this is not the only result, but its energies constitute 

• Pleasure absolutely speaking is not Xvm? thm, r*» V tit r*» avrin eUUtt 
a good at all. For unless the harmony tf/», raumt T ml xmXtf rfr «M^«rif 
naturally produced by the finite united *i»r«», rilow. ib. p. 32. 
with the infinite be first broken pleasure f Plato proves that u»t is that which 
cannot be produced. So that the very applies the finite to the infinite (plea- 
existence of pleasure must presuppose sure) from the analogy of the divine 
a pain, kiy* veUtn vns *{fi»*i*s ftif mind. For as the divine mind rules 
Xvtfiirns nfu* i» r«f ?««* dp* \(m* *m and moderates all things in heaven 
fvru* mm) yintn dXytittww U rtf rirt and earth, (tw$ ier) fimetXufs ffpur 
yiytt*t*i xqntf.—nmk M Kiyf ****u t1 tu^mttu «i *«) yns p. 28.) so does the 
#-«* pir£t$s i X*yt,*s A* <pn *) I* r$u mind of man, which is part of that 
iwtipv xm) *'%£** »e nark Q»*n lfi^v%m divine mind, rule the body, which is a 
ytycrif ift«, Z*i{ Ikiyw b rtf wpdvt, compound of the same elements as 
7<r»? ftuf rtSrc fhipiriu c&t fdv H»?»f the universe. 



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INTRODUCTION. 395 

our greatest happiness. For since Happiness is the most 
perfect energy {htgytla xor £grri)v ogjorijv), and the energies 
of vov$ most perfect, they also constitute the greatest hap- 
piness; so that from the greatest happiness essentially 
results the greatest pleasures, and the converse. Is it 
then needful to exhort mankind to cultivate these ener- 
gies, to live according to vocfc, to imitate the gods and study 
to live like them (for they only can exercise the energies 
of vou;) 9 thus at the same time ensuring our own happiness 
by such a mode of life, and ensuring their favour from 
most resembling themselves, Zjmioi ofy rhv HfMiov ? 

But yet since man is a compound being possessing a 
moral as well as an intellectual nature, to complete his 
happiness he must possess in perfection the energies and 
virtues of that inferior nature, as well as of the higher and 
more divine ; and consequently since these energies are for 
the most part external acts dependent upon external 
means, he must possess to a certain degree both means 
and objects for the performance of those acts : which shows 
not only that this class of energies are essentially inferior 
to the theoretical as being less independent, and less pos- 
sessing those qualities which we invariably attach to Hap- 
piness, but also that they are less adapted to a perfect 
state of existence, such as we attribute to immortal beings. 
Yet at the same time they are not so dependent upon 
external means as some seem ready to imagine. 06 pqv 
otyreov ye woWa>v x«l fteyoAeov 8«^<rwfl«* tov ev$*ifx,ovr)<TOVT<x, el 
fj.yj Mineral iveo t»v exrog ayetiwv fjuxxagiov elvar 06 yoip hy tjJ 
ursg/3oXjj to" otvrotgxes 008* ^ *p*&$i SvvotTOV 8i xeti /m) u^ovtol 
yyg xa) JoAamjf trgirrnv roL xa\&' xou yeig am fierQicov Suvair 
aEv Tl$ WQ&TTUV xaroL T^v ocgeTrjv (p. 435.). 

Having thus concluded the argument, and reverted to 
the same position from which we started, we may now sub- 
stitute in our definition of Happiness what was obscure. 
We have learnt what virtue is and what are the best 
virtues. If, then, those virtues be trofiot and f govri<n$ (in- 
cluding moral virtue in pglvqo-i;), the Happiness of man 
will be the energies resulting from the exercise of those 
habits. 



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ARISTOTELIS 
ETHICA NICOMACHEA. 

LIB. X. 

CHAP. I. 

The consideration of Pleasure necessary from two causes : from its 
own intrinsic importance ; from the designed or undesigned errors 
of those who have treated upon it. 

META 8e ravra irepl r)8ovrj9 7cra? eirerou The neces- 
SuXdelv' fiakiara yap 8ok€l avvcpKemaOai r$> considera- 
y*v€t rjpucov oio Tratoevovo-t rovs veovs OLauaQovres from the 

** ~ \ x > * ~ ** v * * „ importance 

rjOOVrj KCU AV7Tg. OOK€t 0€ Kai TrpOS TT)V TOV of Pleasure 
- v/i > \ / 9 v / « * «in itself. 

brjuovs aperrjv /xey icrrov etvat to yaiptiv 019 oei 
kcu fuaeiv a Set* Siaretvei yap ravra 8ta iravros 
rod filov, poirrfv expvra kcu Svi/a/juv 7rpo? aperr/v 



1. /ura % ravra] The connexion 
of this with the other parts of this 
Treatise will be seen at p. 295. 

— U»i] The Greek Scholiast thinks 
that this word has been used by Aris- 
totle not merely as expressive of the 
diffidence with which he always pro- 
poses his opinions, but likewise from 
this consideration. If pleasure be a 
part of virtue, as we cannot know the 
whole without knowing first each of 
the parts, it is requisite that we should 



now consider pleasure ; if, however, it 
be only accidental to virtue it would 
not be requisite, it would only perhaps 
be requisite to consider it. Only per- 
haps, because as the accidentia are 
never included in the definition, and 
the definition expresses the whole of a 
thing, it is plain that we may know 
the whole without the accidentia, con- 
sequently we might know what vir- 
tue is without knowing what pleasure 



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898 ARISTOTELIS 

re kcu tov cvSaifiova fitov' to /lev yap rj8ea 
And from ir pocupovvrcu, to fie Xxmripa (bevyovatv. C Y7T€/) 

the errors of . ^ , *»**/> r 9 

others con- 0€ TG)V TOIOVTCDV TjKlOT OV OOg€t€ 7Tap€T€0V €IV0U, 

I Of those aXAfi)? T€ KCU 7T0XXtJV €)(OVT(OV afl<f)lO'f}r)TT}0'lV. 

it the Chief oi /lev yap TayaBov rjSovrjv Xcyovatv, 01 & €^6 
it of those evawia? KOfiLorf (pavXov 9 01 fitv cam ireireurixevoi 

who called ^ N „ t N , , , 9 N 

it entirely OITO) Kai ej(€lV, 01 06 0t0fl€V0L peATlOV €lVat TTpoS 

tov fiiov rjpxov airo(f)aiv€LV ttjv rjSovrjv t£>v (f>av- 
Xa>v, kcu €i fir} ecrrlv* peirccv yap tovs 7roXAovs 
irpo9 avnjv kcu SovXeveiv reus r)8ovcu$ y 8tb 8eiv\o 
€ 9 i9 Tovvavriov ayeiv' iXdeiv yap av ovtcos hrt 

The evil TO uicTOV. Mw 7TOT€ h\ OV KoAcO? TOVTO 

conse- 
quences of Xeyerai. oi yap irepl t£>v iv T019 iraOeat kcu 
such mis- ,- , , % N « v 

represent*- TCU9 TTpa^CL AOyOL TjTTOV CtCL 7TLOT01 TCOV €py(OV 

orrav oiv SuKfxovaxrt T019 Kara Tqv cuaOrio'Lv,\b 
Kara(f>popovfi€POt kcu raXrfOes irpoouvcupovaiv* 6 
yap yfreycDP ttjv rjSovrjv 9 6(f>0€L9 iror ecpufievo?, 
aTTOKXiveiv Sokcl irpbs avrr)v coy TOtavrrjv oiaav 
airaaav* to Sioptfieiv yap ovk cot* t&v ttoKKsdv. 
€oIk(ktlv oiv ol aXr/dels tG>v Xoycov ov fiovov 20 
irpbs to elSevat yprjaifiuiTaToi ^cu 9 aXXa kcu 
irpo9 tov fiiov* avv<p8ol yap owes tois epyois 



4. A^r£*W«] After this word the Politics, i. 1. (p. 4. Ed. Goet.) 
Eustratius supplies rm *i() vd> Ejfrg#y. 12. pif «■•« ft #v] But surely they 

5. rky*Sii\ That is, Eudoxus, who do not well, or I question whether they 
said that pleasure was the specific do well in making such an assertion, 
cause and principle of all good. Just A gentle way of expressing a negative, 
in the same way as the Platonists in- and when attended with a subjunctive 
troduced their doctrine of the idea, and mood expressing a doubt in the mind 
affirmed, that the mwmyiit was the of the speaker. Had it been •» p* 
only good, and the specific principle r«ri, it would have implied, they 
(iftjft* i(xn) of all other goods. certainly do not, I am positive they 

8* rm $«u\m] Irrational crea- do not well, 6)c. 
tures, creatures inferior to man. See 



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ETHICORUM LIB. X. «. 



899 



TnoTCvovrcuy 8lo Trporpeirovrax tow tjuvUvras (flV 
tear avTOv?. t£>v filv oiv roiovrtov a\t,9, ra 8* 
elpTjfieva 7T€/u rrjs rjSoinjs eiriXOcofiev. 



CHAP. II. 

The opinion of Eudozus and Plato, concerning Pleasure, refuted — 
that Pleasure is not the Chief Good — that it is not all to be sought 
nor all avoided — that it differs in species, or in those things from 
which it is derived. 

2 EYAOSOS /jl€v oiv ttjv tjSop^v rayaJQov cper Thcargu- 

_? * \ \ //j>t~ i # f »~ N mentsof 

bavcu out to iravo opav ecptefxeva aim)?, /ecu Eudoxus to 



4. e514*s] Of the tenets of 
Eudoxus on this subject, little else 
is known than what is here mentioned 
by Aristotle. He was the son of 
^schines and born at Cnidos: and 
was celebrated for his knowledge of 
legislation, physic, and geometry, in 
which latter science he had the cele- 
brated Archytas for his master. At 
the age of twenty-three, although in 
great poverty, he was so struck with 
the feme of Socrates, that he resolved 
to take a journey to Athens in order to 
become his hearer: and afterwards 
studied under Plato, whom he ac- 
companied into Egypt. Although 
none of his writings remain, he is 
said to have composed treatises upon 
various subjects: upon astronomy, 
geometry, and medicine. He was so 
ardent an admirer of the first of these 
sciences, as to have wished that he 
might share the fate of Phaeton, pro- 
vided that he might have the oppor- 
tunity of as closely inspecting the sun, 
and discovering its form and magni- 
tude. See Diog. Laert. viii. $. 86—91. 
and Menag. ibid. See also Plutarch, 



Non posse s. v. secund. Epicuram. 
Vol. ziv. p. 99. Hutten. 

— rkyuSif] It was usual among 
the Platonists to designate what they 
termed the tp§cific principle (•#*«•<»* 
AfX<0 by the prefix of the letter (r) 
or the word abri: meaning thereby to 
express the very thing itself, the *M 
rwr; from that which was only acci- 
dentally such. Thus by the word 
raurayuih or rkymtl* they meant 
that which wan solely and primarily 
iymiif, whereas all other things, such 
as m«v, ^t>xn, Wsrrtftti &c. were 
called by them kymik but not rkytJm, 
as partaking only of the quality of the 
rkyiit. And according to Eudoxus, 
who had been a disciple of Plato, 
pleasure was not &yuih but rkyiii. 

The Platonists used also these words 
in a particular sense, avnit, mur^mt, 
abrtiv. By the word muvAt they un- 
derstood the principle or Aggft of units, 
(?m»») and monades: making a dis- 
tinction between this and other units. 
The fyx$ of all things they termed 
amir mvTtayuiiv or r&ymi&t. But 
the *vtAv they called the Afx* of all 



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400 



ARISTOTELIS 



prove that 
Pleasure is 
the Chief 
Good. 
1. Because 
all things 
aimed at it 



cAXoya Kal aXoya' kv ttBxti 8* elvou to ouperov 

€7TL€LK€9 9 KCU TO fJboAlOrTa KpOLTlOTOV' TO Stf ITOLVT 



things, (tratrttt rm Srrmt), which was 
subsequent to «fovfy. For the *vr*U 
was first of all things, then the *in-*i*. 
next the «fo?»ff, and finally the mvrt- 
?Wv. (See the Scholiast.) 

Now Eudoxus thought that pleasure 
was the chief good, rkymiit, for if that 
which is aimed at is a good, that which 
is most aimed at is the greatest good, 
and pleasure is the most aimed at, and 
therefore it is the greatest good. 

2dly. That which is opposite to the 
greatest evil, is the greatest good; 
pleasure is opposed to the greatest evil 
(pain) ; and therefore, pleasure is the 
greatest good. 

3dly. Pleasure is sought entirely 
for its own sake, is ultimate and per- 
feet, and consequently is the chief good. 

4thly. That which when added to 
every other good makes that good 
more eligible is r&ymJir. 

Pleasure added to any other good 
makes it more eligible ; 

Consequently pleasure is rkymih. 
♦ Eudoxus confirmed his major pre- 
mise, by saying that good could only 
be made more eligible by the addition 
of its own essence, {mvrh »*r*.) That 
the i(x* '{""i or rkymin was the 
only thing which when added to every 
other good made it more eligible, since 
that alone could be congenerous with 
all goods, as being the source from 
which they derived their essence. But 
this argument, as Aristotle shows, is not 
conclusive : for though pleasure added 
toigivjwr makes tyiniw more eligible, 
it is not because the essence of fpnws 
is increased or altered, but because it 
is the addition of one good to another, 
and two goods are better than one. 
And by the same argument Plato 



overturned the conclusion of Eudoxus : 
for he says, 

If good can only be made greater 
by the addition of its own essence, 
the chief good, as embracing the 
essence of all other goods, cannot 
be increased; and consequently 
if nloth be the ritymiU it cannot 
be improved by the addition of 
any other good ; 
But it is increased by the addition 
of some other good (e. g. pleasure 
with Qprnw* is better than plea- 
sure without) ; and therefore, 
Pleasure is not r&yeJat. 
Yet some have doubted, from the 
inconclusiveness of these arguments of 
Eudoxus, whether he intended to 
prove that pleasure is a good or the 
chief good. But that he rather in- 
tended to prove that pleasure was the 
chief good can scarcely be doubted, 
both from the first objection of Plato 
and from the conclusion of this Chap- 
ter, more particularly the last lines of 
it, in which Aristotle thus sums up the 
argument: in f*\t tut »Sn rkymh* ft 
jf3«Mt »Srt wme* «/{in$. ftfXo faxsr 
iTww, tcai trt tlvi ring «Mgir«) %mf 
mvroif. p. 411. Here then are three 
opinions : 

1. That of Eudoxus, that pleasure 
is the chief good, and essentially good, 
and that all pleasures are good. In 
which latter opinion he was supported 
by the Sophists. Compare the Gorgias 
of Plato, p. 495. Sfl. «••«£»» fjf 
I/mm ro mitri rHv »«) aymJit, *} iW 
ri rSv rHUtt i §vx trrtf itymiit i KAA. 
— ri rn.hr % Qnfu iTmu. 

2. The doctrine of Plato, who denied 
that any pleasure was a good. This 
is also questioned by some, whether 



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ETHICORUM LIB. X. 9>. 401 

iirl tclvto <j)€p€(rdou /JLT/vveiv ©$• 7racri tovto apt- 
arov* €kolotov yap to avr<p ayaOov €vplaK€iv> 
(oa7rep kcu rpo(f)7jj/ m to 8r/ iraaiv ayaBov, teal ou 
7ra.PT i(f)i€Tai, TayaOov eivai. €7rta'T€vovTO 5* ol 
&\oyot 8ta T7)v tov rjdovs aptTTjv pdXKov y Si 
auTOvs* 8ua<f>€povTG>9 yap eSotcei a(o(f>pcov elvat* 
ov 8rj d)9 <f)t\09 tt}9 rjSovrj? £8ok€i rai/ra XeyeiPy 

aAA* 0VT6D9 €\€IP KttT a\7J0€iaP. O^X ffTTOV 2. Because 

•*>*»* # v > ~ i f . > x it is the op- 

6 cper etvat (pavepov €K tov tvavriov rr/u ya/>po«teofthe 

_ _ N / /P « N ~ u. * 9 «/ *> g r «atest 

lOAV7rr}v Kaff avTO iraon (pevKTOV etvai, o/iouof or} evil. 
Tovvavriov aiptTov. MaAzcrra 8 elvai auperov 3. Sought 

O /il) 01 €T€pOP flT/O €T€pOV X a P lV <UpOVfl€0a iuown 
TOIOVTOV 8 6/JLO\oyOVfl€VCDS UVOL TTjV TjBoprjV* 

ovdeva yap brcpayrav twos evctca rjSeTaty a>9 Kaff 
IbavTTjv odaav alpeTtjv ttjj/ rjSovr/v. Upoo-TtOe/ie- 4. All other 

« ~ ~ # 4~ « / - goods are 

V7JV T€ OTtpOVV TOW ayaUCDV aip€T(OT€pOV 7TOl€lV 9 essentially 

T~ ^ v , v v c. improved 

op T<p oiKaioTrpayeiv tcai acocppoveiv /cat avge-byit. 

(T0CU Stj TO aytfBoV aVTO aVT<p. "E<U/C€ 8rj Objection 

*■ / « x ' » /l ~ > > » * f *° tn * s ar " 

OVT09 y€ o Aoyof tcov ayauo)v avrqv a7ro<paiv€ip 9 ^mtnt 

^^n * ** ~\\ « ' • ~ * /*«' urged by 

SOjCtU OL>0€J> flOLAAOV €T€pOV TTaV yap fl€U 6T6/PCW Plato. 



Plato did exclude all pleasure from the mid way between the two, that 

the class of good. But this seems some pleasures are good and some are 

certain : for good is placed by him in not. Or perhaps more correctly, that 

the category of «fci'«, (whether this pleasures are essentially good, but 

term be understood in its logical sense some accidentally evil. 

or as implying the ideal, will not — r$ ft «£#/» mymiif] Compare 

signify,) pleasure in that of relation p. 4. 1 . 

(y»»i#ii). Compare also his own 11. /U)u*t* T iTmm «J£i*fo] See 

words. SA. £g* #vv tf#vrf yt tfrif Cic. de Fin. i. 12. 

yittrif l*r tt, tig eixxrtf ft rh rw *yui$v 18. «»ri *yryj Although the text is 

(Utptt *M>t rtfipTtg ItfSt tfffttvi undoubtedly correct, and it will amount 

IIPXl. ifiirmrm fAt •h. Philebus, to the same, nevertheless I think the 

p. 54. See the whole argument. See argument would be clearer if with the 

also p. 226. 1. n. of this treatise. Greek Scholiast we were to read aurf 

3. The opinion of Aristotle striking for *vry. se. fihttj. 

»d 



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408 



ARISTOTELIS 



70V aipert&rtpov 17 puovovputvov. toiovtc* or} 
\oy<p kcu YlXarwv avaipci oti ovk iortv rfhovrf 
TayaBov* alperdrrepov yap elvat top rfivv ftlov 
putra <f>poirr)<rcw i/ xwpts, ei Se to fiucrov KpeiT- 
TOVj ovk elvcu TffP tJSoptjp ToyaBbv* ovSevo? yaps 
irpooTcOevroe clvto TayaBbv cuper&repop ylptaQcu. 
$7j\oy & w ovtf aXXo ovdep TayaBov ov eaj, b 
fiera tipos t5>v ko£? avro ayaB&v cupsrcrrepov 
yiverai. Tt ohv earl toiovtov, ov teal y/ieT? 

The objec- KOLPG>POVfJL€P ; TOIOVTOP yap £iri{fJT€LTai. Oi 8 10 

fintargu. ivUTTaUL€VOl G>$ OVK ayaBoV oS TTOLPT i(bl€TOl 9 

went of ^ ' y 



2. lUufro] See the Philebus, 
p. 21. sq. 

— TlXmrvf] See the PhUebus, 
p. 60. 3X1. **•*• mm) r«fc . . . 4p7» if 
\n*pri*yur%\ IlPXi. r* *fm\ XXI. 
r*)9 rmym0§v faf f{Uf Qv*n rtfli mmXX§9 
«w» iXX*f. TJPX1. r*9t; XXI. f •tm^un 
rwr* mi) rSn {mm Wm riX$mt trmtrmf 
mm) rmrrti, ptihtif \ripv wr\ In wpr~ 
luttmt, r% \% immiih nXtmrmrtf 1%U9' 
•v%»8riH't HP A. •urm pit •»». XXI. 
§ituut rtf Xiym Xwu^minmu X"0* l**rf- 
£«v \%*%lt$v titrtf iif rii fibt \mm*rm t 
fyunr§9 fdt fariit $(0tnru, Q*Un*n ft 
nktn< Umvrm p*tt ri *u4**irmr»t 
t%*v*»9i—t! M y% vatnfixhp** rt 
rirt, tuf Urnw* IwmpmX mfi m iftirtpp 
it* Ar*, ptnpnt mm) Wttrnpm mm) 
fyiftirtr mm) mXntn )jg«» rnt murms 
'Ufa rJiutut, »•) «!«••• tf ra &n» 
r»vrm9 MLmtr* if •) *•) iruin Jmm 4 
urn) yiyntim, ph t*» In y* hhw, 
%lf mg wXiimf iff •* e$»l{T*rnt, 
•4 pin AkniSt }*&{* x*/{to, f^nrt 
T$**t£vat ytyf»**4i ri «••« tritrttf* 
9tA$»s t pnr au pnifuit rtu tuitvi ft*fr 
Irrnwt Xt* f9f ^X* 1 - r*ur* \iyi tuu 
rt^i Q{0tn*t*<, i7 Ttt tk*w wtUnt #**< 
»«2 rm $£*xtnr&rrH Wfatr Sit ftiftmt 



1%U* p2\X*t n fUTM TIP** jfotoW, 4 

rdrttf OUpmg x*4* fp*n*u*s (tM\X*f n 
fittrm, p^vmnmt mZ mif. — •hiUin ri yt 
riXto* umi wmftv «^tr#» mmi ri t«m(- 
varn kytUh •V&rtp* at vtvrttw un. 
See also p. 21. of the same dialogue. 

8. r# ifo Ur) ruArn] »J ft iymSn 
umi r«Mvr#v kymiii, tZ mm} npus *«mw- 
90VfM9 i iwM9 aymiti %Un mi m^irmi xm7 
mi 9Wi*Ttif»msi **** yrn^ mprh m? 
ifurrnpn fuf fatiw mt^trmri^m rns 
avtilifv. rh ft tmvt§9 yrn^ W^nrurmt, 
rmurif Wri ry, wig} rmi *u&vrm9 yk^ 
myrnimv mt mmt npus »mmwm«^»i» Ivrt^nru 
i Xfytt, it r»trm9 ri l#n» if faff, u§9 
xirtp* f) 4l«tii emfpffon Writ, *) i»- 
Ipi*. 4 $titn*H, H rit rmt Irtfrnfutf. 
Schol. 

10. $i T hurmftiw} Eudozus had 
aaBerted, that that which all things aim 
at is a good, and consequently that 
pleasure being more aimed at than any 
thing else is the greatest good. To this 
reasoning Plato objected, saying, that 
it did not necessarily follow that that 
was a good at which all things aimed* 
For as the tastes of mankind are cor- 
rupted, they generally seek after the 
apparent and not the real good. The 



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ETHICORUM LIB. X. 2. 



403 



firf ovOev XeyGxriv' o yap Tract Sokci, tout elvai Eudoxx*, 

■ «£»>« f \ t i f and Aris- 

<pa/jL€v. o 6 avaipcov raimpr rr/u iriamv ov 7ra*w totie's reply 

/ j ~. » \ \ \ m f i/ to that ob- 

TTurroTepa epet et \x*v yap ra avorjra copeyerajection. 

avT&Vy tjv av ri to Xcyifievov, el 8c kcu ra 

5 <f>povtfia 9 7ra>9 Xeyouv av ri ; icco? 8* *al iv 

t6l9 <j)avXoi? icrri n (pvatKOP ayaBov Kpeirrov 

7/ Kaff avrd, b i<j>t€rai rov ottcclov ayaSov. Ovk Objection 

cotKe 8e ovSe irepX rod ivavriov tcaXw ^cyea&at. cond argu- 
ment of 



appetites of animals are without rea- 
son and judgment, and therefore can 
afford no criterion upon this subject. 
Against these remarks of the Platonists, 
Aristotle brings two objections. If 
only bad men and brutes sought plea- 
sure as a good, then, he says, this 
argument would be of some weight; 
but as the wise and the good seek it as 
well as the bad and the foolish, it is 
not conclusive, it avails nothing to the 
proof that pleasure is not a good. 
Nay, even granting the assumption, 
that only the irrational and brutes 
seek it, yet as they do it from a natural 
impulse, it is plain that there is some 
good in pleasure, for all natural im- 
pulses are to good. See p. 303, 1 1. n. 
and Butler's Analogy, i. 2. 

4. »i to ma) r* $&(**} This re- 
mark is probably aimed against Plato's 
doctrine in the Philebus, who con- 
siders the life of the wise (if Qfrtpu) 
to be a state removed beyond the reach 
of pleasure or pain ; from the influences 
of which he is exempt as are the Gods, 
though not in the same degree. 2fl. 
•h**vt Urt Ti$ rtfr* ifUh 4 rmmvrti 
hdftftt «r«£« «? rtip r«v go/prr* x«2 
«*«£« rkt rw k»w*»ftif§»i IIPXl. ri 
pfo i— XXI. rSf rh rtS ft§ni!t IXipiitf 
(tin #J#/ if r$vrt rit r(/r«» §iitow 
kw$%*\vu $*t. IIPXl. <rbp top ftii %mi- 
ptt ftnVt AvtruWoj Xiyw ; III, \^Mn 



yfy «*•» rtfVi It +n fl , «{«0«Xjr +2* 0wi 
ftntof h7i pfci piyet pfoi vfumpf #«/- 
(Ut rf rit rov tatTt »*) fytnit fiUt 
\\eft,iff.—*l%»vt »8r*t &* Ur/vf yt 
wraffif km) U*< #v&» &rmt %l wdt- 
rmt rSt fiivt trr) 4uir*r§g. Philebus, 
p. 33. And this was consequent upon 
his theory of pleasure. For pain and 
pleasure he considered to be both evil, 
both extremes, but that the real and 
natural state was that of quiescence, 
a middle state equally removed from 
both. See the exquisite passage in 
the Republic, p. 585. sq. 

6. fvrt*ot ky*4L*) Compare p. 
304, 9. 

7. $v* Ui*t] EudoxuB had en- 
deavoured to prove, by the following 
argument, that pleasure is the greatest 
good: 

Whatever is opposed to the greatest 
evil is the greatest good ; 

Pleasure is opposed to the greatest 
evil (pain) ; and therefore it is 
the greatest good. 

He endeavoured to prove that pain 
is the greatest evil by a similar kind of 
argument, as that by which he proved 
that pleasure is the greatest good j for 
if that which is sought for is a good, 
that which is avoided is an evil, and 
Aat which is most avoided is the 
greatest evil. This argument was af- 
terwards adopted by the Epicureans: 

(12 



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404 



ARISTOTELIS 



Eudoxu*, 
and Aris- 
totle's re- 
ply. 



Plato's first 

argument 

against 

pleasure, 

refuted. 

His second, 
also, that it 



ov yap (f)acrLi>, el r) Xvrrq kolkov £ort 9 ttjv r)8ovr)v 
ayafiov eluai' awLKeUrOax yap kcu kolkov /ca/ccp 
kolL apxfxo t$ fxrjScTepcpy Xeyovres ravra ov kclkS>9, 
ov firjp kiri ye r&v elprjfievcDV afcqdevovres. afi(f>olv 
fiev yap ovrcov kokcov kcu (f)€VKra e8et dfi(f>co elvcu^b 
t£>v /ir/Sereptop 8c pqhenpov rj 6/xotW" vvv 8c 
(f>alvoprat rr)v pkv (ftcvyovrcs a>$ KaKov 9 rr/v & 
aipovfjievoi an ayaBov' ovra> 8r) kcu avriKCLTai. 
Ov fir/v ov& cl fir) r&v 7roiorryra)p corlv r) r)8opr/ 9 
8ia row ov8c r£>v ayaBS>v" ov8c yap al 777? 10 
aperrfs evepyeuu TroioTtyres claiv 9 ov& r) cv8cu- 
fjLOvta. Aeyovat 8c to pjcv ayaBov a>pia0ai 9 



see it set forth and refuted in Cic de 
Fin. i. 9. sq. 

To this syllogism it was objected 
by Plato, (see Repub. ix. in init and 
Philebus, p. 33. sq.) as well as by 
Speusippus his successor, (see above 
p. 301, 19. n.) that the major is 
not universally true, for evil is opposed 
to evil as well as to good, as extremes 
to extremes as well as to the mean ; 
that pleasure is opposed to pain not 
as a mean to an extreme, but as an 
extreme to an extreme, and conse- 
quently both are evil. To this Aris- 
totle replies, that if this reasoning be 
true, if both be extremes, then both 
Would be objects of avoidance, whereas 
pain only is an object of avoidance, 
pleasure is not ; therefore as far as this 
objection is concerned, the argument 
of Eudoxus remains in its full force. 
See p. 301, 15. 

9. rwreVw*] Aristotle now pro- 
ceeds to examine and refute the argu- 
ments of the Platonists and others 
against pleasure. Their first reason' 
was, that all goods are qualities, but 
that pleasure was not a quality, and 



consequently not a good. To this he 
replies by denying the major, by show- 
ing that there are many goods, such as 
the energies of virtue, which are good 
and yet are not qualities. The reason 
for asserting that all goods are quali- 
ties, arose from their placing all good 
and evil in that category. But whe- 
ther Plato was the author of this doc- 
trine, it is difficult to determine. But 
if so, we must separate from this num- 
ber Plato's ideal Good. 

12. \%yt>0t It J This second argument 
of the Platonists against pleasure will 
be more clearly seen by stating it at 
full length, and in a syllogistic form : 

Whatever admits of more and less 
is indefinite ; 

Pleasure admits of more and less ; 
therefore 

Pleasure is indefinite. 

Whatever is indefinite is an evil ; 

Pleasure therefore is an evil;— is 
not a good. 

For the proof of the major premise 
of both syllogisms, Plato referred to 
the n*r*%im of the Pythagoreans. 
See p. 17, 7. note, and p. 382, 5. 



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ETHICORUM LIB: X. 2. 



405 



rrjv 5* rj&ovrjv uopurrov elvou, oti Several to»uwW>- 
/xaXAoi/ /cat ro iyrrov. et ficv ovv etc rov rjotaOai 

TOVTO KpLvOVClj KOU 7T€p\ TTfV 8lKOA.OOVVt)V KOU TOS 

aXXas aperd?, Kaff ay evapytos (f>aai paXXou kou 
bifrrov rovs iroiovs imapytiv Kara ras aperas, 
carat to avro' SUcuot yap eiai pJSXXov kou 
avSpciot, €<tti 8e kou 8iKouo7rpayetv kou aaxfrpor 
vtiv pfiXkov kou fyrrov. Et 8 iv tolls r/Sovals, pJ) 2 » 
7tot ov Xtyovai to a1riov y av axriv at pev apuytvs 

10 at 8e pxKTaL Ti yap KcoXvei, KaOairep vyleia 
oypcapemj ofiaa 8e\€Tou to fxaXXov kou to ?jttov, 
ovtod /cat ttjv f)8ovr)P ; ov yap rj avrrj avppeTpta 
iv Traciv iarrtv, ovf? iv T<p avT$ pita tls aei 9 
aAA* avitpAvr) Sta/xevet ea>s twos, kou 8ta<f>€pei 

I5rg> puiXXov kou ?jttov. toiovtov 8rj kou to wepl 



To both of these Aristotle objects. 
In the first place, he says, if from 
seeing men more or less pleased they 
infer that pleasure admits of more and 
less, and is consequently indefinite, by 
the same principle virtue is indefinite, 
because men are more and less vir- 
tuous, and consequently the major 
proposition of the second syllogism, 
that whatever is indefinite is an evil, 
is not true. 

2. But if they draw this inference from 
the consideration of pleasure in itself, 
then it is by no means universally true 
that pleasure admits of more and less. 
It is only the mixed pleasures which 
differ in degree, and have an admix- 
ture of pain, the increase or diminution 
of which causes a variation in those 
pleasures. Just as in the case of health : 
health is something definite and deter- 
mined, yet is continually varying not 
only in different but likewise in the same 



persons : at one time the body is per- 
fectly free from sickness, at another 
time not; the health of the body is 
greater at one time, less at another ; and 
consequently the major premise of the 
first syllogism is not true. 

12. r9fifUT{M] Compare Theages 
de Virtutibus : Urutii m rn HH§t Aprm 
«tg} vJJtm, rSt % %rm0utt $l$rk mm) 
At/** v9t{T*ra, fmtipt %<ri #&* Iv rSf 
drigiXiWau rm «■#•« rns *fa>x** ****** 
««) kvrat m mprm trtwrmmtt, mXk* It rtf 
rttvra rptmfpdnrfmt. #w% yk{ by turn, 
i£*£«rf« r»t \w*m rSt r§2 v*pmr»s 
}vi*f*t*f, It rtf fatgiXfrfa ri ^v£gdv 
mm) ri it^t mm) ri vyfbt mm) rb £»f)i> 
<rf<rr«xi», mXX* \t rtf rmwrm tuymi^m** 
ifaeu,Urt ymt Mt rvp/MTflm *)§ rivrmt. 
Frag. Pythag. p. 33. See also Plato's 
Philebus, p. 26. n. Stallb. $. 42. 
And for the subsequent argument, the 
Philebus, p. 174. and Stallb. Introd. 
p. 56. 



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406 



ARISTOTELIS 



His third T7jV T}8oW)V €v8€Y€TOU €IV0U. TcAeiOV T€ TOyOL- 

argument, v \ * \ / \ * ' 

that plea- 0OV TIU€W€$> T0L9 0€ KlVr)<T€l$ KOU T0L9 y€P€iT€l9 

sure is a t ^ \ « * \ / \ / » 

»;wi#4f,re- arcAetr, ri7^ rjooirqv Kivrjatv Kai yevcaiv amo- 
tfyaivew weipcovrcu. ov koX&s & ioiKouri Xeyeiv 
ov& elvou KtPti<rip' irdoy yap oiiceiov elvat 8ok€l5 
ra\os kou PpaAvrr)?, kou el fir/ Kajff avrqv, olov 
rrj rod Koafiov, irpos aXAo' rjj 5* fjSovrj rovrtov 

ovhinpov v7rapx €L ' W^V^ ai ^ v Y**P * aTl ^ a X eGi>£ 
eiowep 6pytadrjvou 9 rjSeorOcu & ov, ovSe 71700s 
erepov, fiaHi^eiv 5e kou avi-eaOau Kai iravra ra 10 



1. rixuit vi vkyuib] This is the 
third argument of Plato against plea- 
sure : 

All motions and generations are 

imperfect ; 
All pleasure is a motion and a 
generation ; and consequently all 
pleasure is imperfect, and conse- 
quently not the chief good. (See 
p. 402.) 
To this reasoning Aristotle replies 
by confuting the minor premise. All 
motion, he says, is attended with quick- 
ness or slowness, but neither of them 
are compatible with pleasure. We 
may pass from a state of pain to plea- 
sure (nrtfami) either quickly or slowly, 
but when we are in the state (status or 
standing) of pleasure (#iW*/) it is ab- 
surd to say that we energize as to tjiat 
state quickly or slowly ; that, in other 
words, we stand in a state of pleasure 
quickly or slowly. 

I.rktli xtrnvv$—*ri\uf] The earlier 
philosophers, who were much puzzled 
to define motion, included it under the 
notion of inequality, alteration, non- 
entity (tig kwrirnr* **) Irifintr* ma) 
r> f*ti if rtfia*i t %rt JU^trrit rt hats 4 
«<W/f). This they probably derived 
from the Pythagoreans, in whose *w- 
rux'nt the inde6nite (fatten) and the 



moving (xiwJptiMv) are placed under 
the head of evil ; which probably is 
one reason why Plato was induced to 
consider motion and pleasure as an 
evil. 

Aristotle also himself acknowledges 
this difficulty. Compare Phys. Ausc. 
iii. 2. ifr-i »ifnvis Wi^yu* pit rtg i?mu 
h*u, artXbs &«. alrur 3* fa «nXtf ri 
Itnmrh tS l*rb Ui^yu* nivnns, nm) Ita 
r»vr$ $n £«&Mr«v aurht Xafrui ri Irrtt. 
See Simplicius, ibid. 

6. rdx*f »«* Qpttttrns] Compare 
Phys. Ausc. iv. 14. 0«M£o •« £«*«*«» 
pir«0#AJ}» *a) ***•*$ r« jum^emm* ittmyun 
anurias Iv X/&V' r * 7*t !****» **) 
/3g«3vrt£«» aara ***** Irrt *4T*fi4\*r. 

— oaf a&rfa— *pt iXX§\ Motus 
celer est et tardus vel per se et abso- 
lute, vel comparate *£s &UU. Per 
se in rebus quarum non est mquabilis 
motus, ut navis cursus nunc est tar- 
dior, nunc celerior ; item equi cursus, 
etc. Comparate, quo modo plerum- 
que motus intelligi solet, ut Solis cursus, 
cum Saturno comparatus est celer, 
cum Luna tardus, suapte' alioqui na- 
ture sequabilis. Caelum etiam ipsum 
cujus rotatio est squabilis et per se 
neque celera neque tarda, compara- 
tione tamen aliarum rerum ita dici 
potest. GIPH. 



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ETHICORUM LIB, X. 2. 



407 



TOiavra. fjL€Taj3a\Aciv /jlcv oiv €19 rrjp rj&ovrjv 
ra\4<o9 kcu fipaSeco? tcrriv^ iuepyelv 8e icar avrrjv 
ovk e<m ra\ewsy Xeyco 8 fjSecrOcu. T£ve<ri$ hu fourth 

* y * ~ \ > t ~ / argument, 

re 7rav cw €117 ; ooicct yap ovk €k tov tvxovtos that it U a 

_ \ n / /% *w* >f* 9 f > generation 

5 TO TV\OV ytyV€aff€U 9 OAA €£ OV ytyV€TCU> €W or repletion, 

tovto ScaXveadat. kcu oh yeveais -q rjSoinj, tovtov 
17 Xuirq (pOopd. kcu Xcyovai 8* tt)v pkv Xvirqv 
evSetav tov Kara (j>vatv el vac y vr/v 8 rjBoinjv 



3. yiufit ti r«f ] Aristotle now 
proceeds to refute the doctrine of 
Plato, that pleasure is a generation or 
progression (yiwtf). 

For every generation, he says, there 
must be that from which generation 
proceeds, and that in which it ends : 
and that from which it proceeds must 
virtually be of the same elements as 
the thing generated, possessing a power 
of producing something similar to itself j 
«b yk^ l» t»v rv%irr»t t1 rv%it yiyn- 
rtu. (Phys. Ausc. i. 4. sq.) 2ndly. 
Every thing generated is resolvable into 
that from which it was generated by the 
operation of a corruption (fS*(4) op- 
posed to its generation. If therefore 
pleasure were a generation, it must be 
a progression or change from some- 
thing determined into something deter- 
minate; but pleasure generates no- 
thing which is resolvable into the 
same elements from which it was 
generated. 

Further ; if it were a generation, 
some change must take place in some 
subject-matter which is virtually the 
same as that into which it changes. But 
pleasure produces no such effect in the 
subject-matter, nor is the effect pro- 
duced by pleasure similar to the sub- 
ject-matter from which it was pro- 
duced. 

Finally, pleasure is not resolvable 
into any thing similar to itself, but into 



pain which is its opposite. 

II. If pleasure were a generation, 
pain a corruption, then what was gene- 
rated by pleasure would be corrupted 
by pain, and the reverse ; but this is 
not the case. For pleasure actually 
generates nothing. 

The reasons here urged against plea- 
sure being a generation, are somewhat 
different from those in the Seventh 
Book. See p. 296, 1. 

6. yin*U — fAgi] See Plato's 
Philebus, p. 55. 

7. r«» /At Xvrnv tvhmt] This also 
is another argument, by which it was 
attempted to be proved that pleasure 
is not a good. (See also p. 307.) 

All pleasure is a repletion (mmvXn- 
(***), all repletion is a generation, all 
generation is imperfect, therefore plea- 
sure is imperfect, and consequently not 
a good. That pleasure is a repletion, 
was proved from consideration of its 
opposite, pain. If pain is a deficiency 
{Mum), then its opposite, pleasure, is 
a repletion. That pain then is a de- 
ficiency, is clear from these considera- 
tions : if whilst we feel hunger and 
thirst we feel pain, then hunger and 
thirst are pains ; but hunger and thirst 
are deficiencies of the natural habits. 
For the body when it is in want of its 
proper moist or dry elements, is dis- 
turbed from its natural constitution, and 
feels in consequence a pain and craving 



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408 



ARISTOTELIS 



avaTr\r]p(o<TLV. ravra 8e aco/MTUcd iari ra iraBtf. 
el 8r) iaTL rod Kara <f>v<rtv avaTrXrjpcoo'is f) rjSovrj, 
kv $ di>a7r\r/p<o<TL¥, tovt av kcu rjSotro' to crcofia 
apa* ov SoKel 8e' oufi* eoriv apa ava7rXrjp(DO'L$ 
7) rj&ovr)) aXXa ycvo/JLevr/9 fiev avoarXrfpt&aeeo^ fjSoir 5 

(The original T& 9 KCU T€flVOfl€VO$ XvTTOLTO. *H 5<>£a 8 

notioni). aVTT) 8oK€l y€y€VrjadoU €K T(OV 7T€/H TT)V TpOtfffjV 

Xwr&v kcu rjSov&v* ivSeel? yap ycvofievow kcu 
irpoXvTrqOivras rjSea-dou rfj avaTrXrjpdxrei. tovto 
8 9 ov irepi iraxras avfifiaivei ray rjSovas' oXvttolIO 
yap elaiv at re fia$7jfiariKal kol t<ov Kara ras 
alo-Orjcret? at 8ia Tr}? 6cr(f)pr}<T€a)s, kcu aKpodfiara 
8e kcu opafiara 7raXAa Kal fivrj/icu Kal cXttlScs. 
twos oiv ahrat yev&eis eaovrai; ovSevb? yap 
evSeca yeyeinjraL, o5 ylvoir av ava7rXripcoo'i9. 15 

That plea- Upo? 8e T0V9 7rpO<j)€pOPTas TOf 67T0V€l81oT0VS tG)V 



sure is nei- 



to have those wants supplied, and in the 
supplying of them receives pleasure. 
Therefore pain is a natural deficiency, 
and pleasure is a natural repletion. 

To this Aristotle replies ; that if this 
be true, then this deficiency and reple- 
tion are certain affections of the body, 
and consequently, if pain and pleasure 
consist in them, then in whatever they 
take place, that must feel pleasure ; 
consequently the body only would feel 
pleasure. But this is not the case. 
For were it so, then every body (*ZpM, 
corpus) would be sensible of pleasure, 
which is absurd. For the body truly 
is delighted with repletion, but not with 
respect to itself, but with regard to the 
sensitive and nutritive part of the soul. 
Since therefore the body, as a corpo- 
real substance, does not receive plea- 
sure from repletion, it is plain that 
pleasure is not a repletion. 



That we feel pain from hunger, 
arises from the energies of the nutritive 
part of the soul being impeded, and we 
consequently feel pleasure when that 
impediment is removed, and this class 
of energies resume their free and un- 
obstructed exercise. 

1 1. ml «i prntn/tmrtumi] According to 
Plato's own acknowledgment. See 
the Philebus, p. 52. r»vrtt *p*4Z- 
fiut rkg «?{2 rk fuJ^utvm ifotm'f, i# i{* 
hxwlrif nput mZrm viiMf ft\> p* 1%u» 
r§5 pmrfdntr. pnVt lik /MJnp&Tv* sn/nr* 
ukynVvat i£ £?%*» ytyuphui. IIP A. 
iXX* «fr» gwfc»s7. SQ. ci'ift fuJn- 

%tk rnt *Mnt ylyvvfreu, mui^Sg ntk* 
in airmjf AXynMms \ nPXl. ufrt $**u 
yi.— XXI. Tuvrtu rwtn rkg rSt pmim- 
f»Av*t $&•*$ a/M»r»vi n iTmki Xvr«f 
ftiritt. See also Repub. p. 584. 
16. *& ft rtuf] This argument, 



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ETHICORUM LIB. X. 2. 



409 



rjSov&v Xeyoi tls av on ovk icrri ravff r)84a m oiJtheren. 

\ 9 ~ * / '*/•/>/ tirely evil, 

yap €t T019 KOK0D9 0lOK€lfJL€V0l9 Tjbta €OTLV 9 OIT/TCOP nor entirely 

aura kou 7j8ea elvai TrXrjv tovtois, Kadairtp ov8l 



though generally supposed to be di- 
rected merely against the Platonists, 
applies equally to those who said 
pleasure is a chief good, as to those 
who denied that it was a good at 
all ; between whom Aristotle takes the 
middle course, in conformity with his 
observation at p. 29. 10. of this treatise. 

Both are wrong in considering plea- 
sure as contained under one species. 
Thus when the Platonist argued ; as 
are the things which cause delight, so 
are the pleasures derived from them ; 
but many of those things which cause 
delight are disgraceful, consequently 
so are the pleasures derived from 
them ; it does not follow from this 
argument, that pleasure is not a good, 
but that there are various species of 
pleasures, as there are of the things 
from which they are derived, and con* 
sequently as there may be virtuous and 
vicious pleasures, it follows that pleasure 
is not entirely (that is, throughout all 
its species) a good, nor entirely an evil. 
This however is not the answer which 
Aristotle here makes to this argument of 
Plato. But he observes, that to judge 
correctly of pleasure, we are not to 
form our notions of it from what is 
pleasant to the vicious, any more than 
we should form our notions of what 
is healthy from what appears so to 
the diseased. If therefore, to those 
whose moral constitution is depraved, 
that which is vicious appears pleasant, 
we are not to conclude absolutely, 
therefore, that pleasures are vicious: 
but rather to judge from those things 
which are pleasant to the good and the 
virtuous. (See the following chapters.) 

2dly. Because some pleasures are 



said to be disgraceful, this is not to be 
so understood of pleasures absolutely 
and in themselves, but only accident- 
ally, inasmuch as they are derived 
from actions or things which are dis- 
graceful. For instance, the pleasure 
which is derived from the eating of 
food is not absolutely vicious, but ac- 
cidentally it is ; when for instance it 
is derived from excess, from immo- 
derate eating. Although the intem- 
perate therefore appears to derive 
pleasure from immoderate food, yet it 
is not real pleasure, nor should it be 
considered as such. And thus to use 
the instances before us, to desire and 
seek after riches is not dishonourable, 
though it is so to seek for them by 
committing treason: and to desire 
health is not dishonourable, though it 
would be so could it only be done by 
cannibalism. 

But if we are to follow the general 
opinion, and term those things plea- 
sures, whatsoever are pleasant to any 
one, then we must make a distinction, 
and say that pleasures differ in species. 
For the pleasures of the good, and 
those who live according to nature, 
differ specifically from those of the 
depraved and intemperate. For in 
what the virtuous differ from the 
vicious, so do the pleasures of the one 
from the other; otherwise the unjust 
might be delighted with exercising jus- 
tice, and the temperate with temper- 
ance. Otherwise the pleasure derived 
from the society of a flatterer and a 
friend would be the same, and equally 
virtuous or equally vicious. Which is 
absurd. Whence we infer that plea- 
sures differ in species. 



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410 



ARISTOTELIS 



ra T0I9 KOfurovaw vyutva if yXvxea rj irucpd, 
ovX ai Xevxa ra (fxuvopeva rots 6if>0aXfJuwriv: 

a. H ovra> XeyotT av 9 art at fiev rjoovcu cupcTcu 
€urtv, ov fxqy airo ye Tovrtov, coavrep kou to 
irXovretVy irpoSovri & ov, kou to vyiaiveiv, obb 

s.firjv otlovv tJHtyovri. H Tip etSei Siatpepovaiv 

ai rjSovat erepau yap ai airo t&v kolX&v tcov 
airo t&p aiaxp&v, kou ovk etmv rjo-Orjvou ttjv 
tov Sucouov fir/ ovra Slkcuov ovSe ttjv tov (xov- 
ctikov firf ovra puovaiKOV, 6/wuos Se kou iiri 7W10 
aXXa>v. epj^avl^eiv Se Sokci kou 6 <f>iXo?, crepo? 
<ov tov ko\olko9> ovk ovcrav ayafibv ttjv rjSovrjv 
ij Siatpopov? etSei' 6 puev yap irpos TayaObv bpx- 
Xelv 8oK€i, 6 Se irpbs r)8ovr)v y kou T<p /xev bveiSl- 
{erou> tov 8 etraxvovcriv »? irpos erepa bpuXovvra.\b 
Nor the OvSeis t ov eXoiTO tnv ircuSlov Sidvotav evan/ 

chief good* \ 

Sua fiiovy rjSo/ievos i(f> oh ra iratSla a>9 olov 
re fJuaXioTa, ovSe \aipeiv iroi&v ti tS>v ouoyioTcov, 
fiTfSejroTe fxeXXcov Ximrjdrjvou. 7rep\ iroXXa t€ 



5. umi ri bytmimt] Probably 
Aristotle had in view that remarkable 
discussion is the Repub. of Plato, 
p. 406. 

6. rf tfh* hmfipwv) Compare 

PlatO: fffafa flU QMfUt TO k»»XM- 

rrmintra ln$ywi % fitrfw h **) r#v 
**$t$nvir» atnrtf rtf vmtypvu*, #3i*6u 
V mu ««) rht inmrmfarru mm) ind/ru* 
3ig»v km) iXirfov fuerif, nhifiett t *Z 
hm) rit Qpfvtr* »brtf rtjf $pn7r **) 
r»6rtt9 rZt SilttZt \nmri^mt «*t &v ti$ 

fmitur* M*» f j Phileb. p. 11. 

16. »tti/f t At txur*] That not all 
pleasures are good, that pleasure is 
not the chief good, is evident from 



these considerations; that then any 
life of enjoyment would be good and 
desirable, even that of children. 2dly. 
That then we should do nothing bat 
with reference to pleasure. Whereas 
there are many things we now study 
and pursue with much toil and labour 
without any such view. And though 
it may be said that the practice and 
pursuit of such things necessarily car- 
ries pleasure along with it, yet this 
does not affect the argument : for we 
should still pursue them, though we 
were certain that we should derive no 
pleasure from them. This subject is 
more copiously discussed in chap. iv. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. X. 8. 



411 



awovSrjv irouqaalp&ff av kou ei firfSefuav iiri- 
(fxpoi rjSovrjv, olov 6pav y funjfioveveiv, eiSevax, 
ray dperas e\eiv. € * & 4£ avdyicqs hrovrau rov- 
rois rjSovou, ovSev Suxfrepei* eKoifieda yap av 
braxna kou ei fiy yivotr air avrebv rjSovrj. "On Conclusion. 

fiev odv ovre rdyadov rj jjSovrj ovtc iraura alp err), 
SijXov eoucev elvaiy kcu oti elal rives cuperal Kajff 
avrd? Sicufrepovaou rip etSet rj d(f> <ov. rd fiev 
oSv Xeyofitva irep\ rrj9 ^Sovijs kou Xvmjs LKavm 
10 AprjaOto. 



CHAP. HI. 

The definition of Pleasure investigated. 

3 TI 8 ecrrlv rj irolav ti, Kara<f>avearr€pov yevoir pleasure is 

* >>>~i N/> ~ *~n « > nota»i»n#!i#. 

av air apyrjs avaXapovaiv. ook€l yap r/ /i€P i. For time 



8. f) if* «J»] If pleasures differ not in 
species as to themselves, yet they differ 
in species accidentally, inasmuch as 
they are derived from things different 
in species. 

Chap. III. 
Having thus far examined the 
opinions of others touching pleasure, 
Aristotle now proceeds to explain his 
own, first investigating its essence («•/ 
Urft) in order to settle more scienti- 
fically the much disputed question 
respecting its quality (wtsit «), and to 
determine whether it should be con- 
sidered the chief good, or sometimes 
good and sometimes or entirely evil. 
r$7$ (tit ovv h*u ellin'ux, $4fh iTnw 
Aytdov, tun s«f *vri *8rt **rk rvp- 



hhtnf rtit V huu pit i7mm, ml 3) <r«X- 
km) Q*v*ms. In ft r»vrm rprtf, 1/ **) 

t6 fyrr$f t)W». p. 295, 11. 

In this chapter, therefore, he pro- 
ceeds to its definition by farther nar- 
rowing the field of investigation, and 
showing by a comparison between the 
essentials of motion and pleasure, that 
they are specifically different, a mode 
of proceeding, which necessarily draws 
out certain qualities of pleasure, and 
lays down certain data by which we 
may more easily arrive at the dis- 
covery of the real nature, the defi- 
nition of pleasure. 

The reader cannot fail being struck 
with admiration at the exquisite man- 
ner in which Aristotle generally pro- 



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412 



ARISTOTELIS 



andoUce opaat? Kaff bvrwovv yjpovov TeXeia sxvai ov yap 
neti6c dif- ioTtv ivSer}? ovSevo?, b eis varepov yevopuevov 
withretpectreAeuBcrei avrrjs to elSo?. toiovtw 5* eoitce /ecu t\ 

but not with TjSoVTj* 0X0V yap Tt €OTl> KCU KO.T OvSePCL yfiOVOV 
pleasure. AafJoi TIS OV TjOOVrfV TjS €7Tl 7TA€UO yfiOVOV yiPO/MC'S 
VT)$ TC\€UD0T)GT€Tai TO €l8oS. 8l07T€p OvSe KIVT)(TIS 

ktmv* kv Xpovco yap iraxra Kivqai^ teal tcXovs 
twos, olov 17 olKoSofwcr/ rcAe/a, orav irouqcrri ov 
i<f>i€Tai. 7) iu airavrt 8rj Tip XP° U< P V T0 ^ T( p' 
2. The 'Ei> 8e toIs fiepecri tov ypovov iraxrai arcAe??, 10 

pertt of x „ „ & x , , f 

motion /Cat €T€pai TG> €LO€L TT)$ oXt)$ Kdl OAATjACOV T) 

specie*, yap tcov Aiacov avvu€cris €T€pa rqs tov klovos 
pa/38co<r€co$, teal avrai ttjs tov vaov woir/a-ccos. 



ceeds to the most difficult of all tasks, 
the investigation of the several defini- 
tions which are to be found in this 
book; and the similarity of method 
which may be traced in all of them, 
is an evident proof that he proceeded 
in this as in all other parts of his 
subject, upon fixed and scientific prin- 
ciples. 

See his own admirable dissertation 
upon this subject in Anal. Post ii. 12. 

1. 2£*rit—rtXilm rfwu] Vision or 
the act of seeing is perfect at each 
indivisible moment of time. The mo- 
ment we see, we see: nor does the 
act of sight require any thing for its 
perfection at a posterior moment, 
which it possessed not at the moment 
it was exercised. And as is vision 
such is pleasure. For pleasure does 
not consist of an aggregate of many 
other pleasures: nor does one pleasure 
succeed to the first, the first remaining, 
and a third to the second, and so on ; 
nor do the different parts succeed each 
other in different divisions of time, as 



in extension and duration. But plea- 
sure is perfect and complete at each 
moment of time ; wherefore it is not a 
motion, and for the same reason it is 
not a generation. Every motion also, 
and generation, require not only time 
for their completion, but the attain- 
ment of or extension to their end. In 
this resembling a line, consisting of a 
point from which it is generated, a 
point in which it ends, and extension 
through the intermediate space; nei- 
ther is the line generated at any mo- 
ment, its generation and motion is not 
complete till it has reached its end; 
consequently generation and motion 
are not perfect in any time, but only in 
perfect time. Ano rix^v *«} *it«v *& 
X(* 9 * v Mf»r»9 xitnrtt iTnm. Pbys. Aus. 
iii. 1. Whereas neither of the latter are 
required for pleasure. 

For the whole argument of this 
chapter, consult particularly Phys. 
A use. vi. Book. 

13. }m&»rt*(] Levelling or erecting 
the column. Or, more correctly, mea- 



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ETHICORUM LIB. X. 8. 41S 

Kal 7) filv tov vaov TcXcta* ovScpos yap kvSerj? 
7rpo9 to irpoKetfievov* rj 8e T7J9 KprpriSo? KCU 
tov rpiyXv(f>ov areXifc* fikpovs yap e/carepa. t$ 
etSei oiv Sta^kpovai, Kal ovk eoriv kv brtoovv 
b\povcp Xafieiv Kiirqaiv reXeiav Tip elSei, aXX' evirep, 
kv Tcp airavTi. 'OynotW Se Kal knl (3a8icr€<0? kou,3. piace 

~v ~ . > / » < j. * ' '/i constitutes 

TODV A017TCDV €L yap €OTlV Tf (pOpa KUnjCrif 7TOU€P specific dif- 

iroi, Kal Tavrr/9 8ia<f>opal #car eiSt], 7rTr}<ri9 jSa&o-^motUm/not 
aXcrw Kal to, TOtavTa. ov puovov 8 ovrcos, aXXa mpeMttre " 
\0 Kal kv avrr} tt} /3a8l<r€i' to yap irodev wot ov 
toutov kv t$ oraSiep Kal kv t<£ p-kpei, Kal kv 
kripto fiepei Kal £T€pcp, ov8e to 8ie£ikvai rrjv 
ypafifirjv Tr/vSe KOKeivrjv' ov fiovov yap ypafiftr/v 
8ia7rop€V€Tat, aXXa Kal kv tottco odaav, kv krkptp 

15 8 aVTT) €K€LV7)?. At OLKplfielaS fl€V OVV irepl Recapitu- 

/ » v x N * v & » » # lation. 

Kivrjo-€<0f ev aXXois eipTjTai, eoiK€ ovk ev airavri 
ypovtp TeXeia elvat, aXX* ai woXXal areXets Kal 
8ca(j)€povaat T<p etSei, 6?tt€/> to iroOev irol elfio- 
itolov. T7]9 r)8ovrj$ 8 kv oTtpovv Yjpovcp reXeiov 
20 to el8o9. SrjXov ofiv m frepal r av elev aXXrjXcov, 
Kal t&v oXcov ti Kal reXeiW 17 f/Sovrj. 86£et€ & 
av tovto Kal eVc tov firf kv8k\ea0€U Kiveladai fir/ 



swing it by a wand to discover whe- ph $Zt u*r* rivet, $«{<£' h ft *mrk 

ther it is perpendicular. Such is the r«i», «X&«/*w h ft nrnrk ri *•*•*, 

opinion of the Greek Scholiast, from •Sfyws ««) p#*W 

which Camerarius departs not only 16. \t SXkit] See Phys. Ausc. 

without any authority, but also with vi— viii. Books, 

considerable prejudice to the sense. 17. r«XXmi] Except circular motions, 

He translates it, the fluting of the which are always perfect. See De 

column. Caelo, c. 4. According to Eustratius. 

7. 4 fqd] Compare Phys. vii. 3. 21. Wfm T &§] All motion is exten- 

I«rd ft r^uf tiff) xstfrus, 9 n xmrm sion, and is therefore divisible, but 

Ttop, «*) xmrk **th, *«) xarm re pleasure is not divisible, therefore 

mffip, atmyxn mm) rk ntfvfUfm. r^tm. Si pleasure is not motion. 



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414 



ARISTOTELIS 



ep xpovcp, rjUkaOcu 8e' tq yap kv t<cd vvv oKov 
tL etc tovtoov 8e SrjXov kcu oti ov koX&s Xeyovtrt 
KiirrjCTtv T) yeveaiv etvcu 7i\v r/SovrfV. ov yap 
warmp ravra Xeyercu, aXXa tg>v p,epurr£>v kqu 
p.rj oXcov* ov8e yap opaacm lari y&tais ov8e& 
amy/i^s ov8e puovados, ov8t rovrtov ovOkv Kivrfcris 
ov5e y€V€<ri$' ovSt) 8rj ri8ovrjs % oXov yap ti. 

But since Aicr0TfC€O99 8e 7rdoi]9 TTpOS TO CUtrdrfTOV €!/€/>- 



1. Ttf f5f] hTTtS S*T* T09 W9, r*v 

ftXt it *(X** **) wi^mrt rtu xt' 94V > J 
ktm\§yu rj *r*yp§ rf It rp y (**/*$, 
rtiS ft *mrm vh InerUrm XV ftf **y/- 
fitfv, 1$ mtrihn^nnti «•{•» rn «*«£«&«• 
Xmiirm jm) ret i*fXJ.w«, ri ftlt m 
iy&t mmi ri{** J mm) Afaugifw Ut< 
»«f «£r) ma) *{*rm »w Xfyi#frW $<itj. 
Simplicius in Arirt. Phys. Aus. vi. 3. 

— rf iSt &#» r/] See Phys. A us. 
vi.3, 

5. yinei%—enypmt\ Compare Phys. 
A use. vi. 10, 4. Xn ft nmi i* r*fft 
fmn^t In $Sr% ertyftnt •St* iXX* 
mlmSprtt ««ftt M%trm xmiirfrVu.— 7ri 
t, i/ ttwmt h Xt n V ******** l» ft r y ** f 
fmfit, m*w*s ft xt* 9 ** i***^trit t tin *"' 
ng XV*** \lMTrm irf&vt rSt *st§»- 
ftkun If f unurm Set e&eir nle»t ph 
ym{ teem i xt* 90 * *' f **turm, it* r$ 
rmt It x( tf f **n**1**' XV** 31 «£f 
imt^trU iQu*em #g/ri{«f . u in &£*. n 
ertypn Mtturtu, terms nt Xt'*** l****"- 
r§n I? f *vn\ ixn&w* mXk* Mfartt. 

8. *lffir#t»t ft wmnif] XV< t™ r$ ** 
?F r*f)f#/MV, rit in ftnUrpw yptyw* 
mm) tin A* i Xiyu ItnA/ut rutum. SjX*? 
in I* r*t tlfnfiiwt in **** *ar 
lA^yumt mlfinru mnfMrMrrts iN^- 
yfoy fftni^toxrai ng #*t*. jmm in) 
xmf \nm*ny» f*ipt XV f *° **) **t 
ls«#Mf nh h *{*rif hn mm) rtXum 1m, 
i/tuUtg ft **) * nittn, MirJi rp'mp n»« 



Urn h Mtr' Ifityytmr ml*4n**t nj «vr 
«yrj fat*. **) evx Sperm »vrm» tj ft 
&X"{"' T "t *vi*$*in* *vrn t ftfJUt <5f U 
ri#*4« aUMewt *pt ri •Ututt mUinrn 
\ttpy0Vfns lent $l*tim ni*tn. Schol. 

8. miefifeutf ft *a*nt] Adhuc 
docnit voluptatem non esse motam sed 
perfectionem : nunc docet quae volun- 
tas sit et perfectissima sen plenissima et 
unde haec perfectio manet et oriatur. 
Qua recognita continuo intelligetur 
vera vis et Datura voluptatis. (Aris- 
toteles rem aliquam volens definire, 
primum causam querit, inventa causa 
forma cognoscitur, statim forma cog- 
nita res ipsa). Qui locus quia et ver- 
borum interjectionibus et iterationibus 
est obscurior, et vim omnem fere et 
naturam voluptatis complectitur, eum 
paulo altius repetito principio, sic ex- 
plicemus. 

Notum est ex prioribus voluptatem 
quicquid tandem sit ; esse in animo non 
in corpora; (vii,14.x.2.) Animiautem 
partes tres esse, altricem, sentientem 
et intelligentem, notum est ex Physicis. 
Jain vera in altrice nulla est voluntas 
(see p. 407, 7. and note.) quia nulla 
actio, cujus perpetua comes est vo- 
luptas. Reliquum est igitur, ut in his 
tantum duobus anjmi partibus, sen- 
tiente et intelligente collocetur: atque 
ita omnis voluptas vel est in sensu vel 
in mente. Hoc uno jam pramunito 



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ETHICORUM LIB. X. 3. 



415 



yovarjs, rcAct®? Se ttj? ei Stcuceifievrjs irpbs to tends the 

/ xx « x x y >, . ~ x exercise of 

KdXXlOTOV T(OV U7TO TTjV aUTUl)<TlV TOLOVTOP yap every 

fJUCLAlOT €UHU OOK€L J) T€A€ia €V€py€L(l (OLVTTJP the most 

£e Xeyety ivepyuv, rj eV 9 got/, /irjdep 8ca(f)€p€TCo)' pleasure 

_ >i> * fc* o \ ' » \ e » / ^willbede- 

5#ca0 eKaarrov oc peXTiarq eoriv r) evepyeia tov rived from 

v ^ / \ \ / a f 1) the most 

apiarra oicucu/icvov irpos to KparioTOV raw v0 perfect 
avrqv. avrrj av TeXetOTarr/ evq kou rjOLO-rrf 
Kara iraxrav yap attrOrjaiv eartv r/Soprj, bfioixos 
fie kou hiavoiav kol Oe&piav, ySlorr) & 17 rcAcio- 
10 TaT7) 9 TeXetOTarrj & 17 tov ei e\opro9 irpos to 

OWOvSaiOTaTOV T&V V(j) aVTTjV. TeXeiOl 5c T7fP Pleasure 

»/ « «» / »x » \ *> / <*then per- 

cvcpyeiav 77 rjoovr). ov tov avTov oe Tpowov ^fects the 

energy, but 
in a differ- 



et alterum est cognoscendum, nimirum 
ad hujus utriusque animi partis per- 
fectioneni duo esse necessaria, ipsam 
animi facultatem sive sensum sive 
mentem, et rem denique facultati 
utrique subjectam ; ha»c, inquam, duo 
hie spectari debent, facultas et res 
subjecta. Est et tertius ; utriusque 
facultatis suam esse voluptatem, non 
quo sit facultatis (nam actionis est 
comes voluptas) sed quia actio ex 
facilitate manat, cujus actionis propria 
est voluptas. Sensus igitur voluptates 
sunt kxp&pmrm aurium, oculorum 
spectacula &c. Mentis voluptates 
sunt in artibus et scientiis. 

His preemunitis nunc videamus de 
hoc loco. Docet igitur Aristoteles 
sensum et mentem perfici tribus rebus, 
facilitate ipsa, re subjecta et voluptate. 
Perfici id dicitur quod ita expletur ut 
ad summam naturam perductum nihil 
amplius desideret. His igitur tribus 
earum facultatum actiones expleri et 
perfici docet. GIPH. 

4. pnAt 3<«ff{ir»] See p. 309, 
22. and note. 

8. xmrm wmrmf yetf mtetnet*] See 



the Rhetoric i. 11. 

9. hdrtmt urn) /i*g/«? ] The exercise 
of the practical and scientific energies. 
For this use of the term }«£»««, see p. 
223, 10. But the Scholiast gives a dif- 
ferent, and what appears to be a better 
interpretation : tin T £? xiymt 3*«»/«> 
rn» Wtmpmxht ytZtftr, im^imp ft t*» 
t«i{*t %"*> ««) ItifyuMf. AkXstf yme 
Itt^ynru i rnt mfrlnri* atipih *<£r* xm) 
tit \mvrtt frfoQus xm) Itk rnt rsutvrfit 
Xtiffrptfnt r$7f ntivut Imvrit Uii^uemt, 
m) &Ul»r i Tl» 0Xf«r*f, xa) &XX*s i 
\x *pr&eutt *U IfTi^kf Wan**. &**% 
xm) itdQtps mi rtvrmt %i**a) mm) $u% mi 
mvra) totrms. xm) Urn A ulf tH{x £«} 
rtXutrdm xm) hVttrti. ml T &Wms rl~ 
Xutt xm) fiueu, flier cu Vt eii&mftSf. 

11. r»Xu04 Ji rhf Ui^yumi\ Pleasure 
perfects the energy. But pleasure per- 
fects the energy not in the same way as 
the object of sensation (ri mtrtmrn) and 
sense perfect the energy. Just as health 
and the physician are not in the same 
way the cause of health. See the same 
illustration above, p. 251. 2. 

If pleasure is consequent upon every 
exercise of mtrttwf, it will follow that 



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416 



ARISTOTELIS 



ent way 
from the 
faculty or 
object- 
matter. 



T€ r)$OVT) T€\€LOl KCU TO OUOrdr/TOl/ T€ KCU Tf 

aurOrfai?, awovSaia ovra, axrirep ovl? 17 iryieia 



the most perfect pleasure will attend 
the most perfect «fafaw, and conse- 
quently by discovering what is the 
most perfect aUinttf, we shall best 
discover the nature of pleasure. Now 
to perfect *Mn*n it is required that 
not only the organ which energizes, 
but also the object-matter upon which 
it energizes, should be perfect; and 
the more or less this is the case, the 
more or less will be the pleasure 
resulting from the energy. Conse- 
quently there will be infinite varieties 
of pleasure, depending not only upon 
the perfectness of the organ, but also 
of the object-matter, the exercise of 
the faculty being more or less free 
according to the perfection of its 
object-matter. For as Hooker beauti- 
fully expresses it : " Let Phidias have 
rude and obstinate stuff to carve, 
though his art do that it should, his 
work will lack that beauty, which 
otherwise in fitter matter it might have 
had. He that striketh an instrument 
with skill may cause notwithstanding 
a very unpleasant sound, if the string 
whereon he striketh chance to be un- 
capable of harmony." (Vol. i. 259. 
ed. Keble.) And he will from this 
imperfection in the energy, an imper- 
fection not arising from the faculty 
but the object-matter, either diminish 
or wholly destroy the pleasure result- 
ing from it. 

Imrat rutin rn irtfyi/a n ft#M} **} 
rtXuirnf rlt Urn mhrnf. rtkueT ft »u% 
•H Vfrt rtt lx*9rm ««•} r«v Itnipu tl f 
r$ ln^y$if Siyvf (see note p. 372, 2.) 
£rvi£ rh ftmytu elxAfaf * mjm)«^ms« 
rtXwT *m) It^ytif *«u »UMfU9 t jmi- 
U*i t «*ft £ jyuim mm) i imr^lt ifumt 
msrtd tlei r$» vyuumr * fAt y*t »M 
Witt ft) tZtm. rn* rw vymtnn Ifi^yumw, 



i ft rtnrn^ti um) QuXmrru **) Zr*< 
««t«pi/»9 £«rrt7. In ft §l& «Wi{ ri 
mirfnrh rtXwis rnt mUinvn, t, rtltm- 
ftnret r*t 3f«t>««t>, $2r* xotl v\ tilttn 
rtku*T rn* iA^yuat mhrSn h pit ym? 
T&t *«) r) £?r<xf//Eti»#» ««) r$u Itn&pu 
f/V r6 itt^yuf *t§*y§v*t rht in^ytiat, 
ii ft fihtn rjf Itifytif yttepity rup*t- 
QvxuTm ffutrnfu **) QvX&rw Tuiu 
y*( Iti^ytTt $ W ttlrif tjlw, xai fort 
cy Uqyt/f xMJawtf Wtyni/Hw riktg 9 
*W{ n *{a r$Ts It **py' xft? tvrtrtu 
it) xmfan, Xmt it J tin aMnns »«j h 
ImEmm, mm) «*ig2 r) aietnrh *u) )/«»««- 
r§9 In^yy, *m) pUiXsrr* frm* tZ suA 
tyrra %x***> «** «*«f* «■• St#wrw Inj- 
ySen. Paraph. 

18. nXii#r— r« ulettiret] The ob- 
ject of sensation perfects the energy or 
the ofafartf , (for it will amount to the 
same) by carrying out into act that 
which only virtually exists before. 
The energy can only be performed by 
the object-matter being presented to 
the sense. And as the energy is the 
perfection of the faculty (Iwmptt) for 
that is the end and object of all our 
faculties, they having been given to us 
that we should employ them, (as has 
been previously stated), therefore, the 
object of sense as causiogthe energy per- 
fects the «7rAf w . This then exists pre- 
viously to the sense and the energizer, 
and is extraneous to either of them. 
But not so pleasure ; it is neither ex- 
traneous from nor previous to the 
energy, but inseparably allied to and 
consequent upon it, by a simultaneous 
consequence. (See Hhet. i. 7.) Thus 
health and the physician are not in 
the same way the causes of a person 
being healthy. For the physician is 
extraneous, and as causing the health 
of the healthy person, is previous to 



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ETHICORUM LIB. X. 3. 417 

kcu 6 larpof ofJLolco? curia iart rod vyiaivcw. naff 
€KaoTtiu & aia0rf(riv ort yiverai r)8ovf), 8rfXov* 
(0a/46i/ yap opd/iara kcu aKOvafiara elvai r/Sea)' 
SrjXov 8e Kai otl /xaAiara, eVeifiaj/ rf re aur(h)<Ti$ 
517 Kparicrrrj kcu irpos toiovtov evepyjj. rotovrtov 
8 ovt&v rod re aiaOrfrov Kal rod ouaOavofievov, 
del eorcu rfbovr) inrap^ovros ye rod Trocr/o'ovTO^ 

KOU TOV 7T€iaOfJL€VOV. TeXcLOl 8e T7)V il/epyetav 1) In what 

e^ \ 9 t « rtf* » / »xx» « way plea- 

Tjoovrj ovx <w V €gif evvTrapxovara, aXX w sure per. 

„ ^ 9 // / N « * 9 / t tt facta the 

10 einyiyvop.evov ri reAof, oiov tol$ aKfiaioi? rj copa. energies. 
ens dv oiv to re pot/top rj aio'dr/Tov $ olop Set 

KCU TO KpLPOP 7} deCOpOVV, eOTai €P TT} ePepyeiCL 

7) rjSopr}' o/io [cop yap optcop kcu irpos aXXrjXa 
top avrov TpoiTov e\6pT(op rod re TcaQiynKov kou - 

16 TOV 1T0L7JTLK0V TOVTO 7T€(f)VK€ yiPecOcU. Tito? Why some 

odp ovSel? avvex&s rjSeTat; r) Kafipet; Trdvra continually 

» n x 9 n , 9* ~ ~ ^ pleated. 

yap Ta ap&pameia aovparet avpe\OD^ epepyetp. 
ov yiperai odp ovff r)8ovr)' eirerai yap Ttj eVep- 
yeia. epca 8e repmei Kaiva oma> vorrepop fie ov\ 
20ofioi(D$ Sea tovto* to fiep yap irptoTOv irapaKe- 
KXrjrac rj Sidvoia kcu fitarera/zeVcoy irep\ avrd 
epepyel, aorrep Kara njp oyjnp ol epLfSXeiroPTes, 
pjereireiTa 8 ov Toiavrrj i) epepyeia dXXa irapr)- 



the healthy person : whereas health is nor essentially and formally as tys 

not. lfw«^«5r«. 

But yet pleasure does not perfect 11. J#t lu] That is, by being 

the energy as a habit, as a formal and perfect. 

essential cause. For it arises from the 15. *•«?* §3i •Mi] Why then is U 

energy when it is already perfect, that we are not continually pleated ? It 

when its essence is already whole and it that men grow tired and to forego 

complete. Pleasure therefore does not energising, and consequently fail to 

perfect the energy, either materially as receive pleasure? For nothing human 

re Mlrtnrtt, nor efficiently as ofrfaw, can energize without intermission, 

e e 



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418 ARISTOTELIS 

Wkelher fuXrflUVTf' 8ib KCU ff TjdoVT) O/MOVpOVTCU. 'Ope- 

sirablefor ytaOcU &€ TT/9 rfioinjp Olt}0€tl) Tiff op carom-as, 
the revefie. OT€ *Oi TOt; £1^ OiraJTCff €<pi€VTGU If 0€ £©1/ 

ivipytvoL Tit cart, *a* etccurro? rrepi ravra kcu 

TOVTOi? ivepyei a kcu paXurr aycnra, olov 6 5 

/uv povatKos rg oucag irepl ra peXr), 6 Se <f>i\o- 

paBrp Tjj huwoia irtpi ra ffe&prjpara, ovrca 8e 

kcu r&v Xoiiraur €Kcurro9. i) S -qBovrj reXetoi ras 

ivepyeias, kcu to (jjv 8e, ov opeyovrcu. cvXoy&s 

oZv kcu rrjs TJSoiri}? €(f>UvTcu m TeXeiot yap €KaoTq>\0 

to £qv y cup€TOV ov. iroTtpov fie 8ia rt/u qSoirrjv 

to £qv cupovpeda r) Sea to £f}v rqv rjSoinjv, 

afeUrOeo €P ra irapovTt. ovve^EvyOou pev yap 

• Tavra (fxiiverai kcu \<opurpjbv ov Se)(€<r0cu' avev 

T€ yap ivepyeias* ov yiverai ySotnj, irdutrav re 15 

That plea- kvipytiav reXeioi -q rjdovfi. "OOw Sokovctl kcu 

in species tco etSei 8wtff)€p€iv m To. yap ere pa rep etSet v(f> 

they perfect €T€po*v oiopeOa TeXeiovadai. ovTco yap (f>aiv€TCU 

the energies *\* * \ \ « \ / « > ~ \ 

which dTf- kcu Ta (pvaiKa kcu Ta viro T€xwr)$ y oiov (fpa kcu 
species. SevSpa kcu ypctfprj kcu dyaXpaTa kcu otKia kcu 20. 
o-K€V09. bpo'uos Se kcu Ta? ivepyela? ray &a- 
(pepovaa? t$ ttSet viro SiacpepovToov etSet TeXetov- 
cOou. 8ca(f>€povat & at ttjs Siavoia? t£>v icara 
tols alaOrjo-eis kcu avrou aAXrjAcois KaT elSos' 



15. «£#*» — WtfyuKf] And conse- from their respective energies, for the 
quently happiness, and the life of the musician feels not the pleasure of the 
happy man : for which purpose this philosopher nor the philosopher of the 
digression appears to have been intra- musician, as such, it would seem that 
duced. the pleasures differ as the energies. 

16. Mu hxwri] Since the musician As well because the perfections of 
has a peculiar pleasure, and the phi- things different in species must tbem- 
losopher a peculiar pleasure, resulting selves differ in species. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. X. 3. 419 

teal CU TeXetOVCroU 8t/ T)8ovaL <S>aV€l7l & <W Because 

TOVTO KOI €K TOV <rVVCpK€L(O(r0(U TCDV 7)8ovS>V €/Ca- which flow 
~ » /a x ~ /> \ * from the 

arr/p ttj evepyeia rjv rcAeioi. avpav^et yap njv essence of 

i / * «>'/<*/. ~x^ \ * things es- 

tvepyeiav rj ouceia t/oopt) paXXov yap eKowrrasentiaiiy 
SKplvovai Kal e^aKpifiovaiv oi fieff rjSopr}? ivep- must them- 

9 v / « , selves be 

yovvres, oiov ye<ofi€TpiKOL ywovrai oi x aL P OVT€ $ easeniio toj 

x rf « x x different. 

r$> yeoofierpeu/, teat Karavoovmv e/caarra ftqrAAoi/, 
OfJLolcDS 8e KOU 01 <f>t\6fJLOVQ-OL Kal (f)iXocKoS6fioi 
teal 7W aXAcov eKaaroi €7ri8iS6aatp cfc to oIkciop 
10 tpyov \aipovT€9 ai/np. avvavj^ovai h\ ai r)8ovai 9 
ra 81 avpav^ovra oUeca. tois erepots 5e r<p 
€t8€t Kal ra oiic€ia erepa tcd eiSei. En 5e Because the 

~ N x *% > * * /* #» n > i> « / pleasure re- 

imAAov tovt av (paveir/ etc rov ray ap ertpcov suiting from 

€*%» 5k/ ~ » / 9.f\ one energy 

-qoovas tpfirooiovs rat? evepyciais eivai oi yap is not com- 

. „ i / x N » *, ~ ~\' ' » v patible with 

IbcpiXavXoi aovvarovai row Xoyoi? irpoa€\eiv y eav that result- 

/ »x ~ ~x x ' *x ing from an 

KaTOKOV(T(0<TLV avX0VVT09 9 fiaXXov \aipOVT€9 avXT)- opposite 
~ • » / . e \ \ » x energy; 

•ri/cjf ^y wapovarjs evepyetas r) Kara rr/p avXr/- 
tiktjp odv r)8ovr) ttjv irepl rov Xoyov kviprytiav 
<j>0€cp€i. 6/jlolcds 8e tovto kou iiri r&v aXXcov 

20 ovftfialvei, orav apta 7repl 8uo iuepyrj' r) yap 
r)8ixov ttjv irepav eiacpovei, Kav iroXv 8ia(f>epri 
Kara ttjp r)8ovr)v, puaXXov, (oare p.r)8 evepyeiv 
Kara ttjv erepav. 8ib \aipovTes otcoovv <r(f)o8pa 
ov iravv 8pco/xev erepov, kou aXXa iroiovp.ev aAAoty 

25rjp€pLa apeaKOfieyot, Kal kv rols Bear pots oi rpayr]- 
imTL&vreS) orav <j>avXoi oi aycovi^oftevoi acri, 



9. foWarif] See p. 77. The peculiar pleasure of one energy 

1 2. IrthpaXUf] Those things which increases that energy, the pleasure 
produce effects specifically different, resulting from a different energy, pro- 
are themselves specifically different, duces the opposite effect, by destroy- 
But pleasures produce such effects, ing the previous energy. 

E e 2 



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400 ARISTOTELIS 

Opposite TOT€ fJLoXiOT OVTO UpSnTlV. 'ETTel 5* 7J fl€V 

producing oiiceia 7)8ovr) i^axpifiol ras cvcpycia? kou ypovun- 

eflect at fft'TtpaS KOU jScArtOt/ff 7TOL€i, OU & aXXoTpiOU XvflCU- 

vovtcUj SfjXop w 7roXv SieoTGuriv* axeSov yap 
al aXkorpLOU tjSovcu irotovaiv onrep al oIk€iou& 
Xvttou* <f>deipovai yap ras evepyeta? ai ouceuu 
Avjrat, dlov et r<p to ypd<f)€iv ar/Ses kou hriXvirov 
7) to Xoyi&adou' 6 p&v yap ov ypa<j)€i, 6 8' ov 
Xoyifcrcu, Xvwrjpas ovarrjs ttJ9 evepyela*. ovp.- 
Baivei 8rj ire pi tw ivepyeias Tovvavrlov anro r<Si>10 
oitcelcop rj&ov&v T€ kou Xvttcov' olk€lou & clow 
oil eiri ttj evepytia Kajff avrrjv yivop&vai. al 8 
aXkoTpiai r/Soval elprfTCU ori irapanrXrjOLOV ti ttj 
Xwqj ttoiovoiv" <f>0€ipovoi yap, irXrjv ov\ bpLOuos. 
But since Aia<f>€povcrcov 8e T(ov lv*pyuS>v €7ri€iK€ta Kal 0ai>-15 

pleasures , x x f , J ^ 

differ as the XOTT/Tl, KOU TCOV fl€V OUptTCOV OVOCOV TG)V 0€ 

energies, „ ~ *> »* ' « ' v \ 

they roust (f>€VKT(OV T<DV 0V0€T€p(OV, OfJLOIXDS €\OVai KOLV 

alsodifferin « e * /. /* « ' \ > / , , 

virtue and at TjOOVat KOff €K0UTT7)V yap €V€py€iaV OlK€ld 

viciousness. e * / » f \ « ~ ^ , , , 

Conse- TjOovr) eoTiv. 7} /*«/ ovv Ty anrovoaia OlK€ia 
species! eirteucrjs, r) h\ Ttj (fravXr) fwx&ypa m kou yap ai20 
emdvfiiai t<ov fitv koX£>v iircuverai, tS>v 8 

5. ml tlxtTcu Xvrai] This passage desires are partly good and partly had, 
seems to be a fuller explanation of and that in reference to actions, (for 
the previous syllogism, particularly of desire is no farther blameable than as 
Hs major premise, that things which productive of vicious internal or ex- 
produce opposite effects, &c. ternal acts), much more are the plea- 

rl trxitit *e§e*uTai, Us mi timutu sures, because they are more closely 

Xtktat Ad mm) ratrvs $U) r£t infyuSt united with actions and energies, than are 

QJ*(Tixaf, ml 31 r>hva) turn iti. Schol. the desires, both in time and by na- 

14. »lx iuVivt] Nan similiter ad- ture. Desire is disunited in time from 

junxit philosophus, quia aliena volup- energy or action ;r desire being first, 

tas videtur minuere operationem, action subsequent. In nature, be- 

dolor vero impedire ne producatur. cause action is in itself perfect, as in- 

1 ACCIAJ. eluding an end within itself, desire 

20. *«> y*t ml Iwstvftiai] If the not. Whereas pleasure is closely 



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ETHICORUM LIB. X. 3. 421 

axayjptov y^e/cral. oIk€ tore pat 8e rah evepyeiais 
ai iv avrals rjSopai t&v 6p4^<ov* ai p&v yap 
Stcopiafievai eioi Kai rots xpovois kcu rfj <f)va€i y 
ai Se avvtyyvs rai$ evepyeiais, koi aSiopiaroi 

6OVT(0£ COOT %X eiV £/4$lO'l3rJT7lO'lV €1 TOVTOV kdTIV 

7] ivepyeia rrj r/8ovr}. ov pjjv eoiKe ye r) tjSoptj 
Siavoia €ivai ov8* aio-drjais' aroirov yap' dXXa 
8ia to fit) \copl^ea0ai <j>aiverai nai ravrov. 
GHrirep oiv ai ivlpytiai erepai, Kai ai Tj8ovaL 
10 Ata<f>ep€i 8e tj o\f/i9 a(f>rJ9 Kadapiorr/rij Ka\ olkotj As also in 

x v i / , ftx » i/ degrees of 

Kai oir(pprja'i? yevaecos ojaouos orj oiacpepovai^nty) at 

\ « cjv , N / , x > «, / dotheener- 

Kac at rjoovaiy Kai tovtcov at irepi ttjv oiavoiav y &**. 
Kal i/carepai dXXrjXcov. Aokci & eli/ai €KaoT<p As the en- 

w v «* * » / * ^v ,«\ ergiesalso 

£<pa> Kai rjoovrj ouceia, coairep Kai epyov 77 yap of different 

\ \ 3 / \ >*» r / ft\ /i « men and 

15 /cara ttjv evepyeiav. Kai €<p eKaor<p oe VecopovvTt other ani- 

~ » * 1 /. e/ \ ef «* n \malsaredif- 

tovt av (paveiTj erepa yap iwirov rjoomj Kai ferent, their 

\ \ > /% / /%/ tww / N ft pleasures 

KW09 Kai avvp&TTOV) Kavairep HpaKA€iT09 (prjaiv mU st also 

v f 9 * e N / /% ~ x N 4k t be different. 

ovov avpfiar av eAeauai fiaXAov tj ypvaov 
fj8iov yap ypvaov rpo(f>r) ovois. ai p.lv o$v t&v 
20 krip&v r<p eiSei 8ia<f>epov(riv eiSei, tols 8e tG>v 
avrwv a8ia<f>6povs evXoyov eivai. SiaXXarrovai 

allied to energy as not to be separa- 13. l«<foi{*j Axxtx**] And the plea- 
hie or distinct from it. So that we sure: of the intellect differ each from 
might almost imagine that pleasure one other. Wt) ya( ttrrbt I tm> • r% 
was an energy. Yet it is not ; for ttm^rtult »*) o *{**Tt*it, mm) ai r»v- 
surely pleasure is not an act of the «-«» fairi Imipipvri. Schol. 
understanding (2m»w«) nor of sense 14. « yA(] sc.foovn. 
(atonnt). 21. faXA4mnr<] See Plato's Phi- 
10. xafapimri] }ia$i{u ya( fytf lebus, p. 45. The observation here 
atyijff x*4x£i«Tt)ri t xetf foot 4 ft.lt rsv made by Aristotle is probably in- 
tfoouf *trt\*f*fiattr*t fiiuv, fi Ik &fii tended as a reply to the reasoning of 
rj uXfj ftaXXtv wptayu, xa) ii kxon Plato in the passage above quoted. 
rmvTy rtit IfQzfotm **) vns yii>fim In that dialogue Plato makes no es- 
&m$i£U, in rrjf uXnt &*T*rai fiakXtv. sential distinction between the pleasures 
Paraph. See also p. 279, 9. n. of the good or of the vicious, of the 



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422 



ARISTOTELIS 



In tbit 
variety of 
pleasures 
arising both 
from tbeir 
own and 
our natures 
we roust be 
guided by 
the good 
man. He 
is to deter- 



# ov fiiKpov €7rl yc t£>v avdpmrcov' ra yap avra 

TOV9 H*V T€p1T€L TOV9 $€ \V7T€1, KCU T019 flW 

Xirrrrfpa kou ficar/rd eari rot? 5c r)8sa Kat (frikrjTa. 
kcu €7Ti y\vK€€ov 8e tovto avfifiaivec' ov yap ra 
avra Sotcet r<p irvpirrovri teal r<p vyiaivovri) ovScb 
Oep/JLOV eli/at t£ aadevti kcu r<p €V€ktik$. ofioico? 

8e TOVTO KCU €(f) €T€p(DV (TV/JifiaiJ/ei. A0K€l 

& Iv airouri tols tolovtoi? elvai to fyaivop&vov 
T<p cnrovSalcp. el 8e tovto #caA(3? Xeyercu, KaOairep 

8oK€l, KOi €<TTtV eKOLCTTOV fl€Tp0V 7) dpfzTT) Kal 6 10 

ay ados, # toiovtos, koI r/Soval elev av cu.tovtcj) 
<f>acu6fi€vac kcu r)84a oh o$to? \aip€i. tol 8* 



healthy and diseased, a necessary con- 
sequence of his theory, as he consi- 
dered pleasure to be an »tavr\n{»*tt, 
and derived his notions primarily from 
too exclusive a view of our bodily de- 
sires. Thus, in investigating the nature 
of pleasure, instead of considering what 
is really and naturally pleasant in it- 
self, and which can only be discovered 
by examining what is pleasant to him 
who is a correct and competent judge 
of these things' in the natural and per- 
fect man, he draws his inferences from 
what is pleasant to the wicked and 
diseased ; a mode of reasoning wholly 
unphilosophical, and diametrically at 
variance with his practice on other 
occasions. (See p. 33. n.) Thus he 
argues ; $Xl. ovxtvt, ti xa) ra rnt 
tilotnt yiftt fltii Hwrnd «*«ri I%tt fur** 
f$4vKniuti(Ati, tim tit rat **X\e*T*f 
flhrat a*»&\t*TU9 t mXX* tit rat £*(«• 
rdras mat eQt&prdrat XiytfAtfa; ; 
nPXl. **t &v e<u ravrn tyyXPV** 
raw*. 2 XI. ££ tvt ai rpxupi yt, 
«ftri( xat pLyierat rS» fUevift, S kiyt/nw 
«*tXA«*if , at «*i£j ri *Sf*a llrh aurat ; 

npn. «£f ykt oSv xn. Wn^y «Zi 



xa) ftlfyvt tie) xa) ylywrai «*i^2 ro¥t 
xAftftrat It ratt rirus, n wtf) revs 
vytaifotrat 5 — if *v* ori »i •'v^irrwrtt 
xat U TMvrttt 9«rnfiafiP i%if*tw uStX- 
X«» ^vtytifi xa) ptytvri, xa) %*dvra o*ora 
3ja rod eJLpart ti*ta*s trar%tii, f**X- 
X*f r It&ti* %uyyiy wroi, xa) a.'ToTXn- 
pvfitft ftifyvg Ji)«f«f /r^#iW4f;— ri 
•vt \ tysts tit jam/prim *.iyvrt( , if 
%1 nt vat fttyirrat niotat ftttt fituXur; 
•vx %U vyiuat iXJL* tit firop Urrat 1u 
cxtrttt. 

7. hxtTYi* a**a*t] If these plea- 
sures differ in species, and some are 
good and some are bad, how are we to 
discover what are good pleasures, or 
rather what are true pleasures ? 

8. ri Qoififttw] And in all such 
things, that which appears to the good 
man, that is the truth and the reality. 
To him all such things exhibit them- 
selves in their true and native colors. 
To others not so, being viewed through 
a false and distorting medium. 

11. ai rsvrf QojtifiHfat] The ques- 
tion therefore which was left unde- 
cided, in iii. 4. here receives its real 
answer. 



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ETHICORUM LIB, X. 4. 428 

Tovrq* Svaxepfj et rep (jxiiverai rjSea, ovSev davpua- mine for us 

OTOV' 7ToXXai yap <j)0opCU KOU Xv/JLOU aJ>0p<07Ta>I/andwhatis 

yivovrai rjoea o ovk €<ttiv, aXXa tovtoi? kou 

ovtg) 8uiKeifievoi$. ras p&v ofiv 6fioXoyovfi€va>f 

Zalcrxp**'? SrjXou m ov (fxxrtov rjSovas elvou, irXrfv 

Tots 8l€(f)dap/JL€VOl$' T6DV & €7TC€LKCOP tiVCLl 80KOV- 

aa>v iroiav 17 riva (f>areoi/ rod avOpdmov etvcu ; 
r) 4k t£>v tvtpyeuov SrjXov ; tolvtcus yap hrovrai 
at rjboval. etr odv fila early etre wXeiov^ ai rod 
10 reXeiov teal fiaicapiov av8po$, ai ravras reXeiovaai 
rjBovcu KvpUos Xeyoivr av av6p<oirov rjSoval elvai, 
ai 8e Xoiirai bevrepcos kou 7^oAAoc^rc3s , , (Scmep 
ai evepyecai. 

CHAP. IV. 

CONCLUSION OF THE TREATISE. 
That Happiness is a perfect energy, eligible for its own sake. 

6 EIPHMENQN 8e tS>v irepi ray aperas re icaiThedefini- 
15<ptAia$ Kai rjoovas, aoiitop irept evoaifiovias tu7T9> pines* set 

Chap. IV. energies {bifytuu xmr A(*r»t i^W«i) 
Aristotle now proceeds to give a kind are happiness, as we have already 
of summary and application of the whole seen; our inquiry therefore now re- 
book. Having observed at the con- specting pleasure joins issue with that 
elusion of the last chapter that, how- respecting happiness, and become one 
ever multifarious pleasure might be, and the same thing. So that, conse- 
owing to the very different energies quently, when we shall have disco- 
from which it is derived, nevertheless vered the most perfect energies, that 
the greatest pleasure is to be derived is, the most perfect happiness, the 
from the most perfect energies of man same result will inform us what are 
as man, (which he has already shown the most perfect pleasures. 
to be happiness by the very manner Aristotle consequently in this chapter 
in which he arrived at his definition), directs our attention to the fact, that 
it remains that we should further con- pleasure is an energy ; which he also 
aider what are the most perfect ener- substantiates by further arguments, 
gies of man. But the most perfect 



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424 ARISTOTELIS 

forth in the SteXOetv, kirecSr) rcAoy ai)Trfv Tid€p.€V t&v dvOpco- 

fintbook / , „ x N , , 

(p.23.*q.)7ra/a>i/. avaAapovai or) ra 7rpo€ipr)p.eva crvvTopxo- 

resumed. * * « N / v & * » v 

That it is a T€pOS OV €17] O AoyO$. €l7T0p,€V OTl OVK €OTCV 

self-eligible ^o vN „ ^ ,. ^ y , t , 

energy. €£«* KCU yap Tip KaU€VOOVTL Ota piOV V7Tap-)(0C 

av, <f)VT(bv ftovrt fitov, kcu rep 8v<mrxpvvTi ret 5 
fieytarra. el 8rj ravra /it) apea/cei, dXXa paXkov 
els kvepyeidv Ttva dereov, KaJddirep kv toZs irpo- 
repov €ip7}Tcu, tg>v S kvepyet&v al piv euriv 
dvayKCucu kcu 8c erepa cuperal, al 8e Kaff aura?, 
SrjXov on ttjv €v8aifJL0viav t&v Kajff auras aipeTcav 10 
Tiva 0€T€Ov kcu ov tcov 8i oXAo' ovSevb? yap 
cVSe^s r) ev8cupovia aXX* avrdpiajf. Kajff auras 
S elariv alp€Tai> d(f> a>v px/Sev kinfflTelTCU irapa 
Bat not a TJjv kvepyetav. ToiavTai 5* ewai Sokovctlp al 

though this icar dpeTtjv w panels' To, yap Kaka kcu awov8oua\s 

seems to be, . ^* « x , . n ~ * ~ 

an energy TTpaTT€lV T(DV 01 ttVTa atp€TCOV. Kat T(OV ITaiOUOV 
ofsuchana-^ e e . „ , N ^ , „ , ^ t „ 

tnre. And 0€ at 7]0€iou ov yap ot €T€pa auras cupovvrcu 
fiXdwrovrai yap air avTcbv p.aXAov rj axfreXovvrai, 
dp.eXovvT€$ t&v acopAXTtov kcu tt)s KTr/aecos. Kara- 
(^evyovat & eVi tw TOiavTa? Stayayyas tcov 20 
€v8aipiovL^op.€V(ov ol iroXAoi, 810 irapa toIs tu- 
pavvois evSoKipovaiv ol kv tcus touxvtolls Siayay- 
ycus evrpdireXoC (ov yap k^ievrac, kv tovtois 
Trapexpvai <r(f>as aurov? TjSeis* 8eovrcu 8c rotW- 

TGDV. 8oK€L p.€V odv €v8cup.0VLKCL TOVTa €LVai 8 id 25 

to tow kv 8vvaxrT€Lai9 kv tovtois aTrooyoXd&iV) 
ovSev 8e tacos arj]p.€tov ol tolovtol clcrtv' ov yap 



3. i7r^*n] See p. 29. instramenta que fini alicui subjecta, 

9. itmyummi] Necessaria non sunt ad ilium finem ezsequendum sunt ne- 

hoc loco ea que per se necessaria sunt cessaria. MICH. 

et summe expetenda ; sed media et 



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ETHICORUM LIB. X. 3. 425 

€V TG> 8vva<TT€V€lV f) dp€T7) OV& 6 V0V9, d(f> G>P 

ou owovSaiou kvipyttaC ov& el ayevoroi ovtoi 

OVT€9 7)8oV7]$ eWtKplVOVS KOU e\€V0€plOV €7tI T(L$ 

acofiaTucas KaTafavyovaw, 8ta tovto tooths 
bohyrtov aipcTayrepa? swaC Kal yap ol noiSes to. 
Trap avTois Tifu&fieva KpaTiara oiovtol elvat. 
€v\oyov 8rj, axnrep iraioi Kal dv8pdaiv trspa 
tyaiverai Tifjua, ovtcd kou <f>av\oi$ kou kirisiKiaiv. 
KaOairep vbv iroKkaKis elprjTat, /cat Tifiia kou 
\Orj84a ioTTi tol Tcp awovSaicp TOiavTa ovra* e/caoT© 

8e f) KaTOL TTjV OLK€iaV €^LU alp^TCOTOLTTJ tv4py€ia 9 

kou T<p <nrov8aicj) 8e rj Kara ttjv dperqv. ovk ev 
TracSia apa r) evSat/iovia' kou yap Stottov to 
reAos eivai irai8idv^ kou irpaypjaTeveadat kou 

15 KaKOiraOtiv top fiiov wiravra tov iraifav ydpiv. 
airavTa yap a>? elireiv eTepov eveKa alpovfieda 
irXrjv ttjs evSai/xovtas' reAoy yap avrr/. owov- 
8afav 8e Kal irovelv irou8ui$ X*P lP V^^ L0V at '~ 
veTai Kal Xiav iraiSiKOv* irai&iv 5* owm owov- 

20 8d£rj, KaT % Avd^apaiv^ opOco? €X €Ll/ $ 0K€ i' dva- 
7rav(r€L yap eoiKev rj 7rat8id, dSvvaTovvres 8e 
avvex&s irovelv dvairavcrtm 8iovrai. ov 8r} reAoy 
17 avdiravais* yivvrai yap eveKa rqs ivepyelas. 
8ok€l 8* 6 €v8aifJL<ov /8/oy KaT dpeTrjv elvai* o5to$ 

25 8e p.€Td O7rov8f}s, aAA* ovk Iv waiSta. jQcXrao 
T€ Xeyo/jLtv tol oirov8aia t&v yeXoicov kou t<ov 
ixera Trai8ias y Kal tov /SeAriWoy del Kal fioplov 
kou dvOpamov airov8aiOTipav ttjv ivepyeiav* r] 
8c tov (SeXriovos Kpelrroov Kal evSoufiovtKayrepa 

19. *aliZu*\ Compare Plato's Philebus, p. 30. 

Digitized by LjOOQIC 



426 



ARISTOTELIS 



rjStj. airoXaxxreie r op t£>v acofiariKciu rj&oviav 
6 tvx&v kou av8pairo8ov ov\ rjrrov rod apLarov* 
cvSaifiovlas 8 9 ovSel? av8pairo8<p fi€Ta8t8od<ru/, 
€t fir) kcu filov' ov yap ev reus Ttavrats Siayt&yah 
r) €v8cufjL0i>la, aXX* kv reus /car aperrjv ivepyelcus,* 
KaOdirep kou irporepov eiprjTat. 



CHAP. V. 

That perfect energies being of two kinds, happiness is according to 
the best. — What that best is. 



That the EI S tOTLV 7} €v8cUflOVUl KOLT ap€T7/P €V€pyei(L 9 7 

energies ac- vx \ \ / . «/ *> * v 

cording to €VAOyOV KUTa T7)V KpOTLOT7)V CLVTTj OLV €17) TOV 
wh are the * / y «, \ ~ « v Vxx * & x 

most per- apiOTOV. €LT€ 07) VOVS TOVTO €LT€ aAAO Tl, O 07) 
feet, being ; 



3. £»*£««•£*] Compare the Poli- 
tics, iii. 5. (p. 86. ed. Goet.) *«) yk^ 
£v lovXttf 4mb) r£? &XX»9 ?«»f if wtXif 
wt t ettx tffrt, ii* ri ph furi%U9 tvlm- 
f*$viat pn& r§v %nt *ara *pmtpnt. 
Compare Plato's Gorg. p. 491. £. 

4. fiitu] Compare Mag. Moral, 
p. 10. in) #»» \trti n tfoaipnui riXtsn 
&y*fbt mm riXot, «Wi rtvrt its kmrtm- 
tut in xm) 1? rtXtif Irrw $v yk^ lereu 
if *msM, *b y*t hrri traTt iVhtdfjmt, 
iXX' it ££{/, •Sr§$ yrn^ riXuet. Some 
refer the words tl ph ««2 fiUu to **•»- 
imUtt or tVlmip&wt. But Aristotle uses 
the term 0/« simply and absolutely. 
As he observes in his Politics, the life 
of the master is not referred to his 
slave, but the slave to the master ; the 
slave lives in the master, not the master 
in the slave ; in the same way as the 
hand is referred to the man, not the 
man to his hand. If the hand be cut 
off or the man die, it is no longer a 



hand except equivocally. In the same 
way the slave lives in the master, and 
has no life independently as far as he 
is a slave j no energies therefore which 
can be called his own, consequently 
no happiness. See the introductory 
chapters to the first book of the Poli- 
tics upon this subject. See also the 
Pol. vti. 13. 



Chap. V. 

If the theoretical energies possess all 
the qualities which we attribute to 
happiness in the greatest degree, then 
they are the happiness of man. 

But they do possess these qualities 
(for they are K^arttrat, *9n%t*Tdrw t 
fflfrm, *vT(t£x***<*' t r**i i» *%•>£, «- 
Xuwfau) beyond all other energies, 
and consequently they are the happi- 
ness of man. Compare with this chap- 
ter i. 6. 



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ETHICORUM LIB. X. 5. 427 

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£X €lV 7r€ P C KaAGW k <U OtUOV, €LT€ 0€IOP OP KCU 

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KOI T&P yVGHTTCOV, 7T€Oi a 6 vow. En 8**9*x*- 

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tcop fiep yap Trpo? to Qqp dvayKaicov kcu cro(f)09 

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ou9 SiKaLOirpayrfO'eL kcu p&ff a>v 9 o/jlouqs 8e Kal 



7. %t**i9*n t» ya(\ t$vf is the life. But the former only accident- 
noblest of all our faculties ; its object- ally, the latter essentially, as far as 
matter is the most perfect of all matters their energies are concerned. The just 
upon which we can operate ; conse- and the liberal, and those whose ener- 
quently the energies of twt must be gies are of the moral nature, require 
most perfect -(see p. 414, 8), and con- external goods as organs by which they 
sequently the most pleasant of all our may energize ; and not only external 
energies. means, but persons upon whom and with 
15. nmittpimrt] See p. 421, 10. whom they may operate. Whereas the 
19. +(H t% £*» M*my*m4*i\ The wise contemplative energies require neither 
man and the just man both require the one nor the other, but are suffi- 
external goods and the necessaries of cient in themselves* 



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428 ARISTOTELIS 

6 aofypcop kcu 6 avSpetOf kcu t$>p oXXcop €kooto? 9 

6 8e aoif>o9 kcu ko0 ovtop wp Svpotcu Oecopeip, 

kcu oap ap aotjx&repos rf paXXov' fJeXrtov 8 

tows ovptpyov? €\C0P 9 aAA' opxo? avrapK€<rraT09. 

Sought for &ogai t op airn) fWPt) 8i avrrjp ayairaaOaCb 

«*•• ov8ei> yap air avrrjp yipercu irapa to Oecoprjcrcu, 

curb de tg>p irpOKT&p rj irXelop ^ eXarrop 7repi- 

it#x«xjj. iroiovfuOa irapa ttjp irpa^ip. Aotcei re rj 

evSaifioPia eV rr} a\oXg elpat* aoyoXov/jLeOa yap 

tpa <rxoXa(fi>fi€P 9 kcu iroXe/iov/up lp' eiprjprjv 10 

aya>fi€P. t$>p pip ovp irpaicnKtbp dperatp ev tols 

7T0XlTlK0l9 7) €P TOL9 TToXepUKOt? 7) €P€py€ia* CU 

Se 7T€p\ ravra itpajgzis Sokovclp ao~xpXoL elvcu, 
cu pip iroXepuKCu kcu TravreAcSy" ovSels yap alpei- 
rcu to iroXepLtip tov iroXtpeiv ev€tca> ovSe ira-lb 
pao-Kevdfiei iroXepap* 86£cu yap av irapreXm 

pUCU<f}OP09 T19 €LPai, €1 T0V9 <f)lXoV9 TToXefJLtOVS 

ttoloZtO) tpa p&xpu /cat (povoi ylypotpro. eari Sc 
Kot rj tov ttoXitikov 00^(0X09, Kal wap avro TO^ 

3. &iXn$t t Umt] This is said in merely for its own sake, or an energy 

reference to ix. 7. of the soul upon absolute and perfect 

7. Art ft rm wi*kt£i] The moral good, or as some have thought, whose 

energies are less perfect than the con- opinions were afterwards adopted by 

templative, since they are all exer- Epicurus and his followers, that hap- 

cised with a view to some end extra- piness consists in a life of ease and 

neons and ulterior to themselves. As freedom from trouble, all these, and 

courage for victory, temperance for especially the last, are only to be found 

tranquillity, and the like. Whereas in the life of contemplation. For the 

the contemplative energies are exer- political life, whether in war or peace, 

cised merely for the sake of contem- is continually occupied with troubles; 

plation. either in war with a view to a peace, 

9. iv rn *%#X$] Whatever qualities or in a peace with a view to the pre- 

have been attributed to happiness, are servation of peace, or in providing for 

only to be found perfectly in the con- war, or for increase of dominion, or, 

templative life. For whether it be in short, the hap